Arctic/Atlantic island hopping?

[Urmel]

I agree. My point was that without taking Malta you couldn't take Suez. The reverse isn't correct. But that gave Malta a much more critical role, compared to Svalbard's irrelevance in both cases.

Well if you ignore the fact a significant German presence on Svalbard precludes any of the 1941-42 summer Arctic convoys that historically occurred…sure.

How can the occupation of Svalbard in 1943 preclude things in 1941-42? Time travel?

You really need to get your story straight mate, right now it makes zero sense.

You ARE aware that Operation Zitronella/Sizilen happened in 1943? If not, that's the kind of detail that matters.

[Stoat Coat]

I agree. My point was that without taking Malta you couldn't take Suez. The reverse isn't correct. But that gave Malta a much more critical role, compared to Svalbard's irrelevance in both cases.

Well if you ignore the fact a significant German presence on Svalbard precludes any of the 1941-42 summer Arctic convoys that historically occurred…sure.

How can the occupation of Svalbard in 1943 preclude things in 1941-42? Time travel?

You really need to get your story straight mate, right now it makes zero sense.

You ARE aware that Operation Zitronella/Sizilen happened in 1943? If not, that's the kind of detail that matters.

This was the comment you responded to, and I responded in turn to yours…

Just a few quick questions. Are you familiar with the logistical needs of a Gebirgsdivision? Why would Germany place such a specialized unit into the Arctic backwater where it could simply be ignored instead of deploying it with the 2nd and 3rd GJ divisions in Operation Silver Fox?

Operation Silver Fox was in 1941. So yes, it made perfect sense, not “useless unlike Malta”.

[Stoat Coat]

If the Germans unloaded a more substantial force on Spitsbergen during operation Silizien (let’s say a Gebirgs division and some other support), along with a garrison on Bear Island ,which they could have easily done with the force of two Battleship and nine destroyers they used historically, plus they had the Lützow and other destroyers in Arctic waters, would the Allie’s have made a serious effort to capture the islands?

Just a few quick questions. Are you familiar with the logistical needs of a Gebirgsdivision?

They had one of the leanest logistics tails of any German division, that’s for sure, except maybe compared to static divisions.

Just give us a number please. You seem to be familiar with it.

Number of what? How about this:
A Gebirgsjager Division was basically a better trained Infanterie Division trained and specialized in mountain warfare; two of its artillery battalions were light artillery, and it had less gas chugging heavy-weight trucks, which is necessary when the entire point is to be able to chug artillery up sheer slopes and poor roads on a mountain side. You don’t need constant fuel supplies when you don’t have that much in the way of fuel needs, and call it intuition but I’d imagine 75mm ammunition for the 7.5 cm Gebirgsgeschütz 36 is a lot lighter than for the 105mm plus guns of stands Infanterie support. Everything about these divisions is meant to be nimble. But sure, I guess you don’t have to use a full division, you could use fortress infantry battalions (they landed at least one on Svalbard historically) and a single Gebirgsjager regiment.

[Urmel]

I agree. My point was that without taking Malta you couldn't take Suez. The reverse isn't correct. But that gave Malta a much more critical role, compared to Svalbard's irrelevance in both cases.

Well if you ignore the fact a significant German presence on Svalbard precludes any of the 1941-42 summer Arctic convoys that historically occurred…sure.

How can the occupation of Svalbard in 1943 preclude things in 1941-42? Time travel?

You really need to get your story straight mate, right now it makes zero sense.

You ARE aware that Operation Zitronella/Sizilen happened in 1943? If not, that's the kind of detail that matters.

This was the comment you responded to, and I responded in turn to yours…

I suspect it's hard to comment on things one doesn't understand, and to keep track of complex conversations. I had already dismissed the 1941 idea for other reasons, namely that it made zero strategic sense for Germany to commit forces to prevent fantasy future convoys that would never happen because the Soviet Union would have been defeated before 1942. But of course, if you are actually unaware of the German strategic thinking, as you obviously are, that's an easy mistake to make. No need to feel bad.

[Stoat Coat]

I agree. My point was that without taking Malta you couldn't take Suez. The reverse isn't correct. But that gave Malta a much more critical role, compared to Svalbard's irrelevance in both cases.

Well if you ignore the fact a significant German presence on Svalbard precludes any of the 1941-42 summer Arctic convoys that historically occurred…sure.

How can the occupation of Svalbard in 1943 preclude things in 1941-42? Time travel?

You really need to get your story straight mate, right now it makes zero sense.

You ARE aware that Operation Zitronella/Sizilen happened in 1943? If not, that's the kind of detail that matters.

This was the comment you responded to, and I responded in turn to yours…

I suspect it's hard to comment on things one doesn't understand, and to keep track of complex conversations. I had already dismissed the 1941 idea for other reasons, namely that it made zero strategic sense for Germany to commit forces to prevent fantasy future convoys that would never happen because the Soviet Union would have been defeated before 1942. But of course, if you are actually unaware of the German strategic thinking, as you obviously are, that's an easy mistake to make. No need to feel bad.

The arrogance of this whole comment…

[Peter89]

If the Germans unloaded a more substantial force on Spitsbergen during operation Silizien (let’s say a Gebirgs division and some other support), along with a garrison on Bear Island ,which they could have easily done with the force of two Battleship and nine destroyers they used historically, plus they had the Lützow and other destroyers in Arctic waters, would the Allie’s have made a serious effort to capture the islands?

Just a few quick questions. Are you familiar with the logistical needs of a Gebirgsdivision?

They had one of the leanest logistics tails of any German division, that’s for sure, except maybe compared to static divisions.

Just give us a number please. You seem to be familiar with it.

Number of what? How about this:
A Gebirgsjager Division was basically a better trained Infanterie Division trained and specialized in mountain warfare; two of its artillery battalions were light artillery, and it had less gas chugging heavy-weight trucks, which is necessary when the entire point is to be able to chug artillery up sheer slopes and poor roads on a mountain side. You don’t need constant fuel supplies when you don’t have that much in the way of fuel needs, and call it intuition but I’d imagine 75mm ammunition for the 7.5 cm Gebirgsgeschütz 36 is a lot lighter than for the 105mm plus guns of stands Infanterie support. Everything about these divisions is meant to be nimble. But sure, I guess you don’t have to use a full division, you could use fortress infantry battalions (they landed at least one on Svalbard historically) and a single Gebirgsjager regiment.

What kind of resources were locally available in the Spitsbergen, and what kind of naval assets the Germans possessed to supply their forces there? Did the Spitsbergen have the sufficient port and depot facilities to handle the logistical needs of a GJ division? What is the extra logistical requirement to upkeep units in the extreme Arctic cold?

[Urmel]

The arrogance of this whole comment…

Oh I'm sorry. I wasn't aware you were the only one allowed by moderators to roll his eyes. Wow, if only I had known that you have the right to do so, I would have known my place.

But don't let me interrupt your reading further, you have much to catch up on.

Maybe next time, consider whether that roll-eyes smiley and laughing at people is really the best tool to get the response you want. But I guess it made you feel mighty clever at the time. Well done.

[Urmel]

What kind of resources were locally available in the Spitsbergen, and what kind of naval assets the Germans possessed to supply their forces there? Did the Spitsbergen have the sufficient port and depot facilities to handle the logistical needs of a GJ division? What is the extra logistical requirement to upkeep units in the extreme Arctic cold?

Even if those questions were addressed, they would still not be answering the basic question of why sending a GJ division there in:

1) Summer 1941 when it is expected the war against the USSR will be over before autumn of the same year?
2) Autumn 1941 with a dark winter around the corner?
3) Anytime in 1942 when your infantry is urgently needed elsewhere?
4) Autumn 1943 with a dark winter around the corner?

Makes any sense?

[Richard Anderson]

If the Germans unloaded a more substantial force on Spitsbergen during operation Silizien (let’s say a Gebirgs division and some other support), along with a garrison on Bear Island ,which they could have easily done with the force of two Battleship and nine destroyers they used historically, plus they had the Lützow and other destroyers in Arctic waters, would the Allie’s have made a serious effort to capture the islands?

Just a few quick questions. Are you familiar with the logistical needs of a Gebirgsdivision?

They had one of the leanest logistics tails of any German division, that’s for sure, except maybe compared to static divisions.

Just give us a number please. You seem to be familiar with it.

Number of what? How about this:
A Gebirgsjager Division was basically a better trained Infanterie Division trained and specialized in mountain warfare; two of its artillery battalions were light artillery, and it had less gas chugging heavy-weight trucks, which is necessary when the entire point is to be able to chug artillery up sheer slopes and poor roads on a mountain side. You don’t need constant fuel supplies when you don’t have that much in the way of fuel needs, and call it intuition but I’d imagine 75mm ammunition for the 7.5 cm Gebirgsgeschütz 36 is a lot lighter than for the 105mm plus guns of stands Infanterie support. Everything about these divisions is meant to be nimble. But sure, I guess you don’t have to use a full division, you could use fortress infantry battalions (they landed at least one on Svalbard historically) and a single Gebirgsjager regiment.

You are spinning assumptions into what you think are facts. How about instead of speculation and your imagination you deal with some facts?

Erste-Muni-Ausstattung for an Infanterie-Division Typ 1944 was 710.72 metric tons. For a Gebirgsjäger-Division of the same year it was...wait for it, 700.32 metric tons. You're talking a "savings" of 10.4 tons.

Rations, one of the other big weight items, is dependent on the number of men and animals in the unit that need fed. In 1941, the 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division authorized strength was 24,956 men and 7,405 animals. The 1. Welle Infanterie-Divisionen authorized strength was 17,734 men and 4,842 animals.

Vehicles? In 1939, the 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division authorized vehicles strength was 1,903 vehicles - 394 PKW, 793 LKW, and 736 motorcycles. The 1. Welle Infanterie-Divisionen authorized vehicle strength was 1,539 - 394 PKW, 615 LKW, 527 motorcycles, and 3 AFV.

[Peter89]

What kind of resources were locally available in the Spitsbergen, and what kind of naval assets the Germans possessed to supply their forces there? Did the Spitsbergen have the sufficient port and depot facilities to handle the logistical needs of a GJ division? What is the extra logistical requirement to upkeep units in the extreme Arctic cold?

Even if those questions were addressed, they would still not be answering the basic question of why sending a GJ division there in:

1) Summer 1941 when it is expected the war against the USSR will be over before autumn of the same year?
2) Autumn 1941 with a dark winter around the corner?
3) Anytime in 1942 when your infantry is urgently needed elsewhere?
4) Autumn 1943 with a dark winter around the corner?

Makes any sense?

Yes, I began with the question why that GJD would be in the Spitsbergen help to interdict the Arctic convoys when it could be participating in Silver Fox making Arctic convoys impossible.

[thaddeus_c]

I suspect it's hard to comment on things one doesn't understand, and to keep track of complex conversations. I had already dismissed the 1941 idea for other reasons, namely that it made zero strategic sense for Germany to commit forces to prevent fantasy future convoys that would never happen because the Soviet Union would have been defeated before 1942. But of course, if you are actually unaware of the German strategic thinking, as you obviously are, that's an easy mistake to make. No need to feel bad.

feel better after posting that?

thought Hitler specifically mentioned the need to occupy "Polyarny" (Murmansk) so the anticipation was there for Allied (British at that point) convoys resupplying the Soviets?

that was part of my suggestion that the surface fleet of the KM be relocated back to Norway and home waters earlier than historical "Channel Dash." (as this is a "what if" forum I thought that was permitted to alter historical timelines?)

as far as any grounding in real historical events there was a series of operations by both sides beginning in Aug. '41 to exploit (or deny exploitation) of Svalbard.

my original comment was the German side needed to eclipse the original British raid Operation Gauntlet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gauntlet that attempted to destroy any useful infrastructure (that supported the workers in the coal industry)

my own view was not to land any large numbers of troops but more of a commando type operation, and to secret their weather stations, and make any recapture costly.

[Stoat Coat]

Just a few quick questions. Are you familiar with the logistical needs of a Gebirgsdivision?

They had one of the leanest logistics tails of any German division, that’s for sure, except maybe compared to static divisions.

Just give us a number please. You seem to be familiar with it.

Number of what? How about this:
A Gebirgsjager Division was basically a better trained Infanterie Division trained and specialized in mountain warfare; two of its artillery battalions were light artillery, and it had less gas chugging heavy-weight trucks, which is necessary when the entire point is to be able to chug artillery up sheer slopes and poor roads on a mountain side. You don’t need constant fuel supplies when you don’t have that much in the way of fuel needs, and call it intuition but I’d imagine 75mm ammunition for the 7.5 cm Gebirgsgeschütz 36 is a lot lighter than for the 105mm plus guns of stands Infanterie support. Everything about these divisions is meant to be nimble. But sure, I guess you don’t have to use a full division, you could use fortress infantry battalions (they landed at least one on Svalbard historically) and a single Gebirgsjager regiment.

You are spinning assumptions into what you think are facts. How about instead of speculation and your imagination you deal with some facts?

Erste-Muni-Ausstattung for an Infanterie-Division Typ 1944 was 710.72 metric tons. For a Gebirgsjäger-Division of the same year it was...wait for it, 700.32 metric tons. You're talking a "savings" of 10.4 tons.

Rations, one of the other big weight items, is dependent on the number of men and animals in the unit that need fed. In 1941, the 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division authorized strength was 24,956 men and 7,405 animals. The 1. Welle Infanterie-Divisionen authorized strength was 17,734 men and 4,842 animals.

Vehicles? In 1939, the 1. Gebirgsjäger-Division authorized vehicles strength was 1,903 vehicles - 394 PKW, 793 LKW, and 736 motorcycles. The 1. Welle Infanterie-Divisionen authorized vehicle strength was 1,539 - 394 PKW, 615 LKW, 527 motorcycles, and 3 AFV.

Your first two sentences are a little unnecessary in the snark factor for my taste, but fine. I don’t want to gripe with you too much because I know you’re a nice guy who’s shared a lot of useful stuff with me, but I went back and checked the sources I have available.

Your numbers definitely seem high, Ian Baxter in his book on the Gebirgsjager, put the typical authorized strength for a Gebirgsjager Division during the invasion of Poland at 14,000 men, 1,500 horses, 4,300 pack animals, and 550 “mountain horses” (5,350 animals total), and 1,600 vehicles “which included many motorcycles and cross country cars and 600 horse drawn vehicles”. Horse drawn “vehicles” obviously don’t use gas, and it’s well known that deliberately lighter weight trucks were issued to the Gebirgs formations, although I’ll admit that it’s an assumption on my part that they burned less gas.

That being said, you make an awfully big assumption yourself by thinking that the Gebirgsjager Divisions used in Scandinavia historically, and theoretically in this scenario, are like the case samples you mention.

FYI as Nigel Askey mentioned in his Op. Barbarossa organization book the 2nd and 3rd Gebirgsjager Divisions historically fielded in the Arctic/Northern regions (notably during Silverfox) AKA the ones that were actually being used in highly Mountainous and Arctic environment's, exclusively possessed two battalions of light artillery and medium artillery (75mm, and some 105s) and no heavy artillery at all to operate properly. The others used like reinforced Infantry divisions on the eastern front had two extra artillery battalions, including at least two batteries of motorized heavy artillery. Except 1st Gebirgsjager Division which had three batteries of motorized heavy arty, and was the only division whose regiments had the Grebirgs heavy gun infantry platoons (two 15cm Howitzers each), so you seem to have selected an outlier to make your case look better than it is. Not a huge difference but notable, especially for prime mover requirements. I’ll note that photographic evidence of the famous detachment from 1st Gebirgs used to occupy mount Elberus (including a photo I posted earlier) shows only the use of the 7.5cm mountain gun precisely because of the problems of heavy and medium arty in the mountains.

Peter89 brought up the logistics concerns to begin with, he seemed to think it was ridiculous for the Gebirgsjager to play a role, even though they were used in just about every major Arctic operation for the Germans conducted historically which is why I thought they might be used, as they were from Narvik onwards. And what German divisions exactly did have a “leaner logistics” tail than even a standard Mountain division other than static divisions, let alone the ones as organized for Arctic operations, and would have be used in a theoretical holding action on mountainous archipelago like Svalbard?

[Stoat Coat]

I suspect it's hard to comment on things one doesn't understand, and to keep track of complex conversations. I had already dismissed the 1941 idea for other reasons, namely that it made zero strategic sense for Germany to commit forces to prevent fantasy future convoys that would never happen because the Soviet Union would have been defeated before 1942. But of course, if you are actually unaware of the German strategic thinking, as you obviously are, that's an easy mistake to make. No need to feel bad.

feel better after posting that?

thought Hitler specifically mentioned the need to occupy "Polyarny" (Murmansk) so the anticipation was there for Allied (British at that point) convoys resupplying the Soviets?

that was part of my suggestion that the surface fleet of the KM be relocated back to Norway and home waters earlier than historical "Channel Dash." (as this is a "what if" forum I thought that was permitted to alter historical timelines?)

as far as any grounding in real historical events there was a series of operations by both sides beginning in Aug. '41 to exploit (or deny exploitation) of Svalbard.

my original comment was the German side needed to eclipse the original British raid Operation Gauntlet https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Gauntlet that attempted to destroy any useful infrastructure (that supported the workers in the coal industry)

my own view was not to land any large numbers of troops but more of a commando type operation, and to secret their weather stations, and make any recapture costly.

Exactly, I already amended slightly the comment earlier about a whole division, a regiment or so could get the job done.

[Stoat Coat]

I thought OP made a good case for the benefits of occupying Bear Island and Spitsbergen, and also how it could be I totally captured with ease. It’s wether or not Germany can hold them that is the question.

Given that German naval and air forces operating from mainland Norway could accomplish the same task, with less of a logistical tail...I don't see any benefit.

It is not like these are far flung islands in the Pacific covering dead ground.

FYI, Spitsbergen is 600 miles from mainland Norway. If it’s occupied earlier in the war, before all summer convoys ceased, Spitsbergen is much closer to the summer routes. Bear Island straddled both the winter and summer routes. The greater frequency and intensity of air attacks alone enabled by a significant LW presence is substantial; in fact for most of the air attacks on Allied convoys there was no air. escort for the German attack planes, the distances were too large. Obviously a major downside is that the anchorage can’t be used for the long winter period because of the ice cap.

FBA43857-ADAA-4C40-A0AB-EE70EA29E007.gif

Btw, I don’t think the Germans sending a more substantial force to occupy Svalbard is that much of a stretch, if for nothing other than Hitler’s obsession with defending Norway from an imagined Allied invasion, and the disproportionate forces committed to Norways defense reflect that, regardless of the real benefit of the Germans, a more ambitious and/or earlier version of Zitronella is easy to imagine and even accomplish. The real question, as I brought up earlier, is would the Allies care enough to re-occupy those islands so they couldn’t be used by the Luftwaffe? On the one hand: MacArthur had Nimitz launch the Palau islands campaign purely out of concern for possible flanking and air attacks by…a cut-off force defending an already wrecked airfield on Peleliu, so never doubt how inane a target may seem, but then again the Allies don’t seem to have ever seriously considered operations in Norway after 1940, unlike the Philippines. So I admit that part is very “what-if” material, although I suspect Special Boat Service commando raids is probable.

What I don’t understand is why some in this thread act like the Germans occupying Svalbard with more forces and earlier is some massive departure with reality. LOL. Yeah, German invasion of Svalbard….that could never have happend... https://www.criticalpast.com/video/6567 ... iegsmarine

[Texas Jäger]

I agree. My point was that without taking Malta you couldn't take Suez. The reverse isn't correct. But that gave Malta a much more critical role, compared to Svalbard's irrelevance in both cases.

Well if you ignore the fact a significant German presence on Svalbard precludes any of the 1941-42 summer Arctic convoys that historically occurred…sure.

How can the occupation of Svalbard in 1943 preclude things in 1941-42? Time travel?

You really need to get your story straight mate, right now it makes zero sense.

You ARE aware that Operation Zitronella/Sizilen happened in 1943? If not, that's the kind of detail that matters.

This was the comment you responded to, and I responded in turn to yours…

I suspect it's hard to comment on things one doesn't understand, and to keep track of complex conversations. I had already dismissed the 1941 idea for other reasons, namely that it made zero strategic sense for Germany to commit forces to prevent fantasy future convoys that would never happen because the Soviet Union would have been defeated before 1942. But of course, if you are actually unaware of the German strategic thinking, as you obviously are, that's an easy mistake to make. No need to feel bad.

Not sure what you're on about. The entire point of devoting two German corps (including three mountain divisions) to Silberfuchs, otherwise launched in a strategic backwater that could have easily been defended by the Finns, was to occupy Murmansk and prevent any open route to the Soviet Union for resupply by the UK. Considering the first convoys from the UK came just a few weeks after Barbarossa began, they weren't exactly far off in that fear, and it hardly took much foresight to predict it either. Are you not aware that the Arctic convoys were the major source of Western supplies for Russia during WWI as well?

Given that Silver Fox failed miserably, defending both sides of the Barents sea corridor to Murmansk doesn't sound too crazy to me.