TMP Overall; German Options

[ljadw]

Hello All :

I have been spending too much time on this thread lately, it takes a LOT of research
time that I prefer to spend on other areas. However, Mr. TheMarcksPlan has responded
to the latest in this thread

here[/here].
If anyone would like to continue to discuss Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ideas - or anything else about WW2 - you can do so
[url=https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/ww2analysis/]here


However, I will make a final few remarks:

Yes, and USSBS took rubber recycling into account:

Since there is only one reason to create rubber crumb, ( To recycle that rubber) why are
you questioning the ability of Germany to recycle rubber? Just throwing out chaff?

Cite please. There were 394,000 workers in the automotive industry in 1943,

Mr. TheMarcksPlan already gave you cite in his last post in "Germany mobilizes earlier."
Given that USSBS Motor Vehicale Report states 130k workers, it's obvious the 400k workers
for "automotive industry" includes additional non-truck products like aero engines and tanks.

How do you get to 30%?

23,000 more trucks in Barbarossa was appx. 30% of Germany's annual truck production. And that's
a big overcount because, as discussed in USSBS truck report, the truck industry was underutilized
throughout this period. Building 30% more trucks before Barbarossa would feasibly require
ZERO additional workers, certainly less than 30% workforce delta.

Germany wasn't producing enough lorries to maintain its existing fleet

What is the relevance of this argument to Germany producing 23,000 more trucks to Barbarossa?
Please explain.

Any historian who challenges TMP's opinions is a dull reciter of facts

I can go along with the ' dull reciter ' portion, whether they are really ' facts ' is up for
discussion......

The Germans had a nickname for the French trucks that were requisitioned in 1941
and broke down before they got to Warsaw ... "elephants." GSWW Vol IV p. 1139.

Ok so Ostheer would have been better off with ZERO French trucks? They actually hurt
the German army? I cannot see how that makes much sense - even bad trucks, confined
to certain, limited roads can be put to use.
I feel that your vague indictments of French trucks have no analytical value. Even assuming
every single French truck breaks down after a few months, even if every French Truck fell to
pieces after just a few months, the Ostheer could have certainly executed a couple more
devastating Kessels in Ukraine.

And of course you're ignoring Mr. TheMarcksPlan's argument that no additional French trucks
are necessary, though they're sufficient. Also sufficient is German manufacture of 23,000
more military trucks, equipped with tires either from Germany's underestimated rubber supply
or from recycling of more looted French tires (with the French trucks left to rot, if it comes to that).
You will say the USSBS "accounted for" recycling but it didn't account for recycling of additional
looted French trucks - obviously.

A truck carrying supplies for an infantry division that marches 50 kilometers, then stops
to engage the enemy, is going to burn a lot less fuel then [sic] a truck carrying supplies
for a panzer division driving 300 kilometers over the same period and has to constantly
maneuver to engage the enemy the entire time, and then keeps on driving farther and
farther east.

Even conceding that is true, what's the relevance?

the Grosstransportraum trucks that have to drive 300 or 400 kilometers to drop off supplies
and then drive back

They don't have to ATL, as better railway support means supplies arrive nearer the front. Again,
total Ostheer fuel consumption is probably lower in Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ATL.

Yes, just assume everything will be easier,

This was your and others' tactic against MrTheMarksPlan : when he said something extensively
reasoned and supported by evidence, you call it an assumption. That gives him the option of
(1) restating the entire argument,
(2) walking away from the forum,
(3) getting visibly annoyed by this behavior.

Here you're pretending that Mr. TheMarcksPlan didn't detail the campaign's course and why AGS's
ability to destroy its opponents repeatedly - and without the assistance of AGC - lead to greater
RKKA casualties, lower Ostheer losses, and lower Soviet warmaking potential.

Maybe AGC reaches Moscow. So what.

Again you have to pretend you're arguing against something Mr.TheMarcksPlan never said. He
was always clear that merely taking Moscow isn't enough - that was his central criticism of
Halder et. al. for planning a bad campaign.

I can grant that the Red Army will be weaker in 1942 if Germany somehow pulls off this ATL.
The question is, how much weaker.

That is the question and it's something Mr. TheMarcksPlan discussed extensively. Again, I feel that
you have declined to engage substantively.

The Ostheer is going to be weaker than it was in 1941 ... all the planning and assuming in the world
can't make up for the reality of attrition on the Eastern Front.

This is just a re-statement of the Theology of the Invincible Soviet Union. It ignores the fact that,
in October of 1941, Stalin and the Soviet Government began making plans to secretly abandon Moscow
in the face of the advancing Wehrmacht, and only chose to stay in the city because they felt that
it might cause the entire Soviet Structure to collapse if they didn't.
Did the "reality of attrition" not exist during 1942? If it did exist, then why was Ostheer stronger
in 1943 than 1942?

The War on the Ostfront has been researched for nearly eight decades. The U.S. Army War College has
conducted WarGames on it. And other, very skilled researchers have also done gaming scenarios on
the various aspects of Barbarrossa. And, the one innescapable fact that always emerged was: If the
USSR lost Moscow, which was a central rail and road hub, as well as the administrative and coordinative
center of the USSR, the Soviet Forces would have collapsed by the end of 1942.


Paul R. Ward

It is not on the US Army War College,which was /is full of bias to the USSR during the Cold War,to decide, using War Games ,that Germany would have won the war in the East .It is not on the US to decide who could have won the Second European Civil War .It would also not on a European Army College to decide,using War Games, that the South could have won the US Civil War .
And Stalin did not decide to remain at Moscow because he was afraid that if he left,this would cause the collaps of the USSR, but because the army told him that the Germans could not get Moscow .
And, the Ostheer was not stronger in 1943 than in 1941 . Saying that it was stronger is only copycatting the Halder/Manstein/Guderian claims .

[Peter89]

That's not necessarily the argument - though you offer no proof that tires couldn't be swapped.

It's been stated countless times in these threads that Germany requisitioned more trucks from the civilian sector. But these trucks were useless on the Eastern Front. The Germans had a nickname for the French trucks that were requisitioned in 1941 and broke down before they got to Warsaw ... "elephants." GSWW Vol IV p. 1139.

Why didn't the Germans transport the trucks via train? Marching trucks from France to Romania seems to be an overkill (no wonder that they broke down). Besides, the German trucks broke down in Poland and frankly everywhere else. In North Africa 1942, Rommel's transport system had a huge chunk of captured trucks, with an ever-decreasing operational readiness: because spare parts were not forthcoming. The maintenance guidelines estimated a very optimistic 20% of the vehicles in repair / out of commission at any given time (ofc it was a higher percentage during operation-heavy periods).

What people tend to forget about WW2 mechanized warfare is its funnel-like nature: you can have 1000 tanks / trucks / aircrafts at the first attack at day 1, but even without any enemy interference, by the time you march 1000 km in 10 weeks, you'll have maybe 10% of that strength: this is why no offensive took 1000 km at one stroke. And even that is an optimistic assumption, because to keep up any operational readiness, the invaders had to have a decentralized and well-supplied maintenance system, which the Germans clearly did not have.

So even if the Germans could produce endless amount of tires and trucks, it wouldn't matter as long as their logistical system could bring those tires forth from the depos to the repair shops, and the repair shops could change those tires with sufficient speed. And given they couldn't cope with the existing fleet of vehicles, it is questionable what force an extra panzer group would represent compared to the force OTL.

TMP's vision, that in an alternate scenario, the Red Army had to be defeated in much more successful border battles is by and large correct. I have very serious doubts that the actual, net combat capabilities of the Ostheer in the fall/winter 1941 would improve by adding an additional fleet of problems to it.

[historygeek2021]

Why didn't the Germans transport the trucks via train?

Because Germany didn't have enough trains, just like they didn't have enough trucks, and not enough manpower or raw materials to make more trucks or trains or tanks or planes. The answer to all these "What If Germany tried X, Y or Z ..." is always the same: Germany didn't have enough.

[Richard Anderson]

In order to conjure up a remotely plausible Seelöwe, the Germans had to gain such an air superiority over the Channel and the invasion coast that could negate both the Royal Navy and the local superiority of British ground troops - and we know that they didn't even pull off a draw. So does it really worth to go into the possible dates of operation and barges?

Yes, I think going into the details is worth it, although the ad infinitum repetitive parts get tiresome.

Seriously, you can look at the plans and preparations and decide:

1. It was just an elaborate bluff, which seems a silly amount of effort for such a sham.
2. The Germans weren't aggressive enough and just chickened out, which as you point out is also silly.
3. The Germans were in earnest, but were unable to gain control of the sea lanes and airspace, so Hitler made the decision to "delay", which effectively meant a cancellation when the Ostfront opened, which seems the most likely since a large number of the converted barges were not returned to their original owners but were kept in reserve.

From the last being the most likely you can then work backwards and say, well what if they were ready earlier? However, that "readiness" always seems to be just "start earlier", but that does not change the preconditions regarding the sea lanes and airspace. The Germans could have refined their loading and assault plan all they wanted, introduced PiLaBo, Siebelfähre, MFP, and the like to supplement the barges, but that would still not give them control of the sea lanes and airspace. So they did not need to start planning SEELÖWE earlier, they needed to be able to gain air superiority over Britain and place a decisive block in the way of Royal Navy intervention. So what did they need to do that? Increase the capabilities of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, which means starting planning for SEELÖWE in 1933 or so. And even then you have the problem of where the resources come from - oh, of course, the expansion of the Heer - no problem!

[Peter89]

Why didn't the Germans transport the trucks via train?

Because Germany didn't have enough trains, just like they didn't have enough trucks, and not enough manpower or raw materials to make more trucks or trains or tanks or planes. The answer to all these "What If Germany tried X, Y or Z ..." is always the same: Germany didn't have enough.

Okay but I still don't see who had the idea to drive the trucks between eg. Paris and Warsaw, which was a longer route than Warsaw-Moscow; using motor fuel for movement instead of coal. It doesn't really make much sense to me.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

As for Germany Mobilizing earlier, I happened to run across this interesting Forum on
Tapatalk, which explores this very topic

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/ww2anal ... li-t3.html.

It might be worth reading, as it seems to address a number of very salient points.
I definitely recomend it


Paul R. Ward

[Huszar666]

I accidentally found some point directed at me:

No. Stavka cannot reinforce Leningard as it did historically because the early destruction of
Southwest Front (and SWF's repeated destruction by a stronger AGS) means the August-December
reinforcements sent to Leningrad need to be used elsewhere.
The Soviets rarely shifted units North-South because its units usually didn't live long enough for
that. Instead, they varied the flow of reinforcements to the different sectors.

The soviets could not shift units North-South in any applicable numbers not because "short half-life" but because of distances and the lack of trains. Those were transporting stuff West-East, and brought troops East-West to where there was still stuff to transport back East. There were multiple istances in 1941 where a shift of troops North-South (or S-N) would have been nice to have, but the soviets simply couldn't do that.
All that STILL hangs on the Ostheer managing to close a few meaningfull pockets with more soviets troops caught than OTL

If you go back, you will find that Mr. TheMarcksPlan addressed this point in a long posting

post

to which you didn't reply. Not all or even most divisions are needed in Northern Romania.

After I pointed out that there was ZERO chance to concentrate the wanted troops in NE Rumania because of... there being ONE useable road and ONE marginally useable rail line he responded with puttin even more troops around Iasi.
Unfortunately his idea of "South of Iasi" was technically "right at Iasi" and unfortunately reaching Iasi would STILL use that only ONE road for a large part and the only one other parallel rail line (that my or may not coincide with the other line up to NE Rumania).
Concentrating two AKs (=6 Divisions) plus 2 PzK (= 6 Divisions?) "South of Iasi" was (im)possible as much as concentrating them in NE Rumania.

Furthermore, concentrating any units at or "South of" Iasi would largly remove them from any consideration in relation to the Galizian Kessel. The two PzK around Iasi would need even more time to reach and cross the Dniester in the North (assuming they would be free to wheel North), than starting from NE-Rumania, AND the AKs would be unable to advance North at all.
Even assuming, a "few" (meaning 1-2 Pzk) would be able to cross the Dniester in the North and advance even further North for... what was it? 200-250km? to link up with 1st PzG, the flank protection would be negligable. Non-existent, more likely.
Accoring to his map, 603rd and 604th AK would be left guarding the front between Pruth and Dniester, up to, say, Mogilev-Podolski, and the not-so-many Rumanian divisions (that STILL would have to concentrate on the border, using the exact same roads the German troops would have) would not be enough to make a difference. So, even assuming the "few" PzK achieve freedom of operation North of the Dniester in a meaningfull timeframe, that would leave only two AKs (601st and 602nd on his map, ie. 6 Divisions, plus a minimal Rumanian contingent) to cover two times 200-250km, that is 400-500kms.
But... Since there was no possibility of concentrating 21 German divisions (plus whatever the Rumanians put there) in Eastern Rumania in a meaningfull time-frame, no matter if that was NE-Rumania or "around Iasi"....

I have to confess, his idea to push the reserve fast Divisions of 1st PzG up to the front earlier, has some merit. It is strange, however that those five units sat idly behind the front for so long, would need to research the why.

So even if the Germans could produce endless amount of tires and trucks, it wouldn't matter as long as their logistical system could bring those tires forth from the depos to the repair shops, and the repair shops could change those tires with sufficient speed. And given they couldn't cope with the existing fleet of vehicles, it is questionable what force an extra panzer group would represent compared to the force OTL.

Exactly. Add fuel, ammo and food to the list, and we are golden

Yes, I think going into the details is worth it, although the ad infinitum repetitive parts get tiresome.

Actually, I find the whole Seelöwe-thing quite interesting. You can magic up further Panzer Armies, devise plots to crush soviet fronts, put jet fighters into the air a few years earlier, and so forth and so forth, and mostly no one ever has much problem with it.
But as soon as someone dares to even utter the name "Seelöwe" all hell breaks lose

[historygeek2021]

Why didn't the Germans transport the trucks via train?

Because Germany didn't have enough trains, just like they didn't have enough trucks, and not enough manpower or raw materials to make more trucks or trains or tanks or planes. The answer to all these "What If Germany tried X, Y or Z ..." is always the same: Germany didn't have enough.

Okay but I still don't see who had the idea to drive the trucks between eg. Paris and Warsaw, which was a longer route than Warsaw-Moscow; using motor fuel for movement instead of coal. It doesn't really make much sense to me.

It was out of desperation. Only 54 tons of supplies actually made it to the frontline from these French trucks.

[Aber]

Hello All : As for Germany Mobilizing earlier, I happened to run across this interesting Forum on
Tapatalk, which explores this very topic

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/ww2anal ... li-t3.html.

It might be worth reading, as it seems to address a number of very salient points.
I definitely recomend it

Paul R. Ward

Alternatively you could go here

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=258598

for the same thing closer to home AND with useful comments.

[Peter89]

Why didn't the Germans transport the trucks via train?

Because Germany didn't have enough trains, just like they didn't have enough trucks, and not enough manpower or raw materials to make more trucks or trains or tanks or planes. The answer to all these "What If Germany tried X, Y or Z ..." is always the same: Germany didn't have enough.

Okay but I still don't see who had the idea to drive the trucks between eg. Paris and Warsaw, which was a longer route than Warsaw-Moscow; using motor fuel for movement instead of coal. It doesn't really make much sense to me.

It was out of desperation. Only 54 tons of supplies actually made it to the frontline from these French trucks.

54 tons? If it was French wine, I am not 100% sure we approach this issue from the right angle.

[Richard Anderson]

Hello All : As for Germany Mobilizing earlier, I happened to run across this interesting Forum on
Tapatalk, which explores this very topic

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/ww2anal ... li-t3.html.

It might be worth reading, as it seems to address a number of very salient points.
I definitely recomend it

Paul R. Ward

Alternatively you could go here

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=258598

for the same thing closer to home AND with useful comments.

Fascinating. I've seen self-licking ice cream cones before, but never a self-made echo chamber.

[Michael Kenny]

Fascinating. I've seen self-licking ice cream cones before, but never a self-made echo chamber.

Hmm..............I guess the 'E-Mail group of like-minded posters' was not considered good enough. I wonder if it is running in tandem or are the gang expected to join the new group and worship the Master in public?

[The Ibis]

Fascinating. I've seen self-licking ice cream cones before, but never a self-made echo chamber.

Hmm..............I guess the 'E-Mail group of like-minded posters' was not considered good enough. Is it still running in tandem or are the gang expected to join the new group and worship the Master in public?

" 'E-Mail group of like-minded posters' "?????

[Huszar666]

Fascinating. I've seen self-licking ice cream cones before, but never a self-made echo chamber.

Do you listen to the news on TV?

Actually, if you repeat stuff enough times on as many media as possible, and enough folks listen to it, it will become truth.

****
fun fact, I just bought the division history for the 95th ID - that just accidentaly happened to be advancing behind 1st PzGr OTL. The first month of the eastern campaign is full of complaints about the bad... abyssmal roads...

Another little tidbit. For an "Army Group" of around 20 divisions for only 10 day you would need at least 200-300t of supply per division and day, so, say, 42.000-63.000 tons. Not counting supply for the LW or Rumanians. Even if we assume, the rails in Eastern Rumania could accomodate trains with a net loading of 500t, that would mean 84-126 trains worth of supply needing to be carted up to NE-Rumania or to "around Iasi". On very few, single track rail lines.
Maybe I'm just beating up a dead horse, but this needed to be said.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Hello All : As for Germany Mobilizing earlier, I happened to run across this interesting
Forum on Tapatalk, which explores this very topic

https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/ww2anal ... li-t3.html.

It might be worth reading, as it seems to address a number of very salient points.
I definitely recomend it

Paul R. Ward

Alternatively you could go here

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=258598

for the same thing closer to home AND with useful comments.

Also "helpful" might be to test your points against the actual author of the thread, the
one who has conducted and shared the research and analysis underlying the ideas debated
here. The one who knows the most on this topic.

Of course, if you're unwilling to engage him unless he is unable to respond, or if you
don't think your points can withstand his scrutiny, then carry on the conversation without
being challenged. ( Similar to two Ice Cream Cones licking each other....... )


Paul R. Ward

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