The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes. Moreover, the relationship between R&D, serial production, operational and strategic needs in Germany was strained at best, but usually nonexistent.

Indeed. I think a much more viable "what if" would be to suppose that the Nazi government did less to share the wealth with all and sundry industrialists (and of course high Party officials - I'm looking at you Hermann!) prewar. With respect to the production of AFVs I find it completely irrational that essentially every heavy industrial firm - Krupp, Daimler-Benz, Henschell, MIAG, MAN, Alkett, and FAMO - regardless of their actual capability were selected as final assembly plants for the Panzer III and IV, while so much of their plant was obviously jury-rigged.

For example, early on Krupp was the primary manufacturer of turrets for both the Panzer III and IV, the Panzer III of which were then shipped to other final assembliers for installation on chassis. It is unclear just when each of the Panzer III assembly plants gained the ability to assemble turrets in house. We thus have the spectacle of Panzer III Fahrgestell assembled at Daimler's Marienfelde-Berlin plant being hauled 35 kilometers to Alkett's Borsigwald-Berlin plant so that turret's shipped from Krupp's Grusonwerk, Magdeburg 150 kilometers to Alkett so the two bits can be stuck together. While that is the extreme case, even Henschell ended up hauling its assembled Panzer III Fahrgestell from its Wwek III at Mittelfeld-Kassel "across the street: to Wegmann's plant for final assembly with Wegmann-manufactured turrets, a process they continued with Tiger production.

While MAN was large enough to keep all assembly under one roof, MIAG at half its size was given orders of 140 Panzer III F and G, compared to 186 for MAN...and as far as I can tell no effort was spent of expanding the MIAG plant. Instead, VOMAG received a contract for its Panzerhalle in1941, which nearly tripled its assembly floor space and moved it under one roof - when it was completed two years later. And don't get me started on Nibelungen, which as far as I can tell served more to line Dicke Hermanns pockets than it did to build tanks.

Why task tiny FAMO with building tanks it didn't have the capacity for?

Overall, the decisions regarding the AFV assembly plants make little sense except to illustrate just how bankrupt the German industrial plant was.

On one hand, I can agree with Lachenkrieg about the importance and the effects of this cycle, but on the other, I am well aware of the historical reality - at least in case of the aircrafts - why this system never really worked for the Germans.

This is why I think that in mechanized warfare WIs there are only 3 credible approaches:
1. Organizational WIs, like TA Gardner's idea
2. Reallocation of existing resources, like the naval aviation vs continental aviation
3. WIs related to MRO activities

I generally consider R&D WIs not really credible. Having worked / studied for cca 5 years in many countries in scientific R&D, my personal experiences support this notion. Research, by default means you have to try 99 things until the 100th will work. To say that a certain equipment could be finished earlier, it goes against all chances. For this exact reason modern research uses a very few innovative minds, most of the educated people execute the plans of the few; like in industry, a very few people designs, most people work on assembly lines or in positions which require education, but not thinking. Back then in Nazi Germany, scientific research management was seriously marred with many basic problems, things we would consider trivial today. Examples like the expulsion of humanists and Jews are well-known, but I'm thinking more of the effects of the ceased international scientific cooperations and the imbecile conscription of highly trained personnel. Let's not forget that before the Nazi regime came, Germany was the international hub of science, German was the primary language in sciences, and so on.

Well, so many aspects of the vaunted "highly efficient" German mobilization planning were simple madness. Whoever thought that diverting two-thirds of automotive manufacturing to building aircraft sub-components was a good idea? Why was the system of industrial deferments so bad that entire divisions were furloughed in the winter of 1940/1941 so as to have enough workforce to keep the plants going?

[LachenKrieg]

Not really. Numbers tell otherwise. There's a smorgesbord of statistics how much the Wehrmacht was spent by the spring of 1942. Stalingrad was a disaster indeed, exacerbated by bad last minute decisions, but it was not the "turning point of the war". That happened much earlier, during mid 1941.

Well I understand how you can rationalize the notion that Germany had already lost the war when it invaded Russia, because I have listened to that argument numerous times before, but why not just say Germany had already lost the war after Hitler rose to power? But more to the point, what do the numbers say?

Sure there is a smorgasbord of stats that show how German military losses in men and material continued to mount as the war dragged on, but you have me seriously wondering if you weren't packing a bagged lunch that day?

Russia suffered nearly 3 million casualties during Barbarossa, what was the casualty list on the German side? And how did winter play into that? German forces had been severely depleted by the end of the winter of 1942, so much so that it had lost the immediate ability to perform an all out offensive on the Eastern Front, but it was far from spent by the spring of 1942. Germany not only repelled Russia's spring attempt to retake Kharkov, but its counter-offensive nearly wiped out Russia's South-West front causing almost 300k casualties on top of huge material losses. And more major Russian defeats would come before Germany even started its main summer offensive in 1942. Russia suffered defeat after defeat in the weeks that followed the start of Germany's 1942 summer offensive, and its success was hampered more by logistics issues than anything else.

Sure, but you literally claimed the following:

I'm not sure what your getting at here Peter, yes you have correctly quoted me as saying this WI is not about how Germany could have won the war, but rather it proposes how they could have improved their fighting force, and in doing so their chance of stabilizing the Eastern Front after Barbarossa.

Thus you claim that with better Pz III / IV guns, the Eastern Front could have been stabilized. You claim that a better gun on Pz III and Pz IV could have preserved Germany's limited AFV arsenal. You claim that better guns might have prevented encirclements.

You yourself said that the German leadership made a wrong choice by splitting up the troops, thus, the encirclements did not depend on the weapons of the encircled, but on two things: the wrong decisions of the German leadership and the good decisions of the Soviet leadership. By claiming that better guns on Pz III / IV could change the outcome of a theatre as large as the Eastern Front, you unintentionally claim that these weapons were decisive, and decisive in particular when it comes to AFV survival.

Part of the problem here Peter is when you engage in a WI, you have to be at least willing to let go of history as you know it in order to explore the plausible. In other words, in order to add anything to a WI, whether it be for or against, you have to be able to think outside the box and get beyond "Yeah but it didn't happen that way". If you go back and read the original proposal to the WI, I list improved armament and rational decision making on the part of German leadership as the two requirements.

I will have to widen the discussion a little here in order to make myself clear, so bare with me.

For example, someone might ask if Germany could have made a 5.0 cm AT gun in 1936? The answer to that question is obviously yes, of course it could have. Then someone might ask if the Pz III could have been armed with a 5.0 cm gun when it first debuted? If we consider that the initial request was for a 5.0 gun, and we then add that to the fact that Germany was capable of making such a gun, then we can say it is possible the Pz III could have been initially armed with a 5.0 gun.

The net effect of any change can never be truly known until the outcome related to the change has occurred. Lets say in this example Lutz was the head of the Army instead of Beck. And instead of clinging to tradition, he was more open to looking at things from a new perspective and fully supported the concept of fast moving armored divisions. This could also have been Beck himself, but we are just having fun with names here.

Now lets say what comes out of this stroke of luck is Germany's first main battle tank was armed with the 5.0 L/60. That would have been a very powerful weapon during the invasion of Poland, but not while confronting the frontal armor of a T34's just 12 months later. Pz III crews would have still experienced the same problem of not being able to penetrate the Russian tank's frontal armor, and the reported problem regarding the weak armament of Panzers on the Eastern Front would have still been sent. The net effect of this would be the need to find a better solution. A solution that could answer to all the claims I claimed you claim I claimed;)

But aside from making a claim, I also asked you a question that is still unanswered. I will repeat it here because your answer to it is equal to the proof you demand from my claim. If Germany would have just made the early Pz III/IV's, would it have had any effect on the outcome of the war in terms of the amount of time required to conclude it? All other things being equal with logistics, bad decisions, and what ever else you want to add,... what do you think would have happened? I think its quite clear, The Pz III E would have trouble penetrating a number of tanks even from the side, and the war would have ended much sooner than it did. Can you provide me with proof that Germany could have continued fighting the war until it did in 1945 with just the 3.7 cm armed Pz III, and short barrel 7.5 cm Pz IV?

But again regarding encirclement, you are misunderstanding my meaning. There are many reasons, or factors that may contribute to the threat of being encircled. Bad decision making is just one of them. The role of a better gun here would be to provide the fire power needed to break out of the encirclement. Another role would be to dominate the battle field to deny your enemy the chance to threaten you with encirclement. Another role would be to inflict so much damage that your enemy is unable to continue the fight, let alone encircle you. I think you should probably be getting it by now.

When it comes to mechanized warfare - tanks, vehicles, aircrafts, etc. - yes, I do believe so. You know what's the single most important cause in AFV loss? Not enemy guns, not enemy bombers, not enemy tanks but mechanical failure. The same is true for aircrafts; about 40-50% of the losses in WW II were not glorious aerial combat but accidents, malfunction and the sort.

And I can give you many examples how improved maintenance actually enhanced combat power throughout different campaigns of WW II. Can you give me one example when a better AFV gun changed the outcome of war in a theatre? Even temporarily?

I can actually do better than that Peter, I can give you literally tens of thousands of permanent examples, where would you like FedEX to deliver the boxes?

Joking aside Peter, yes I imagine maintenance/spare parts issues especially during WWII when all this new technology was in a constant and rapid state of change was a big deal for most countries, especially Germany. But I think you are confusing two separate issues here. Mechanical issues, although bothersome and costly, were usually fixable. And although some vehicles were repairable after being penetrated, a large percentage of them were permanently destroyed. That type of permanent damage usually has a much more dramatic impact on the men and material of a military then a broken final drive does. Of course there were vehicles that were lost due to mechanical failure because they could not be safely retrieved from the battle field, but effective guns were a very significant factor here.

Germany committed 991 armored vehicles to its summer offensive of which just 94 were capable of penetrating the T34's frontal armor (PzIV Lg). That is less than 10%, and yet Russia lost nearly every armored encounter during that entire campaign (source Stalingrad 1942-43 (1) Forczyk). This fact alone speaks to the German commanders ability to win on the tactical battle field. But to bolster the superior tactics and what they openly admitted was a weak armored force, were a small number of 8.8 cm Flak guns. These guns were decisive in a number of battles. The point to a better gun is that it can help develop a tactical advantage irrespective of your position. If your gun is only capable of damaging the enemy up close and from the side, then this usually requires either really good planning, or maneuvering to get into position to do so. Moving into position often enough required the tank crew to expose itself to an increased threat which often enough resulted in the loss of men and material. A better gun increases the number of option you have on the battle field. Lets say even half of the 407 Pz III L/60's they had were long barrel StuG's (assuming the WI), they may have been able to reach Stalingrad in 4 weeks instead of 9. That in itself would have had a huge impact on the outcome of the summer offensive in 1942.

But you know, that's the main issue of this whole conversation. Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was the problem - otherwise, it might take the Wallies a little bit more effort to defeat the Axis. If your economy can't manufacture enough weapons, and / or quality weapons, then why start an unnecessary multi-front war?
Not one but many contemporaries were in disbelief when Hitler attacked the SU. It was pure madness. For Germany, it would worth billions of Reichsmarks just to keep the Soviets out of the war. It was not the Panzer III / IV's fault that they were tasked with a near impossible task.

In any case, most of the damage to the tanks were not done by tanks, so...

So here's another WI forya, After defeating France and cornering Britain at Dunkirk, Germany pauses to offer peace because it is willing to withdraw its troops from occupied Europe (excluding land taken from Germany after WWI) if Britain agrees to go along with it all. France forces Britain to accept, and sends German troops packing. The Normandy invasion is no longer a thing... But regarding your definition of "most of the damage", please see above.

This is not true, but a popular myth. It was not the Eastern Front that prompted German heavy tank development. The German rearmament tried to do a lot of development lines, but only a very few things worked, a lot of projects never came into reality. Germany also tended to have the nasty habit of developing things that were total failures like the He 177 and almost everything were both having extraordinary delays and teething problems.
Not to mention their favourites, the stopgap solutions, which were the usual way of dealing with things. Tinkering by the army was also commonplace. In the end, the experiences on the Eastern Front did not induce, but speeded up the German tank projects.

I never said that improving the German inventory was not a good idea, or that it had no effect. It might had some effect, but since we are talking about a very narrow thing - a type of gun on a type of tanks - the effects will be narrow, too. At most there were 1-3000 operational AFVs capable of carrying this gun at any given time in the war. What would have happened if the Germans used the 5cm L/60 or the 7.5cm L/48 from the beginning of Barbarossa? Yes, I think it wouldn't change much.

The only myth here might be your claim that someone is saying the Eastern Front prompted Heavy tank development. What it prompted was for Germany to put things into high gear. They were at a loss on meeting the T34/KV tanks, and there was an urgent need to find a solution to counter them. The Pz III/IV's already in production could be improved slightly in terms of armor, but this was not a long term solution in their eyes. And the Pz III could not carry anything more than a the L/60. After meeting the T34, the Pz III was at best a good light recon tank, but in order for it to excel at that it would have also needed improvements to its mobility beyond what it already had. I would have loved to see something like that happen only because the Pz III L is one of my favorite WWII tanks, but that would have been a useless endeavor if undertaken before the massive work needed to secure a stronger gun for a better fighting force. But hey, then they would have had a really fast uber tank to drive across the English Channel in

[LachenKrieg]

This is way too familiar. TMP is back folks.

Hello Richard,...

I don't know what or who TMP is, but I'm not it or he.

Don't have time at the moment, but I see you have posted something else recently.

Cheers.

[Peter89]

Not really. Numbers tell otherwise. There's a smorgesbord of statistics how much the Wehrmacht was spent by the spring of 1942. Stalingrad was a disaster indeed, exacerbated by bad last minute decisions, but it was not the "turning point of the war". That happened much earlier, during mid 1941.

Well I understand how you can rationalize the notion that Germany had already lost the war when it invaded Russia, because I have listened to that argument numerous times before, but why not just say Germany had already lost the war after Hitler rose to power?

Because Hitler's rise to power was one thing, Germany's chances to "win" the war was another (Germany as a country and a nation lost a lot with Hitler already in peace). The only reason why Hitler was able to achieve early victories was the dysfunctional peace treaties after WW1 which destroyed the continental balance of power.

But more to the point, what do the numbers say?

The numbers say that Germany could never replace the losses it suffered in the Barbarossa campaign.


Sure there is a smorgasbord of stats that show how German military losses in men and material continued to mount as the war dragged on, but you have me seriously wondering if you weren't packing a bagged lunch that day?

Russia suffered nearly 3 million casualties during Barbarossa, what was the casualty list on the German side?

Over 1 million. And most of the vechicles, aircrafts, tanks and were either destroyed, damaged or inoperational.

German forces had been severely depleted by the end of the winter of 1942, so much so that it had lost the immediate ability to perform an all out offensive on the Eastern Front, but it was far from spent by the spring of 1942.

Again, the Wehrmacht was on the brink of collapse during the winter.

At the end of March 1942, OKH reported that out of 162 divisions in the east, 8 were suitable for offensive operations, 3 could be brought up to full offensive capability after a short rest, and 47 could perform limited offensive tasks. The rest were only suitable for defensive warfare. Tank losses had reached 3,486 from a tank force numbering 3,350 in June 1941, and which had received only 873 replacement tanks. The number of tanks ready for action on the eastern front on March 30, 1942, was 140.

On 1941 June 21 there were 296 theoretically operational Stukas out of 518 in total.
On 1941 June 21 there were 1,021 theoretically operational bombers out of 1,800 in total.
On 1941 June 21 there were 1,092 theoretically operational fighters out of 1,608 in total.

On 1941 January 31 there were 131 theoretically operational Stukas out of 445 in total.
On 1941 January 31 there were 432 theoretically operational bombers out of 1,745 in total.
On 1941 January 31 there were 622 theoretically operational fighters out of 1,647 in total.

An army corps was encircled at Demyansk. The whole army group center was surrounded from three sides, there were Soviets in their rear areas and whatnot. They could barely hang on.

I could continue the line.

And how did winter play into that?

[...]

Germany not only repelled Russia's spring attempt to retake Kharkov, but its counter-offensive nearly wiped out Russia's South-West front causing almost 300k casualties on top of huge material losses. And more major Russian defeats would come before Germany even started its main summer offensive in 1942. Russia suffered defeat after defeat in the weeks that followed the start of Germany's 1942 summer offensive, and its success was hampered more by logistics issues than anything else.

[...]

Joking aside Peter, yes I imagine maintenance/spare parts issues especially during WWII when all this new technology was in a constant and rapid state of change was a big deal for most countries, especially Germany. But I think you are confusing two separate issues here. Mechanical issues, although bothersome and costly, were usually fixable.

You are seriously wrong here. These were the issues that decided the outcome of battles, operations and theatres, not certain, improved guns on certain tanks. I'm sorry to say this, but the way you speak about these determining factors indicates that you are not quite familiar with the numbers related to the topic.

Sure, but you literally claimed the following:

I'm not sure what your getting at here Peter, yes you have correctly quoted me as saying this WI is not about how Germany could have won the war, but rather it proposes how they could have improved their fighting force, and in doing so their chance of stabilizing the Eastern Front after Barbarossa.

Yes, but it is not a plausible proposition.

Thus you claim that with better Pz III / IV guns, the Eastern Front could have been stabilized. You claim that a better gun on Pz III and Pz IV could have preserved Germany's limited AFV arsenal. You claim that better guns might have prevented encirclements.

You yourself said that the German leadership made a wrong choice by splitting up the troops, thus, the encirclements did not depend on the weapons of the encircled, but on two things: the wrong decisions of the German leadership and the good decisions of the Soviet leadership. By claiming that better guns on Pz III / IV could change the outcome of a theatre as large as the Eastern Front, you unintentionally claim that these weapons were decisive, and decisive in particular when it comes to AFV survival.

Part of the problem here Peter is when you engage in a WI, you have to be at least willing to let go of history as you know it in order to explore the plausible. In other words, in order to add anything to a WI, whether it be for or against, you have to be able to think outside the box and get beyond "Yeah but it didn't happen that way". If you go back and read the original proposal to the WI, I list improved armament and rational decision making on the part of German leadership as the two requirements.

If we let go history as we know it, it is not a WI anymore but a historical fiction, a fantasy.

To explore whether a decision was good or bad, we need WIs. But if we say that "better decision making and better things are my requirements" just doesn't make sense.

I will have to widen the discussion a little here in order to make myself clear, so bare with me.

For example, someone might ask if Germany could have made a 5.0 cm AT gun in 1936? The answer to that question is obviously yes, of course it could have. Then someone might ask if the Pz III could have been armed with a 5.0 cm gun when it first debuted? If we consider that the initial request was for a 5.0 gun, and we then add that to the fact that Germany was capable of making such a gun, then we can say it is possible the Pz III could have been initially armed with a 5.0 gun.

The net effect of any change can never be truly known until the outcome related to the change has occurred. Lets say in this example Lutz was the head of the Army instead of Beck. And instead of clinging to tradition, he was more open to looking at things from a new perspective and fully supported the concept of fast moving armored divisions. This could also have been Beck himself, but we are just having fun with names here.

Now lets say what comes out of this stroke of luck is Germany's first main battle tank was armed with the 5.0 L/60. That would have been a very powerful weapon during the invasion of Poland, but not while confronting the frontal armor of a T34's just 12 months later. Pz III crews would have still experienced the same problem of not being able to penetrate the Russian tank's frontal armor, and the reported problem regarding the weak armament of Panzers on the Eastern Front would have still been sent. The net effect of this would be the need to find a better solution. A solution that could answer to all the claims I claimed you claim I claimed;)

???

But aside from making a claim, I also asked you a question that is still unanswered. I will repeat it here because your answer to it is equal to the proof you demand from my claim. If Germany would have just made the early Pz III/IV's, would it have had any effect on the outcome of the war in terms of the amount of time required to conclude it? All other things being equal with logistics, bad decisions, and what ever else you want to add,... what do you think would have happened? I think its quite clear, The Pz III E would have trouble penetrating a number of tanks even from the side, and the war would have ended much sooner than it did. Can you provide me with proof that Germany could have continued fighting the war until it did in 1945 with just the 3.7 cm armed Pz III, and short barrel 7.5 cm Pz IV?

You are asking the wrong question. Of course it doesn't work like this; one can not conjure up things from thin air or remove them at will when it suits his agenda. The correct question would be this: "Can you provide me arguments that Germany could have continued fighting the war until it did in 1945 with just the 3.7 cm armed Pz III, and short barrel 7.5 cm Pz IV - given that all the manpower, time, resources, crews, maintenance, etc. could be freed up and could be spent on something else instead?"

Yeah, I can.

But again regarding encirclement, you are misunderstanding my meaning. There are many reasons, or factors that may contribute to the threat of being encircled. Bad decision making is just one of them. The role of a better gun here would be to provide the fire power needed to break out of the encirclement.

Do you know how much of the Wehrmacht's firepower came from Pz III and Pz IV tanks, and what would be the net change with their improved armament?

Another role would be to dominate the battle field to deny your enemy the chance to threaten you with encirclement. Another role would be to inflict so much damage that your enemy is unable to continue the fight, let alone encircle you. I think you should probably be getting it by now.

I do, but sadly, this is only imagination.

When it comes to mechanized warfare - tanks, vehicles, aircrafts, etc. - yes, I do believe so. You know what's the single most important cause in AFV loss? Not enemy guns, not enemy bombers, not enemy tanks but mechanical failure. The same is true for aircrafts; about 40-50% of the losses in WW II were not glorious aerial combat but accidents, malfunction and the sort.

And I can give you many examples how improved maintenance actually enhanced combat power throughout different campaigns of WW II. Can you give me one example when a better AFV gun changed the outcome of war in a theatre? Even temporarily?

I can actually do better than that Peter, I can give you literally tens of thousands of permanent examples, where would you like FedEX to deliver the boxes?

[...]

And although some vehicles were repairable after being penetrated, a large percentage of them were permanently destroyed. That type of permanent damage usually has a much more dramatic impact on the men and material of a military then a broken final drive does. Of course there were vehicles that were lost due to mechanical failure because they could not be safely retrieved from the battle field, but effective guns were a very significant factor here.

Again, it didn't work like that. Tanks required maintenance, repairs and overhauls. Thus, if you gain 20% combat power with the new guns, you can lose it in a week with the lack of spare parts. Retrieving tanks from battlefields is a different task, which was also very complicated when large operations happened over long distances.

Germany committed 991 armored vehicles to its summer offensive of which just 94 were capable of penetrating the T34's frontal armor (PzIV Lg). That is less than 10%, and yet Russia lost nearly every armored encounter during that entire campaign (source Stalingrad 1942-43 (1) Forczyk). This fact alone speaks to the German commanders ability to win on the tactical battle field. But to bolster the superior tactics and what they openly admitted was a weak armored force, were a small number of 8.8 cm Flak guns. These guns were decisive in a number of battles. The point to a better gun is that it can help develop a tactical advantage irrespective of your position. If your gun is only capable of damaging the enemy up close and from the side, then this usually requires either really good planning, or maneuvering to get into position to do so. Moving into position often enough required the tank crew to expose itself to an increased threat which often enough resulted in the loss of men and material. A better gun increases the number of option you have on the battle field.

First you need to demonstrate that the main cause of tank losses were other tanks; then that it was the frontal armor that was hit mostly, and then finally, you have to answer where do you get these better guns? What did the German war effort sacrificed in your WI to get those guns?

Lets say even half of the 407 Pz III L/60's they had were long barrel StuG's (assuming the WI), they may have been able to reach Stalingrad in 4 weeks instead of 9. That in itself would have had a huge impact on the outcome of the summer offensive in 1942.

I'd like to know where did this idea came from?

But you know, that's the main issue of this whole conversation. Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was the problem - otherwise, it might take the Wallies a little bit more effort to defeat the Axis. If your economy can't manufacture enough weapons, and / or quality weapons, then why start an unnecessary multi-front war?
Not one but many contemporaries were in disbelief when Hitler attacked the SU. It was pure madness. For Germany, it would worth billions of Reichsmarks just to keep the Soviets out of the war. It was not the Panzer III / IV's fault that they were tasked with a near impossible task.

In any case, most of the damage to the tanks were not done by tanks, so...

So here's another WI forya, After defeating France and cornering Britain at Dunkirk, Germany pauses to offer peace because it is willing to withdraw its troops from occupied Europe (excluding land taken from Germany after WWI) if Britain agrees to go along with it all. France forces Britain to accept, and sends German troops packing. The Normandy invasion is no longer a thing... But regarding your definition of "most of the damage", please see above.

I see, but there is nothing answering that most basic problem.

This is not true, but a popular myth. It was not the Eastern Front that prompted German heavy tank development. The German rearmament tried to do a lot of development lines, but only a very few things worked, a lot of projects never came into reality. Germany also tended to have the nasty habit of developing things that were total failures like the He 177 and almost everything were both having extraordinary delays and teething problems.
Not to mention their favourites, the stopgap solutions, which were the usual way of dealing with things. Tinkering by the army was also commonplace. In the end, the experiences on the Eastern Front did not induce, but speeded up the German tank projects.

I never said that improving the German inventory was not a good idea, or that it had no effect. It might had some effect, but since we are talking about a very narrow thing - a type of gun on a type of tanks - the effects will be narrow, too. At most there were 1-3000 operational AFVs capable of carrying this gun at any given time in the war. What would have happened if the Germans used the 5cm L/60 or the 7.5cm L/48 from the beginning of Barbarossa? Yes, I think it wouldn't change much.

The only myth here might be your claim that someone is saying the Eastern Front prompted Heavy tank development. What it prompted was for Germany to put things into high gear. They were at a loss on meeting the T34/KV tanks, and there was an urgent need to find a solution to counter them. The Pz III/IV's already in production could be improved slightly in terms of armor, but this was not a long term solution in their eyes. And the Pz III could not carry anything more than a the L/60. After meeting the T34, the Pz III was at best a good light recon tank, but in order for it to excel at that it would have also needed improvements to its mobility beyond what it already had. I would have loved to see something like that happen only because the Pz III L is one of my favorite WWII tanks, but that would have been a useless endeavor if undertaken before the massive work needed to secure a stronger gun for a better fighting force. But hey, then they would have had a really fast uber tank to drive across the English Channel in

You seem to think that the majority of the Soviet tanks were T34s and KVs in 1941-1942. They weren't.

[Richard Anderson]

You seem to think that the majority of the Soviet tanks were T34s and KVs in 1941-1942. They weren't.

Indeed Peter. I love how all the problems raised with these ideas get glossed over and the most important questions get ignored. It is that element of LachenKrieg replies that remind me too much of TMP's antics before he finally got banned. As in this nonsense...

For example, someone might ask if Germany could have made a 5.0 cm AT gun in 1936? The answer to that question is obviously yes, of course it could have. Then someone might ask if the Pz III could have been armed with a 5.0 cm gun when it first debuted? If we consider that the initial request was for a 5.0 gun, and we then add that to the fact that Germany was capable of making such a gun, then we can say it is possible the Pz III could have been initially armed with a 5.0 gun.

Which simply ignores the facts as I laid them out earlier:

"The initial discussions on whether or not to develop a 5cm gun for the proposed light tank go back to 1932, before the ZW was even authorized. However, no authorization or funding for a tank-mounted 5cm gun were approved until 4 January 1938 and the RFP from WaPrüf 4 to Krupp went out 15 March 1938. At that time Krupp and Rheinmetall were working on completing the 5cm PaK 37 and used it as the basis for their proposal. The basic specification requirement was:

1. The muzzle must remain behind the front edge of the Panzer so was restricted to 2103 mm.
2. Cartridge and projectile should be short due to restricted turret space.
3. Penetration of 40mm at 700 meters at 30 degrees.

The gun was proposed for the 7./ZW series (Ausf H), which was the third production model after the Ausf F and G. In 6 ordered 759 Panzer III (the 7./ZW) on 11 July 1938 and extended the order by another 440 (the 8./ZW) on 6 December 1938. By 11 July 1938, they already had production orders placed for 435 5./ZW and 800 6./ZW."

Yes indeedy, the decision could have been made to fit the ZW with a new 5cm gun. However, the gun would then have logically been the Rheinmetall gun that became the 5cm PaK 37, which was rejected as a PaK gun by the Heer in 1938. Logically then, since its development started at the same time as the ZW decision was made, there is no reason to suppose it would have been completed two years earlier than it historically was...other than magical thinking. It was prewar, there were many projects being funded, there was a limited pool of money, especially after the cutbacks caused by the 1937 recession, and so on.

However, it is also possible that Rheinmetall could have instead come up with the 5cm PaK 38 instead of the 37, sure. But that does not eliminate the widely held belief that overhanging tank guns were potentially a serious problem - a belief so widespread it was held not just by In 6 but also by American and British ordnance. So it is equally likely if the Rheinmetall gun completing development in 1938 was an L60 that In 6 would have demanded it be cut down to L42, putting us back to square one.

BTW, I did forget that Guderian was appointed Kommando der Panzertruppen (Inspekteur), so head of In 6, as of 25 November 1938 (he was Chef des Stabes under Lutz until 1 October 1935 when he was promoted 2. Pz.-Div.) but only held that post until he was assigned as Kommandierende General XIX Armee-Korps (mot) on 1 July 1939. His main task was pushing through the decision to convert the leichte Divisionen to Panzer Divisionen on 24 February 1939, which had been one of his proposals in his earlier tenure.

None of that solves the problem that the Panzer III was plagued by development problems that combined with the scattershot approach to industrial mobilization made it woefully late to large-scale production, which would not be changed by installing a different gun.

Nor does LachenKrieg bother to answer questions regarding some of his other faulty assumptions:

"Why do you think the Panzer III was not "approved for final production until 1939? By 1 January 1939 all 65 of the pilot 1., 2., and 3. ZW were complete and the first of the production series 4. ZW (Ausf E) was ready."

Response? Crickets.

Answering questions about the supposed Guderian-Beck-Manstein "struggle" also gets glossed over but I suspect was generated by an uncritical reading of pages 32-33 of Panzer Leader where Guderian simply lies, stating:

"I had to win a long drawn-out fight with General Beck before he would agree to set up the Panzer Divisions and publish the training manuals for armored troops. Finally, he went as far as to agree to the establishment of two Panzer Divisions, while I was already insisting on three. I described the advantages of these new formations to him in the most glowing terms…he replied: 'No, no, I do not want to have anything to do with you people. You move too fast for me.'"

Except that the first three Panzer divisions were approved simultaneously by Beck on 1 September 1934, they were all organized effective 15 October 1935, and Guderian was not head of In 6 so was unlikely to have addressed Beck in the manner described. Meanwhile, Beck was so "resistant" to Panzers and Sturmgeschütz he also authorized the creation of three Panzer brigades as a first step to more divisions, delayed the organization of 12 new Panzer-Abwehr-Abteilungen in order to fund the required Panzer-Abteilungen, and approved the development of the Sturmartillerie in order to prevent the dilution of the Panzertruppen, which was the alternative.

I am afraid to much of the "Guderian smart, Beck dumb" trope is derived from reading too much Guderian and Kenneth Macksey, who parroted much of what Guderian claimed happened in Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg, which is hagiography of the worst sort.

[Peter89]

You seem to think that the majority of the Soviet tanks were T34s and KVs in 1941-1942. They weren't.

Indeed Peter. I love how all the problems raised with these ideas get glossed over and the most important questions get ignored. It is that element of LachenKrieg replies that remind me too much of TMP's antics before he finally got banned. As in this nonsense...

As you well know, I do not subscribe to your enmity towards him or vica versa, plus I think it's not really elegant to call out someone when he can not be here to defend himself. Even though I'm not TMP's lawyer, I have to state that he actually processed a lot of infos and tried to use sources above the level of the Battlefield series.

Also, an interesting sidenote. The 1848-1849 Freedom War in Hungary made a huge imprint in the public psyché and there were some critical moments in the war when the popular myths were like "one more push could have done it". Despite modern historians like Róbert Hermann disproved most of these claims (surprise-surprise, most of these last pushes were not doable for mundane things like supplies and training), even after 170 years, well-read people try to cling on to the idea that history could have been different easily. I guess it is something people are yearning for. Also when I point out that it was the Jews who provided the Hussar forces with horses and after the war, they had to pay the largest sum of war reparations it is magnitudes less popular than the story of the Polish legion. People like to imagine cavalry charges, tanks impenetrable by other tanks, tanks with superior firepower, and the such.

In reality, more Polish soldiers fought on the Habsburg side, and the only credible WI in that war would have been the never-hiring of Dembiński, who alone was responsible for some of the worst defeats of the army. And let's just not talk about Josef Bem or the rest of them, because I share Károly Leiningen-Westerburg's views on them.

Also it was not the cavalry charges that took most of the lives in that war either. Not even artillery, bayonettes or swords. Not even war, but cholera. But cholera is not interesting. Not glorious. However, from the Russian archives it turned out that out of the 13,554 fallen Russian soldiers, over 11,000 died in cholera or other diseases.

[Richard Anderson]

As you well know, I do not subscribe to your enmity towards him or vica versa, plus I think it's not really elegant to call out someone when he can not be here to defend himself. Even though I'm not TMP's lawyer, I have to state that he actually processed a lot of infos and tried to use sources above the level of the Battlefield series.

Oh that's fair to a degree I suppose Peter but I wouldn't describe it as "enmity". More like distaste on my part considering I tried on and offline to reach a modus vivendi with TMP only to have it work for a few posts before he went completely off the rails with the whole "I am a lawyer and thus only I understand logical argumentation" shtick. It just got too tiresome after a while. And I'm afraid I've seen the same thing here.

The real logical disconnect is that the OP insists that historical fact is irrelevant, because this is a what if, but fails to realize the logical disconnect in their own argument.

The things they say they would change did not actually happen, so their declarative statements that thus and such would result are pure imagination on their part. Would arming StuG and/or Panzer IV with 7.5cm KwK/StuK 40 prior to BARBAROSSA change anything? Maybe. Maybe not. But there is no evidence whatsoever that it would, simply because it did not happen. We can imagine what might have happened but that is quite a different thing.

That is one of the many reasons the intent of a historical counterfactual is not to predict a different future but rather to understand why the actual future happened the way it did.

The logical absurd endpoint of such an argument are arguments such as "what if the Germans developed the Panther in 1938?" or "what if the Germans developed the Leopard II in 1938?" How about "what if the Germans developed directed energy weapons in 1938?" It swiftly slips into ASB territory.

Also, an interesting sidenote. The 1848-1849 Freedom War in Hungary made a huge imprint in the public psyché and there were some critical moments in the war when the popular myths were like "one more push could have done it". Despite modern historians like Róbert Hermann disproved most of these claims (surprise-surprise, most of these last pushes were not doable for mundane things like supplies and training), even after 170 years, well-read people try to cling on to the idea that history could have been different easily. I guess it is something people are yearning for. Also when I point out that it was the Jews who provided the Hussar forces with horses and after the war, they had to pay the largest sum of war reparations it is magnitudes less popular than the story of the Polish legion. People like to imagine cavalry charges, tanks impenetrable by other tanks, tanks with superior firepower, and the such.

In reality, more Polish soldiers fought on the Habsburg side, and the only credible WI in that war would have been the never-hiring of Dembiński, who alone was responsible for some of the worst defeats of the army. And let's just not talk about Josef Bem or the rest of them, because I share Károly Leiningen-Westerburg's views on them.

Also it was not the cavalry charges that took most of the lives in that war either. Not even artillery, bayonettes or swords. Not even war, but cholera. But cholera is not interesting. Not glorious. However, from the Russian archives it turned out that out of the 13,554 fallen Russian soldiers, over 11,000 died in cholera or other diseases.

Very true. We could look at fleckfieber on the Ostfront in 1941-1945 and find much the same although the proportions to battle casualties were not quite as bad.

[Peter89]

As you well know, I do not subscribe to your enmity towards him or vica versa, plus I think it's not really elegant to call out someone when he can not be here to defend himself. Even though I'm not TMP's lawyer, I have to state that he actually processed a lot of infos and tried to use sources above the level of the Battlefield series.

Oh that's fair to a degree I suppose Peter but I wouldn't describe it as "enmity". More like distaste on my part considering I tried on and offline to reach a modus vivendi with TMP only to have it work for a few posts before he went completely off the rails with the whole "I am a lawyer and thus only I understand logical argumentation" shtick. It just got too tiresome after a while. And I'm afraid I've seen the same thing here.

Even offline? You guys met IRL and still continue to act like this? Wicked.
If you ever meet again, please tell me and I'll send you a few bottles of good wine. Maybe it was just a poor choice of drink.

The real logical disconnect is that the OP insists that historical fact is irrelevant, because this is a what if, but fails to realize the logical disconnect in their own argument.

The things they say they would change did not actually happen, so their declarative statements that thus and such would result are pure imagination on their part. Would arming StuG and/or Panzer IV with 7.5cm KwK/StuK 40 prior to BARBAROSSA change anything? Maybe. Maybe not. But there is no evidence whatsoever that it would, simply because it did not happen. We can imagine what might have happened but that is quite a different thing.

That is one of the many reasons the intent of a historical counterfactual is not to predict a different future but rather to understand why the actual future happened the way it did.

The logical absurd endpoint of such an argument are arguments such as "what if the Germans developed the Panther in 1938?" or "what if the Germans developed the Leopard II in 1938?" How about "what if the Germans developed directed energy weapons in 1938?" It swiftly slips into ASB territory.

I don't fully share your views on this. For me, the purpose of WIs are not to invent a fantasy scenario, but to examine the possible decisions the historical actors could make. Without this, we can not rate their performance or responsibility. In order to do it, I always examine how likely a decision or event was or would be. If we'd say that things happened and nothing else could happen, is not realistic for me. Some choices were real, and some others were not; Leopard II in 1938 is not a realistic choice, but eg. the launching or not launching of Barbarossa was. There is also luck and misfortune, which can not be explained any other way with the information we have on hand. Of course you are right with the extreme cases which goes against common sense. I personally also don't really like WIs in which people design their own alternative operations which has little to do with historical reality, but even those are not black and white, because on the level of theory, it is much easier to prove that something can exist than it can't.

[Richard Anderson]

Even offline? You guys met IRL and still continue to act like this? Wicked.
If you ever meet again, please tell me and I'll send you a few bottles of good wine. Maybe it was just a poor choice of drink.

No, he emailed me and we conversed online but not here at AHF. He lives in the Chicago area where my son and granddaughter are so there was a possibility of meeting but it only smoothed things over for a bit.

I don't fully share your views on this. For me, the purpose of WIs are not to invent a fantasy scenario, but to examine the possible decisions the historical actors could make. Without this, we can not rate their performance or responsibility. In order to do it, I always examine how likely a decision or event was or would be. If we'd say that things happened and nothing else could happen, is not realistic for me. Some choices were real, and some others were not; Leopard II in 1938 is not a realistic choice, but eg. the launching or not launching of Barbarossa was. There is also luck and misfortune, which can not be explained any other way with the information we have on hand. Of course you are right with the extreme cases which goes against common sense. I personally also don't really like WIs in which people design their own alternative operations which has little to do with historical reality, but even those are not black and white, because on the level of theory, it is much easier to prove that something can exist than it can't.

Exactly, I think we both agree, the what if needs a reasonable starting point and simply back-dating events to fit the new desired timeline is not really reasonable. How many years can you shift an event just to make a what if work before it becomes absurd? One year? Five? Ten? See what I mean?

And yes, the "alternative operational scheme" scenarios of which TMP was a particular fan just don't hold water and are so annoying precisely because you cannot say it could not happen that way. It comes down to "I reject your reality and substitute my own."

[LachenKrieg]

Because Hitler's rise to power was one thing, Germany's chances to "win" the war was another (Germany as a country and a nation lost a lot with Hitler already in peace). The only reason why Hitler was able to achieve early victories was the dysfunctional peace treaties after WW1 which destroyed the continental balance of power.

The numbers say that Germany could never replace the losses it suffered in the Barbarossa campaign.

Sure there is a smorgasbord of stats that show how German military losses in men and material continued to mount as the war dragged on, but you have me seriously wondering if you weren't packing a bagged lunch that day?

Again, the Wehrmacht was on the brink of collapse during the winter.

An army corps was encircled at Demyansk. The whole army group center was surrounded from three sides, there were Soviets in their rear areas and whatnot. They could barely hang on.

I could continue the line.

Peter, go back and read what you posted because that is what my comments were referring to. You said Germany had already lost the war in mid 1941. That would put your guesstimate at the start of the invasion. June is mid year! For the first several months of the invasion Peter, Germany was very far from losing the war. It was Russia that was having all the problems. The problem Germany had in the first several months of the invasion was what to do with all the prisoners. I don't know where you get your information from, but it isn't from a history book, at least not one I've read. Yes Russia stunned Germany by being able to go on the offensive that winter, but the Russians weren't in much better shape in terms of the number of tanks and field guns on hand. They lost most of what they had the previous summer/fall. My understanding is that Germany wasn't counting on a protracted war, and its forces were ill prepared for winter as a result. The winter of 1941/42 was a significant unforeseen factor that weighed heavily on Germany's war effort. Your all important logistical support for example was brought to a standstill. But Germany's summer offensive in 1942 proved to be just as devastating for Russia as the 1941 invasion was, even though Germany was unable to reach its intended goals in either campaign. The point is, they were far from spent as you put it. But I don't give a crap because that is not what this WI is about!

You are seriously wrong here. These were the issues that decided the outcome of battles, operations and theatres, not certain, improved guns on certain tanks. I'm sorry to say this, but the way you speak about these determining factors indicates that you are not quite familiar with the numbers related to the topic.

Wrong about what Peter? I never said that the logistic support of an army isn't important. Just look at how fuel shortages affected Germany's offensives let along the lack of food, clothing, spare parts ect. Where you are seriously wrong is in thinking that only spare parts matter, and this WI isn't about logistics. It is about the effectiveness of a tank's armament. You know, the pointy thing on a tank that goes boom!

You are asking the wrong question. Of course it doesn't work like this; one can not conjure up things from thin air or remove them at will when it suits his agenda. The correct question would be this: "Can you provide me arguments that Germany could have continued fighting the war until it did in 1945 with just the 3.7 cm armed Pz III, and short barrel 7.5 cm Pz IV - given that all the manpower, time, resources, crews, maintenance, etc. could be freed up and could be spent on something else instead?"

Yeah, I can.

Yes, but it is not a plausible proposition.

You can say that again in reference to the above....

The above quotes are priceless. So what... you mean all the manpower your going to get out of dead tank crews? Is that the manpower you counting on? The question I asked Peter was based on your assertion that the gun on a tank has no relevance to the outcome of armored battles. If what your saying has any bases in reality, then Germany didn't need to develop the Tiger/Panther, or the larger guns put on the Pz III/IV. Hence the question you were asked. According to you, Germany could have fought the war with just the 3.7 cm gun, as long as they had spare tires.... right?

The long barrelled Pz IV was highly valued by tank crews for its gun, and I believe it wouldn't be hard to find personal accounts of German tank crews that demonstrate this exact sentiment.

What about handguns and SMG's for tank crews Peter, did they need those? Oh wait let me guess, maybe peashooters?

I mean seriously Peter, the concept that a tanks armament has no bearing on its effectiveness is so lacking in reason that I won't bother discussing this point any further unless you answer the question we both know you can't. Germany would have never been able to last until 1945 with just the 3.7 cm PzIII. It was okay against Poland's horse mounted cavalry in 1939, but by 1941 the situation had already changed drastically from where things were in 1935, and it wouldn't have worked the rest of the war any other place.

If we let go history as we know it, it is not a WI anymore but a historical fiction, a fantasy.

To explore whether a decision was good or bad, we need WIs. But if we say that "better decision making and better things are my requirements" just doesn't make sense.

WI stands for "WHAT IF", as in what if something else happened. The something else has to be plausible of course, but just by the nature of the question being asked should tell you there must be a difference between the "WHAT IF", and the historical fact being considered.

What I meant by letting go of history as you know it, is that you must be able to accept the plausible as an alternative to history. If for example the Pz III was armed with an L60 before the start of Barbarossa, then you have to consider the effect that has on the course of the war from that point on, and not just as a single point in time.

On average, a more effective gun should translate into more kills with more loss of men and material on the enemy's side. And this effect would have to be carried through to the end of the war, and not just as a single point in time.

Your argument regarding the effect of logistics is fair, but when two tanks are staring at each other ready to pull the trigger, I think it should be clear that we are talking about something else other than how much fuel you have, or whether you have spare parts. You wouldn't have drove the tank into battle if it needed spare parts. You wouldn't have been able to drive it without fuel. So when someone is shooting at you, just go with it Peter and assume he has fuel and ammo.

And if something happens to your tank while you are in battle, your much better off with a gun that can defeat your enemy. You are conflating two different issues. Again, your point about logistics is valid, but it does not replace the point I am making regarding the effectiveness of a tanks gun, which is what this WI is about.

and this is where you logic loses even a hint of common sense. I'm sorry but I could care less that you can't understand the value of a tanks armament. But here's a little mental exercise for you. Place a T34 and a Panther tank facing each other 1500 m apart and let the shooting start. Both crews are all stocked up on tires and cigars in case your wondering. A T34 has no chance of defeating the Panther, but the Panther will end both the crew and the tank. The Panther might break down on the way back to base, but that is a separate issue, and it has nothing to do with this WI.

Do you know how much of the Wehrmacht's firepower came from Pz III and Pz IV tanks, and what would be the net change with their improved armament?

I do, but sadly, this is only imagination.

The net change Peter is that you would be able to defeat your enemy from all angles, as opposed to hoping you can flank him. In case you aren't aware, that is not always possible. But as I have said, I will not engage with you on this point any further if you insist on keeping the conversation at this level of stupidity. You shouldn't have to look to hard to find references on what actual German tank crews thought about the PzIII gun vs T34/KV tanks.

Again, it didn't work like that. Tanks required maintenance, repairs and overhauls. Thus, if you gain 20% combat power with the new guns, you can lose it in a week with the lack of spare parts. Retrieving tanks from battlefields is a different task, which was also very complicated when large operations happened over long distances.

What didn't work like that? What are you going on about? This WI is not about logistics, maintenance, or spare parts. It is about the effectiveness of a gun. And it appears to me that your only purpose here is to pose a circular argument that makes no sense what so ever to try and get me to react so that Dick can have me banned from this forum. I am supposing that he is a little mad for being spanked the way he was. If there isn't a rule against this type of thing, then there should be. You have stated your opinion, and I have asked you to support it with something other than a circular argument. I am now asking the moderators here if it is acceptable for someone to pose nothing more than a circular argument for the purpose of causing confrontation?

First you need to demonstrate that the main cause of tank losses were other tanks; then that it was the frontal armor that was hit mostly, and then finally, you have to answer where do you get these better guns? What did the German war effort sacrificed in your WI to get those guns?

Yeah I'll do that right after you demonstrate Germany could have continued to fight the war until it did in 1945 with nothing but a 3.7 cm Pz III.

You seem to think that the majority of the Soviet tanks were T34s and KVs in 1941-1942. They weren't.

And your point is? Russia apparently had over 4000 T34/KV tanks by the summer of 1942.

[LachenKrieg]

Indeed Peter. I love how all the problems raised with these ideas get glossed over and the most important questions get ignored. It is that element of LachenKrieg replies that remind me too much of TMP's antics before he finally got banned. As in this nonsense...

To start, I wanted to ask if its okay if I referred to you as Dick instead of having to spell your full name out each time we correspond with each other? If you have a problem with the abbreviated form of your name, then please don't hesitate to let me know.

Secondly, I am completely at a loss when it comes to TMP. To be transparent, after you mentioned this the first time several days ago, someone had the courtesy to fill me in. I now understand that you and this other person didn't see eye-to-eye, and that there was a lot of friction between you. I am completely removed from this situation, and yet you seem to be in the same boat as you were before. Has it ever occurred to you that you may have been part of the problem? I get how this could all look like a setup, but it isn't and you will just have to believe me. The truth is, I never heard the name TMP before you mentioned it, but based on the few exchanges you and I have shared, it kind of all makes sense to me now.

I am not going to bother going over your post point for point. Unless you raise a valid argument against my WI, I will restate the WI here with support and leave it at that.

In this WI scenario, the Pz III is armed with the L/60 cannon before the start of Barbarossa so that a decision to abandon the Pz III as a battle tank can be made sooner than it was, and Pz III chassis production can be used to manufacture long barrelled StuG's starting anywhere between September - December 1941.

The following quote is from page 66 in Encyclopedia of German tanks of World War Two; Chamberlain, Doyale, Jentz (tech. Editor):

"History: Orders were given to get the 5cm KwK39 L/60 gun into a production series as quickly as possible which resulted in the Ausf J series being split between this gun and the 5cm KwK l/42. Originally, in August 1940, Hitler had ordered the L/60 gun, but the Ordnance Department did not implement the decision as the L/42 had recently been introduced and had proven successful. At his birthday demonstration in April 1941, Hitler saw the Ausf J still without the long gun and insisted on its fitting as soon as possible. Events in Russia two months later proved the need for a more powerful armament."

The following quote is from page 40 in Panzer III & its varients; Spielberger:

"When the Russian T-34 and KV tanks appeared at the start of the Russian campaign in 1941, the weakness of the German tank armament was quickly revealed to its fullest extent. This would not have been necessary if the Army Weapons Office had followed the instructions issued personally by Hitler in 1940 and installed the 50 mm KwK 39L/60 gun, which was already available at that time. In the Pz III, the 37mm KwK was actually replaced only by the 50mm KwK L/42, a decision that led to unfortunate results and caused serious disagreements between Hitler and the Army Weapons Office."

[Peter89]

Because Hitler's rise to power was one thing, Germany's chances to "win" the war was another (Germany as a country and a nation lost a lot with Hitler already in peace). The only reason why Hitler was able to achieve early victories was the dysfunctional peace treaties after WW1 which destroyed the continental balance of power.

The numbers say that Germany could never replace the losses it suffered in the Barbarossa campaign.

Sure there is a smorgasbord of stats that show how German military losses in men and material continued to mount as the war dragged on, but you have me seriously wondering if you weren't packing a bagged lunch that day?

Again, the Wehrmacht was on the brink of collapse during the winter.

An army corps was encircled at Demyansk. The whole army group center was surrounded from three sides, there were Soviets in their rear areas and whatnot. They could barely hang on.

I could continue the line.

Peter, go back and read what you posted because that is what my comments were referring to. You said Germany had already lost the war in mid 1941. That would put your guesstimate at the start of the invasion. June is mid year! For the first several months of the invasion Peter, Germany was very far from losing the war. It was Russia that was having all the problems. The problem Germany had in the first several months of the invasion was what to do with all the prisoners. I don't know where you get your information from, but it isn't from a history book, at least not one I've read. Yes Russia stunned Germany by being able to go on the offensive that winter, but the Russians weren't in much better shape in terms of the number of tanks and field guns on hand. They lost most of what they had the previous summer/fall. My understanding is that Germany wasn't counting on a protracted war, and its forces were ill prepared for winter as a result. The winter of 1941/42 was a significant unforeseen factor that weighed heavily on Germany's war effort. Your all important logistical support for example was brought to a standstill. But Germany's summer offensive in 1942 proved to be just as devastating for Russia as the 1941 invasion was, even though Germany was unable to reach its intended goals in either campaign. The point is, they were far from spent as you put it. But I don't give a crap because that is not what this WI is about!

You are seriously wrong here. These were the issues that decided the outcome of battles, operations and theatres, not certain, improved guns on certain tanks. I'm sorry to say this, but the way you speak about these determining factors indicates that you are not quite familiar with the numbers related to the topic.

Wrong about what Peter? I never said that the logistic support of an army isn't important. Just look at how fuel shortages affected Germany's offensives let along the lack of food, clothing, spare parts ect. Where you are seriously wrong is in thinking that only spare parts matter, and this WI isn't about logistics. It is about the effectiveness of a tank's armament. You know, the pointy thing on a tank that goes boom!

1. I never said that only the spare parts matter, although they were involved in 7/10 of the repair jobs. (Operational readiness does not entirely depend on repair.)
2. This WI is about the supposed effect of the better guns on certain tanks. I say it is not such a relevant factor that could determine the outcome of theatres of the size of the Eastern Front; logistics and organization can.

I said the Wehrmacht was a spent force by the spring of 1942, you said it wasn't. You told me to give you the numbers, I brought you first rate numbers from primary sources: the state of the divisions, the aircrafts, the tanks. I can give you the exact references, if you need them. The victories Germany scored in 1942 were the last spasms of a lost cause. The Soviets actually took the initiative as early as August. In the southern sector, they regrouped their forces and counterattacked in the autumn just as in the central and later on in the northern sector.

You are asking the wrong question. Of course it doesn't work like this; one can not conjure up things from thin air or remove them at will when it suits his agenda. The correct question would be this: "Can you provide me arguments that Germany could have continued fighting the war until it did in 1945 with just the 3.7 cm armed Pz III, and short barrel 7.5 cm Pz IV - given that all the manpower, time, resources, crews, maintenance, etc. could be freed up and could be spent on something else instead?"

Yeah, I can.

Yes, but it is not a plausible proposition.

You can say that again in reference to the above....

The above quotes are priceless. So what... you mean all the manpower your going to get out of dead tank crews? Is that the manpower you counting on? The question I asked Peter was based on your assertion that the gun on a tank has no relevance to the outcome of armored battles. If what your saying has any bases in reality, then Germany didn't need to develop the Tiger/Panther, or the larger guns put on the Pz III/IV. Hence the question you were asked. According to you, Germany could have fought the war with just the 3.7 cm gun, as long as they had spare tires.... right?

1. I never said that it has NO relevance, I explicitly stated the opposite. It has some relevance, but it is not a game-changer. Are you even reading my comments?
2. Tanks don't use tires.

No strawman please, because I'm not gonna answer those.

Manpower that was required to develop, produce, equip and maintain the new guns on the tanks.

The long barrelled Pz IV was highly valued by tank crews for its gun, and I believe it wouldn't be hard to find personal accounts of German tank crews that demonstrate this exact sentiment.

A better tank is a better tank than a worse tank, no one is arguing with that. The question is what is the net difference of this WI?

What about handguns and SMG's for tank crews Peter, did they need those? Oh wait let me guess, maybe peashooters?

Please try to adjust your manners.

I mean seriously Peter, the concept that a tanks armament has no bearing on its effectiveness is so lacking in reason that I won't bother discussing this point any further unless you answer the question we both know you can't. Germany would have never been able to last until 1945 with just the 3.7 cm PzIII. It was okay against Poland's horse mounted cavalry in 1939, but by 1941 the situation had already changed drastically from where things were in 1935, and it wouldn't have worked the rest of the war any other place.

Again, please do not use strawman. I told you several times before, I never said that.

First you need to demonstrate that the main cause of tank losses were other tanks; then that it was the frontal armor that was hit mostly, and then finally, you have to answer where do you get these better guns? What did the German war effort sacrificed in your WI to get those guns?

Yeah I'll do that right after you demonstrate Germany could have continued to fight the war until it did in 1945 with nothing but a 3.7 cm Pz III.

Moreover: of course I can answer it. If Germany does not attack the Soviet Union, never sets foot in Africa, they could drag on until May 1945 without improved tank armament. If I consider the high cost of tank developments and production, Germany could do much, much better.

If we let go history as we know it, it is not a WI anymore but a historical fiction, a fantasy.

To explore whether a decision was good or bad, we need WIs. But if we say that "better decision making and better things are my requirements" just doesn't make sense.

WI stands for "WHAT IF", as in what if something else happened. The something else has to be plausible of course, but just by the nature of the question being asked should tell you there must be a difference between the "WHAT IF", and the historical fact being considered.

What I meant by letting go of history as you know it, is that you must be able to accept the plausible as an alternative to history. If for example the Pz III was armed with an L60 before the start of Barbarossa, then you have to consider the effect that has on the course of the war from that point on, and not just as a single point in time.

On average, a more effective gun should translate into more kills with more loss of men and material on the enemy's side. And this effect would have to be carried through to the end of the war, and not just as a single point in time.

You still don't understand, do you?

Yes, a better gun is better.

But in any What Ifs you must name where do this extra resources come from?

There is a give and the take. You only talk about one side of the things. I keep reminding you of the cost side.

Your argument regarding the effect of logistics is fair, but when two tanks are staring at each other ready to pull the trigger, I think it should be clear that we are talking about something else other than how much fuel you have, or whether you have spare parts. You wouldn't have drove the tank into battle if it needed spare parts. You wouldn't have been able to drive it without fuel. So when someone is shooting at you, just go with it Peter and assume he has fuel and ammo.

And if something happens to your tank while you are in battle, your much better off with a gun that can defeat your enemy. You are conflating two different issues. Again, your point about logistics is valid, but it does not replace the point I am making regarding the effectiveness of a tanks gun, which is what this WI is about.

and this is where you logic loses even a hint of common sense. I'm sorry but I could care less that you can't understand the value of a tanks armament. But here's a little mental exercise for you. Place a T34 and a Panther tank facing each other 1500 m apart and let the shooting start. Both crews are all stocked up on tires and cigars in case your wondering. A T34 has no chance of defeating the Panther, but the Panther will end both the crew and the tank. The Panther might break down on the way back to base, but that is a separate issue, and it has nothing to do with this WI.

Again, tell me how most tanks were lost in combat. Was it tank vs tank fight?

Do you know how much of the Wehrmacht's firepower came from Pz III and Pz IV tanks, and what would be the net change with their improved armament?

I do, but sadly, this is only imagination.

The net change Peter is that you would be able to defeat your enemy from all angles, as opposed to hoping you can flank him. In case you aren't aware, that is not always possible. But as I have said, I will not engage with you on this point any further if you insist on keeping the conversation at this level of stupidity. You shouldn't have to look to hard to find references on what actual German tank crews thought about the PzIII gun vs T34/KV tanks.

Just simply answer my questions.

Again, it didn't work like that. Tanks required maintenance, repairs and overhauls. Thus, if you gain 20% combat power with the new guns, you can lose it in a week with the lack of spare parts. Retrieving tanks from battlefields is a different task, which was also very complicated when large operations happened over long distances.

What didn't work like that? What are you going on about? This WI is not about logistics, maintenance, or spare parts. It is about the effectiveness of a gun. And it appears to me that your only purpose here is to pose a circular argument that makes no sense what so ever to try and get me to react so that Dick can have me banned from this forum. I am supposing that he is a little mad for being spanked the way he was. If there isn't a rule against this type of thing, then there should be. You have stated your opinion, and I have asked you to support it with something other than a circular argument. I am now asking the moderators here if it is acceptable for someone to pose nothing more than a circular argument for the purpose of causing confrontation?

Not at all, I do not want to get you banned - in general, I am not in favour of banning. (I don't know who Dick is.)

You seem to think that the majority of the Soviet tanks were T34s and KVs in 1941-1942. They weren't.

And your point is? Russia apparently had over 4000 T34/KV tanks by the summer of 1942.

And they were dealt with the results we know from history.

German tank damage output would increase with better guns on tanks.

What would the Germans sacrifice in order to get those better guns on their tanks?

Infantry equipment? Aircraft production? Submarines? AT guns?

[Richard Anderson]

To start, I wanted to ask if its okay if I referred to you as Dick instead of having to spell your full name out each time we correspond with each other? If you have a problem with the abbreviated form of your name, then please don't hesitate to let me know.

My Dad was Dick, please don't call me that. I am Richard or Rich. But you have the better of us all; what should I call you? Laughing Boy?

Secondly, I am completely at a loss when it comes to TMP. To be transparent, after you mentioned this the first time several days ago, someone had the courtesy to fill me in. I now understand that you and this other person didn't see eye-to-eye, and that there was a lot of friction between you. I am completely removed from this situation, and yet you seem to be in the same boat as you were before. Has it ever occurred to you that you may have been part of the problem? I get how this could all look like a setup, but it isn't and you will just have to believe me. The truth is, I never heard the name TMP before you mentioned it, but based on the few exchanges you and I have shared, it kind of all makes sense to me now.

Of course I'm part of the problem. I'm old and crotchety and have high standards. Sue me.

I am not going to bother going over your post point for point. Unless you raise a valid argument against my WI, I will restate the WI here with support and leave it at that.

In this WI scenario, the Pz III is armed with the L/60 cannon before the start of Barbarossa so that a decision to abandon the Pz III as a battle tank can be made sooner than it was, and Pz III chassis production can be used to manufacture long barrelled StuG's starting anywhere between September - December 1941.

The following quote is from page 66 in Encyclopedia of German tanks of World War Two; Chamberlain, Doyale, Jentz (tech. Editor):

"History: Orders were given to get the 5cm KwK39 L/60 gun into a production series as quickly as possible which resulted in the Ausf J series being split between this gun and the 5cm KwK l/42. Originally, in August 1940, Hitler had ordered the L/60 gun, but the Ordnance Department did not implement the decision as the L/42 had recently been introduced and had proven successful. At his birthday demonstration in April 1941, Hitler saw the Ausf J still without the long gun and insisted on its fitting as soon as possible. Events in Russia two months later proved the need for a more powerful armament."

The following quote is from page 40 in Panzer III & its varients; Spielberger:

"When the Russian T-34 and KV tanks appeared at the start of the Russian campaign in 1941, the weakness of the German tank armament was quickly revealed to its fullest extent. This would not have been necessary if the Army Weapons Office had followed the instructions issued personally by Hitler in 1940 and installed the 50 mm KwK 39L/60 gun, which was already available at that time. In the Pz III, the 37mm KwK was actually replaced only by the 50mm KwK L/42, a decision that led to unfortunate results and caused serious disagreements between Hitler and the Army Weapons Office."

Curiously enough I know that. The disconnect appears to be between your imagination of what that could have possibly meant and what the reality was. The 5cm gun, as I pointed out a while ago, was a brand new caliber for the German armaments industry. Not only did Rheinmetall have to develop the gun, they then had to present it to the Heeres-Waffenamt for technical and service testing before production contract was completed. Then Rheinmetall had to retool a production line that was already going full bore producing the 3.7cm PaK/KwK for mass production of the new 5cm gun. Then there were always start-up issues with new production - the Germans referred to it as "Kinderkrankheiten". Then the completed new production had to be tested by the HWA to ensure they met specification and did not have faults. We know these were major issued because even though the 5cm PaK was approved, contracted for, and funded by spring 1939, it did not actually begin production until spring 1940 - in March all of four had been completed and accepted by the HWA.

Now add in the time for developing the gun mounting for the new PaK 38 so that it becomes the KwK 39 mounted in the Panzer III.

Assume all goes well and all those things that could and did delay the start of new production worked perfectly, if the starting point is Hitler's birthday directive of April 1940, there is still the problem of how many of the initially limited production gets allocated to KwK and how many to PaK. And how do you get around the very real stricture regarding limitations on the length of the tank barrel, which led to the KwK produced according to Hitler's order being an L42 gun rather than an L60 gun. Did Hitler literally order the L60 be used or did he order a 5cm gun be used? Regardless, the stricture was maintained and the result was production of the L42 KwK began sometime in June at low rate with the first completed tanks accepted in July.

So assume that Hitler did indeed order the L60, the designers accepted that and the HWA accepted the change on barrel length. With an assumed months delay you might expect as many as 750 Panzer III with KwK 39 accepted by 22 June 1941. Is that a critical mass? But haven't you been saying that the KwK 39 was useless frontally against the T-34/KV? Do we then circle back to the need for the 7.5cm KwK 40 and the use of an assault gun as a tank? How does that work?

[Richard Anderson]

BTW, I forgot to mention I am unclear where the assumption that the proposed armament change would significantly alter the personnel losses in the Panzerwaffe during BARBAROSSA. During the 2d, 3d, and 4th QTR 1941 the Germans recorded the loss of 345 Pz I, 393 Pz II, 773 Pz 38t, 782 Pz III, and 369 Pz IV. The proposed change can only affect the losses of the Pz III, right? So in782 tanks with 3,910 crew at threat. Of whom on average probably 1,986 or so were casualties, of whom perhaps 489 were killed and some other number permanently incapacitated. Call it a "savings" of 1,300 men? Is that significant?

BTW, how does changing the armament of the Pz III affect the losses of the Pz I, Pz II, Pz 38t, and Pz IV?

[LachenKrieg]

1. I never said that only the spare parts matter, although they were involved in 7/10 of the repair jobs. (Operational readiness does not entirely depend on repair.)
2. This WI is about the supposed effect of the better guns on certain tanks. I say it is not such a relevant factor that could determine the outcome of theatres of the size of the Eastern Front; logistics and organization can.

I said the Wehrmacht was a spent force by the spring of 1942, you said it wasn't. You told me to give you the numbers, I brought you first rate numbers from primary sources: the state of the divisions, the aircrafts, the tanks. I can give you the exact references, if you need them. The victories Germany scored in 1942 were the last spasms of a lost cause. The Soviets actually took the initiative as early as August. In the southern sector, they regrouped their forces and counterattacked in the autumn just as in the central and later on in the northern sector.

All right Peter fair enough, I appreciate the effort.
I don't think there is any value though in discussing Germany's capability at any given point in the war, because I don't believe you are being objective. Do you really believe that In the spring of 1942, Russian military leaders were sitting around a table telling each not to worry about the spat of recent losses because those are just the last spasms of a lost cause, or are you saying that because you know how the war ended?

But to the rest of your comment, the type of armored vehicle and the effectiveness of its weapon system is very much a part of/a primary factor of organization. I find it strange that you don't see that. The entire war was punctuated by both sides trying to get a leg up on their enemy. That meant more powerful battleships, faster fighter planes with more range, and yes... a more capable armored fighting force. This is not rocket science Peter.

1. I never said that it has NO relevance, I explicitly stated the opposite. It has some relevance, but it is not a game-changer. Are you even reading my comments?
2. Tanks don't use tires.

A better tank is a better tank than a worse tank, no one is arguing with that. The question is what is the net difference of this WI?

Manpower that was required to develop, produce, equip and maintain the new guns on the tanks.

Do you know how much of the Wehrmacht's firepower came from Pz III and Pz IV tanks, and what would be the net change with their improved armament?

You still don't understand, do you?

Yes, a better gun is better.

But in any What Ifs you must name where do this extra resources come from?

There is a give and the take. You only talk about one side of the things. I keep reminding you of the cost side.

German tank damage output would increase with better guns on tanks.

What would the Germans sacrifice in order to get those better guns on their tanks?

Infantry equipment? Aircraft production? Submarines? AT guns?

First of all you are trying to imply that the WI would require a give and take, but this is simply not the case. All the WI requires is that the Pz III chassis which was already made is used to make long barrelled StuG's. In other words, make long barreled StuG's instead of Pz III L/M's. So there is no give and take here. Instead of making a 5.0 cm gun with a turret, the WI calls for just making a 7.5 cm gun. In terms of cost, the StuG cost slightly less to make and that is before we consider the cost/time for all the refitting that had to be done to correct the poor decision of putting the short barrel 5.0 cm gun in the first place.

And this leads to your second assumption regarding manpower. There is no requirement/need for additional manpower. As I already said above, they were already making Pz III's when they should have been making StuG's.

In terms of the fire power, I already gave you an example from the forces Germany fielded in the summer offensive against Stalingrad, Less than 10% of the vehicles on hand could actually penetrate a T34's frontal armor. Had they made long barrelled StuG's instead of Pz III L's, they could have increased that number to well beyond 50%.

Moreover: of course I can answer it. If Germany does not attack the Soviet Union, never sets foot in Africa, they could drag on until May 1945 without improved tank armament. If I consider the high cost of tank developments and production, Germany could do much, much better.

Isn't that a little bit like saying, if Germany didn't go to war?

And they were dealt with the results we know from history.

No they weren't dealt with Peter, this is the whole reason/purpose for the WI. Germany needed to improve the effectiveness of its fighting force in order to deal with the larger production capacity of Russia

Again, tell me how most tanks were lost in combat. Was it tank vs tank fight?

I'm not sure if this is a loaded question, but if you are talking about combat then yes tanks lost in battle (other tanks/AT guns) would obviously be a big piece of the pie.