wm wrote: ↑09 Nov 2022 11:16
Desperate because the Czechoslovak Army was encircled already without any fight.
No point of the territory was safe from the German airforce, and any target was reachable by air in two dozen minutes and from both sides.
Yes, the distances are not that big, but Luftwaffe would be mosty non-factor in October 1938, from several reasons: weather was real awful, while bomber command had a lots of planes to its disposal (yet from 1400 bombers, just 580 were operational, the crews were not there (from expected crews to man those 1400 bombers, there were only 380 crews fully operational) a lots of stuff was missing.
Plus it works the other way too: a successful raid to Linz railway hub can cripple the entire south logistic, Berlin is just 50 minutes away for B-71 bombers.
wm wrote: ↑09 Nov 2022 11:16
Additionally, the border areas (i.e., the battlefields) were populated almost entirely by the (highly motivated) Germans.
Thirty percent of people living in the encircled territory were Germans too.
It was almost like the Czechoslovak Army was encircled in enemy territory, the enemy within numbered millions.
What was the supposed role of those "highly motivated" germans? Those who were really motivated, entered the Freikorps, started the uprising and fled to Germany in September after martial law was established. The remaining citizens were non-factor. And that was before the mobilization, which was highly successful (heck even 40% of German men were part of the army, despite order from Heinlein (and Hitler) not to participate).
wm wrote: ↑09 Nov 2022 11:16
Wasn't the Czechoslovak plan to retreat as fast as possible to Slovakia anyway? The Germans were more or less ok with that, although they would try to prevent it.
No that was not the plan. The problem of the Czechoslovak army was a very long border with Germany. That's why the entire border fortification system was created, to lower the risk of sneak attack at one point and quick advance of Germans into the country. While a lots of the fortification was missing, it was there and needed to be pierced by Germans which would take time and would result in blood bath. Notice that northern part was in much better shape, combined with the really problematic terrain there would pretty much guarantee that this area would hold and prevent from army being encircled around Prague.
The plan was to shorten the front - the first location would be on the Vltava and Berounka river ahead of Prague, the second location would be at Moravian highlands, third on the Slovak border (also mountainous) and last resort in the high mountains in Slovakia, and then eventually flee to Romania to maintain the fighting capability of the army. German logistic routes would grow, their army would get more casualties as they were on offensive and the final battle would be between armies of relatively equal strength.
All that assumed that France would honor its treaty and will launch the offensive against Germany. There were even plans for French bombers to fly swing missions to Czechoslovakia, France had their equipment (ammo, bombs) on several Czechoslovak air bases. Not honoring this agreement with active bullying from the UK government was the reason for accepting the Munich, not any desperate military situation.
In fact it was German side which would find themselves in the desperate situation, as they lacked many pieces needed for a successful operation, starting with a plan (their only plan expected sneak attack before mobilization happened, which was not the case in early October), trained forces to get numerical advantage needed for successful attack, equipment, oil (especially if Rumania cut their transfers) and general public support for another war which would be very bloody.