No, they did not produce that many pieces of field artillery. Neither in 1942, nor anytime later.In 1942, after total mobilization was implemented, the USSR produced 287,000.
Source? Per Dunn, 1942 was the highest year for field artillery production (excluding mortars and 45 mm anti-tank guns): 30,100. It declined to 22,100 in 1943 because they had more than enough. Stalin's Keys to Victory, p. 143.Huszar666 wrote: ↑10 Jun 2022 21:05No, they did not produce that many pieces of field artillery. Neither in 1942, nor anytime later.
The highest number produced was 1944 with 20.733. Do not mix up the soviet counting method for "artillery" with everyone else's method (where only field pieces were counted)
I don't see it that way, that is the USSR was a not a poor but resource rich industrial state. Including a large portion of the population who were well skilled & educated. & all that was misused and inefficiently exploited for defense.historygeek2021 wrote: ↑10 Jun 2022 14:01.... A poor country like the Soviet Union is never going to field divisions with the quality of the U.S. Army or even the Wehrmacht. ...
Oh I agree there, expanding far beyond the goals of the 1939 plans creates a new set of problems.Art wrote: ↑10 Jun 2022 19:57Why would they need leadership for 600 divisions, when the plan was to mobilize only 303?Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑09 Jun 2022 05:11Im skeptical creating a offensive capable leadership in a year for 600 divisions would happen.
Mobilization of the army of 303 divisons was mostly possible with available resources. According to Timoshenko and Zhukov (February 1941)
Needed for the mobilized army - 1 003 917 officers for all grades
Available as of 1.1.41 - 527 456
Graduation of cadets from military schools - 93 138
Promotion of enlised men with higher or completed secondary education - 121 118 (*)
Call of reserve officers - 465 190
Total - 1 206 902
There was a shortage in certain categories (medical officers, tank, signal, engineer officers), but as far as total numbers are concerned, there was even some surplus for replacement of casualties.
* Enlisted men of the active army who graduated from universities or secondary schools (and were undergoing training as reserve officers) were to be automatically promoted to officer positions with the start of mobilization.
Add in the over promotion of the cadres of 1939 due to the purges & the pool is even weaker.Promotion of enlised men with higher or completed secondary education - 121 118 (*)
Call of reserve officers - 465 190
Only for NCOs (and also personnel of air forces and border guard). The default service length for privates was still 2 years.historygeek2021 wrote: ↑10 Jun 2022 20:01Conscription was lengthened to 3 years in 1939. Stumbling Colossus, p. 99.
You should also consider personnel recieved at mobilization (not counted as replacements) and arrivals of entire units and formations (not counted either).Per Lopukhovsky, there were 4,004,000 permanent casualties by December 1, during which period there were 2,130,000 field replacements.
It's in the link I posted. Click "production of guns 1939-1945".Source? Per Dunn, 1942 was the highest year for field artillery production (excluding mortars and 45 mm anti-tank guns): 30,100. It declined to 22,100 in 1943 because they had more than enough. Stalin's Keys to Victory, p. 143.
No, Glantz says, "the term of military service for enlisted men and NCOs" was increased to 3 years.
It was the pre-war units that suffered the heaviest losses: 3rd, 10th, 4th, 13th, 16th, 19th, 20th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 26th, 18th and 9th armies all destroyed.You should also consider personnel recieved at mobilization (not counted as replacements) and arrivals of entire units and formations (not counted either).
No, Dunn is clear that he excludes AA guns and AT guns.
Not sure how accurate your website is but Dunn lists 3 factories that were each capable of producing more than 10,000 76 mm field guns per year. Per Glantz and боевой состав Советской Армии, the total Red Army on June 22, 1941 required approximately 10,000 76 mm field guns (198 rifle divisions x 44; 61 tank divisions x 12; 31 motorized divisions x 24) and Dunn gives the total available at the start of Barbarossa at 32,000 (p. 33), so theoretically the Red Army could have tripled in size and still had enough 76 mm field guns without any increase in production. That's just 76 mm field guns but per Glantz Table 6.3 the supply of 122 mm howitzers was even better and per Dunn just 3 factories were capable of producing nearly 20,000 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers per year (pp. 30-32).Just for comperasion: for 300 further divisions plus corps-, army- and STAVKA-level stuff, you would need around 20.000 further pieces (probably more, I'm not in the mood to calculate a more exact number), while the production of field pieces were:
1940: 5.381
1941: 9.455 -and after Late-June the number probably went up sharply.
So, from May 1940 to May 1941 there were probably around 6000 field pieces manufactured. You would need at least quadrolupe the number to be able to outfit the OTL troops AND the new, further 300 divisions. With 26.000 pieces, you would be still over 1942 by 3500 pieces or so.
When mobilization was declared millions of reservists were called to their units. That meant a large increase of the operational army above pre-war strength.
That's wrong then. According to the law on universal military service of 1939 the length of service was establihsed as follows:No, Glantz says, "the term of military service for enlisted men and NCOs" was increased to 3 years.
And these reservists somehow went immediately to the units at the front? Got a source on that?
What is soldat.ru? Who publishes it? How do we know it's more reliable than David Glantz?
Reservists are called up. They either (1) go to their internal military districts to form new units, (2) join the field replacement battalions, or (3) are "received" by existing formations. I have seen references to the first 2, but not the 3rd until Art's post. I'm asking for sources and information on (3). I have a hard time seeing how the formations in the western USSR received reservists the third way. Maybe some standing formations in the interior and Far East received units the third way, but not many were transferred to the west.
That would be interesting to know, which ones those were. Since the total of 76mm field guns NEVER went above 16.000 and change/year during the whole war.Dunn lists 3 factories that were each capable of producing more than 10,000 76 mm field guns per year.
20k total or each? Makes no difference, since 122+152mm NEVER went above 4200 and change/year during the whole war.the supply of 122 mm howitzers was even better and per Dunn just 3 factories were capable of producing nearly 20,000 122 mm and 152 mm howitzers per year (pp. 30-32).
armcharigeneral gives around 8.500, which is a much more believable number. Even IF we add mountain and regimental guns (6400 or so), we would STILL be around 15k, less than the half of the qouted number.Dunn gives the total available at the start of Barbarossa at 32,000
He quotes these sources:Not sure how accurate your website is
Since Dunn makes extraordinary false claims for at-is and production numbers, I would very much doubt, he is correct in this assumtion.No, Dunn is clear that he excludes AA guns and AT guns.
