The Danzig Corridor

[Gorque]

Those nations that were allied; Hungary, Romania, Italy, Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria were treated differently than those that were conquered and then occupied; France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Czechs, Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark.

If the circumstances had been different for Poland, who can say with absolute certainty that Poland would not have been included within the first set on nations mentioned. If my memory serves me correctly, was not one of A.H.'s first foreign policy achievements the signing of a treaty with Poland?

Finally, occupied nations require the stationing of troops within their territory. If A.H.'s ultimate aim was the Soviet Union, that would mean that many fewer troops available for the coming conflict.

[wm]

At first he tried to reach an agreement and the concessions he offered were not insignificant.

What significant concessions do you have in mind? There were none.
Like German money, his concessions were worth something to the Germans but outside Germany, they were worthless (with the exception, that in need, you could use German money as toilet paper.)
In 1940 Stalin at least offered the Fins two times more territory for the territories he demanded (and they still resisted.) But Poland was expected to hand over strategically vital territories for mere words. Gold for glass beads.

In 1925, at Locarno, Germany guaranteed the borders of all Western countries: France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and still all of them were attacked.
Even Poland wasn't attacked because Polish borders weren't "guaranteed" but because the German minority in Poland was supposedly presecuted and Poland was attacking Germany.

Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory. Since 5.45 A.M. we have been returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met by bombs.
Adolf Hitler

I know the Polish leadership said they expected to lose once they were in Rumania but I was not aware that they were saying it before the start of the war. I thought that Plan Z envisaged the gradual withdrawal of the army to south-eastern Poland and then to hang on till the French launched their offensive in the west. Presumably if the Poles expected to be defeated they had a plan for what to do in the event of defeat. I am not aware of the Poles activating any such plan perhaps wm you could tell us if such a plan existed.

The instruction for the Polish negotiators (negotiating the infamous May 1939 French-Polish military convention - Kasprzycki-Gamelin agreement) accepted that:

Poland alone, facing the enormous German (military) advantage will be so bloodied, will lose so much territory it will be unable to fight the war anymore.

The plan merely demanded the Polish Army inflicted maximum losses, avoided total defeat, and waited for the French counter-offensive.
No sane military planner expected Poland alone would survive, they gave Poland from four weeks (in American press) to a few months (in the French press.)

[wm]

Those nations that were allied; Hungary, Romania, Italy, Finland, Slovakia, Bulgaria were treated differently than those that were conquered and then occupied; France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Czechs, Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark.

If the circumstances had been different for Poland, who can say with absolute certainty that Poland would not have been included within the first set on nations mentioned. If my memory serves me correctly, was not one of A.H.'s first foreign policy achievements the signing of a treaty with Poland?

Finally, occupied nations require the stationing of troops within their territory. If A.H.'s ultimate aim was the Soviet Union, that would mean that many fewer troops available for the coming conflict.

The German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was a Polish achievement but the Nazis regarded it as humiliating - that a small despicable country was able to dictate terms using veiled military threats.

There is no doubt, I think, Poland would get the better treatment in such circumstances although Poland would become a puppet state very quickly.
Hitler only resorted to genocide against the Poles to preempt inevitable resistance, remembering the numerous Polish uprisings against partition powers and later the underground arm resistance against Russia (and political against Germany.)
Disregarding any moral considerations one needs to admit he was right.

But it has to be said that although occupied: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Czechs, Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark all collaborated with the Nazis. And because of that got much better treatment than Poland.

[Orlov]

According to Wikipedia Bohlen received the full content of the Pact on August 24 and Roosevelt was informed. Wikipedia says that the US did not share the information with Britain, France or Poland. You live and learn. It would not have made any difference if the Poles had known about a secret protocol since its army was by this time concentrated in the west and Hitler was determined to destroy the country.

I didn't write anything like that - Steve please forgive me, but Wikipedia is not the source.
German diplomat (anti-National Socialist) in Moscow Hans von Herwarth conveyed the great secret of the secret protocol to his American colleague Charles Bohlen, the American chargé d'affaires at the Moscow embassy. This caused the American ambassador to Moscow, Steinhardt, to send an appropriate telegram to Washington on August 24, ie one day after the fact.
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1939, vol. I, Washington, pp. 342–348.

Steinhardt's telegram did not affect the course of history. Assistant Secretary of State Cordell Hull Adolf Berle immediately argued that the Nazi-Soviet pact would not last. From the very beginning, however, he had no doubts that it was a death sentence against Poland.
J.L. Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States. An Interpretive History, New York 1978, p. 139.

Italian diplomacy was introduced into the secrets of the German-Soviet negotiations by Herwarth. He chose the foreign service of this country (not the US) to start his action. Later, however, he broke off contact with the Italian embassy for fear of Italian indiscretions against the Germans.
I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, ottava serie, t. XIII, Roma 1953, pp. 171–172, 182–184.

French diplomacy gained invaluable information about the secret Berlin-Moscow deal, and there were two sources. The ambassadors in Berlin and Moscow reported to Paris that there would be a great revolution in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe. On August 21, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bonnet received a report from the ambassador to the capital of the USSR that "Poland and Romania would be divided" ("partage de la Pologne et de la Roumanie") and "certain parts of the Baltic states would be left under Soviet control" ("l 'abandon au controle soviétique de certaines parties des états baltes'). Three days later, the same diplomat sent a message to Quai d'Orsay announcing the conclusion of a secret protocol attached to a public non-aggression treaty. The provisions of this appendix were to concern the Baltic states, Romania and Poland. Coulondre, in turn, came into the possession of similar news, and they came from "the entourage" of Hans Lammers, head of the Reich Chancellery in Berlin. Known since the end of 1939. Perhaps a controlled leak. There was no investigation. Lammers was not removed from office. He continued to serve Hitler.
Documents Diplomatiques Français, t. XVIII, Paris 1985, pp. 233–234, doc. 183.
Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Archives diplomatiques, La Courneuve (Paris), Papiers d’agents – Naggiar, vol. 199/41.

The Nazi [German]-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939: When Did Stalin Decide to Align with Hitler, and Was Poland the Culprit?
by Anna M. Cienciala [in:] https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/213406527.pdf
[...]There is no evidence that it was passed on to the British, French, or Polish governments, but Roosevelt warned the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Konstantin A. Oumansky, that if war broke out in Europe and the Far East, and if the Axis powers were victorious, then both the United States and the USSR would be affected, but the latter would be affected immediately. Therefore, the president believed that an agreement against aggression on the part of other European powers would have a stabilizing effect. This message was repeated by Steinhardt to Molotov on August 16, but it did not seem to have any effect.108 After this, Washington did pass on Steinhardt's second report to the British. On August 17, the U.S. Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, told the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, that the German ambassador in Moscow had seen Molotov two days earlier and transmitted an oral statement from Hitler to Stalin to the effect that Germany had no aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union, and that there was no conflict of interest between the two powers "from the Baltic to the Black Sea." Thus, Germany was ready to discuss any territorial questions in Eastern Europe and conversations should start very soon be- cause she was ready to send a negotiator to Moscow immediately.109 However, this message was intercepted and delayed, most likely by Francis Herbert King. Six years later, at the Potsdam Conference, Anthony Eden told Bohlen that due to a communist spy in the Foreign Office code room, it was not received until after Berlin had announced Ribbentrop's forthcoming visit to Moscow. The Lindsay telegram was, indeed, officially registered in the foreign office on August 18 at 9.30 a.m., but was not received in the Central Department until August 22.110 Halifax told the U.S. ambassador, Joseph F. Kennedy, on August 23, that [Sir Robert G.] Vansittart [the chief diplomatic adviser to the Foreign Office] "believes there is a provision in the agreement providing for the fourth partition of Poland."111 Perhaps, Vansittart had read the Lindsay telegram, or perhaps also the report sent that day to Paris by the French ambassador in Berlin, Robert Coulondre. Whatever Vansittart's source, he informed Halifax, who passed it on to Kennedy. [...]

108. For Steinhardt report, August 15, 1939, see FRUS 1939, I, 334-35; see also Charles Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1939 (New York, 1973), 80-82, and Hans von Herwarth, with S. Frederick Starr, Against Two Evils (New York, 1981), 159-160. For report on German proposals of August 3, see U.S. Charge in the Soviet Union (Grummon) to secretary of state, Moscow, August 3, 1939, FRUS 1939, I, 292-293. For President Roosevelt's warning to Ambassador Oumansky, with re- quest that Steinhardt repeat it to Molotov, see under secretary of state to Steinhardt, August 4,1939, ibid., 293-294; for Steinhardt's report on conversation with Molotov, August 16, ibid., 296-298; Russian record: SPE no.329, GK 2, no. 564.
109. For Welles' report on German proposals of August 15 to the British ambas- sador, see Sir Ronald Lindsay to Halifax, Washington, August 17, 1939, DBFP 3rd ser. VII (London, 1954), no.41.
110. See Watt, "Francis Herbert King," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 3, no. 4 (1988): 79, and his "An Intelligence Surprise: The Failure of the Foreign Office to Anticipate the Nazi-Soviet Pact," Intelligence and National Security, vol. 4, no. 3 (1989): 524; here Watt names the Soviet agent as John Herbert King. For Eden to Bohlen at Potsdam, see Bohlen, Witness to History, 80-82. Herwarth writes that the message was not deciphered until after the spy was replaced, Against Two Evils, 161, but this is incorrect because King was arrested after September 4, see note 116 below.
111. Kennedy to secretary of state, August 23, 1939, FRUS, 1939, I, 339-340.

[Steve]

wm,
Recognising the German Polish border was a significant concession. It meant relinquishing claims to all pre 1919 German territory and leaving about three quarters of a million Germans under Polish rule. To put it in a modern context imagine the furore if the USA said it no longer recognised the border with Mexico. Apart from extra territorial rail and road links across the Polish Corridor it would remain Polish. The Germans could of course cut Polish access to Gdynia but technology in 1939 was sufficiently advanced to build either a bridge over or a tunnel under the German links. There are three tunnels in England built under the river Mersey before 1939 to connect the area of Wirral with Liverpool; all three are still in use. Danzig did not belong to Poland the Poles only had certain rights in the city. The Nazi party ran every day affairs in Danzig and its German population wanted to reunite with Germany. Hitler offered to guarantee Polish economic rights in the city but of course he could go back on his word. If he did it would not have been an economic disaster for Poland as Danzig in 1939 accounted for about a third of Polish maritime trade and this was mainly bulk cargo. Gdynia was Poland’s main port in 1939.

If using German money for toilet paper in 1939 the rate of exchange was one dollar for about 2.49 marks. The question is how many marks would an average person need to wipe one bottom? Let us be economical and say five notes or almost two dollars. A dollar in 1938 is worth about forty dollars today. Clearly only very rich people could have afforded to wipe their bottoms with Reich marks in 1939. Did Colonel Beck use Reich marks?

Hitler never guaranteed anybody's borders at Locarno and Stresemann never guaranteed Polish borders. Could Hitler be trusted? Probably not, but not certainly not, the man did not act rationally. The only other alternative was resisting and then for certain suffering a total military defeat after which the terms Hitler had offered would be off the table.

If Poland’s leaders went to war expecting to be defeated and then after only 21 years of independence to return to foreign occupation for who knew how long they were total numb nuts.

Orlov, I never said that you did write “anything like that” I wrote that according to Wikipedia. It just goes to show that even after having a subject as your hobby for donkey’s years there is still something new out there. The spy in the Foreign Office code room came up in a post a while back. When the British sent a negotiating team to Moscow in 1939 to discuss a defence agreement the instructions to them went through the FO code room. The Soviets had the British negotiators instructions before they did. After the Soviet German Pact the Soviets passed on information received from their man to the Germans.

[wm]

wm,
Recognising the German Polish border was a significant concession. It meant relinquishing claims to all pre 1919 German territory and leaving about three quarters of a million Germans under Polish rule.

Poland owned the territories already, perfectly legally, and Germany agreed to that by signing the Treaty of Versailles.
Additionally, Germany renounced war as means of settling political disputes, by signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact and later the non-aggression treaty with Poland (where the Kellogg-Briand Pact was explicitly mentioned.)
So that concession was meaningless. It gave Poland what Poland already had and Germany had no right to do anything about it.

If using German money for toilet paper in 1939 the rate of exchange was one dollar for about 2.49 marks.

German money was officially declared a non-convertible currency. You weren't even allowed to exchange it. And the Germans weren't allowed to own foreign currencies.
You couldn't buy, let's say, an Arabian ostrich for 1000 marks. Nobody would sell you the animal. But you could barter it for a hundred German hens. The rate of exchange was used to establish how many hens you needed. German trade was almost exclusively based on barter for that reason.
And this was the main reason the Nazi-Jewish Haavara Agreement was signed. To avoid the problem that German money was worthless outside Germany.

Hitler never guaranteed anybody's borders"at Locarno

Exactly, one guy guaranteed it and his successor didn't.
That was precisely what Beck said to Ribbentrop, that there was no guarantee that Hitler's successor would give a damn about Hitler's guarantees.
Besides, Nazi Germany could have attacked Poland for any other reason, as they say - it is easy to find a stick to beat a dog.

If Poland's leaders went to war expecting to be defeated and then after only 21 years of independence to return to foreign occupation for who knew how long they were total numb nuts.

It's better to be total numb nuts than a Nazi collaborator - or not?
As the philosopher said: "The wise man does not expose himself needlessly to danger ... but he is willing, in great crises, to give even his life, knowing that under certain conditions it is not worthwhile to live."
You have no right the deny the right to self-defense to other people if you are willing to surrender to evil yourself.


And what's wrong with all that anyway. Too hot for Hitler?
It wasn't like a Polish leader had to commit suicide with his wife, and his dog at the end of the war. In fact, at the same time, the Polish flag flew over Berlin.

[Gorque]

The German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was a Polish achievement but the Nazis regarded it as humiliating - that a small despicable country was able to dictate terms using veiled military threats.

There is no doubt, I think, Poland would get the better treatment in such circumstances although Poland would become a puppet state very quickly.
Hitler only resorted to genocide against the Poles to preempt inevitable resistance, remembering the numerous Polish uprisings against partition powers and later the underground arm resistance against Russia (and political against Germany.)
Disregarding any moral considerations one needs to admit he was right.

But it has to be said that although occupied: France, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Czechs, Yugoslavia, Greece, Denmark all collaborated with the Nazis. And because of that got much better treatment than Poland.

Hi wm:

Thank you for your reply to my posting

I respectfully disagree with your assertion that the Nazis regarded it as a humiliating concession, my words, but in the eyes of the diplomats, this was a great achievement for the new regime in that it highlighted their ability to arrive at a mutually, partially, agreeable conclusion to an intractable problem, the corridor and East Prussia. It allowed A.H. to buy himself time for rearmament while giving the Poles the trading off of appeasing the Soviets against the Germans. What more could the Poles expect considering the treaty of of Locarno and the completion of the Maginot Line. It reads as a win-win to me as both nations got what they wanted in the short-term, security.

[wm]

I respectfully disagree with your assertion that the Nazis regarded it as a humiliating concession, my words, but in the eyes of the diplomats, this was a great achievement for the new regime in that it highlighted their ability to arrive at a mutually, partially, agreeable conclusion to an intractable problem, the corridor and East Prussia.

Well, some said so:

when the Fuehrer was Chancellor, under pressure from Pilsudski he made a pact with Poland renouncing vital German territory in the East and recognizing the Polish Corridor - a humiliating blow to German pride, and a renunciation which would have thrown Hitler himself into fits of the most violent and hysterical flagellation if it had been authored by anybody else.
I Knew Hitler by Kurt Ludecke

And that guy, an idealist Nazi, really knew Hitler - personally.

The German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was hailed by the German press as an important contribution to European peace, so it was an achievement (assuming the Nazis wanted peace) but really why a great one?
Weimar Germany could have signed such a declaration any time it wished, but instead, it preferred to wage a (devastating) customs, economic and political war on Poland. At one point Poland was close to bankruptcy because of that.

Btw the declaration was signed by von Neurath who represented not Hitler but the president - Paul von Hindenburg. Only the president could sign international treaties.
It was still Hindenburg's, not Hitler's Germany.

[wm]

It allowed A.H. to buy himself time for rearmament while giving the Poles the trading off of appeasing the Soviets against the Germans.

I don't quite understand, Poland had nothing to do with the rearmament. The rearmament violated the Treaty of Versailles, but Poland wasn't a principal signatory of the treaty and had no right to intervene in defense of it (like Germany, Poland was asked to sign on the dotted line and be quiet about it).

The principal signatories were OK with the rearmament and that was it, nobody was going to ask Poland for an opinion.
The German-Polish declaration of non-aggression certainly didn't give Germany any right to rearm.
Actually, Poland didn't like it at all, from contemporary Polish press:
The Germans have been allowed to re-arm. The truth is coming out.
The Treaty of Versailles

treaty.jpg

If a principal signatory (Britain, France) declared an armed crusade against Germany (and the Treaty of Versailles gave them every right and then some to do it) and called the other members of the League of Nations to arms Poland would join.
The German-Polish declaration of non-aggression explicitly allowed that.

Btw Germany was allowed to rearm in 1933, several months before the German-Polish declaration was signed.

[wm]

What about it, it seems everybody loved the declaration:

Chamberlain hails the pact.png

Paris hails the pact.png

[Gorque]

It allowed A.H. to buy himself time for rearmament while giving the Poles the trading off of appeasing the Soviets against the Germans.

I don't quite understand, Poland had nothing to do with the rearmament. The rearmament violated the Treaty of Versailles, but Poland wasn't a principal signatory of the treaty and had no right to intervene in defense of it (like Germany, Poland was asked to sign on the dotted line and be quiet about it).

Hi wm:

Of course Poland had nothing to do with the German rearmament. I should have been added more clarifying context to my statement beforehand.
What I meant by the above was due to the signing of the pact, it lent credence A.H.'s assertions, within the diplomatic circles, of his assertions that his deeds and actions were for peaceful intents and sought only to right the wrongs of the Versailles treaty, ergo, buying time until his true intentions became known.

[Gorque]

I respectfully disagree with your assertion that the Nazis regarded it as a humiliating concession, my words, but in the eyes of the diplomats, this was a great achievement for the new regime in that it highlighted their ability to arrive at a mutually, partially, agreeable conclusion to an intractable problem, the corridor and East Prussia.

Well, some said so:

when the Fuehrer was Chancellor, under pressure from Pilsudski he made a pact with Poland renouncing vital German territory in the East and recognizing the Polish Corridor - a humiliating blow to German pride, and a renunciation which would have thrown Hitler himself into fits of the most violent and hysterical flagellation if it had been authored by anybody else.
I Knew Hitler by Kurt Ludecke

And that guy, an idealist Nazi, really knew Hitler - personally.

The German-Polish declaration of non-aggression was hailed by the German press as an important contribution to European peace, so it was an achievement (assuming the Nazis wanted peace) but really why a great one?
Weimar Germany could have signed such a declaration any time it wished, but instead, it preferred to wage a (devastating) customs, economic and political war on Poland. At one point Poland was close to bankruptcy because of that.

Btw the declaration was signed by von Neurath who represented not Hitler but the president - Paul von Hindenburg. Only the president could sign international treaties.
It was still Hindenburg's, not Hitler's Germany.

Hi wm:

Weimar could've, but chose not to: A.H. did and to much of the balance of the world, it was hailed as a great achievement in reducing tensions between the two parties. Along comes this low-brow Trommler, better known for his attempt of overthrow, by force, the Weimar regime, street-brawling, and bombast and succeeds where past German governments failed/refused merely by changing the order of the precedents to the agreement.

PS: While Hindenburg signed the pact, the true power within Weimar Germany rested within the Reichstag and in particular, the Chancellor.

[Steve]

I am not disputing that a great deal of pre war German trade was based on barter but this mainly applied to east central Europe. In a country like the UK when Mercedes wanted to sell their cars there they did not barter them for chickens.

“In 1935 it was decided to take premises at Brook House in London s prestigious Park Lane, facing Hyde Park, with Herr von Keller as Manager of private-car sales. The war caused these showrooms to be closed in December 1939,” Taken from Motor Sport magazine.

The 1934 German Polish agreement was clearly more beneficial for Germany than Poland. Hitler needed years to rebuild Germany’s armed forces and this is why he signed the agreement it gave him security in the east. It did not guarantee Poland’s border with Germany there is no mention in the agreement of the border. In theory the agreement guaranteed peace for ten years and therefore the border should not be an issue for ten years. As people did not know what Hitler intended they thought the agreement was a step towards building European peace not realising it was a step towards bringing the roof down.

To sign an agreement does not make you a collaborator. If it did then the people who signed the 1934 agreement were collaborators. It was a vassal Polish army raised its flag over Berlin in 1945.

[wm]

What I meant by the above was due to the signing of the pact, it lent credence A.H.'s assertions, within the diplomatic circles, of his assertions that his deeds and actions were for peaceful intents and sought only to right the wrongs of the Versailles treaty, ergo, buying time until his true intentions became known.

Certainly, it was like that. I haven't seen any contemporary comment (British, French, American) that didn't hail it as a great, long-term contribution to peace.

[wm]

The 1934 German Polish agreement was clearly more beneficial for Germany than Poland. Hitler needed years to rebuild Germany’s armed forces and this is why he signed the agreement it gave him security in the east.

I don't quite understand it. The declaration (it was titled a declaration, not a pact or a treaty) didn't grant Hitler the right to rearm, intimidate, wage wars. So why did it give him security?

Does it mean that the non-aggression treaties (they were actually called treaties) with France and the Soviet Union (signed several years earlier and never repudiated) gave Hitler security in the east and in the west?

The declaration specifically excluded existing commitments and it included: the French-Polish Alliance, The Treaty of Versailles, The Covenant of the League of Nations, Kellogg–Briand Pact, and the Conventions for the Definition of Aggression.
The last four were the cornerstones of common security and peace in Europe. There was nothing else.
Nothing was easier than stopping an aggressor (with Polish cooperation) if there had been a political wish and consensus to do it.