It is not on the US Army War College,which was /is full of bias to the USSR during the Cold War,to decide, using War Games ,that Germany would have won the war in the East .It is not on the US to decide who could have won the Second European Civil War .It would also not on a European Army College to decide,using War Games, that the South could have won the US Civil War .paulrward wrote: ↑06 Jun 2022 23:00Hello All :
I have been spending too much time on this thread lately, it takes a LOT of research
time that I prefer to spend on other areas. However, Mr. TheMarcksPlan has responded
to the latest in this thread
If anyone would like to continue to discuss Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ideas - or anything else about WW2 - you can do so
However, I will make a final few remarks:
Since there is only one reason to create rubber crumb, ( To recycle that rubber) why arehistorygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15Yes, and USSBS took rubber recycling into account:
you questioning the ability of Germany to recycle rubber? Just throwing out chaff?
Mr. TheMarcksPlan already gave you cite in his last post in "Germany mobilizes earlier."historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15Cite please. There were 394,000 workers in the automotive industry in 1943,
Given that USSBS Motor Vehicale Report states 130k workers, it's obvious the 400k workers
for "automotive industry" includes additional non-truck products like aero engines and tanks.
historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15How do you get to 30%?
23,000 more trucks in Barbarossa was appx. 30% of Germany's annual truck production. And that's
a big overcount because, as discussed in USSBS truck report, the truck industry was underutilized
throughout this period. Building 30% more trucks before Barbarossa would feasibly require
ZERO additional workers, certainly less than 30% workforce delta.
What is the relevance of this argument to Germany producing 23,000 more trucks to Barbarossa?historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15Germany wasn't producing enough lorries to maintain its existing fleet
I can go along with the ' dull reciter ' portion, whether they are really ' facts ' is up forhistorygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15Any historian who challenges TMP's opinions is a dull reciter of facts
historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15
The Germans had a nickname for the French trucks that were requisitioned in 1941
and broke down before they got to Warsaw ... "elephants." GSWW Vol IV p. 1139.
Ok so Ostheer would have been better off with ZERO French trucks? They actually hurt
the German army? I cannot see how that makes much sense - even bad trucks, confined
to certain, limited roads can be put to use.
I feel that your vague indictments of French trucks have no analytical value. Even assuming
every single French truck breaks down after a few months, even if every French Truck fell to
pieces after just a few months, the Ostheer could have certainly executed a couple more
devastating Kessels in Ukraine.
And of course you're ignoring Mr. TheMarcksPlan's argument that no additional French trucks
are necessary, though they're sufficient. Also sufficient is German manufacture of 23,000
more military trucks, equipped with tires either from Germany's underestimated rubber supply
or from recycling of more looted French tires (with the French trucks left to rot, if it comes to that).
You will say the USSBS "accounted for" recycling but it didn't account for recycling of additional
looted French trucks - obviously.
historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15
A truck carrying supplies for an infantry division that marches 50 kilometers, then stops
to engage the enemy, is going to burn a lot less fuel then [sic] a truck carrying supplies
for a panzer division driving 300 kilometers over the same period and has to constantly
maneuver to engage the enemy the entire time, and then keeps on driving farther and
Even conceding that is true, what's the relevance?
historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15the Grosstransportraum trucks that have to drive 300 or 400 kilometers to drop off supplies
and then drive back
They don't have to ATL, as better railway support means supplies arrive nearer the front. Again,
total Ostheer fuel consumption is probably lower in Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ATL.
This was your and others' tactic against MrTheMarksPlan : when he said something extensivelyhistorygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15Yes, just assume everything will be easier,
reasoned and supported by evidence, you call it an assumption. That gives him the option of
(1) restating the entire argument,
(2) walking away from the forum,
(3) getting visibly annoyed by this behavior.
Here you're pretending that Mr. TheMarcksPlan didn't detail the campaign's course and why AGS's
ability to destroy its opponents repeatedly - and without the assistance of AGC - lead to greater
RKKA casualties, lower Ostheer losses, and lower Soviet warmaking potential.
Again you have to pretend you're arguing against something Mr.TheMarcksPlan never said. Hehistorygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15Maybe AGC reaches Moscow. So what.
was always clear that merely taking Moscow isn't enough - that was his central criticism of
Halder et. al. for planning a bad campaign.
That is the question and it's something Mr. TheMarcksPlan discussed extensively. Again, I feel thathistorygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15I can grant that the Red Army will be weaker in 1942 if Germany somehow pulls off this ATL.
The question is, how much weaker.
you have declined to engage substantively.
historygeek2021 wrote: ↑05 Jun 2022 22:15The Ostheer is going to be weaker than it was in 1941 ... all the planning and assuming in the world
can't make up for the reality of attrition on the Eastern Front.
This is just a re-statement of the Theology of the Invincible Soviet Union. It ignores the fact that,
in October of 1941, Stalin and the Soviet Government began making plans to secretly abandon Moscow
in the face of the advancing Wehrmacht, and only chose to stay in the city because they felt that
it might cause the entire Soviet Structure to collapse if they didn't.
Did the "reality of attrition" not exist during 1942? If it did exist, then why was Ostheer stronger
in 1943 than 1942?
The War on the Ostfront has been researched for nearly eight decades. The U.S. Army War College has
conducted WarGames on it. And other, very skilled researchers have also done gaming scenarios on
the various aspects of Barbarrossa. And, the one innescapable fact that always emerged was: If the
USSR lost Moscow, which was a central rail and road hub, as well as the administrative and coordinative
center of the USSR, the Soviet Forces would have collapsed by the end of 1942.
Paul R. Ward
And Stalin did not decide to remain at Moscow because he was afraid that if he left,this would cause the collaps of the USSR, but because the army told him that the Germans could not get Moscow .
And, the Ostheer was not stronger in 1943 than in 1941 . Saying that it was stronger is only copycatting the Halder/Manstein/Guderian claims .