The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[LachenKrieg]

To start, I wanted to ask if its okay if I referred to you as Dick instead of having to spell your full name out each time we correspond with each other? If you have a problem with the abbreviated form of your name, then please don't hesitate to let me know.

My Dad was Dick, please don't call me that. I am Richard or Rich. But you have the better of us all; what should I call you? Laughing Boy?

Secondly, I am completely at a loss when it comes to TMP. To be transparent, after you mentioned this the first time several days ago, someone had the courtesy to fill me in. I now understand that you and this other person didn't see eye-to-eye, and that there was a lot of friction between you. I am completely removed from this situation, and yet you seem to be in the same boat as you were before. Has it ever occurred to you that you may have been part of the problem? I get how this could all look like a setup, but it isn't and you will just have to believe me. The truth is, I never heard the name TMP before you mentioned it, but based on the few exchanges you and I have shared, it kind of all makes sense to me now.

Of course I'm part of the problem. I'm old and crotchety and have high standards. Sue me.

I am not going to bother going over your post point for point. Unless you raise a valid argument against my WI, I will restate the WI here with support and leave it at that.

In this WI scenario, the Pz III is armed with the L/60 cannon before the start of Barbarossa so that a decision to abandon the Pz III as a battle tank can be made sooner than it was, and Pz III chassis production can be used to manufacture long barrelled StuG's starting anywhere between September - December 1941.

The following quote is from page 66 in Encyclopedia of German tanks of World War Two; Chamberlain, Doyale, Jentz (tech. Editor):

"History: Orders were given to get the 5cm KwK39 L/60 gun into a production series as quickly as possible which resulted in the Ausf J series being split between this gun and the 5cm KwK l/42. Originally, in August 1940, Hitler had ordered the L/60 gun, but the Ordnance Department did not implement the decision as the L/42 had recently been introduced and had proven successful. At his birthday demonstration in April 1941, Hitler saw the Ausf J still without the long gun and insisted on its fitting as soon as possible. Events in Russia two months later proved the need for a more powerful armament."

The following quote is from page 40 in Panzer III & its varients; Spielberger:

"When the Russian T-34 and KV tanks appeared at the start of the Russian campaign in 1941, the weakness of the German tank armament was quickly revealed to its fullest extent. This would not have been necessary if the Army Weapons Office had followed the instructions issued personally by Hitler in 1940 and installed the 50 mm KwK 39L/60 gun, which was already available at that time. In the Pz III, the 37mm KwK was actually replaced only by the 50mm KwK L/42, a decision that led to unfortunate results and caused serious disagreements between Hitler and the Army Weapons Office."

Curiously enough I know that. The disconnect appears to be between your imagination of what that could have possibly meant and what the reality was. The 5cm gun, as I pointed out a while ago, was a brand new caliber for the German armaments industry. Not only did Rheinmetall have to develop the gun, they then had to present it to the Heeres-Waffenamt for technical and service testing before production contract was completed. Then Rheinmetall had to retool a production line that was already going full bore producing the 3.7cm PaK/KwK for mass production of the new 5cm gun. Then there were always start-up issues with new production - the Germans referred to it as "Kinderkrankheiten". Then the completed new production had to be tested by the HWA to ensure they met specification and did not have faults. We know these were major issued because even though the 5cm PaK was approved, contracted for, and funded by spring 1939, it did not actually begin production until spring 1940 - in March all of four had been completed and accepted by the HWA.

Now add in the time for developing the gun mounting for the new PaK 38 so that it becomes the KwK 39 mounted in the Panzer III.

Assume all goes well and all those things that could and did delay the start of new production worked perfectly, if the starting point is Hitler's birthday directive of April 1940, there is still the problem of how many of the initially limited production gets allocated to KwK and how many to PaK. And how do you get around the very real stricture regarding limitations on the length of the tank barrel, which led to the KwK produced according to Hitler's order being an L42 gun rather than an L60 gun. Did Hitler literally order the L60 be used or did he order a 5cm gun be used? Regardless, the stricture was maintained and the result was production of the L42 KwK began sometime in June at low rate with the first completed tanks accepted in July.

So assume that Hitler did indeed order the L60, the designers accepted that and the HWA accepted the change on barrel length. With an assumed months delay you might expect as many as 750 Panzer III with KwK 39 accepted by 22 June 1941. Is that a critical mass? But haven't you been saying that the KwK 39 was useless frontally against the T-34/KV? Do we then circle back to the need for the 7.5cm KwK 40 and the use of an assault gun as a tank? How does that work?

Richard, thanks for your comments.

That was a great explanation, but the simple fact is the request for the long barrelled gun was delayed by a year. The WI is suggesting that long barrelled StuG's go into production 4 to 6 months earlier, which would have been feasible had the Ordnance Dept. acted accordingly.

And I do appreciate your attempt at projecting the effect of making StuG's earlier, but I think it is a little more complicated then that. No the effect of a more potent fighting force would not only affect the number of Pz III's. More enemy tank kills would mean those tanks would not be available in further fighting so it would potentially affect the German military as a whole (men and material). But even if we just go with the 1300 you projected, Yes that is significant. That would mean Germany could have retained 260 experienced tank crews. There is no way to bare the effects of this out in a simple calculation, but it goes without saying that the loss of experienced tank crews due to attrition was a significant factor in later stages of the war.

[Richard Anderson]

That was a great explanation, but the simple fact is the request for the long barrelled gun was delayed by a year. The WI is suggesting that long barrelled StuG's go into production 4 to 6 months earlier, which would have been feasible had the Ordnance Dept. acted accordingly.

Sorry but that is incorrect and now you appear to be conflating two different "long barrelled" guns. One is the 5cm PaK 38 L60/KwK L39 and the other is the 7.5cm Pak 40. Neither were delayed by a year.

And I do appreciate your attempt at projecting the effect of making StuG's earlier, but I think it is a little more complicated then that. No the effect of a more potent fighting force would not only affect the number of Pz III's. More enemy tank kills would mean those tanks would not be available in further fighting so it would potentially affect the German military as a whole (men and material). But even if we just go with the 1300 you projected, Yes that is significant. That would mean Germany could have retained 260 experienced tank crews. There is no way to bare the effects of this out in a simple calculation, but it goes without saying that the loss of experienced tank crews due to attrition was a significant factor in later stages of the war.

You are welcome but again we appear to be talking about two different "long barrelled" tanks and assault guns and yes it is much more complicated than that. And however did you ever manage to suss out the notion I "projected" 1300 anything from "With an assumed months delay you might expect as many as 750 Panzer III with KwK 39 accepted by 22 June 1941"? I fail to see how 750 is 1300 or how Panzer III with KwK 39 is StuG III with StuK 40? Oh, wait, sorry, I see we are now mixing up crew losses with Panzer and Sturmgeschütz production.

No, if you want more StuG III whatever the flavor of armament you first have to select which manufacturer will convert from Pz III production, since the cards aren't in it for finding another one reading and waiting to do so in the period from mid 1940 to mid 1941. Alkett completed its first StuG around June 1940 but also its first Panzer III c. August 1940 and continued to manufacture the Pz III at low rate until February 1941. I doubt they could expand much on the rate they were running - about 33 completed chassis per month (Pz III and StuG III), partly because they were also busy assembling turrets onto DB Fahrgestell, which apparently took up a fair amount of their workforce and floor space. You could decide to accept the loss of Panzer production entailed by converting another plant to StuG but the question is who and does it generate enough? Henschel is a problem since it is low-rate production stemming from too much work, DB is really occupied on building the Befehlspanzer, which were seen as critical for command and control, MIAG is also low-rate production and just started completing Pz III in June 1940 so a loss of a month - conservative - to retail means around 139 StuG for the loss of 153 Pz, and so on.

Germany just didn't have much unused capacity and you still haven't explained why the Panzerwaffe will role over and accept the replacement of Panzer with Sturmgeschütz without murmur when it was readily apparent to them that the Panzer was the arm of exploitation and victory while the Sturmgeschütz was an infantry support weapon.

So was the loss of "experienced tank crews due to attrition was a significant factor in later stages of the war"? I don't know of many instances - if any - where Panzers or Sturmgeschütz were nonoperational due to a lack of crew. Do you? Manpower was perpetually an issue with the Wehrmacht but I don't think the possible "savings" of 1,300 tank crew out of 829,836 battle casualties on the Ostfront in 1941 made much of a difference. Especially given that I doubt that much of that speculative figure might have resulted from losses in tank duels because they didn't have a big enough gun.

[Aida1]

Even taking into account the serious losses in men and material that resulted from the fatal error of dividing Germany’s forces in the south between Stalingrad and the push for the Caucasus, an improved fighting force would have likely helped to decrease losses at the expense of the opposing Russian units fighting there. But without considering what impact an improved fighting force would have had on German losses as it advanced toward the Volga, using just the number of available vehicles at the start of the Russian counter offensive gives Heeresgruppe B alone some 200 additional 7.5 cm guns, while Heeresgruppe A would have had an additional 66 (source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2).

These alterations would have not only augmented the firepower of Heeresgruppe B, but would have equally affected the German forces fighting capability in general. I propose these alterations could have significantly improved the ability of Heeresgruppe B to at least avoid encirclement of its 6th Army, while aiding German forces as a whole in their efforts to stabilize the quickly deteriorating Eastern Front.

What are your thoughts?

The ability to avoid encirclement was fundamentally inhibited by the bad fuel situation of 6 army and by the weakness of 48 pz corps . The lack of fuel and the weather slowed down the assembly and movement of the mobile divisions of 6 Army so no quick intervention was possible(Stalingrad M.Kehrig DVA 1974 pp 136-137). XIV Pz corps had only 0,1 VS Otto and 0,1 Diesel on 19.11(day report 6 Army 19.11.42 RH 20-6/792 p 462) Tanks with a different calibre of gun cannot change the mobility problems due to weather and lack of fuel..

[Peter89]

Why do you call me Peter-Peter-Peter all the time? It is not a big deal and I didn't comment on it for a few replies, but now it seems to be a pattern. This is a forum, where my name shouldn't matter, only my opinion should.

1. I never said that only the spare parts matter, although they were involved in 7/10 of the repair jobs. (Operational readiness does not entirely depend on repair.)
2. This WI is about the supposed effect of the better guns on certain tanks. I say it is not such a relevant factor that could determine the outcome of theatres of the size of the Eastern Front; logistics and organization can.

I said the Wehrmacht was a spent force by the spring of 1942, you said it wasn't. You told me to give you the numbers, I brought you first rate numbers from primary sources: the state of the divisions, the aircrafts, the tanks. I can give you the exact references, if you need them. The victories Germany scored in 1942 were the last spasms of a lost cause. The Soviets actually took the initiative as early as August. In the southern sector, they regrouped their forces and counterattacked in the autumn just as in the central and later on in the northern sector.

All right Peter fair enough, I appreciate the effort.
I don't think there is any value though in discussing Germany's capability at any given point in the war, because I don't believe you are being objective. Do you really believe that In the spring of 1942, Russian military leaders were sitting around a table telling each not to worry about the spat of recent losses because those are just the last spasms of a lost cause, or are you saying that because you know how the war ended?

I think in early 1942 the Soviets knew that the Germans screwed up their best chance, probably their only chance to beat them. They wanted to exploit their winter victories, but the Germans could stabilize, then during the summer, Soviet overextension, minor Axis help and German reinforcements gave them another possibility to try to go on the offensive. The Soviets couldn't be 100% sure in the spring, how much power the Germans had left, but they knew that Germany was engaged in a hopeless war against the British and declared war on the Americans; thus they knew if they could stall the last German attempt to win the war in the East in 1942, then they won. The only reason why the German invasion of 1942 looks so dramatic on maps was that logically, the Germans had to hit something critical, and the Soviets assumed that the Germans are going for Moscow, as Moscow was only 250 km from Rhzev. Baku was something like 1750 km from Kharkov. The Soviets knew that distance - even with limited resistance - will blunt the edge of the German forces. They'll burn fuel, their supplies will dwindle, their limited forces will be spread and the Soviets will have time to generate enough forces to counterattack.

But to the rest of your comment, the type of armored vehicle and the effectiveness of its weapon system is very much a part of/a primary factor of organization. I find it strange that you don't see that. The entire war was punctuated by both sides trying to get a leg up on their enemy. That meant more powerful battleships, faster fighter planes with more range, and yes... a more capable armored fighting force. This is not rocket science Peter.

Yes, it is not.

1. I never said that it has NO relevance, I explicitly stated the opposite. It has some relevance, but it is not a game-changer. Are you even reading my comments?
2. Tanks don't use tires.

A better tank is a better tank than a worse tank, no one is arguing with that. The question is what is the net difference of this WI?

Manpower that was required to develop, produce, equip and maintain the new guns on the tanks.

Do you know how much of the Wehrmacht's firepower came from Pz III and Pz IV tanks, and what would be the net change with their improved armament?

You still don't understand, do you?

Yes, a better gun is better.

But in any What Ifs you must name where do this extra resources come from?

There is a give and the take. You only talk about one side of the things. I keep reminding you of the cost side.

German tank damage output would increase with better guns on tanks.

What would the Germans sacrifice in order to get those better guns on their tanks?

Infantry equipment? Aircraft production? Submarines? AT guns?

First of all you are trying to imply that the WI would require a give and take, but this is simply not the case.

Yes it is.

WIs have to have a starting point, from where the alternative scenario unfolds. And then we have to examine how the different decisions will affect the course of the history we know it.

All the WI requires is that the Pz III chassis which was already made is used to make long barrelled StuG's. In other words, make long barreled StuG's instead of Pz III L/M's. So there is no give and take here. Instead of making a 5.0 cm gun with a turret, the WI calls for just making a 7.5 cm gun. In terms of cost, the StuG cost slightly less to make and that is before we consider the cost/time for all the refitting that had to be done to correct the poor decision of putting the short barrel 5.0 cm gun in the first place.

Ehm, well, for this to happen, you'll have to demonstrate that enough "long barreled" guns could be made in time, and that German industry had the capacity to produce StuGs instead of Pz IIIs. Also, you have to make a case for the better effectiveness of StuGs in all combat situations where Pz III L/Ms were concerned.

And this leads to your second assumption regarding manpower. There is no requirement/need for additional manpower. As I already said above, they were already making Pz III's when they should have been making StuG's.

I guess it was easier to make StuGs than Pz IIIs, so the difference might even benefit your scenario. But why don't you make an effort and bring us numbers? Unit costs, production hours, resource quotas...

In terms of the fire power, I already gave you an example from the forces Germany fielded in the summer offensive against Stalingrad, Less than 10% of the vehicles on hand could actually penetrate a T34's frontal armor. Had they made long barrelled StuG's instead of Pz III L's, they could have increased that number to well beyond 50%.

Yes, but that statistics is irrelevant on its own. I asked you, but I'm gonna ask you again: what percentage of tanks there were T-34, and how often did a frontal armor penetration by another AFV disabled a T34?

Moreover: of course I can answer it. If Germany does not attack the Soviet Union, never sets foot in Africa, they could drag on until May 1945 without improved tank armament. If I consider the high cost of tank developments and production, Germany could do much, much better.

Isn't that a little bit like saying, if Germany didn't go to war?

No.

And they were dealt with the results we know from history.

No they weren't dealt with Peter, this is the whole reason/purpose for the WI. Germany needed to improve the effectiveness of its fighting force in order to deal with the larger production capacity of Russia

Yes they were, with the results we know from history - do you actually read my comments?

If you want to make a case that long barreled StuGs... 1. were possible, 2. could have stabilized the Eastern Front in 1942, then please do address the most fundamental issues with this concept. Let's move on from the part where you explain it over and over again that a better gun penetrates more armor and leads to more disabled enemy tanks.

Again, tell me how most tanks were lost in combat. Was it tank vs tank fight?

I'm not sure if this is a loaded question, but if you are talking about combat then yes tanks lost in battle (other tanks/AT guns) would obviously be a big piece of the pie.

Could you please quantify it? Using some sources perhaps?

[LachenKrieg]

Sorry but that is incorrect and now you appear to be conflating two different "long barrelled" guns. One is the 5cm PaK 38 L60/KwK L39 and the other is the 7.5cm Pak 40. Neither were delayed by a year...

I would like to respond Richard, but I would first have to be able to understand the point your trying to make. In which way am I combining/confusing the two guns? I think it's reasonable to expect when you contribute to an online forum that you follow along. When I go back and read most of what you contributed here, you are either reciting a boat load of pointless facts, or you seem to be off on your own tangent instead of following the point of the thread. Please explain how I am confusing two different long barrel guns, and I will try to clear things up for you AGAIN in my response.

Thanks!

[Aida1]

So what could this WI scenario offer to the very desperate situation described above? Can it address the poor judgment German leadership took to split its forces in the South? No it can't. Can it address the logistical nightmare of resupplying units that came as a bonus with the poor judgment? No it can't. But what it does offer is a plausible path to increased firepower of German forces, and more specifically in this case the firepower of Heeresgurppe B, by replacing 266 5.0 cm L60 guns with 266 7.5 cm L48 cannons. And in doing so, abandoning the Pz III L60 earlier than it did might have also helped slow/reduce Germany's battlefield losses of men and material. The number 266 is a product of the decision to split its forces, so had Germany abandoned PzIII L60 production in favor of StuG L48 production, it is possible the number of available units would be higher than 266 when the Russian counter offensive begins.

But ignoring the fundamental fuel shortage which inhibits mobility. To deal with the russian counter offensive , the mobile divisions needed to be able to move fast enough in the first place. So your scenario does not really change things.

[LachenKrieg]

Even taking into account the serious losses in men and material that resulted from the fatal error of dividing Germany’s forces in the south between Stalingrad and the push for the Caucasus, an improved fighting force would have likely helped to decrease losses at the expense of the opposing Russian units fighting there. But without considering what impact an improved fighting force would have had on German losses as it advanced toward the Volga, using just the number of available vehicles at the start of the Russian counter offensive gives Heeresgruppe B alone some 200 additional 7.5 cm guns, while Heeresgruppe A would have had an additional 66 (source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2).

These alterations would have not only augmented the firepower of Heeresgruppe B, but would have equally affected the German forces fighting capability in general. I propose these alterations could have significantly improved the ability of Heeresgruppe B to at least avoid encirclement of its 6th Army, while aiding German forces as a whole in their efforts to stabilize the quickly deteriorating Eastern Front.

What are your thoughts?

The ability to avoid encirclement was fundamentally inhibited by the bad fuel situation of 6 army and by the weakness of 48 pz corps . The lack of fuel and the weather slowed down the assembly and movement of the mobile divisions of 6 Army so no quick intervention was possible(Stalingrad M.Kehrig DVA 1974 pp 136-137). XIV Pz corps had only 0,1 VS Otto and 0,1 Diesel on 19.11(day report 6 Army 19.11.42 RH 20-6/792 p 462) Tanks with a different calibre of gun cannot change the mobility problems due to weather and lack of fuel..

Well you wont get any argument from this end, unless of course your trying to claim that Germany was encircled from the start of the war in 1939, to its conclusion in 1945.

Yes Germany had a lot of logistical problems that were mostly linked to the extensive front line, and the vast distances they had to travel in their attempt to conquer. But weather and lack of fuel are just two reasons that an army might become encircled.

One way a more potent fighting force might have helped is to aid a quicker advance. Another way is that it helps to reduce the enemy's strength, thereby limiting its ability to encircle, or its ability to deliver the decisive blow needed to capitalize on the encirclement once its completed. A good example of this is seen in the Russian winter offensive in 1941/42. A number of German units were encircled during their retreat, but Russian forces for the most part were had been too weakened from their losses the previous summer/fall that they were unable to destroy the forces being encircled.

In the case of 6th Armee at Stalingrad, the more potent guns would have certainly been put to good use while trying to break contact with Russian, but German leadership would have also had to recognized the need to do so and given the order in good time.

[Aida1]

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

Later in the war Stugs were integrated in the pz div as an expedient to give them more armor but tanks and Stugs guns working together did not work out. The stug could certainly work as a tank hunter but within a tank division in an offensive or counter offensive role it did not work well.

[Aida1]

Even taking into account the serious losses in men and material that resulted from the fatal error of dividing Germany’s forces in the south between Stalingrad and the push for the Caucasus, an improved fighting force would have likely helped to decrease losses at the expense of the opposing Russian units fighting there. But without considering what impact an improved fighting force would have had on German losses as it advanced toward the Volga, using just the number of available vehicles at the start of the Russian counter offensive gives Heeresgruppe B alone some 200 additional 7.5 cm guns, while Heeresgruppe A would have had an additional 66 (source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2).

These alterations would have not only augmented the firepower of Heeresgruppe B, but would have equally affected the German forces fighting capability in general. I propose these alterations could have significantly improved the ability of Heeresgruppe B to at least avoid encirclement of its 6th Army, while aiding German forces as a whole in their efforts to stabilize the quickly deteriorating Eastern Front.

What are your thoughts?

The ability to avoid encirclement was fundamentally inhibited by the bad fuel situation of 6 army and by the weakness of 48 pz corps . The lack of fuel and the weather slowed down the assembly and movement of the mobile divisions of 6 Army so no quick intervention was possible(Stalingrad M.Kehrig DVA 1974 pp 136-137). XIV Pz corps had only 0,1 VS Otto and 0,1 Diesel on 19.11(day report 6 Army 19.11.42 RH 20-6/792 p 462) Tanks with a different calibre of gun cannot change the mobility problems due to weather and lack of fuel..

Well you wont get any argument from this end, unless of course your trying to claim that Germany was encircled from the start of the war in 1939, to its conclusion in 1945.

Yes Germany had a lot of logistical problems that were mostly linked to the extensive front line, and the vast distances they had to travel in their attempt to conquer. But weather and lack of fuel are just two reasons that an army might become encircled.

One way a more potent fighting force might have helped is to aid a quicker advance. Another way is that it helps to reduce the enemy's strength, thereby limiting its ability to encircle, or its ability to deliver the decisive blow needed to capitalize on the encirclement once its completed. A good example of this is seen in the Russian winter offensive in 1941/42. A number of German units were encircled during their retreat, but Russian forces for the most part were had been too weakened from their losses the previous summer/fall that they were unable to destroy the forces being encircled.

In the case of 6th Armee at Stalingrad, the more potent guns would have certainly been put to good use while trying to break contact with Russian, but German leadership would have also had to recognized the need to do so and given the order in good time.

6 Army had been suffering a serious lack of fuel for a long time .Which made moving its mobile divisions very difficult and slow. So a quick counterattack was not possible. Firepower is all very well but you need to be able to bring it to the enemy.

[LachenKrieg]

So what could this WI scenario offer to the very desperate situation described above? Can it address the poor judgment German leadership took to split its forces in the South? No it can't. Can it address the logistical nightmare of resupplying units that came as a bonus with the poor judgment? No it can't. But what it does offer is a plausible path to increased firepower of German forces, and more specifically in this case the firepower of Heeresgurppe B, by replacing 266 5.0 cm L60 guns with 266 7.5 cm L48 cannons. And in doing so, abandoning the Pz III L60 earlier than it did might have also helped slow/reduce Germany's battlefield losses of men and material. The number 266 is a product of the decision to split its forces, so had Germany abandoned PzIII L60 production in favor of StuG L48 production, it is possible the number of available units would be higher than 266 when the Russian counter offensive begins.

But ignoring the fundamental fuel shortage which inhibits mobility. To deal with the russian counter offensive , the mobile divisions needed to be able to move fast enough in the first place. So your scenario does not really change things.

No one is ignoring the fundamental fuel problem, but your scenario is ignoring the effects of a more potent fighting force. And yet again, the impression is your comments rely on what happened and not WHAT IF.

It was feasible for Germany to abandon turreted versions of the Pz III as a main battle tank much sooner than it did in favor of using those resources to make a much more capable weapons system. Your scenario completely ignores the effect that could have had. If Germany could have reached Stalingrad in 5 weeks instead of 9, this in itself could have helped lessen the fuel shortage. It might have also helped Germany reach its primary objective in 1942, which was to secure the natural resource needed to make fuel. So no, I'm not ignoring the fuel problem as much as you are introducing a scenario that ignores the point of the WI.

[LachenKrieg]

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

Later in the war Stugs were integrated in the pz div as an expedient to give them more armor but tanks and Stugs guns working together did not work out. The stug could certainly work as a tank hunter but within a tank division in an offensive or counter offensive role it did not work well.

Can you point out what you mean by StuG's and tanks didn't work out? And what would it possibly matter? So what happens if they deploy StuG's as either an attached Battalion, or as a Brigade. The relevant point is that it is a much more effective weapon system, and the net effect was they could destroy enemy armor much easier.

[LachenKrieg]

Even taking into account the serious losses in men and material that resulted from the fatal error of dividing Germany’s forces in the south between Stalingrad and the push for the Caucasus, an improved fighting force would have likely helped to decrease losses at the expense of the opposing Russian units fighting there. But without considering what impact an improved fighting force would have had on German losses as it advanced toward the Volga, using just the number of available vehicles at the start of the Russian counter offensive gives Heeresgruppe B alone some 200 additional 7.5 cm guns, while Heeresgruppe A would have had an additional 66 (source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2).

These alterations would have not only augmented the firepower of Heeresgruppe B, but would have equally affected the German forces fighting capability in general. I propose these alterations could have significantly improved the ability of Heeresgruppe B to at least avoid encirclement of its 6th Army, while aiding German forces as a whole in their efforts to stabilize the quickly deteriorating Eastern Front.

What are your thoughts?

The ability to avoid encirclement was fundamentally inhibited by the bad fuel situation of 6 army and by the weakness of 48 pz corps . The lack of fuel and the weather slowed down the assembly and movement of the mobile divisions of 6 Army so no quick intervention was possible(Stalingrad M.Kehrig DVA 1974 pp 136-137). XIV Pz corps had only 0,1 VS Otto and 0,1 Diesel on 19.11(day report 6 Army 19.11.42 RH 20-6/792 p 462) Tanks with a different calibre of gun cannot change the mobility problems due to weather and lack of fuel..

Well you wont get any argument from this end, unless of course your trying to claim that Germany was encircled from the start of the war in 1939, to its conclusion in 1945.

Yes Germany had a lot of logistical problems that were mostly linked to the extensive front line, and the vast distances they had to travel in their attempt to conquer. But weather and lack of fuel are just two reasons that an army might become encircled.

One way a more potent fighting force might have helped is to aid a quicker advance. Another way is that it helps to reduce the enemy's strength, thereby limiting its ability to encircle, or its ability to deliver the decisive blow needed to capitalize on the encirclement once its completed. A good example of this is seen in the Russian winter offensive in 1941/42. A number of German units were encircled during their retreat, but Russian forces for the most part were had been too weakened from their losses the previous summer/fall that they were unable to destroy the forces being encircled.

In the case of 6th Armee at Stalingrad, the more potent guns would have certainly been put to good use while trying to break contact with Russian, but German leadership would have also had to recognized the need to do so and given the order in good time.

6 Army had been suffering a serious lack of fuel for a long time .Which made moving its mobile divisions very difficult and slow. So a quick counterattack was not possible. Firepower is all very well but you need to be able to bring it to the enemy.

Your repeated yourself without answering the bold text, which was in answer to the issue you were raising.

[Richard Anderson]

Sorry but that is incorrect and now you appear to be conflating two different "long barrelled" guns. One is the 5cm PaK 38 L60/KwK L39 and the other is the 7.5cm Pak 40. Neither were delayed by a year...

I would like to respond Richard, but I would first have to be able to understand the point your trying to make. In which way am I combining/confusing the two guns? I think it's reasonable to expect when you contribute to an online forum that you follow along. When I go back and read most of what you contributed here, you are either reciting a boat load of pointless facts, or you seem to be off on your own tangent instead of following the point of the thread. Please explain how I am confusing two different long barrel guns, and I will try to clear things up for you AGAIN in my response.

Ah, we're back to you being annoyed by "pointless facts" again rather than understanding how they effect how you want to change history.

Why are you having a hard time understanding that in my response I was referring to the 5cm PaK 38/KwK 39 but you began going on about:

long barrelled guns" in Sturmgeschütz? As in "That was a great explanation, but the simple fact is the request for the long barrelled gun was delayed by a year. The WI is suggesting that long barrelled StuG's go into production 4 to 6 months earlier, which would have been feasible had the Ordnance Dept. acted accordingly.

You might successfully argue that the "long barrelled" 5cm gun was actually "delayed" but only if you can show that there was ever a clear intent to put such a gun that did not yet exist into the Panzer III. Spielberger is being disingenuous at best or is deliberately obscuring the reality at worst. No, the "50 mm KwK 39L/60 gun" was NOT "already available at that time" - NOT in April 1940 it wasn't. It did not exist then. It was not a thing. The PaK 38 did exist - all of 20 of them that had been accepted by the HWA. Pretending that somehow means that a Panzer III with a 5cm KwK 39 could have been in production is facile, especially when you look at the actual production record of the Panzer III, which was problematic in and of itself in every way.

There is even less evidence than that that the 7.5cm PaK/KwK 40 was delayed at all. If anything, its development and installation into an armored vehicle was done with incredible quickness as these things go but, not satisfied with that already remarkable history, you now want to make it "4 to 6 months earlier" still? Why? How? All I can see as an explanation from you as to how or why that works is hand wavium - you want it so in order to make your what if work, so it will be so.

However, the HWA did actually see a clear need for increased gun calibers before the war and ordered development of the 7.5cm PaK in 1938 - but the realities of government processes meant that the funding for that was in 1939 and two and a half years is about what could be expected for what was an entirely new and highly advanced gun - one of the reasons it was even possible to fit such a gun into the Panzer IV was its fortuitously highly compact and lightweight design.

Nor does any of that hand wavium resolve how and why the requirement of the Schnelltruppen for actual Panzer rather than Sturmgeschütz goes away or how a reduction in the total number of AFV available when the basic numbers required had yet to be met would improve things.

[Aida1]

Even taking into account the serious losses in men and material that resulted from the fatal error of dividing Germany’s forces in the south between Stalingrad and the push for the Caucasus, an improved fighting force would have likely helped to decrease losses at the expense of the opposing Russian units fighting there. But without considering what impact an improved fighting force would have had on German losses as it advanced toward the Volga, using just the number of available vehicles at the start of the Russian counter offensive gives Heeresgruppe B alone some 200 additional 7.5 cm guns, while Heeresgruppe A would have had an additional 66 (source: Jentz, Panzer Truppen Vol 2).

These alterations would have not only augmented the firepower of Heeresgruppe B, but would have equally affected the German forces fighting capability in general. I propose these alterations could have significantly improved the ability of Heeresgruppe B to at least avoid encirclement of its 6th Army, while aiding German forces as a whole in their efforts to stabilize the quickly deteriorating Eastern Front.

What are your thoughts?

The ability to avoid encirclement was fundamentally inhibited by the bad fuel situation of 6 army and by the weakness of 48 pz corps . The lack of fuel and the weather slowed down the assembly and movement of the mobile divisions of 6 Army so no quick intervention was possible(Stalingrad M.Kehrig DVA 1974 pp 136-137). XIV Pz corps had only 0,1 VS Otto and 0,1 Diesel on 19.11(day report 6 Army 19.11.42 RH 20-6/792 p 462) Tanks with a different calibre of gun cannot change the mobility problems due to weather and lack of fuel..

Well you wont get any argument from this end, unless of course your trying to claim that Germany was encircled from the start of the war in 1939, to its conclusion in 1945.

Yes Germany had a lot of logistical problems that were mostly linked to the extensive front line, and the vast distances they had to travel in their attempt to conquer. But weather and lack of fuel are just two reasons that an army might become encircled.

One way a more potent fighting force might have helped is to aid a quicker advance. Another way is that it helps to reduce the enemy's strength, thereby limiting its ability to encircle, or its ability to deliver the decisive blow needed to capitalize on the encirclement once its completed. A good example of this is seen in the Russian winter offensive in 1941/42. A number of German units were encircled during their retreat, but Russian forces for the most part were had been too weakened from their losses the previous summer/fall that they were unable to destroy the forces being encircled.

In the case of 6th Armee at Stalingrad, the more potent guns would have certainly been put to good use while trying to break contact with Russian, but German leadership would have also had to recognized the need to do so and given the order in good time.

6 Army had been suffering a serious lack of fuel for a long time .Which made moving its mobile divisions very difficult and slow. So a quick counterattack was not possible. Firepower is all very well but you need to be able to bring it to the enemy.

Your repeated yourself without answering the bold text, which was in answer to the issue you were raising.

You would have to explain how the russian forces used in the offensive would have been significantly attritted so the offensive would be far less successful. And that implies placing these more potent German forces you are talking about near enough to the russian ofensive forces. And there is the problem. Fuel was a major inhiting factor from the beginning of Fall Blau. Detailed logistical data of 6 Army show this major problem.
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[Aida1]

And yes, the StuG was initially designed for infantry support as an assault gun. But that was when it was equipped with the short barrel 7.5 cm gun. This WI scenario is not discussing the StuG's role as an assault gun, it is discussing the up-gunned version that was put in a tank hunter role. But I would like to see your reference to the StuG being unsuccessful. My understanding is that StuG crews chalked up more tank kills than Panzer crews did. Can you provide me with your reference, because I am really interested to see what it is.

Later in the war Stugs were integrated in the pz div as an expedient to give them more armor but tanks and Stugs guns working together did not work out. The stug could certainly work as a tank hunter but within a tank division in an offensive or counter offensive role it did not work well.

Can you point out what you mean by StuG's and tanks didn't work out? And what would it possibly matter? So what happens if they deploy StuG's as either an attached Battalion, or as a Brigade. The relevant point is that it is a much more effective weapon system, and the net effect was they could destroy enemy armor much easier.

" Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen 15.04.1943

Leaflet on the use of a Sturmgeschützabteilung within the Panzerregiment

1) Within some Panzer divisions it is necessary to equip a Panzerabteilung with Sturmgeschütze as an intermediary solution
2) The Panzerabteilung is equipped with 96 Sturmgeschütze
Organisation: staff 3 command tanks
staff company( recce and security platoon) 5 Sturmgeschütze
1. to 4. company kp troop 2 Sturmgeschütze each
1. to 4. platoon 5 Sturmgeschütze each
3) The Sturmgeschütze has the following advantages over a Panzer IV:
a) strong frontal armor( from april 1943 newly produced Panzer IV will have armor of the same stregth)
b) lower height and therefore a smaller target
Disadvantages are:
a) no commander cupola so lesser command and sighting ability(from december 1942 new Sturmgeschütze
have a command cupola)
b) no turret so no ability to fire in all directions
c) no machinegun that can fire in all directions. This affects the ability for close defense.
4) The performance and properties of the sturmgeschütze do not allow autonomous operations without panzer or panzergrenadiere
Its advantages make it into a tank hunter. This governs the use of the Pz Abteilung equipped with Sturmgeschütze with the Panzer regt and the Pz division.
5) Attack
a) the Sturmgeschütz Abt cannot fight like a Pz Abt autonomously within the enemy. Support and monitoring by Panzer or Panzer grenadiere will therefore always be necessary. Therefore the use in the last echelon for collaboration with the Pz grenadiere will be the rule
For this the instructions for collaboration with the infantry apply(H.Dv 200/2m AVA Die Sturmgeschütz batterie of 07.09.1942 besides the supplementary annexes)

b) Pz Abt equipped with with the Pz III and Panzer IV with thin frontal armor(50mm) can be reinforced by Sturmgeschütze comapnies or platoons for special missions(point, attack with limited objective)
The Sturmgeschütze then fight in the front

c) when meeting enemy tanks, the Sturmgescütze units are put to the front to free the other Pz Abt. for moving against flank and rear and so for the complete destruction of the enemy tanks.

d) as tank hunters the Sturmgeschütze are to be driven behind the open wings of the regt so that they can protect the flanks and support the regt when confronting enemy tanks

e) when the Pz grenadiere have to create the preconditions for the operation of the regt , for example in crossing a river, then the Sturmgeschütze can make their mission effectively easier by their fire

6) Defense
In the defense the sturmgeschütze units will, like the Pz Abt, be kept back and used for counter thrusts and counter attacks with the Pz Grenadiere .
Specifically, the Sturmgeschütze unit has the role of the tank hunter

7) Retreat
By an attack with limited objective, in collaboration with Panzer and Panzer grenadiere, the retreat from the enemy is made easier. The operation of the Sturmgeschütze units as tank hunters will be in the foreground.

Guderian"

Above are the instructions by Guderian for the use of Stug within the pzdiv. These were not always followed which lead to problems. Stugs could not operate as tanks. They were a good tank hunter and could have a role as such whitin a pz div. .