political effects of a delayed start to WW2

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rob
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political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by rob » 12 Oct 2002 21:35

Lets assume that Hitler postpones any moves against Poland for a year and a half, and 1940 passes off peacefully. With no war on in Europe I just can't see FDR staying on as President. A fully mobilized anti- FDR movement might have emerged. His plan for "court-packing" was the first time he tried to do something very untraditional and he was massively defeated in congress, so a third-term try in a time of peace might also unleash massive opposition. Assuming he doesn't run, if we have a President Garner (FDRs VP through 1940) or a Republican, that has got to impact French and British calculations of US support or lack thereof in a war with Germany.
Concerning France, Daladier had postponed the 1940 French elections until 1942 in the summer of 1939. However, with no immediate threat of war he might not have. Not sure how French elections would have turned out, likely less left wing candidates elected as no longer a Popular Front electoral alliance with Radical Party.
In Britain, I'm guessing a 1940 parliamentary election leads to conservatives reelected under Chamberlain. One queston is, would he have tried to get conservative associations to deselect party rebels such as Churchill, Spears et al as Conservative candidates. Also, with his health starting to fail would he have resigned in 1940 to be replaced by Halifax perhaps?
Not sure where all this would lead to if Germany now begins moves against Poland. On the one hand, another year or two of British and French military rearmament would be a plus side for them, on the other hand, a less pro allied US president would counterbalance that, and its likely that any other US president would be both less personally interventionist than FDR, and not as powerfull vis a vis congress anyway even if he wanted to get the US involved as FDR was.

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Good Question...

Post by Citadel » 13 Oct 2002 20:35

It would also have taken the sting out of the invasion of the Slovack rump, Munich was too recent to allow that to pass without public outcry (which forced Chamberlain to declare over Poland)

A simple stalling by Hitler would have brought additional appeasement, almost certainly, as well as the realisation of his 4 year plan from 1936. In the Hossbach memorandum, he himself is quoted as believing European war is best before 1943....perhaps he sampled the grapes of wrath before they were a good vintage?

I have no idea re: the US, but the rearmament of the Allies would not have matched the armament of the Germans. Hitler stumbled into war and set his own demise in motion....but he was soo near, imho.

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Post by Tim Smith » 14 Oct 2002 22:11

Actually the armament production of Britain and France combined would have outstripped German production in 1940, unless as a result of Munich the Allied leaders cut back on rearmament slightly to ease the pressure on their economies.

But based on the historical 1940 figures, both Britain and France each, individually, surpassed German production in fighter aircraft, tanks, guns and ships in May 1940. But the French spurt came too late and the British were starting almost from scratch after Dunkirk where tanks and guns were concerned.

But all through the Battle of Britain, the British built many more fighters than the Luftwaffe, and by the end of October 1940 their fighter force outnumbered Germany's.

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Post by Leibstandarte » 24 Oct 2002 06:06

That is an excellent subject. I take your point on the rearmament of the British and French Armed forces seriously. However, I would like to posit the following:

The UK and France would still have been crushed as they did not "understand" the nature that armor or air power plays in battle. Do not forget that Britain did not "get it right" concerning armor and close co-operation with the other arms of the forces until 1942 when they had had the experience of fighting in North Africa against Germany for a whole year.

Having said that...if Germany could have taken the corridor then I doubt there would have been a Polish War. Even if there had been there would most likely have been no reaction from either France or Britain. Britain's fighting talk about safeguarding (complete hyberole) the Polish borders was only given after Czech and Slovak lands were annexed in March 1939.

Roosevely essentially pushed the Japanese into War with the US. Since he decided to cut off the oil supply to Japan that meant Japan only had enough oil for maybe 9-12 mths before she ran dry. He knew what he was doing....no doubt about it. If he had been removed I doubt if Japan would have gone to war with the US.

No US in the War then bye bye Russia - forget Britain and France etc. Hitler had no interest in their countries other than to ensure they did not attack or present a serious threat to his beloved Third Reich.

Just some thoughts....thanks for a great "what if"....


Leibstandarte :-)

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by Cantankerous » 16 Dec 2022 21:44

Leibstandarte wrote:
24 Oct 2002 06:06
That is an excellent subject. I take your point on the rearmament of the British and French Armed forces seriously. However, I would like to posit the following:

The UK and France would still have been crushed as they did not "understand" the nature that armor or air power plays in battle. Do not forget that Britain did not "get it right" concerning armor and close co-operation with the other arms of the forces until 1942 when they had had the experience of fighting in North Africa against Germany for a whole year.

Having said that...if Germany could have taken the corridor then I doubt there would have been a Polish War. Even if there had been there would most likely have been no reaction from either France or Britain. Britain's fighting talk about safeguarding (complete hyberole) the Polish borders was only given after Czech and Slovak lands were annexed in March 1939.

Roosevely essentially pushed the Japanese into War with the US. Since he decided to cut off the oil supply to Japan that meant Japan only had enough oil for maybe 9-12 mths before she ran dry. He knew what he was doing....no doubt about it. If he had been removed I doubt if Japan would have gone to war with the US.

No US in the War then bye bye Russia - forget Britain and France etc. Hitler had no interest in their countries other than to ensure they did not attack or present a serious threat to his beloved Third Reich.

Just some thoughts....thanks for a great "what if"....


Leibstandarte :-)
Although this thread is 20 years old, I should emphasize that judging from the WW2 aircraft production graph on page 361 of Enzo Angelucci's book The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft: 1914 to the Present, even though FDR waited after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to declare war on the Axis powers, US military aircraft production on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack as of late 1941 exceeded 19,000 aircraft compared to 6,028 warplanes in 1940 not just because Roosevelt himself came to share Churchill's recognition that Hitler was a mortal threat to European peace who had to be beaten, but also due to the FDR administration having asking Congress in January 1939 for $300 million to be spent on procuring aircraft for the US Army Air Corps, which eventually received authorization from Congress to buy 3,251 aircraft. American tank production in 1940 paled in comparison to 4,021 tanks built by the US before Pearl Harbor, so it may be safe to say that US aircraft and tank production was already increasing by leaps and bounds by the time that the US entry into World War II ended the Great Depression by giving some unemployed Americans jobs in the arms industry.

The US began supplying military vehicles and aircraft to the USSR a few months before entering WW2, so even if the US had not entered World War II, the VVS would still have defeated the Luftwaffe and Heer on its own because the number of Soviet aircraft built in 1939 to 1941 was greater than the number of US aircraft delivered to the USSR via Lend-Lease, and some of the VVS generals who survived the 1937-1938 purges of the Soviet armed forces warned that Hitler was not going to honor his end of the bargain under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact due to his belief that all Slavic peoples were inferior to the Aryan races, and thus were inclined to support increased military aircraft production just in case the Führer cheated on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by T. A. Gardner » 16 Dec 2022 22:35

What does Japan do in Asia in this scenario?

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Dec 2022 17:02

T. A. Gardner wrote:
16 Dec 2022 22:35
What does Japan do in Asia in this scenario?

Continues attempting to close out the "China Incident". Nice France does not collapse in mid 1940 then there is not Japanese occupation of French Indochina & hence to US Embargos of Japan as we understand them. Any US action to intervene in the Sino Japanese war depends on the new administrations attitude. I guessing it will remain for another year less damaging actions such as the weak pre 1941 embargoes & diplomatic acts. Possibly the most important action may not even be by the US government. Japan was increasingly running its China war & by extension its economy on credit, mostly with US and London banks. While this was not yet burdensome in 1939 or 1940 the trend in this & japans economy in general was not in a good direction. The market place may very well cause the US banks to evaluate japan as a higher risk in 1941 bumping up interest rates for short and long term credit to Jpans government & business. Thats going to add to the existing loss from persecution of the war and overstressed economy. If the government wants to avoid compounding problems in 1941-42 they need to take a hard realistic look at their war policies/strategy. I suspect the odds are against this & Japan is headed for economic problems from 1942.

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Dec 2022 17:18

The common wisdom is France suffered from a dysfunctional arms industry. This can be regarded as true for the 1930s. But, from 1938 there had been a effort to reorganize this sector. By early 1940 the task was far advanced and production of many types of new modern arms were underway. This effort had been underway but stalled for much of the 1930s, & the Munich Crisis triggered effective action. Other advantages were both France and Britain had a significant Gold and currency reserve. They were able to pay up front for their global war purchases OTL 1939 & 1940, with only short term credit necessary. France intended under its war time economic plans to defer using extended credit until later 1941 or 1942. Absent war both nations would be able to avoid major credit problems or costs longer as they would be making their war preparations on a long term basis vs the emergency basis of OTL in 1939-1940.

Conversely the nazi administration was running on extended credit where it could still find it, or fraud. Acquiring the Austrian and Cezch banks & treasuries helped, but was not a long term solution. The trajectory of the nazi Reichs economy was downward while they kept up the massive rearmament program. Solvency & a rising economy might have been possible, but not with such massive military expenses. Beyond that lies the general corruption and ineptitude of the nazi leaders. That was having a negative effect that would need to be altered.

Over the long haul 1939-1941 Britain and France have the advantage in rearming & economics. The nazi regime can only keep up if they make large scale policy changes, one of which is to slow rearming significantly.

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Dec 2022 17:32

Cantankerous wrote:
16 Dec 2022 21:44

Although this thread is 20 years old, I should emphasize that judging from the WW2 aircraft production graph on page 361 of Enzo Angelucci's book The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Military Aircraft: 1914 to the Present, even though FDR waited after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor to declare war on the Axis powers, US military aircraft production on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack as of late 1941 exceeded 19,000 aircraft compared to 6,028 warplanes in 1940 not just because Roosevelt himself came to share Churchill's recognition that Hitler was a mortal threat to European peace who had to be beaten, but also due to the FDR administration having asking Congress in January 1939 for $300 million to be spent on procuring aircraft for the US Army Air Corps, which eventually received authorization from Congress to buy 3,251 aircraft. American tank production in 1940 paled in comparison to 4,021 tanks built by the US before Pearl Harbor, so it may be safe to say that US aircraft and tank production was already increasing by leaps and bounds by the time that the US entry into World War II ended the Great Depression by giving some unemployed Americans jobs in the arms industry.

The US began supplying military vehicles and aircraft to the USSR a few months before entering WW2, so even if the US had not entered World War II, the VVS would still have defeated the Luftwaffe and Heer on its own because the number of Soviet aircraft built in 1939 to 1941 was greater than the number of US aircraft delivered to the USSR via Lend-Lease, and some of the VVS generals who survived the 1937-1938 purges of the Soviet armed forces warned that Hitler was not going to honor his end of the bargain under the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact due to his belief that all Slavic peoples were inferior to the Aryan races, and thus were inclined to support increased military aircraft production just in case the Führer cheated on the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

In this alternate TL US production 1939-1941 depends on two things.

1. is the peace time investment the Brits and French continue to make in orders from US industry. OTL this was rising in raw materials and non military goods, but until the Neutrality Acts were weakened to the Cash and Casrry status actual arms or direct war material was embarked to everyone. The legislation concerning the existing Neutrality Acts did not occur until after the war started in 1939 & is less likely if there is not war.

2. Massive US military investment did not start until after France fell, and the authorization and funding of the Protective Mobilization Plan in the Autumn of 1939. The previous large increases in the Navy and War Department budgets passed in 1938 look big on paper, but did not make up in any way the neglect of the previous two decades. Absent a immediate European war The US Army moves up from #19, behind Portugal, to #15 behind Spain. The Navy would still be unable to execute War Plan ORANGE vs Japan without a further two year building program.

So, yes theres significant assistance from US industry, but without war its not as great as OTL 1940-41. What worse for the US is that without activating the PMP the severe flaws in the War Departments industrial plans are not revealed.

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by paulrward » 17 Dec 2022 17:45

Hello All :

Mr. Schwamberger posted :
What worse for the US is that without activating the PMP the severe
flaws in the War Departments industrial plans are not revealed.
Can we assume that the PMP you referred to was Project Management Program ?


In my experience, the use of Acronyms by U.S. Government Employees has given rise to much
confusion.

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

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Re:

Post by OpanaPointer » 17 Dec 2022 18:11

Leibstandarte wrote:
24 Oct 2002 06:06

Roosevely essentially pushed the Japanese into War with the US. Since he decided to cut off the oil supply to Japan that meant Japan only had enough oil for maybe 9-12 mths before she ran dry. He knew what he was doing....no doubt about it. If he had been removed I doubt if Japan would have gone to war with the US.
Leibstandarte :-)
The US was a major producer of crude oil.

1. The brass wanted the national reserve topped up.

2.The public wanted to run civilian industry.

3. The British wanted every drop we could send them.

4. The Japanese wanted fuel to continue their ultimately futile attempt to conquer China.

Hard to decide what to trim, ain't it?
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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by T. A. Gardner » 17 Dec 2022 19:46

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
17 Dec 2022 17:02
T. A. Gardner wrote:
16 Dec 2022 22:35
What does Japan do in Asia in this scenario?

Continues attempting to close out the "China Incident". Nice France does not collapse in mid 1940 then there is not Japanese occupation of French Indochina & hence to US Embargos of Japan as we understand them. Any US action to intervene in the Sino Japanese war depends on the new administrations attitude. I guessing it will remain for another year less damaging actions such as the weak pre 1941 embargoes & diplomatic acts. Possibly the most important action may not even be by the US government. Japan was increasingly running its China war & by extension its economy on credit, mostly with US and London banks. While this was not yet burdensome in 1939 or 1940 the trend in this & japans economy in general was not in a good direction. The market place may very well cause the US banks to evaluate japan as a higher risk in 1941 bumping up interest rates for short and long term credit to Jpans government & business. Thats going to add to the existing loss from persecution of the war and overstressed economy. If the government wants to avoid compounding problems in 1941-42 they need to take a hard realistic look at their war policies/strategy. I suspect the odds are against this & Japan is headed for economic problems from 1942.
Then as I see it, the US doesn't precipitate a Pacific War at the end of 1941, but rather some time well into 1942. If the US build up in the Philippines and the Dutch build up in the DEI remain roughly the same, by the time Japan does go to war neither is realistically takeable.

Japan would still continue their conquest of China. I can't see the IJA backing down from that.

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by OpanaPointer » 17 Dec 2022 21:15

The IJA was obsessed with China. They wouldn't back down if there was a dinosaur killer headed for Beijing.
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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 18 Dec 2022 19:26

If the US build up in the Philippines and the Dutch build up in the DEI remain roughly the same, by the time Japan does go to war neither is realistically takeable.

Possibly. The US build up of 1941 was largely in response to the course of war in Europe, and the failure of the embargoes to change japans national goals. Absent a European war & IndoChina occupation=embargos=Japanese preparations for pacific War. US preparations will be different and not so extensive. However a lack of increase of US Army strength in the PI is offset by the continued growth of the Philippine armed forces into 1942. The trajectory of USN strength recovery also runs against the Japanese. The Budget bill of 1938, that increased funding of War & Navy Depts for 1939-1940, was more important for a Pacific war than the Army increase.


The IJA was obsessed with China. They wouldn't back down if there was a dinosaur killer headed for Beijing.

The failure to understand this by the US leaders was the reason the Embargo Acts failed. & actually backfired. & it ran deeper in Japan than the Army, or rouge Army officers. The Zaibatsu or upper business leaders also saw firm domination of China as Japans best strategy. The goal of bout every Chinese political group was to restore Chinese economic and military power at its zenith. That included returning Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea from Japanese to Chinese control. Japans business community had bet their fortunes on investment in those regions and sought to thwart Chinese revanchism through direct control of China. That such control would in theory benefit Japan economically was also desirable in the thinking of the business leaders.

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Re: political effects of a delayed start to WW2

Post by OldBill » 18 Dec 2022 19:48

"The IJA was obsessed with China. They wouldn't back down if there was a dinosaur killer headed for Beijing.

The failure to understand this by the US leaders was the reason the Embargo Acts failed. & actually backfired. & it ran deeper in Japan than the Army, or rouge Army officers. The Zaibatsu or upper business leaders also saw firm domination of China as Japans best strategy. The goal of bout every Chinese political group was to restore Chinese economic and military power at its zenith. That included returning Manchuria, Taiwan, and Korea from Japanese to Chinese control. Japans business community had bet their fortunes on investment in those regions and sought to thwart Chinese revanchism through direct control of China. That such control would in theory benefit Japan economically was also desirable in the thinking of the business leaders."


This will also mean a lesser amount of money for the IJN and more for the IJA. A smaller IJN means less chance of conflict with the Western Powers.

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