The Army Ordnance Department plays a role in the outcome at Stalingrad.

[Richard Anderson]

If I may add something on the sidenote: the gun of a tank was an important equipment of course, but it was not a game-changer on the strategic scale.

Indeed. That is another notion that has no real support. The idea that switching out a single weapon system could change that history is on shaky ground to say the least.

[T. A. Gardner]

If I may add something on the sidenote: the gun of a tank was an important equipment of course, but it was not a game-changer on the strategic scale.

All other things being equal, the most common element in victory was superiority in numbers. The qualitative improvement a better gun on Pz III tanks would offer, could not offset the Soviet superiority in numbers. When it comes to quality, almost nothing matters as much as training (including officier training in command, control and doctrine). When it comes to quantity, almost nothing matters as much as maintenance, including adequate supplies - most notably that of spare parts. The failure of the centralized maintenance system alone contributed to more operational non-availability than any "gun upgrade WI" could offset. Then comes the question of supplies, the lack of which also contributed to more loss of effective fighting power than any production priority decisions could influence realistically.

Tanks did not operate in an empty space either. The Battle of Arracourt showed that even supposedly superior German tanks could be defeated when they lack air cover, recon units, supporting infantry, anti-tank guns and so on. Changing a gun type on a certain type of tank will influence little in the strategic outcome of the war.

Thus my suggestion that the focus be on improving civil engineering capacity as that is a force multiplier. You have the same forces but more of it is available to fight and less is wasted in daily operations outside of combat.

[LachenKrieg]

Clearly you have been offended, and I don't mind owning that with an apology to step things back, but that would also require effort from your side. What your sensing is not attitude, but more like frustration from having the things I said misrepresented.

No actually, what you said is quoted below...

The StuG III was not a tank, it was an assault gun, an infantry support weapon, and when the Germans tried to use it as a tank in 1943 it proved unsuccessful.

I then asked you to provide a reference to which you cited a section from Jentz's Panzer Truppen.

We can review that section here if you like, but I will point out what your citing is simply 4 experience reports as recorded by 4 individuals that had command over Panzer units, not the German Armee, or even the Panzer Turppen as a whole! If this is the proof you were talking about, then I think you are grossly exaggerating the value of these reports in terms of their ability to provide any sort of conclusion to the StuG's battle performance. There are so many variables at play here that it is almost impossible to take any meaningful conclusions from them. You could probably generate a new point of view with each battle report in that case. The only conclusions I make from the 4 reports is that the StuG was a useful weapon on the battle field, and that the degree of just how useful depends on the person making the report. There are also scores of battle/experience reports from commanding officers in StuG units that paint the picture in a slightly different tint. I can only recommend you read some of them. There is also the fact that StuG's continued to be relied on in a tank hunter/destroyer role more and more as the war progressed as a testament to their combat value.

It also helps to keep an open mind when reading the various reference materials available as they were originally written in German and had to be translated. I have come across numerous misprints, errors, and contradictory texts in a number of the reference sources I have.

Report 1: The author states "The mixture of StuG's and PzIV's has proven itself to be useful. The StuG's are employed very much like Panzers..." After 9 days of heavy combat the unit knocked out 184 tanks, 87 ATG, 26 artillery. Enemy tanks were almost exclusively T34's.

Report 2:
This report might be one of those where some of the text has been mistranslated. The author gives answers to 4 questions. The first question is whether Panzers and StuGs should be mixed. His concluding remark is "another solution would be overly complicated", which leaves me wondering if the preceding translated text was meant to say "in no case should they NOT be mixed within units". He then follows with the answer to his second question regarding how well this has worked out; "both panzer IV and StuG have worked out well". The author also seems to use the terms Panzer and StuG interchangeably. When listing the weapons used, he states Panzers, Pak, Artillery, and Air support. Later he states "we need Panzers, Panzers, and more Panzers including StuG's to increase the offensive power". He concludes that they must have numerically superior, really strong Panzer units to achieve offensive victories. Its hard to imagine how a Panzer Crew would characterize their tanks as strong if they were unable to penetrate enemy armor? NOTE: The author is not making a reference to Pz III L's here.

Report 3:
The author categorizes his combat experience commanding a mixed unit into 4 different types of maneuvers. He notes the StuG offers an advantage in FIRST WAVE attacks due to its lower profile, but the lack of a turret and adequate protection for MG crew slows the assault and increases risk in close combat situations. There is no doubt a turret offers certain advantages, but regarding the speed of the assault, it is worth noting that German tank tactics usually called for stopping the vehicle before firing. And in the case of the StuG, the entire crew is always oriented to the direction of the gun, which can help speed up reaction, and simplify communications between Commander, Gunner, and driver when spotting targets. In a turreted vehicle, for the driver to position the hull to have his armor face a threat can put the driver and gunner in opposing movements. Not to mention hull travers is usually faster than turret travers. In any event, well trained crews are essential in both types of vehicles, especially when speed and efficiency are needed. He states that the StuG is better used in the SECOND WAVE, but best when EMPLOYED WITH INFANTRY. Lastly he states the StuG has proven itself to be very good in DEFENSE. He then provides numbers of kills for each vehicle type showing the turreted tank to be superior, which is no surprise considering the way in which he apparently deployed the StuG's under his command.

Report 4: Details the battle results after 4 days of fighting in StuG's. Losses 1 Pz.Bef.Wg, 6 StuG's - Kills 12 tanks, 19 ATG, 2 Artillery, 3 motars, 3 trucks.

But I will repeat, your use of "THEY EVALUATED" is an exaggeration of the facts to say the least Richard if you don't mind me being frank. I am assuming you don't mean that Germany based its military doctrine on this commanders 16 day experience report in 1943 are you? And it would be interested to know what you think of the 1st report in comparison to the 3rd? Both reports were made by Panzer Truppen Commanders. But its not all lost on me Richard, because I think the following quote was well stated:

Richard Anderson wrote " The problem is the actual purpose of the counterfactual in historical analysis is to better understand why things happened the way they did."


I think the above quote points to a very important part of this discussion, and one that I would like to add to, but it would be helpful to better understand how and in what context you frame your argument. Could you provide your source for the statement you make in the quote below?

Richard Anderson wrote " That is why HWA overruled the request of the Schnelletruppen for a 5cm gun in the ZW development. They felt it would take too long and so went with what was already available."

Because as far as understanding why history happened the way it did, it is sometimes useful to first put it in the context of our own life experiences. If you have ever been involved in a large organizational structure, then you probably already experienced the struggle that often arises for limited resources between competing groups within an organization. The power struggle that was going on between the various branches of the German military at that time has been alluded to by a number of well known researchers in this field. Overlaying this with the intended purpose for Hitler's military expansion makes the internal power struggles in prewar Germany that much easier to understand.

But I feel no shame in saying that I find your conclusions to be too sterile/shallow Richard in the sense that there doesn't appear to be any real effort to connect, at a deeper level, why things happened and I think this causes you to sometimes overlook obvious points.

For example, you stated the reason for not putting a 5.0 cm gun in the Pz III initially was because they would have had to wait until 1938. While this may be true, the Pz III wasn't approved for final production until 1939.

You also use the fact that Germany was working on a heavy breakthrough tank, and that the intention was to arm it with a larger caliber gun long before knowledge of the T34/KV existed as a way to rationalize the notion that the discovery of these Russian tanks was of no importance. Your right, Germany didn't contemplate making a heavy tank because Russia did, but the gravity of the situation changed significantly when it was discovered that they had.

You also agreed that a long barrel 7.5 cm gun could have gone into the StuG III earlier, but stand on the historical limited production to claim it would have no impact anyway. This is what I would call using what happened to brush aside the plausible alternative that could have happened. Bringing this back to your stated purpose of understanding why things happened, I encourage you to first review all the efforts that were made to rescue/revive the PzIII as an effective AT weapon, and then ask yourself why?

As you pointed out the Pz III is a tank, and as such it fell under the responsibility of Guderian. The StuG being an assault gun came under the control of the Germany Army's Artillery. The power struggle between players like Guderian, Beck, and Manstein for example is a well accepted fact. Having resources originally allocated for PzIII production reallocated for StuG production is synonymous to Guderian loosing out to Beck and the German Army's Artillery branch. Granted I admit it is hard to really appreciate small details like this unless you have experienced this same type of behavior in a large organization.

But this could go on and on, I mean I'm not even half way through your last post. So to conclude out of the need for other interests, this WI made a suggestion to address a specific question. A suggestion that you BTW purposefully distorted the meaning of. I never said Germany didn't need more tanks. Sure if Germany would have been able to produce PzIII L60's in multiples of what it actually did, that too could have probably had a similar effect. But the WI being suggested is not attempting to operate under the assumption that Germany could double/triple/quadruple its PzIII production, because that I hope we can all agree would not be plausible.

Instead the suggestion was to improve the number of tanks Germany did produce so that they could be as effective as possible on the battle field. In other words, because of the limited production Germany had, the effectiveness of each tank fielded was even more important. Spending multiple rounds of ammunition in an attempt to knock out an enemy only to be blown apart in a single shot can hardly be seen as being effective, or efficient, and it does nothing to address the need for more tanks. It in fact helps to decrease the number of tanks, and is a complete waste of resources. And given the problem Germany faced by the end of August 1942, switching out PzIII production lines to PzIV would accomplish nothing, because aside from the downtime needed to make that happen, they would still be fielding a similarly armored vehicle with the same L48 gun. The most direct way to a more potent AFV force would be to abandon turreted versions of the PzIII and utilize all PzIII chassis for the production of long barrel StuG III's.

Good Night Sir!

[LachenKrieg]

If I may add something on the sidenote: the gun of a tank was an important equipment of course, but it was not a game-changer on the strategic scale.

All other things being equal, the most common element in victory was superiority in numbers. The qualitative improvement a better gun on Pz III tanks would offer, could not offset the Soviet superiority in numbers. When it comes to quality, almost nothing matters as much as training (including officier training in command, control and doctrine). When it comes to quantity, almost nothing matters as much as maintenance, including adequate supplies - most notably that of spare parts. The failure of the centralized maintenance system alone contributed to more operational non-availability than any "gun upgrade WI" could offset. Then comes the question of supplies, the lack of which also contributed to more loss of effective fighting power than any production priority decisions could influence realistically.

Tanks did not operate in an empty space either. The Battle of Arracourt showed that even supposedly superior German tanks could be defeated when they lack air cover, recon units, supporting infantry, anti-tank guns and so on. Changing a gun type on a certain type of tank will influence little in the strategic outcome of the war.

Peter, thank you for your comments. I will try to be short.

While what you are saying would be very true under most circumstances, the history surrounding this particular topic would disagree with you.

Anyone interested can review a number of the early battles in WWII, especially those on the Eastern Front to better appreciate/understand why.

If you are familiar with Panzer Truppen, as I am sure you are, Jentz asks several very relevant questions to open his introduction. Two of the most interesting questions for me were, how did the Germans survive in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority, and how did they defeat enemy tanks that had better guns and armor?

It would take me far too much time just now to do a proper job of putting this together in post just now, but in short I believe the discussion includes both German tactics as well as aspects of Russian tank design that fed into the situational awareness of its crew.

So while German tank crews were able to initially beat the odds and overcome the masses of Russian tanks, the protracted war caused a serious deficit in experienced NCO's and tank crews that were a lot harder to replace than the material losses they experienced. This situation would be made even worse as Russia learned from its mistakes and perfected it's own tactics.

But I am sure you already know all of this, Essentially irreplaceable losses and a severe lack of supply would eventually tell the end of this story.

But that is not what this WI is about. When forces in the south were split, German leadership made an already desperate situation untenable. The WI offers almost the only thing left to offer considering the circumstances. If Germany was to have any chance of stabilizing the Eastern Front as they faced an invasion from the West, it would have been to break contact with the enemy at Stalingrad before the end of August and fall back behind more defensible position. Fielding guns that were capable of taking out enemy armor with the least amount of expended ammunition would have helped conserve the limited number of AFV Germany did have, while at the same time cause an increased loss of men and material to the opposing force. Would that have been enough to win a war with multiple fronts, no I doubt it. But what it might have done is create the opportunity to avoid encirclement and stabilize the Eastern Front.

[Richard Anderson]

Clearly you have been offended, and I don't mind owning that with an apology to step things back, but that would also require effort from your side. What your sensing is not attitude, but more like frustration from having the things I said misrepresented.

Fair enough. No, not offended but frustrated as well.

No actually, what you said is quoted below...

The StuG III was not a tank, it was an assault gun, an infantry support weapon, and when the Germans tried to use it as a tank in 1943 it proved unsuccessful.

Indeed, but what you replied with was:

I asked you to provide a source that can demonstrate/document that the StuG was unsuccessful, but instead you cited a section of a book that actually supports its use.

,,,but I never said the StuG was unsiccesful, I said it was unsuccessful as a tank, which was what the German assessment was.

I then asked you to provide a reference to which you cited a section from Jentz's Panzer Truppen.

We can review that section here if you like, but I will point out what your citing is simply 4 experience reports as recorded by 4 individuals that had command over Panzer units, not the German Armee, or even the Panzer Turppen as a whole!

Three divisions, 14., 16., and 24. Panzer were recreated 17 February 1943 following the Stalingrad disaster with a combined Panzer-Sturmgeschütz Panzer-Regiment where the III. Abteilung was comprised of Sturmgeschütz and the other two Abteilungen of Panzer IV. The reason was lack of sufficient replacement Panzers and Guderian's desire to increase the strength of the Panzer-Regiment. Then in July 1943, the I. Abteilung of each were detached for conversion to Panther and the III. Abteilung shifted to an organization of two Pz-IV and two StuG Kompanien.

All three divisions were committed with that organization in the fall of 1943. The commander of Panzer-Regiment 36. wrote the assessment I referenced. The commander of III./Panzer-Regiment 36, III./Panzer-Regiment 24, and a Hauptmann in III./Panzer-Regiment 24. also wrote assessments. None were glowing with respect to the concept. The Panzertruppen continued to have a crying need for replacements but no other unit converted to such an organization.

Why?

If this is the proof you were talking about, then I think you are grossly exaggerating the value of these reports in terms of their ability to provide any sort of conclusion to the StuG's battle performance.

Okay, then where are all the glowing reports of the StuG stating they were a wonderful Panzer replacement and they should be used throughout the Panzerwaffe as a Panzer replacement? Where is the record of units converting wholesale to Panzer-Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen in the Panzerwaffe?

(snip)It also helps to keep an open mind when reading the various reference materials available as they were originally written in German and had to be translated. I have come across numerous misprints, errors, and contradictory texts in a number of the reference sources I have.

This report might be one of those where some of the text has been mistranslated.

While that can be true, I would not make the assumption that Tom Jentz mistranslated anything. If anything, his translations of German to English tend to retain the Germanic syntax more than most other authors. However, I will see if I can track down my copy of the original and check.

The author gives answers to 4 questions. The first question is whether Panzers and StuGs should be mixed. His concluding remark is "another solution would be overly complicated", which leaves me wondering if the preceding translated text was meant to say "in no case should they NOT be mixed within units". He then follows with the answer to his second question regarding how well this has worked out; "both panzer IV and StuG have worked out well". The author also seems to use the terms Panzer and StuG interchangeably. When listing the weapons used, he states Panzers, Pak, Artillery, and Air support. Later he states "we need Panzers, Panzers, and more Panzers including StuG's to increase the offensive power". He concludes that they must have numerically superior, really strong Panzer units to achieve offensive victories. Its hard to imagine how a Panzer Crew would characterize their tanks as strong if they were unable to penetrate enemy armor? NOTE: The author is not making a reference to Pz III L's here.

Why yes, you could say he wanted three times as many Panzer as StuG. Or you could say he was damning with faint praise. Regardless and despite the availability of StuG as Panzer replacements, they really only were used as such once, in three battalions, and only for half the battalion strength.

Again, if they were so successful, why wasn't the organization expanded throughout the Panzerwaffe?

But I will repeat, your use of "THEY EVALUATED" is an exaggeration of the facts to say the least Richard if you don't mind me being frank. I am assuming you don't mean that Germany based its military doctrine on this commanders 16 day experience report in 1943 are you?

They are called Erfahrungsbericht - experience reports - and are filed with the records of the Generalinspektür der Panzertruppen. You know, Heinz, the other guy with the funny mustache responsible after February 1943 for the organization and doctrine of the Panzertruppen? The evaluations based on the Erfahrungsbericht were done by that inspectorate. Do you think if they found the StuG a spiffy replacement for the Panzer that they would continue that organizational trend?

And it would be interested to know what you think of the 1st report in comparison to the 3rd? Both reports were made by Panzer Truppen Commanders.

Actually the last, written by the Oberstleutnant commanding Panzer-Regiment 2. is possibly the most valuable, since he was in a position to assess the overall performance of the regiment.

But its not all lost on me Richard, because I think the following quote was well stated:

Oh, shucks, thanks.

Richard Anderson wrote " That is why HWA overruled the request of the Schnelletruppen for a 5cm gun in the ZW development. They felt it would take too long and so went with what was already available."

Because as far as understanding why history happened the way it did, it is sometimes useful to first put it in the context of our own life experiences. If you have ever been involved in a large organizational structure, then you probably already experienced the struggle that often arises for limited resources between competing groups within an organization. The power struggle that was going on between the various branches of the German military at that time has been alluded to by a number of well known researchers in this field. Overlaying this with the intended purpose for Hitler's military expansion makes the internal power struggles in prewar Germany that much easier to understand.

But I feel no shame in saying that I find your conclusions to be too sterile/shallow Richard in the sense that there doesn't appear to be any real effort to connect, at a deeper level, why things happened and I think this causes you to sometimes overlook obvious points.

Yes, I have worked in both large and small organizational structures but if my shorthand assessment is too sterile/shallow for you I'm sorry. I don't always bother to dig back deeply into sources on these internet discussions because all too often I find I am on a tail-chasing expedition where no evidence ever transcends the assumptions of the other poster.

For example, you stated the reason for not putting a 5.0 cm gun in the Pz III initially was because they would have had to wait until 1938. While this may be true, the Pz III wasn't approved for final production until 1939.

The initial discussions on whether or not to develop a 5cm gun for the proposed light tank go back to 1932, before the ZW was even authorized. However, no authorization or funding for a tank-mounted 5cm gun were approved until 4 January 1938 and the RFP from WaPrüf 4 to Krupp went out 15 March 1938. At that time Krupp and Rheinmetall were working on completing the 5cm PaK 37 and used it as the basis for their proposal. The basic specification requirement was:

1. The muzzle must remain behind the front edge of the Panzer so was restricted to 2103 mm.
2. Cartridge and projectile should be short due to restricted turret space.
3. Penetration of 40mm at 700 meters at 30 degrees.

The gun was proposed for the 7./ZW series (Ausf H), which was the third production model after the Ausf F and G. In 6 ordered 759 Panzer III (the 7./ZW) on 11 July 1938 and extended the order by another 440 (the 8./ZW) on 6 December 1938. By 11 July 1938, they already had production orders placed for 435 5./ZW and 800 6./ZW.

Why do you think the Panzer III was not "approved for final production until 1939? By 1 January 1939 all 65 of the pilot 1., 2., and 3. ZW were complete and the first of the production series 4. ZW (Ausf E) was ready.

You also use the fact that Germany was working on a heavy breakthrough tank, and that the intention was to arm it with a larger caliber gun long before knowledge of the T34/KV existed as a way to rationalize the notion that the discovery of these Russian tanks was of no importance. Your right, Germany didn't contemplate making a heavy tank because Russia did, but the gravity of the situation changed significantly when it was discovered that they had.

I don't believe I ever said the "discovery of these Russian tanks was of no importance"?

You also agreed that a long barrel 7.5 cm gun could have gone into the StuG III earlier, but stand on the historical limited production to claim it would have no impact anyway. This is what I would call using what happened to brush aside the plausible alternative that could have happened. Bringing this back to your stated purpose of understanding why things happened, I encourage you to first review all the efforts that were made to rescue/revive the PzIII as an effective AT weapon, and then ask yourself why?

Um, no, I said no such thing. I said that Krupp experimented with installing a pre-production PaK 40 in L33 caliber in March 1941 but nothing came of it. Given the production of the PaK/KwK 40 began in c. December 1941 it is remarkable that they were in armored vehicles as early as February 1942 (3 Marder) and March (StuG and Pz IV possibly?) However, if the weapon doesn't exist earlier than December 1941 it is difficult to see how it can be put into an armored vehicle earlier than that.

Could it have been developed earlier? Sure, in theory. The development time for most of those guns seemed to run around two years, so instead of the request going through funding in FY 1938 for start of work in early 1939, all they needed to do was fund it in FY 1937 for start of work in early 1938. Presto!

As you pointed out the Pz III is a tank, and as such it fell under the responsibility of Guderian.

Nope. Guderian had no overarching authority over HWA, the Schnelltruppen, or OKH. He was head of In 6 until 15 August 1935, so the early decisions on building the Panzer III - letting out competing contracts to multiple firms - was at leadt partly his responsibility, but until he became General-Inspektür der Panzertruppen in February 1943 his "responsibility" for Panzer III was bupkis.

The StuG being an assault gun came under the control of the Germany Army's Artillery. The power struggle between players like Guderian, Beck, and Manstein for example is a well accepted fact.

What "power struggle" was Guderian involved in? He was an Oberst at In 6 at the time. You do realize that when Manstein wrote his memo to Beck on 8 June 1935 he was a Hauptmann? And that he played no further role in the development of the Sturmartillerie?

Having resources originally allocated for PzIII production reallocated for StuG production is synonymous to Guderian loosing out to Beck and the German Army's Artillery branch. Granted I admit it is hard to really appreciate small details like this unless you have experienced this same type of behavior in a large organization.

This is starting to sound like a Belton Cooperish diatribe.

But this could go on and on, I mean I'm not even half way through your last post. So to conclude out of the need for other interests, this WI made a suggestion to address a specific question. A suggestion that you BTW purposefully distorted the meaning of. I never said Germany didn't need more tanks. Sure if Germany would have been able to produce PzIII L60's in multiples of what it actually did, that too could have probably had a similar effect. But the WI being suggested is not attempting to operate under the assumption that Germany could double/triple/quadruple its PzIII production, because that I hope we can all agree would not be plausible.

Instead the suggestion was to improve the number of tanks Germany did produce so that they could be as effective as possible on the battle field. In other words, because of the limited production Germany had, the effectiveness of each tank fielded was even more important. Spending multiple rounds of ammunition in an attempt to knock out an enemy only to be blown apart in a single shot can hardly be seen as being effective, or efficient, and it does nothing to address the need for more tanks. It in fact helps to decrease the number of tanks, and is a complete waste of resources. And given the problem Germany faced by the end of August 1942, switching out PzIII production lines to PzIV would accomplish nothing, because aside from the downtime needed to make that happen, they would still be fielding a similarly armored vehicle with the same L48 gun. The most direct way to a more potent AFV force would be to abandon turreted versions of the PzIII and utilize all PzIII chassis for the production of long barrel StuG III's.

Damn I guess they were just dumb...

[Peter89]

If I may add something on the sidenote: the gun of a tank was an important equipment of course, but it was not a game-changer on the strategic scale.

All other things being equal, the most common element in victory was superiority in numbers. The qualitative improvement a better gun on Pz III tanks would offer, could not offset the Soviet superiority in numbers. When it comes to quality, almost nothing matters as much as training (including officier training in command, control and doctrine). When it comes to quantity, almost nothing matters as much as maintenance, including adequate supplies - most notably that of spare parts. The failure of the centralized maintenance system alone contributed to more operational non-availability than any "gun upgrade WI" could offset. Then comes the question of supplies, the lack of which also contributed to more loss of effective fighting power than any production priority decisions could influence realistically.

Tanks did not operate in an empty space either. The Battle of Arracourt showed that even supposedly superior German tanks could be defeated when they lack air cover, recon units, supporting infantry, anti-tank guns and so on. Changing a gun type on a certain type of tank will influence little in the strategic outcome of the war.

Peter, thank you for your comments. I will try to be short.

While what you are saying would be very true under most circumstances, the history surrounding this particular topic would disagree with you.

Anyone interested can review a number of the early battles in WWII, especially those on the Eastern Front to better appreciate/understand why.

If you are familiar with Panzer Truppen, as I am sure you are, Jentz asks several very relevant questions to open his introduction. Two of the most interesting questions for me were, how did the Germans survive in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority, and how did they defeat enemy tanks that had better guns and armor?

It would take me far too much time just now to do a proper job of putting this together in post just now, but in short I believe the discussion includes both German tactics as well as aspects of Russian tank design that fed into the situational awareness of its crew.

So while German tank crews were able to initially beat the odds and overcome the masses of Russian tanks, the protracted war caused a serious deficit in experienced NCO's and tank crews that were a lot harder to replace than the material losses they experienced. This situation would be made even worse as Russia learned from its mistakes and perfected it's own tactics.

But I am sure you already know all of this, Essentially irreplaceable losses and a severe lack of supply would eventually tell the end of this story.

But that is not what this WI is about. When forces in the south were split, German leadership made an already desperate situation untenable. The WI offers almost the only thing left to offer considering the circumstances. If Germany was to have any chance of stabilizing the Eastern Front as they faced an invasion from the West, it would have been to break contact with the enemy at Stalingrad before the end of August and fall back behind more defensible position. Fielding guns that were capable of taking out enemy armor with the least amount of expended ammunition would have helped conserve the limited number of AFV Germany did have, while at the same time cause an increased loss of men and material to the opposing force. Would that have been enough to win a war with multiple fronts, no I doubt it. But what it might have done is create the opportunity to avoid encirclement and stabilize the Eastern Front.

Hello LachenKrieg,

The opening of the Eastern Front was a catastrophic blunder, and in my opinion the Germans were never one last push or one little change away from victory there. If anything, they've done much better than they should have. After the decisive winter of 1941/1942, the Germans declared war on the US (a war they could never hope to win), they were defeated in the air by Britain and on the land by the Soviets. The rational approach should have been the evacuation of Africa (with the Barbarossa in their minds, the Germans shouldn't have gone there in the first place) and small offensives in the East, within the range of the more permanent airfields, the maintenance workshops and the mobile formations.

Of course the problem was that the Soviets and the Allies generated forces at a much higher pace, so Germany had to win, and had to win in 1942. Thus they decided to risk overextension. We know the results, but avoiding the Stalingrad disaster would not save the Germans like that. Encirclements happened all the time (Demyansk, Kholm, Velikiye Luki, etc.), and the 9th army in Rhzev barely survived Operation Mars. Who knows what would have happened if the Soviets did not risk to assault a well-defended Don defense line, but put even more troops for Operation Mars or Operation Iskra.

As for the equipment of the tanks, I told you it might be important, but what decisively benefited the Germans in the border battles were the following things:
- the Soviet problems with command & control
- the long German preparations
- the short supply lines and good maintenance situation

If you believe that a tank gun could decisively influence some parts of the Eastern front campaigns, please do provide some sources or facts. I mean yes, a better gun is better, and it could achieve better results, but you have to demonstrate its decisive role in operations.

[LachenKrieg]

,,,but I never said the StuG was unsiccesful, I said it was unsuccessful as a tank, which was what the German assessment was.

TBH Richard, the feeling I have had from the start of this discussion with you is that you are being disingenuous, and it seems I was right. You mean the StuG was unsuccessful as a tank in the same way your car would be unsuccessful as an airplane? The bold text in your quote above is nothing more than you giving/inventing your own meaning to the text.

The personal assessment of the StuG in all 4 reports WAS NOT that it was unsuccessful as a tank (armored vehicle). Where do you get that from, and where in the 3rd report does it say that? The 3rd report points to obvious differences between the two, but it does not say the StuG was unsuccessful at anything. The 3rd report states what is seen as an advantage for turreted vehicles, but where did it say the StuG failed to successfully engage targets to the left or right. Remember, the 3rd report is made by someone trained in tanks. Even if he actually commanded in a StuG, I am guessing he would have a lot more experience in a turreted vehicle. It would be completely understandable if his assessment contained some form of bias in that regard.

In the 1st report, it clearly states that the mix HAS PROVEN ITSELF TO BE USEFUL. It also states that StuG's are employed MUCH LIKE PANZERS. This German assessment clearly disagrees with yours, and somewhat counters the 3rd. How do you fit this into the narrative your spinning here? You mean a someone gave his opinion on how the StuG was best used, and you mistranslated that to mean... the German Army has deemed the StuG to be unsuccessful as a tank?

In the 2nd report, and I should first be clear, I am not suggesting or assuming that anyone misinterpreted something on purpose. Errors and mistakes are easy to make especially in a project of this size and magnitude. It wouldn't be the first time an incorrect edit/translation/quote made it to print undetected.

I am just pointing out that the English meaning of the text doesn't make sense when read together. The English text reads as if the German author said he doesn't think mixed units are good, but then follows that by saying another solution would be overly complicated. It would make more sense if the author suggested the something better, but instead he implies that a mixed group is at least better then any other solution. The author then follows that by stating the PzIV and StuG have worked out well, which again doesn't really agree with the first translated statement.

But aside from that, the 2nd report also includes StuG's as part of the recognized need to increase offensive power, and the author finds it bearable to have up to half of the allotment of vehicles in a Panzer-Abteilung to be StuG's. What does this persons assessment tell you Richard? What does 50% mean? Would you also misinterpret that as being "unsuccessful"? Can you point out what it is that leaves you with the impression none of the reports were glowing with respect to the concept? Did you even read the 1st, 2nd, and 4th reports?

Another point in the 2nd report is the author actually states he thinks the StuG is the IDEAL WEAPON for engaging tanks at least in the terrain of Southern Russia. See how this contrasts with the 3rd report that claims it is difficult for the StuG to engage enemy targets in heavy ground? While the authors of both reports don't seem to share the same opinion here, I question how the author of the 3rd report sees the terrain as being a problem for the StuG, and not for the PzIV? Having a turret means you can traverse the gun left and right without traversing the hull, but that couldn't possibly replace the real-life need to traverse the hull in practice. Out of all 4 reports, the 3rd has the most obvious signs of bias towards Panzers. And I don't see that as such a big surprise given the organization he belongs to and the leadership role he plays in it. Some of this could simply be linked to his pride and loyalty towards the Panzerwaffe.

If you consider the last (4th) report the most valuable, then what in it would support the wild claim your making? I am actually really interested in how you came to this logical misstep.

So again, there is no German assessment that the StuG failed, or was unsuccessful, your making that part up right? Nothing in the 4 experience reports indicates the German Army assessed the StuG in the way you are implying. If your plan is to simply define success as having a turret, then like I said Richard that is just you being disingenuous in an attempt to make the narrative more believable.

All three divisions were committed with that organization in the fall of 1943. The commander of Panzer-Regiment 36. wrote the assessment I referenced. The commander of III./Panzer-Regiment 36, III./Panzer-Regiment 24, and a Hauptmann in III./Panzer-Regiment 24. also wrote assessments. None were glowing with respect to the concept. The Panzertruppen continued to have a crying need for replacements but no other unit converted to such an organization.

Why?

Because StuG's were not considered part of the Panzerwaffe. Sturmartillery came under the German Army's Artillery and were deployed first as Battalions, and then later in Brigades. The Inspector General of armored troops had little to say about resources allocated as assault artillery. But it goes without saying that the StuG was transformed into a very effective AT weapon, and continued in that role until the end of the war.

Um, no, I said no such thing.

Actually Richard you did, and this is what you said. To be honest, its getting a little boring having to go back with each new post to point out things you said, but claim you didn't.

Yes, it could have gone into a StuG earlier but given that only Alkett was seriously engaged in its manufacture how many could there be until StuG chassis production increased?

I can't remember who, but someone here once said:

You know, Heinz, the other guy with the funny mustache responsible after February 1943 for the organization and doctrine of the Panzertruppen?

And IIRC, he also said:

Nope. Guderian had no overarching authority over HWA, the Schnelltruppen, or OKH. He was head of In 6 until 15 August 1935, so the early decisions on building the Panzer III - letting out competing contracts to multiple firms - was at leadt partly his responsibility, but until he became General-Inspektür der Panzertruppen in February 1943 his "responsibility" for Panzer III was bupkis.

Its also getting a little stale to have you misstate, or take things out of context just to fit your narrative.

BTW, you can stop citing every single fact and figure about WWII Germany. I get it. You not only bought the book, you read it! I think that's great, and I really do appreciate your knowledge and interest on this subject. If your using the facts and figures to make a point, then fine I'm all ears and eyes, but what point are you making by regurgitating every date, fact, and figure you ever read about a guns development, or the career milestones of someone?

A central focus in my last post was regarding the wild claims you made about 4 experience/battle reports from 1943. So part of the discussion was built with the mindset of using mixed Panzer/StuG units. I guess I just assumed you would understand I wasn't talking about the good Generals upbringing, or when he took his first sip of beer.

My last post was also about large organizational structures and the power struggles that are often seen in them. Regardless, I don't see what difference it makes, or the point your trying to make here. Guderian was the driving force behind the creation of Germany's Panzer Divisions and you should be able to understand that without taking things out of context, unless of course your doing that on purpose.

Regardless of what position he held at anytime during this period, his loyalty and support was obviously behind the Panzerwaffe from the beginning to the end. Manstein on the other hand fully supported the creation and use of assault artillery, which belongs to a different arm then the one Guderian directly supported. Manstein was meant to link the Army's Chief of Staff who supported the idea of assault artillery, while opposing the formation of armored troops. My point Richard being that this is a large organization with large well defined structures where protectionism is common.

I am sure you are well aware, but in case you haven't bought any books on this yet, you can read about the struggles that were faced in trying to create the Panzer Divisions in a number of places.

The simple facts are there was a power struggle that existed, and it greatly affected what and when things were done. I can supply quotes if you need them. Beck clearly supported the military's infantry over the formation of armored divisions, and he is said to have also limited the level of authority the Commander of Armored Troops had after their formation. From my own experience, I can tell you that it is not uncommon to see this type of rivalry especially in institutions with such a long standing history as the military. New upstarts set to take the limelight are easy targets in that type of organization. The same can be said for the Panzer Divisions once its head was given more administrative control over the Divisions interests. Ceding control over an area of responsibility to another section within an organization is usually not given easily. This aspect of institutional culture wasn't unique to WWII Germany, but was likely present in WWI and continues still today.

This WI proposed that by abandoning turreted versions of the PzIII, Germany could have improved the effectiveness of its AFV force by producing long barrel StuG's.

Your initial reply to that was that a long barrel gun for the PzIII chassis couldn't have been delivered earlier than it was. To support that claim you also said that initially the 3.7 cm gun was decided on because otherwise it would take too long for a 5.0 cm gun to arrive. I haven't seen your reference to support this.

You also claimed that the WI wouldn't work because what was needed were more tanks. And to support that claim you cited 4 experience reports while misstating the content of the reports to claim more StuG's wouldn't hep the situation.

You also claimed that it would take 2 - 2.5 years to develop a 7.5 cm gun as a further reason why the WI is not plausible, while I can provide a timeline that would suggest a 7.5 cm gun was developed in much less time.

I haven't seen anything in your argument that proves the WI isn't plausible, and remain convinced that it could have helped Germany improve the combat effectiveness of its AFV.

[LachenKrieg]

Hello LachenKrieg,

The opening of the Eastern Front was a catastrophic blunder, and in my opinion the Germans were never one last push or one little change away from victory there. If anything, they've done much better than they should have. After the decisive winter of 1941/1942, the Germans declared war on the US (a war they could never hope to win), they were defeated in the air by Britain and on the land by the Soviets. The rational approach should have been the evacuation of Africa (with the Barbarossa in their minds, the Germans shouldn't have gone there in the first place) and small offensives in the East, within the range of the more permanent airfields, the maintenance workshops and the mobile formations.

Of course the problem was that the Soviets and the Allies generated forces at a much higher pace, so Germany had to win, and had to win in 1942. Thus they decided to risk overextension. We know the results, but avoiding the Stalingrad disaster would not save the Germans like that. Encirclements happened all the time (Demyansk, Kholm, Velikiye Luki, etc.), and the 9th army in Rhzev barely survived Operation Mars. Who knows what would have happened if the Soviets did not risk to assault a well-defended Don defense line, but put even more troops for Operation Mars or Operation Iskra.

As for the equipment of the tanks, I told you it might be important, but what decisively benefited the Germans in the border battles were the following things:
- the Soviet problems with command & control
- the long German preparations
- the short supply lines and good maintenance situation

If you believe that a tank gun could decisively influence some parts of the Eastern front campaigns, please do provide some sources or facts. I mean yes, a better gun is better, and it could achieve better results, but you have to demonstrate its decisive role in operations.

I don't contribute to WWII history forums, or participate in online WWII game sites because I enjoy promoting war. My fascination with WWII mostly revolves around the advances in technology in that time period and the speed at which it occurred. I admit I do have a bias towards German armored vehicles in much the same way I have a bias towards German automobiles today. I'm saying this only because this is the second time someone is suggesting I am somehow arguing that Germany could have won the war. While that might be the impression, nothing could be further from the truth.

That being said, I think the biggest blunder was trying to conduct a war on multiple fronts especially considering the conditions Germany was in just a few short years before the start of the war. Had Germany resolved its aggression with France and Britain and withdrew its troops from Western Europe, the catastrophe might have been a different blunder. But I disagree with you on at least one point, the early successes on the EF were not a one-hit wonder, and a number of those successes were well beyond Germany's boarder. Germany fought a large part of the war with overextended supply lines and under very difficult maintenance/supply conditions. The Russians on the other hand had much shorter supply lines throughout the war. I think Germany paid for its successes and failures just like everyone else did. Yes encirclement happened all the time on both sides, but their defeat in Stalingrad marked a turning point in the war and sent the Germans into full scale retreat.

But this is not a thread about how Germany could win the war. You stated earlier that supply/maintenance is the biggest factor in military victories. I haven't made any claims with regards to how a more potent fighting force affects victory in comparison to the effect of an army's supply/maintenance. I'm wondering if you realize though how connected the effectiveness of an army is to the workings of its logistics support. When you receive more damaged vehicles, aren't you putting more strain on maintenance? If you use more ammunition, wouldn't you put more strain on supply? And if your causing more damage to the enemy, aren't you putting the opposing force under the same logistical pressures?

The outcome of a more effective fighting force is self evident. That is not to say that there is only one factor determining the effectiveness of a fighting force. There are many factors of which the gun of an AFV is only one. If you are WWII Germany in the throws of a multi-front war with a limited ability to keep your armored forces supplied with vehicles, what should you do? Manufacture vehicles that have both a short shelf life, and a limited ability to inflict damage to the enemy? Or do you make a vehicle that can at least cause damage, and in doing so possibly tip the balance of power in your favor. In the first scenario, you are almost certainly going to be plagued with a shortage of vehicles as you march toward defeat.

When the first reports started streaming in from the Eastern Front about the difficulties being faced by Panzer crews, what was the response? I'm hoping your going to say they set out to urgently find solutions on how to improve the situation. This primarily meant more armor, and bigger guns.

This WI is simply an extension to that. This same reaction BTW was something the Allied forces did as well. When tanks like the Tiger and Panther arrived on the scene, there was an urgent need to equip allied forces with an ability to counter them.

So if the gun/armor of a tank is of so little importance, then what do you propose would have happened if Germany gave no heed those early reports, and just kept producing early Pz III/IV's? Do you think the war would have ended before 1945, or would it have extended beyond that? I think that is a fair question considering your response. IMO, the answer to that question is self evident.

[Richard Anderson]

This is way too familiar. TMP is back folks.

[Richard Anderson]

I'm sorry but yet another case of "you fail to understand the genius of my magic widget thus you are an ignoramus, you are disingenuous, you are whatever. I'm tired of it and frankly have much more important things to do with my life than to coddle serial nonsense. Cheers, you've been successfully ignored.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. Anderson posted :

This is way too familiar. TMP is back folks.

Do I detect the stinky smell of soft, wet, steaming fear ?

Seriously, Eric is far too busy Moderating a new Forum to spend any serious time here.

Respectfully:

Paul R. Ward

[Peter89]

Hello LachenKrieg,

The opening of the Eastern Front was a catastrophic blunder, and in my opinion the Germans were never one last push or one little change away from victory there. If anything, they've done much better than they should have. After the decisive winter of 1941/1942, the Germans declared war on the US (a war they could never hope to win), they were defeated in the air by Britain and on the land by the Soviets. The rational approach should have been the evacuation of Africa (with the Barbarossa in their minds, the Germans shouldn't have gone there in the first place) and small offensives in the East, within the range of the more permanent airfields, the maintenance workshops and the mobile formations.

Of course the problem was that the Soviets and the Allies generated forces at a much higher pace, so Germany had to win, and had to win in 1942. Thus they decided to risk overextension. We know the results, but avoiding the Stalingrad disaster would not save the Germans like that. Encirclements happened all the time (Demyansk, Kholm, Velikiye Luki, etc.), and the 9th army in Rhzev barely survived Operation Mars. Who knows what would have happened if the Soviets did not risk to assault a well-defended Don defense line, but put even more troops for Operation Mars or Operation Iskra.

As for the equipment of the tanks, I told you it might be important, but what decisively benefited the Germans in the border battles were the following things:
- the Soviet problems with command & control
- the long German preparations
- the short supply lines and good maintenance situation

If you believe that a tank gun could decisively influence some parts of the Eastern front campaigns, please do provide some sources or facts. I mean yes, a better gun is better, and it could achieve better results, but you have to demonstrate its decisive role in operations.

I don't contribute to WWII history forums, or participate in online WWII game sites because I enjoy promoting war. My fascination with WWII mostly revolves around the advances in technology in that time period and the speed at which it occurred. I admit I do have a bias towards German armored vehicles in much the same way I have a bias towards German automobiles today. I'm saying this only because this is the second time someone is suggesting I am somehow arguing that Germany could have won the war. While that might be the impression, nothing could be further from the truth.

That being said, I think the biggest blunder was trying to conduct a war on multiple fronts especially considering the conditions Germany was in just a few short years before the start of the war. Had Germany resolved its aggression with France and Britain and withdrew its troops from Western Europe, the catastrophe might have been a different blunder. But I disagree with you on at least one point, the early successes on the EF were not a one-hit wonder, and a number of those successes were well beyond Germany's boarder. Germany fought a large part of the war with overextended supply lines and under very difficult maintenance/supply conditions. The Russians on the other hand had much shorter supply lines throughout the war. I think Germany paid for its successes and failures just like everyone else did. Yes encirclement happened all the time on both sides, but their defeat in Stalingrad marked a turning point in the war and sent the Germans into full scale retreat.

Not really. Numbers tell otherwise. There's a smorgesbord of statistics how much the Wehrmacht was spent by the spring of 1942. Stalingrad was a disaster indeed, exacerbated by bad last minute decisions, but it was not the "turning point of the war". That happened much earlier, during mid 1941.

But this is not a thread about how Germany could win the war.

Sure, but you literally claimed the following:

But that is not what this WI is about. When forces in the south were split, German leadership made an already desperate situation untenable. The WI offers almost the only thing left to offer considering the circumstances. If Germany was to have any chance of stabilizing the Eastern Front as they faced an invasion from the West, it would have been to break contact with the enemy at Stalingrad before the end of August and fall back behind more defensible position. Fielding guns that were capable of taking out enemy armor with the least amount of expended ammunition would have helped conserve the limited number of AFV Germany did have, while at the same time cause an increased loss of men and material to the opposing force. Would that have been enough to win a war with multiple fronts, no I doubt it. But what it might have done is create the opportunity to avoid encirclement and stabilize the Eastern Front.

Thus you claim that with better Pz III / IV guns, the Eastern Front could have been stabilized. You claim that a better gun on Pz III and Pz IV could have preserved Germany's limited AFV arsenal. You claim that better guns might have prevented encirclements.

You yourself said that the German leadership made a wrong choice by splitting up the troops, thus, the encirclements did not depend on the weapons of the encircled, but on two things: the wrong decisions of the German leadership and the good decisions of the Soviet leadership. By claiming that better guns on Pz III / IV could change the outcome of a theatre as large as the Eastern Front, you unintentionally claim that these weapons were decisive, and decisive in particular when it comes to AFV survival.

However...

You stated earlier that supply/maintenance is the biggest factor in military victories.

When it comes to mechanized warfare - tanks, vehicles, aircrafts, etc. - yes, I do believe so. You know what's the single most important cause in AFV loss? Not enemy guns, not enemy bombers, not enemy tanks but mechanical failure. The same is true for aircrafts; about 40-50% of the losses in WW II were not glorious aerial combat but accidents, malfunction and the sort.

And I can give you many examples how improved maintenance actually enhanced combat power throughout different campaigns of WW II. Can you give me one example when a better AFV gun changed the outcome of war in a theatre? Even temporarily?

I haven't made any claims with regards to how a more potent fighting force affects victory in comparison to the effect of an army's supply/maintenance. I'm wondering if you realize though how connected the effectiveness of an army is to the workings of its logistics support. When you receive more damaged vehicles, aren't you putting more strain on maintenance? If you use more ammunition, wouldn't you put more strain on supply? And if your causing more damage to the enemy, aren't you putting the opposing force under the same logistical pressures?

I think we do not need to reinvent warm water, the more is better, the more costs more, etc.

An interesting remark on the Germans though. Their military literature doesn't really approach "logistics" or the infrastructure of the war the same way as the Anglo-Saxons do. The word Nachschub does not perfectly translate to logistics. It's more like supply management, coming from the age when ox-drawn wagons trailed behind armies and the supplies had to be pushed forward. I recommend Bertold Brecht's masterpiece as a reliable source.

The reason for this is simple. The Germans (including Habsburg-Austrians) were not stupid. They fought different type of wars than the Anglo-Saxons. The seasonal campaigns, the continental warfare, the hodgepodge and dubious nature of camp followers didn't really help to improve the image of logistics in the German army(/ies). Thus even when Germany was one of the largest nations and fielded one of the largest armies in the world, even when they fought wars offshore, their institutions and way of thinking largely remained the same.

The outcome of a more effective fighting force is self evident. That is not to say that there is only one factor determining the effectiveness of a fighting force. There are many factors of which the gun of an AFV is only one. If you are WWII Germany in the throws of a multi-front war with a limited ability to keep your armored forces supplied with vehicles, what should you do? Manufacture vehicles that have both a short shelf life, and a limited ability to inflict damage to the enemy? Or do you make a vehicle that can at least cause damage, and in doing so possibly tip the balance of power in your favor. In the first scenario, you are almost certainly going to be plagued with a shortage of vehicles as you march toward defeat.

But you know, that's the main issue of this whole conversation. Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was the problem - otherwise, it might take the Wallies a little bit more effort to defeat the Axis. If your economy can't manufacture enough weapons, and / or quality weapons, then why start an unnecessary multi-front war?
Not one but many contemporaries were in disbelief when Hitler attacked the SU. It was pure madness. For Germany, it would worth billions of Reichsmarks just to keep the Soviets out of the war. It was not the Panzer III / IV's fault that they were tasked with a near impossible task.

In any case, most of the damage to the tanks were not done by tanks, so...

When the first reports started streaming in from the Eastern Front about the difficulties being faced by Panzer crews, what was the response? I'm hoping your going to say they set out to urgently find solutions on how to improve the situation. This primarily meant more armor, and bigger guns.

This WI is simply an extension to that. This same reaction BTW was something the Allied forces did as well. When tanks like the Tiger and Panther arrived on the scene, there was an urgent need to equip allied forces with an ability to counter them.

So if the gun/armor of a tank is of so little importance, then what do you propose would have happened if Germany gave no heed those early reports, and just kept producing early Pz III/IV's? Do you think the war would have ended before 1945, or would it have extended beyond that? I think that is a fair question considering your response. IMO, the answer to that question is self evident.

This is not true, but a popular myth. It was not the Eastern Front that prompted German heavy tank development. The German rearmament tried to do a lot of development lines, but only a very few things worked, a lot of projects never came into reality. Germany also tended to have the nasty habit of developing things that were total failures like the He 177 and almost everything were both having extraordinary delays and teething problems.
Not to mention their favourites, the stopgap solutions, which were the usual way of dealing with things. Tinkering by the army was also commonplace. In the end, the experiences on the Eastern Front did not induce, but speeded up the German tank projects.

I never said that improving the German inventory was not a good idea, or that it had no effect. It might had some effect, but since we are talking about a very narrow thing - a type of gun on a type of tanks - the effects will be narrow, too. At most there were 1-3000 operational AFVs capable of carrying this gun at any given time in the war. What would have happened if the Germans used the 5cm L/60 or the 7.5cm L/48 from the beginning of Barbarossa? Yes, I think it wouldn't change much.

[Richard Anderson]

When the first reports started streaming in from the Eastern Front about the difficulties being faced by Panzer crews, what was the response? I'm hoping your going to say they set out to urgently find solutions on how to improve the situation. This primarily meant more armor, and bigger guns.
(snip)

(snip)
This is not true, but a popular myth. It was not the Eastern Front that prompted German heavy tank development.

Indeed, the idea that Germany was complacently bumbling along fully satisfied with the Panzer III and IV combination and the 5cm and 7.5cm kurz guns is also popular myth that simply doesn't match the actual events. The Ostfront was also not what prompted German medium tank development.

As I remarked earlier, the Tiger I development went back to the Durchbruchwagen prototypes in 1937 and 1938. Vk30.01(H) and VK 36.01(H) were both 7.5cm KwK 37 armed successors begun in 1939 but the turrets were never completed. The specification for what became VK45.01(H) were laid down in May 1941 but the design relied on the four years of experience in the earlier prototypes. The main specification changes were the increased armor and the requirement it mount an 8.8cm gun.

In a similar way Panther did not emerge complete from Guderian's brain in November 1941. It began from the realization in early 1938 that it would be better and was now possible to build a single medium tank to replace the Panzer III and IV combination. Daimler, Krupp, and MAN all embarked on designing replacements. DB's VK20.01 (III) and VK20.01 (D), Krupp's VK20.01 (K), and MAN's VK20.01 (M) and VK 20.02 (M) were all well into development by February 1941 and all were intended for either the 5cm KwK 39 or the 7.5cm KwK 40, but Rheinmetall already had begin development of the 7.5cm L70...all before the first encounters with the T-34 and KV tanks.

So the plan was always to improve the mobility, protection, and firepower of the medium tank, while also producing a specialized heavy tank. The encounter did increase the urgency, which led to the premature deployments of the Tiger and Panther as well as various stopgap measures such as the Marder and Panzer IV lang.

It is also not true but a popular myth with regards to the supposed Western Allied reaction to the "arrival" of the Tiger and Panther. For the British, the 6-pdr gun was a prewar development, while the Vickers 75mm High-Velocity Tank Gun and Royal Ordnance 17-pdr Quickfire gun development work began in March 1942, and all were expected to be mounted in tanks as the anticipation was that enemy tanks would be getting more and more protection. The rush into service of the 17-pdr antitank gun as "SWALLOW" was in anticipation of the arrival of Tiger I in North Africa but the various "FIREFLY" projects to get a tank-mounted 17-pdr went back to mid 1942, before any firm knowledge of Tigers or Panthers was in hand.

For the Americans, the plan to mount a 3" high velocity tank gun in the Medium Tank M4 went back to August 1940, while the plans for an improved successor to the M4 with a 3" gun began in May 1942, while development of a tank-mounted 90mm gun began on 1 October 1942.

[Peter89]

When the first reports started streaming in from the Eastern Front about the difficulties being faced by Panzer crews, what was the response? I'm hoping your going to say they set out to urgently find solutions on how to improve the situation. This primarily meant more armor, and bigger guns.
(snip)

(snip)
This is not true, but a popular myth. It was not the Eastern Front that prompted German heavy tank development.

Indeed, the idea that Germany was complacently bumbling along fully satisfied with the Panzer III and IV combination and the 5cm and 7.5cm kurz guns is also popular myth that simply doesn't match the actual events. The Ostfront was also not what prompted German medium tank development.

As I remarked earlier, the Tiger I development went back to the Durchbruchwagen prototypes in 1937 and 1938. Vk30.01(H) and VK 36.01(H) were both 7.5cm KwK 37 armed successors begun in 1939 but the turrets were never completed. The specification for what became VK45.01(H) were laid down in May 1941 but the design relied on the four years of experience in the earlier prototypes. The main specification changes were the increased armor and the requirement it mount an 8.8cm gun.

In a similar way Panther did not emerge complete from Guderian's brain in November 1941. It began from the realization in early 1938 that it would be better and was now possible to build a single medium tank to replace the Panzer III and IV combination. Daimler, Krupp, and MAN all embarked on designing replacements. DB's VK20.01 (III) and VK20.01 (D), Krupp's VK20.01 (K), and MAN's VK20.01 (M) and VK 20.02 (M) were all well into development by February 1941 and all were intended for either the 5cm KwK 39 or the 7.5cm KwK 40, but Rheinmetall already had begin development of the 7.5cm L70...all before the first encounters with the T-34 and KV tanks.

So the plan was always to improve the mobility, protection, and firepower of the medium tank, while also producing a specialized heavy tank. The encounter did increase the urgency, which led to the premature deployments of the Tiger and Panther as well as various stopgap measures such as the Marder and Panzer IV lang.

It is also not true but a popular myth with regards to the supposed Western Allied reaction to the "arrival" of the Tiger and Panther. For the British, the 6-pdr gun was a prewar development, while the Vickers 75mm High-Velocity Tank Gun and Royal Ordnance 17-pdr Quickfire gun development work began in March 1942, and all were expected to be mounted in tanks as the anticipation was that enemy tanks would be getting more and more protection. The rush into service of the 17-pdr antitank gun as "SWALLOW" was in anticipation of the arrival of Tiger I in North Africa but the various "FIREFLY" projects to get a tank-mounted 17-pdr went back to mid 1942, before any firm knowledge of Tigers or Panthers was in hand.

For the Americans, the plan to mount a 3" high velocity tank gun in the Medium Tank M4 went back to August 1940, while the plans for an improved successor to the M4 with a 3" gun began in May 1942, while development of a tank-mounted 90mm gun began on 1 October 1942.

Yes. Moreover, the relationship between R&D, serial production, operational and strategic needs in Germany was strained at best, but usually nonexistent. On one hand, I can agree with Lachenkrieg about the importance and the effects of this cycle, but on the other, I am well aware of the historical reality - at least in case of the aircrafts - why this system never really worked for the Germans.

This is why I think that in mechanized warfare WIs there are only 3 credible approaches:
1. Organizational WIs, like TA Gardner's idea
2. Reallocation of existing resources, like the naval aviation vs continental aviation
3. WIs related to MRO activities

I generally consider R&D WIs not really credible. Having worked / studied for cca 5 years in many countries in scientific R&D, my personal experiences support this notion. Research, by default means you have to try 99 things until the 100th will work. To say that a certain equipment could be finished earlier, it goes against all chances. For this exact reason modern research uses a very few innovative minds, most of the educated people execute the plans of the few; like in industry, a very few people designs, most people work on assembly lines or in positions which require education, but not thinking. Back then in Nazi Germany, scientific research management was seriously marred with many basic problems, things we would consider trivial today. Examples like the expulsion of humanists and Jews are well-known, but I'm thinking more of the effects of the ceased international scientific cooperations and the imbecile conscription of highly trained personnel. Let's not forget that before the Nazi regime came, Germany was the international hub of science, German was the primary language in sciences, and so on.

[LachenKrieg]

Not really. Numbers tell otherwise. There's a smorgesbord of statistics how much the Wehrmacht was spent by the spring of 1942. Stalingrad was a disaster indeed, exacerbated by bad last minute decisions, but it was not the "turning point of the war". That happened much earlier, during mid 1941.

Well I understand how you can rationalize the notion that Germany had already lost the war when it invaded Russia, because I have listened to that argument numerous times before, but why not just say Germany had already lost the war after Hitler rose to power? But more to the point, what do the numbers say?

Sure there is a smorgasbord of stats that show how German military losses in men and material continued to mount as the war dragged on, but you have me seriously wondering if you weren't packing a bagged lunch that day?

Russia suffered nearly 3 million casualties during Barbarossa, what was the casualty list on the German side? And how did winter play into that? German forces had been severely depleted by the end of the winter of 1942, so much so that it had lost the immediate ability to perform an all out offensive on the Eastern Front, but it was far from spent by the spring of 1942. Germany not only repelled Russia's spring attempt to retake Kharkov, but its counter-offensive nearly wiped out Russia's South-West front causing almost 300k casualties on top of huge material losses. And more major Russian defeats would come before Germany even started its main summer offensive in 1942. Russia suffered defeat after defeat in the weeks that followed the start of Germany's 1942 summer offensive, and its success was hampered more by logistics issues than anything else.

Sure, but you literally claimed the following:

I'm not sure what your getting at here Peter, yes you have correctly quoted me as saying this WI is not about how Germany could have won the war, but rather it proposes how they could have improved their fighting force, and in doing so their chance of stabilizing the Eastern Front after Barbarossa.

Thus you claim that with better Pz III / IV guns, the Eastern Front could have been stabilized. You claim that a better gun on Pz III and Pz IV could have preserved Germany's limited AFV arsenal. You claim that better guns might have prevented encirclements.

You yourself said that the German leadership made a wrong choice by splitting up the troops, thus, the encirclements did not depend on the weapons of the encircled, but on two things: the wrong decisions of the German leadership and the good decisions of the Soviet leadership. By claiming that better guns on Pz III / IV could change the outcome of a theatre as large as the Eastern Front, you unintentionally claim that these weapons were decisive, and decisive in particular when it comes to AFV survival.

Part of the problem here Peter is when you engage in a WI, you have to be at least willing to let go of history as you know it in order to explore the plausible. In other words, in order to add anything to a WI, whether it be for or against, you have to be able to think outside the box and get beyond "Yeah but it didn't happen that way". If you go back and read the original proposal to the WI, I list improved armament and rational decision making on the part of German leadership as the two requirements.

I will have to widen the discussion a little here in order to make myself clear, so bare with me.

For example, someone might ask if Germany could have made a 5.0 cm AT gun in 1936? The answer to that question is obviously yes, of course it could have. Then someone might ask if the Pz III could have been armed with a 5.0 cm gun when it first debuted? If we consider that the initial request was for a 5.0 gun, and we then add that to the fact that Germany was capable of making such a gun, then we can say it is possible the Pz III could have been initially armed with a 5.0 gun.

The net effect of any change can never be truly known until the outcome related to the change has occurred. Lets say in this example Lutz was the head of the Army instead of Beck. And instead of clinging to tradition, he was more open to looking at things from a new perspective and fully supported the concept of fast moving armored divisions. This could also have been Beck himself, but we are just having fun with names here.

Now lets say what comes out of this stroke of luck is Germany's first main battle tank was armed with the 5.0 L/60. That would have been a very powerful weapon during the invasion of Poland, but not while confronting the frontal armor of a T34's just 12 months later. Pz III crews would have still experienced the same problem of not being able to penetrate the Russian tank's frontal armor, and the reported problem regarding the weak armament of Panzers on the Eastern Front would have still been sent. The net effect of this would be the need to find a better solution. A solution that could answer to all the claims I claimed you claim I claimed;)

But aside from making a claim, I also asked you a question that is still unanswered. I will repeat it here because your answer to it is equal to the proof you demand from my claim. If Germany would have just made the early Pz III/IV's, would it have had any effect on the outcome of the war in terms of the amount of time required to conclude it? All other things being equal with logistics, bad decisions, and what ever else you want to add,... what do you think would have happened? I think its quite clear, The Pz III E would have trouble penetrating a number of tanks even from the side, and the war would have ended much sooner than it did. Can you provide me with proof that Germany could have continued fighting the war until it did in 1945 with just the 3.7 cm armed Pz III, and short barrel 7.5 cm Pz IV?

But again regarding encirclement, you are misunderstanding my meaning. There are many reasons, or factors that may contribute to the threat of being encircled. Bad decision making is just one of them. The role of a better gun here would be to provide the fire power needed to break out of the encirclement. Another role would be to dominate the battle field to deny your enemy the chance to threaten you with encirclement. Another role would be to inflict so much damage that your enemy is unable to continue the fight, let alone encircle you. I think you should probably be getting it by now.

When it comes to mechanized warfare - tanks, vehicles, aircrafts, etc. - yes, I do believe so. You know what's the single most important cause in AFV loss? Not enemy guns, not enemy bombers, not enemy tanks but mechanical failure. The same is true for aircrafts; about 40-50% of the losses in WW II were not glorious aerial combat but accidents, malfunction and the sort.

And I can give you many examples how improved maintenance actually enhanced combat power throughout different campaigns of WW II. Can you give me one example when a better AFV gun changed the outcome of war in a theatre? Even temporarily?

I can actually do better than that Peter, I can give you literally tens of thousands of permanent examples, where would you like FedEX to deliver the boxes?

Joking aside Peter, yes I imagine maintenance/spare parts issues especially during WWII when all this new technology was in a constant and rapid state of change was a big deal for most countries, especially Germany. But I think you are confusing two separate issues here. Mechanical issues, although bothersome and costly, were usually fixable. And although some vehicles were repairable after being penetrated, a large percentage of them were permanently destroyed. That type of permanent damage usually has a much more dramatic impact on the men and material of a military then a broken final drive does. Of course there were vehicles that were lost due to mechanical failure because they could not be safely retrieved from the battle field, but effective guns were a very significant factor here.

Germany committed 991 armored vehicles to its summer offensive of which just 94 were capable of penetrating the T34's frontal armor (PzIV Lg). That is less than 10%, and yet Russia lost nearly every armored encounter during that entire campaign (source Stalingrad 1942-43 (1) Forczyk). This fact alone speaks to the German commanders ability to win on the tactical battle field. But to bolster the superior tactics and what they openly admitted was a weak armored force, were a small number of 8.8 cm Flak guns. These guns were decisive in a number of battles. The point to a better gun is that it can help develop a tactical advantage irrespective of your position. If your gun is only capable of damaging the enemy up close and from the side, then this usually requires either really good planning, or maneuvering to get into position to do so. Moving into position often enough required the tank crew to expose itself to an increased threat which often enough resulted in the loss of men and material. A better gun increases the number of option you have on the battle field. Lets say even half of the 407 Pz III L/60's they had were long barrel StuG's (assuming the WI), they may have been able to reach Stalingrad in 4 weeks instead of 9. That in itself would have had a huge impact on the outcome of the summer offensive in 1942.

But you know, that's the main issue of this whole conversation. Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was the problem - otherwise, it might take the Wallies a little bit more effort to defeat the Axis. If your economy can't manufacture enough weapons, and / or quality weapons, then why start an unnecessary multi-front war?
Not one but many contemporaries were in disbelief when Hitler attacked the SU. It was pure madness. For Germany, it would worth billions of Reichsmarks just to keep the Soviets out of the war. It was not the Panzer III / IV's fault that they were tasked with a near impossible task.

In any case, most of the damage to the tanks were not done by tanks, so...

So here's another WI forya, After defeating France and cornering Britain at Dunkirk, Germany pauses to offer peace because it is willing to withdraw its troops from occupied Europe (excluding land taken from Germany after WWI) if Britain agrees to go along with it all. France forces Britain to accept, and sends German troops packing. The Normandy invasion is no longer a thing... But regarding your definition of "most of the damage", please see above.

This is not true, but a popular myth. It was not the Eastern Front that prompted German heavy tank development. The German rearmament tried to do a lot of development lines, but only a very few things worked, a lot of projects never came into reality. Germany also tended to have the nasty habit of developing things that were total failures like the He 177 and almost everything were both having extraordinary delays and teething problems.
Not to mention their favourites, the stopgap solutions, which were the usual way of dealing with things. Tinkering by the army was also commonplace. In the end, the experiences on the Eastern Front did not induce, but speeded up the German tank projects.

I never said that improving the German inventory was not a good idea, or that it had no effect. It might had some effect, but since we are talking about a very narrow thing - a type of gun on a type of tanks - the effects will be narrow, too. At most there were 1-3000 operational AFVs capable of carrying this gun at any given time in the war. What would have happened if the Germans used the 5cm L/60 or the 7.5cm L/48 from the beginning of Barbarossa? Yes, I think it wouldn't change much.

The only myth here might be your claim that someone is saying the Eastern Front prompted Heavy tank development. What it prompted was for Germany to put things into high gear. They were at a loss on meeting the T34/KV tanks, and there was an urgent need to find a solution to counter them. The Pz III/IV's already in production could be improved slightly in terms of armor, but this was not a long term solution in their eyes. And the Pz III could not carry anything more than a the L/60. After meeting the T34, the Pz III was at best a good light recon tank, but in order for it it excel at that it would have also needed improvements to its mobility beyond what it already had. I would have loved to see something like that happen only because the Pz III L is one of my favorite WWII tanks, but that would have been a useless endeavor if undertaken before the massive work needed to secure a stronger gun for a better fighting force. But hey, then they would have had a really fast uber tank to drive across the English Channel in