TMP Overall; German Options

[Richard Anderson]

Actually, if you don't have much in the way of wagons and motor vehicles in the 1st and 2nd Gruppe of 1st Staffel, only in the 3rd Gruppe and the 2nd and 3rd Staffeln, even the "series" type of ramp would be useable. Probably no direct enemy interference with the unloading, so the guys can bring out the ropes to fix the barges in place and unload the vehicles in peace.

Given where the landings were planned for, the assumption ramp builders would probably not be subject to "direct enemy interference with the unloading" is unwarranted. I rather suspect that after the Vorausabteilungen get butchered any barges landing will become the sole attention of the defenders and erecting ramps will quickly become the last thing they attempt to do.

No, the PlB 38 was a military sector pionier assault boat, but was sold to private owners after the military trials. Why it was sold, and for what it was used later, I do not know, probably a normal commercial barge or a river ferry.

Okay, that is clearer, but still doesn't explain why any would be constructed prior to the delivery of the PiLaBo 39? Or why a large quantity would be ordered and built in 1940 when there was no apparent urgency to do so even with SEELÖWE planning ongoing?

If I remember corretly, there were at least three stages in the planning:
1, every last barge gets a pusher boat (Stossboot) on its own, no matter if it's a powered or unpowered
2, only the unpowered ones get pusher boats, the powered ones are to land on their own
3, one Schleppzug (a pair of barges) consists of one powered and one unpowered barge, they are fixed together and the powered barge bring both on land. Maybe/probably there is still a pusher boat brought along for each Schleppzug, but they are primary there for the barges from the transports.
I would need to find the correct places, if I remember corretly, this evolution of the landing was described in different places as side notes.

Indeed, Schenk's major failing is not placing everything into a coherent timeline. However, it is clear that whenever "3" became the plan, the pusher boats remained a vital part of the boat array.

If the planning starts 3-4 weeks earlier, the conversion of the AF would also start earlier, with a bit more than 130 being ready on 10th September.

Okay...except that they were a Bondel/Siebel product, which Kommando, along with Henke's Pionier-Lehr Abteilung 1., began work in mid-July. Again, I see no realistic way that they could begin their research and testing in early June, when ROT was in full swing?

You are probably right with those being the Infanteriekarren. Just a quick calculation:
Each platoon had one, there was one for two heavy MG and two for each 8cm mortar, for a total of 27 for each Btl. Having 6 Btls landing that would mean 162 pieces. With the Radfahrabteilung, 189. However, the Btls should have landed with 2 companies, not three. Even if we assume the light trailers of the PAK and other stuff are considered "Karren", that would only add another 30 or so pieces. 100 or so trailer/carts are maybe a bit too much for other uses. What the at least 41 horses that don't have carts to pull were there for (probably more, if we assume, trailers were counted as KArren by Schenk), I have not the faintest idea.

I suspect they would be Reitpferde rather than Zugpferde.

Maybe 60 cars would be enough for pulling the PAK and such, but that would still leave 30 or so cars and 34 trucks (and all those MC) for some other uses.
I do feel, so many vehicles were not neccessary for the very first landing, while the beachhead wasn't even established...

So you want to cut back the use of all vehicles in the initial landing, not just horse-drawn vehicles? That makes moving any heavy weapons any distance very problematic.

The problem is the same faced by the British and Americans when planning NEPTUNE, only there it was not horse-drawn versus motorized that was the issued, but rather wheeled motorized versus tracked motorized vehicles in the assault. Wherever possible the choice was for tracks for obvious reasons, but in some cases wheels were all there could be. The same compromises, but for different reasons, were faced by the German planners.

As for why? Probably it had something to to with OKH's idea that a landing would be only made as a coup-de-grace (Dolchstoss) against a beaten enemy.

That is a distinct possibility.

I wouldn't call them idiots,

Nor was I calling them that. It was rhetorical sarcasm. Just because they made planning decisions that we don't see a reason for in the spotty records of these events does not mean that they did not have very good reasons to do things the way they did.

more likely not giving a damn about the whole issue. Since OKH though about the whole jazz as delivering a coup-de-grace against a beaten enemy, and not caring much for the whole operation, they probably didn't made the effort to think things through.

Possibly, but what OKH may have thought did not necessarily translate into what the armee, korps, and division Ia, Ib, and Ic thought while doing the actual operational planning. They may have hoped it would be a coup-de-grace, but I doubt they planned it as such. OTOH, they were badly constrained in their planning by the decisions made by OKH and OKM.

HOWEVER
There were a lot of Engineer Btls, bridging columns a the like that WERE stripped from their original Division for the landing...

There were? Which?

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Even if Spain joins the Axis, the fundamental problem would not disappear (on the contrary,
it would be more serious): Spain needed the exact same raw materials as Germany and its
allies. By the way, could you please give me the source where Franco pledged himself for
the Axis cause, but Hitler refused?

On June 16th, 1940, Petain took over the Government of France, and immediately contacted the Spanish
Ambassador, requesting him to contact the Spanish Ambassador to Germany, and present the Germans
with an offer to Surrender. It was at this time, apparently that Franco, having been notified of this,
also instructed his Ambassador in Berlin to present the offer of Spanish assistance in the War. I have
not been able to find out what the German response was, but two days later, Franco transmitted to
his Ambassador in Berlin a formal letter to Hitler, offering Spain's willingness to join the Axis in return
for Gibralter, French Morroco, and Cameroon. Hitler was not in Berlin at this time, having prepared
to travel to France..... So, the letter was not presented to him until June 19th, 1940. Hitler rejected
the initial offer, as HE wanted Cameroonback, it having been taken from the Germans by Britain in WW1.

The Hitler and Franco met in October, 1940, and the meeting was described by Hitler has being like a
trip to the Dentist.... Franco wanted too much, Hitler didn't want to give anything, and so the golden
opportunity disappeared.

As for the Spanish need for Raw materials: All Spain needs to provide is Atlantic Coast Air Bases,
Mediterranean naval bases for the U Boats and Commerce Raiders, and Warm Bodies in terms of
infantry to fight in Russia.

As for an Attack on Gibralter: The Italians use their navy to shell The Rock, and their Air Force to
bomb The Rock, and the Spanish use their Army to Take the Rock ! Even the British conceded that,
were the Spanish to attack Gibralter in 1940, it could only hold out for about 60 days at the most, and
the British did NOT have the means or the forces to reinforce Gibralter. It would have fallen, just like
Singapore, which as we all know, was the Gibralter of the East.....

Also it is obvious from the USSBS' numbers that during the early phase of Barbarossa, a great
amount of Soviet stock was captured in motor fuel, thus the consumption - production numbers
are actually more favourable in the operation-heavy months of 1941 than during the lull in
1940/1941.

It was suggested previously that the Germans couldn't use this fuel, which is just flat out
wrong. From Toprani's Oil and the Great Powers:

In a conspicuous example of foresight, before the invasion the [German] army created
mobile facilities to raise the octane rating of captured gasoline with benzol.106

If Army Group South overruns the Ukraine rapidly, it would certainly have captured even more
fuel than than they did historically - which was a significant amount.

I don't see anything in Scherner's or Schmelzing's articles stating that tires from civilian trucks
could be swapped onto military trucks and endure the road conditions in the Soviet Union.

That's not necessarily the argument - though you offer no proof that tires couldn't be swapped.
If the tires don't swap, recycle the rubber. Recycling of rubber is an old practice

old practice:

One thing that is important for you to understand is rubber recycling. However, while
it seems like a recent development, this is far from reality. The fact is that rubber recycling
has its first emergence as far back as rubbers’ industrial utilization.
This is because around the 1900s, the cost of rubbers was as considerable as that of silver.
Precisely, it was quite valuable, which made its reuse cost-effective and business smart.

Scherner's article discusses the extensive recycling emphasis placed by Germany after WW1:

One further lesson which the German authorities drew
from the experience of the Great War was not only to expand recycling
capacities but also to foster recycling R&D.84

It's an article about metals but we can either pretend that a recycling-focused Germany
didn't use well-known rubber recycling techniques or we can make the obvious inference
that they recycled rubber. And, even if they didn't, faced with the sudden need for more
rubber, and with stacks of old French and Russian Tires lying around, I am certain that
some bright little German Chemist would have suggested it. Remember: Bielstein's
is still published in German, as every chemist such as myself is well aware !

Schmelzing's article fails to provide reliable data on 1940 rubber supplies

I feel that Mr. TheMarcksPlan's point wasn't that Schmelzing's article is reliable - in fact,
he immediately pointed out an error when somebody else first showed it to him.
The point is that the USSBS stats are an undercount because they're based solely on import
statistics, which apparently leave out significant amounts of rubber supplied directly to the
German military, which did not report its acquisitions to import authorities. This may not
seem like a major issue, but the facts are clear.

The question we're
discussing is whether Hitler could have forcibly transferred hundreds of thousands of French,
Belgian and Dutch workers to Germany in 1940 and expected them to produce enough serviceable
panzers for 5 panzer divisions and 5 motorized divisions in less than a year.

What is your argument that they could not have produced them, aside from rubber? Again,
you conceded this point in the past. As Mr. TheMarcksPlan argued in multiple threads, and as
should be obvious, the production needed is <1% of German munitions production even in 1940.
The workforce of the entire tank and motor vehicles industries in 1940 was 136,000. Even
assuming that Germany cannot requisition ANY more French/Dutch/Belgian trucks or take
more from the economy, it needs to produce ~30% more than they did historically in the year
before Barbarossa. That means that Germany needs another ~40,000 workers.
The notion that Germany needed 1.25mil more French workers immediately but that's obvious
straw man. It is far lower than that.

USSBS took a glib view toward Germany's truck situation. Further research has shown the
Heer was already in dire straits for trucks before Barbarossa. From Stahel's Operation
Barbarossa and Germany's defeat in the East, Chapter 3:

Both Mr TheMarcksPlan has stated, and I agree, that Stahel has at best a superficial knowledge
of economics. JMHO.

And per GSSW
Vol 4., p. 1119, to maintain the Heer’s fleet of lorries, 150,000 would need to be produced
each year, but only 39,000 were produced in 1941.

Yet we know Heer truck numbers were higher in late 1942 than before Barbarossa, so
GSWW is seems missing something here. Hmmmmmm.......

In this ATL we are
adding a fifth that is stronger than the other 4. How much fuel and ammunition from this new
axis of advance will be consumed is impossible to calculate precisely, but a good guess is that
it will consume at least as much as the other 4 on average

That's not how fuel consumption works. Fuel is burned by vehicles. 3% more vehicles - call it
4% with tanks - would burn ~4% more fuel.
Most fuel consumption was tactical, not strategic. It is well known that German command
vehicles had 4x the mileage of non-command vehicles. The OTL Army Group South almost
certainly burned more fuel in its slow, grinding advance through Ukraine than it would in this
proposed scenario, where the advances would be faster against a more disorganized opposition,
where a sizable portion of the Soviet Army had been destroyed in the Border Battles. If anything,
total Ostheer fuel consumption would be lower in Mr. TheMarcksPlan's Scenario, because
there would be less tactical combat against a weaker Red Army AFTER the Border Battles.

Even if Germany somehow scrounged together the tanks, trucks and fuel to create a pincer out
of northern Romania, it isn't going to change the outcome of the campaign if most of the Ostheer's
vehicles have broken down by autumn. The campaign will still stall out somewhere around Moscow,
and then in 1942 a weaker Ostheer will be left facing a Red Army that is twice as strong as it was
in 1941. It turns out there was a good reason for needing to finish the campaign in a single season:
the Red Army would surge in strength over the winter of 41-42, while the Ostheer would inevitably
deteriorate.

"Most" of Ostheer's vehicles had broken down by Fall '41, yet Ostheer executed the two biggest
encirclements in military history that Fall. You're confusing your analysis of Mr.TheMarcksPlan's
scenario with the Historical Events, and imposing the Historical outcomes onto a more ideally-
equipped Ostheer.

By assuming the campaign "stalls out" around Moscow, you're ignoring the more rapid advance
that would be possible with a better equipped Ost-heer. - especially that Army Group Center
resumes its drive on Moscow during August because Army Group South doesn't need its help.

By assuming the Ostheer's "inevitable" deterioration over Winter, you're assuming that German
army production is the same as OTL: it's slashed during Barbarossa and then further declines due
to the Winter Crisis (which Mr. TheMarcksPlan's scenario avoids by preparing the railways properly).
You're also assuming that German force generation after Barbarossa begins is the same as occurred
historically,, whereas Mr. TheMarcksPlan's scenario specifies it is not (foreign workers substitute for
German workers, who go to the Heer during 1941 as they did later historically).

By assuming the Red Army grows as it did historically, you're assuming the Red Army would hold as
much territory as it did historicaly (therefore as much population and economic resources for
regeneration). This does not make sense - a more damaged Soviet Union would NOT have been
been able to generate as many new divisions, nor would they have been able to equip them.

Mr. TheMarcksPlan's scenario has very good arguments and evidence against these assumptions,
which any post claiming to refute it should try to address.

much of the plan hanged
upon the assumtion the STAVKA would conveniently shift troops from as far as Leningrad to the
Ukraine.

No. Stavka cannot reinforce Leningard as it did historically because the early destruction of
Southwest Front (and SWF's repeated destruction by a stronger AGS) means the August-December
reinforcements sent to Leningrad need to be used elsewhere.
The Soviets rarely shifted units North-South because its units usually didn't live long enough for
that. Instead, they varied the flow of reinforcements to the different sectors.

We still have the problem
of concentrating that 5th PzA PLUS the OTL 11th Army (plus further reinforcements) in North-
Eastern Rumania with about ONE useable road and ONE marginally useable railway line.

If you go back, you will find that Mr. TheMarcksPlan addressed this point in a long posting

post

to which you didn't reply. Not all or even most divisions are needed in Northern Romania.


This is about all I have time for today.


Paul R. Ward

[Huszar666]

Morning,

Given where the landings were planned for, the assumption ramp builders would probably not be subject to "direct enemy interference with the unloading" is unwarranted. I rather suspect that after the Vorausabteilungen get butchered any barges landing will become the sole attention of the defenders and erecting ramps will quickly become the last thing they attempt to do.

First, the plan what the Vorausabteilungen should do was non-sensical at all.
Secondly, havin no transports in the 2nd Gruppe, but they being pushed back a few hours would enable the 2nd Gruppe (the barges) to land and establish a bridghead. SO, in "my" planning, the vehicles (in the 3rd Group or the 2nd Staffel) would have a larger chance to be landed as in the original planning - in the 2nd Group, the barges for the "Main Landing"

I hope, I made the difference clear.

Okay, that is clearer, but still doesn't explain why any would be constructed prior to the delivery of the PiLaBo 39? Or why a large quantity would be ordered and built in 1940 when there was no apparent urgency to do so even with SEELÖWE planning ongoing?

Technically, I do not care about either the PLB 38 or the PLB 39. Having a dozen at hand would be nice, but Seelöwe would not hinge on them either way.
I bought them into discussion only to show, that theoreticallay it would have been possible to build, say, 50-100 of them.

Okay...except that they were a Bondel/Siebel product, which Kommando, along with Henke's Pionier-Lehr Abteilung 1., began work in mid-July. Again, I see no realistic way that they could begin their research and testing in early June, when ROT was in full swing?

I don't care about the AF-barges either, if there are a couple for the 3rd Staffel or 2nd Treffen, they are nice to have, but the owerall plan did not hang on those 130-200 extra powered barges.

So you want to cut back the use of all vehicles in the initial landing, not just horse-drawn vehicles? That makes moving any heavy weapons any distance very problematic.

Yes, exactly. Or rather: not cut back, but elimininate every last one of them from the 2nd Group. You do not need them for establishing the initial bridgehead, and they are just stealing room from fighting troops there.
The 3,7 PAK, Flak 38, lIG and all the stuff could be moved by the crew for short distances (actually, in battle situations, they were mostly not moved by the vehicles, but the crew), as could be (and were) the Infanteriekarren.
About two hours later, the barges from the transports would arrive, at a time, when the bridgehead is (hopefully) already established, and the troops could have a part of their vehicles - say, 50%. The others would land from the transports in the 2nd Staffel sometimes in the next few days.
In the first two hours or so the 2nd Group would only be able to advance a few kilometers, so moving the heavy weapons wouldn't be an issue. Even dragging them to Ashford would be doable.

So, my basic idea is to maximalise the hitting power of the initial landing (that is 1st and 2nd Gruppe), and land the vehicles - as few as workable - only with the 3rd Gruppe or 2nd Staffel. Because 1, you need hitting power in the first few hours more than vulnerable vehicles and 2, even in the most optimistic version, the bridgehead would not be so large that you would need strong transport capabilities in the first few hours (or the first 1-2 days)

Nor was I calling them that. It was rhetorical sarcasm. Just because they made planning decisions that we don't see a reason for in the spotty records of these events does not mean that they did not have very good reasons to do things the way they did.

Actually, this is why I like What-ifs so much. If done correctly, you will get an idea why the folks back than did stuff like they did.
Except for Seelöwe. After decades, I still don't get it.

Possibly, but what OKH may have thought did not necessarily translate into what the armee, korps, and division Ia, Ib, and Ic thought while doing the actual operational planning. They may have hoped it would be a coup-de-grace, but I doubt they planned it as such. OTOH, they were badly constrained in their planning by the decisions made by OKH and OKM.

On division level, there was quite a buzz about the whole operation. Unfortunately, the divisions could only work with what their supperiors deigned to pass down - and here I include Corps, Army and Army Group level. No clear directions and you will waste the effort.

There were? Which?

I started to trace the troops back according to Niehorster:
http://www.niehorster.org/011_germany/4 ... hgr_a.html
For example with XIII. AK, 1st, 21st, 253rd and 296th Pionierbattalions were troops from other divisions. At VII. AK the 42nd, 262nd and 299th. Plus some Bridgeing Columns. True, I did not take a note if the unit was stripped from their divisions, only noted it for myself.
The Artillery is another question, with the Heavy Abteilungen having a completly different number than the divisional art.Rgt, so it's a bit confusing, which heavy Abt was stripped and which was Heerestruppe to begin with. I think, I found at least one Abt that was stipped and was not Heerestruppe. I could be wrong, though.

[Huszar666]

Hitler rejected
the initial offer, as HE wanted Cameroonback, it having been taken from the Germans by Britain in WW1.

That is actually wrong. Hitler did not want ANY colonies back, he got rashes even if someone mentioned African Colonies.
There WERE parts of the scientific/economic comunity that argued for getting Cameroon and German East back, but they were not officials and the official dogma was to leave Africa alone.
So, Hitler could not have rejected Franco, because he "wanted Cameroon back".

[historygeek2021]

That's not necessarily the argument - though you offer no proof that tires couldn't be swapped.
If the tires don't swap, recycle the rubber. Recycling of rubber is an old practice

old practice:

Yes, and USSBS took rubber recycling into account:

Recycled Rubber USSBS.png

Also, recycled rubber produces marginal quality tires at best even with today's technology. Good luck using 1941 recycling technology to make tires that will survive on Soviet roads. https://cen.acs.org/articles/93/i16/Elu ... cling.html

The point is that the USSBS stats are an undercount because they're based solely on import
statistics, which apparently leave out significant amounts of rubber supplied directly to the
German military, which did not report its acquisitions to import authorities. This may not
seem like a major issue, but the facts are clear.

Schmelzing's article does not establish this. He notes that there were different and overlapping authorities collecting raw materials from the occupied countries, but he does not establish that the actual amount of rubber collected was different from USSBS. Besides, if there was unaccounted for rubber supplied to the German military as you claim, then it was already used in the OTL - there is no extra rubber available for this ATL.

The workforce of the entire tank and motor vehicles industries in 1940 was 136,000.

Cite please. There were 394,000 workers in the automotive industry in 1943, and Germany was still relying on Vichy truck factories for the entirety of its increase in truck production. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id= ... &skin=2021

Even
assuming that Germany cannot requisition ANY more French/Dutch/Belgian trucks or take
more from the economy, it needs to produce ~30% more than they did historically in the year
before Barbarossa. That means that Germany needs another ~40,000 workers.

How do you get to 30%? As already established in this thread, Germany wasn't producing enough lorries to maintain its existing fleet, even without the wear and tear of a campaign on poor Soviet roads. And simply adding the same percentage of workers as the percentage of trucks needed is ... oversimplistic, to say the least. If the industry was as small as you say, then the workers were highly specialized. Since the French workers specialized in making trucks were already making trucks for the Wehrmacht in French factories, that means you have to draft untrained workers and get them to produce the X many trucks needed in time to have them transported over the single railroad line that goes near northern Romania ...

Both Mr TheMarcksPlan has stated, and I agree, that Stahel has at best a superficial knowledge
of economics. JMHO.

Yes, I've noticed a pattern. Any historian who challenges TMP's opinions is a dull reciter of facts, incapable of analytical thought, and anyone who can be interpreted as supporting his opinions is a brilliant counterfactual genius.

And per GSSW
Vol 4., p. 1119, to maintain the Heer’s fleet of lorries, 150,000 would need to be produced
each year, but only 39,000 were produced in 1941.

Yet we know Heer truck numbers were higher in late 1942 than before Barbarossa, so
GSWW is seems missing something here. Hmmmmmm.......

Nothing is missing. It's been stated countless times in these threads that Germany requisitioned more trucks from the civilian sector. But these trucks were useless on the Eastern Front. The Germans had a nickname for the French trucks that were requisitioned in 1941 and broke down before they got to Warsaw ... "elephants." GSWW Vol IV p. 1139.

That's not how fuel consumption works. Fuel is burned by vehicles. 3% more vehicles - call it
4% with tanks - would burn ~4% more fuel.

That's not how fuel consumption works. Fuel is burned by vehicles moving. A truck carrying supplies for an infantry division that marches 50 kilometers, then stops to engage the enemy, is going to burn a lot less fuel then a truck carrying supplies for a panzer division driving 300 kilometers over the same period and has to constantly maneuver to engage the enemy the entire time, and then keeps on driving farther and farther east. And the Grosstransportraum trucks that have to drive 300 or 400 kilometers to drop off supplies and then drive back are going to burn a lot more fuel than a truck supporting an infantry division that occasionally force marches 50 kilometers a day then takes up static fighting positions.

Most fuel consumption was tactical, not strategic. It is well known that German command
vehicles had 4x the mileage of non-command vehicles. The OTL Army Group South almost
certainly burned more fuel in its slow, grinding advance through Ukraine than it would in this
proposed scenario, where the advances would be faster against a more disorganized opposition,
where a sizable portion of the Soviet Army had been destroyed in the Border Battles. If anything,
total Ostheer fuel consumption would be lower in Mr. TheMarcksPlan's Scenario, because
there would be less tactical combat against a weaker Red Army AFTER the Border Battles.

Yes, just assume everything will be easier, what a great way to plan for a campaign. Or, how about the fact that in order to accomplish the series of "double pincers" needed to encircle the Red Army's reserve armies, this fifth panzer group will be chugging along at 300 kilometer clips throughout July and at least early August? How is the fuel going to reach them given the poor railroads in Romania and the fact that Army Group South couldn't get enough trains to support itself in the OTL when it had only one panzer group?

"Most" of Ostheer's vehicles had broken down by Fall '41, yet Ostheer executed the two biggest
encirclements in military history that Fall. You're confusing your analysis of Mr.TheMarcksPlan's
scenario with the Historical Events, and imposing the Historical outcomes onto a more ideally-
equipped Ostheer.

Kiev was giftwrapped by Stalin for Guderian's slow crawling panzer group that took 21 days (August 25 - September 14) to link up with Kleist at Lokhvitsa. Vyazma and Bryansk were shallow encirclements. The panzer divisions that tried to plunge ahead to Tula ran out of fuel.

By assuming the campaign "stalls out" around Moscow, you're ignoring the more rapid advance
that would be possible with a better equipped Ost-heer. - especially that Army Group Center
resumes its drive on Moscow during August because Army Group South doesn't need its help.

Maybe AGC reaches Moscow. So what. The USSR isn't going to suddenly implode once Guderian and Bock take a selfie on the Kremlin. The Red Army is going to keep fighting, and all those divisions and brigades that pushed the Ostheer back to Velikiye Luki in the winter came from the interior of the country, not Moscow. The Ostheer's equipment is still getting weaker each month while the Red Army is getting stronger.

By assuming the Ostheer's "inevitable" deterioration over Winter, you're assuming that German
army production is the same as OTL: it's slashed during Barbarossa and then further declines due
to the Winter Crisis (which Mr. TheMarcksPlan's scenario avoids by preparing the railways properly).
You're also assuming that German force generation after Barbarossa begins is the same as occurred
historically,, whereas Mr. TheMarcksPlan's scenario specifies it is not (foreign workers substitute for
German workers, who go to the Heer during 1941 as they did later historically).

I guess if we just assume and specify that everything will be better, then it will be ...

By assuming the Red Army grows as it did historically, you're assuming the Red Army would hold as
much territory as it did historicaly (therefore as much population and economic resources for
regeneration). This does not make sense - a more damaged Soviet Union would NOT have been
been able to generate as many new divisions, nor would they have been able to equip them.

I can grant that the Red Army will be weaker in 1942 if Germany somehow pulls off this ATL. The question is, how much weaker. The Red Army fielded 5.4 million frontline soldiers by May 1942 historically and had another 3.5 million in reserve. Maybe the Red Army can only support 4 million frontline troops in 1942 if this ATL somehow works. It still has 1 or 2 million in reserve to replenish losses any time the Ostheer pulls off a kessel, and its extremely young male population is going to provide an endless supply of new recruits.

Sov population by age.png

The Ostheer is going to be weaker than it was in 1941 ... all the planning and assuming in the world can't make up for the reality of attrition on the Eastern Front. That leaves Germany with one more summer campaign, which might encircle a few more Soviet armies and extend Germany's supply lines even further to the east, and maybe with the prescient Leadership in this ATL Germany avoids a Stalingrad disaster over the winter, but the Red Army is still growing stronger. Its evacuated factories in Siberia are getting set up, its extremely young male population is maturing into an endless supply of new recruits, lend-lease is increasing, the Allies are landing in Morocco and soon Sicily and soon France ...

Mr. TheMarcksPlan's scenario has very good arguments and evidence against these assumptions,
which any post claiming to refute it should try to address.

I thought that's what we've been doing?

Edits: typos

[Richard Anderson]

First, the plan what the Vorausabteilungen should do was non-sensical at all.

Indeed, which combined with the lack of good intelligence on the defenses leads me to believe they would be butchered.

Secondly, havin no transports in the 2nd Gruppe, but they being pushed back a few hours would enable the 2nd Gruppe (the barges) to land and establish a bridghead. SO, in "my" planning, the vehicles (in the 3rd Group or the 2nd Staffel) would have a larger chance to be landed as in the original planning - in the 2nd Group, the barges for the "Main Landing"

I hope, I made the difference clear.

Yes, thanks.

Technically, I do not care about either the PLB 38 or the PLB 39. Having a dozen at hand would be nice, but Seelöwe would not hinge on them either way.
I bought them into discussion only to show, that theoreticallay it would have been possible to build, say, 50-100 of them.

Theoretically they could have had thousands of MFP if only the development contract had been issued earlier than 5 December 1940.

I don't care about the AF-barges either, if there are a couple for the 3rd Staffel or 2nd Treffen, they are nice to have, but the owerall plan did not hang on those 130-200 extra powered barges.

Well, sooner or later you're going to run out of barges then.

Yes, exactly. Or rather: not cut back, but elimininate every last one of them from the 2nd Group. You do not need them for establishing the initial bridgehead, and they are just stealing room from fighting troops there.

You may be a bit too sanguine about the ability of troops to unload and move heavy weapons from an extemporaneous landing craft, across a sand/shingle/clay beach and over sea walls, dunes, bluffs, and so forth, without getting exhausted and/or killed in the process as they struggle with them. Overloaded amphibious troops tend to die easily on the beach.

Except for Seelöwe. After decades, I still don't get it.

Agree. 100 percent.

On division level, there was quite a buzz about the whole operation. Unfortunately, the divisions could only work with what their supperiors deigned to pass down - and here I include Corps, Army and Army Group level. No clear directions and you will waste the effort.

Yep.

I started to trace the troops back according to Niehorster:
http://www.niehorster.org/011_germany/4 ... hgr_a.html

Good old Leo, I hadn't realized he had put together a SEELÖWE page.

It does make me wonder though. Normally such reinforcements would be drawn from Heerestruppen, so I suspect we're seeing a dearth of trained and equipped Pionier as Heerestruppen. The bridge units make more sense, since the light bridging would have been more appropriate for the task, while the Heerstruppen bridging units were generally heavier...and someone was making off with their sS and Herbert bridges.

[Huszar666]

Morning,

Yes, I've noticed a pattern. Any historian who challenges TMP's opinions is a dull reciter of facts, incapable of analytical thought, and anyone who can be interpreted as supporting his opinions is a brilliant counterfactual genius.

yeah, I noticed that too. You forgot "ignoring the guy who has a different opinion" and "calling that guy names".

Maybe AGC reaches Moscow. So what. The USSR isn't going to suddenly implode once Guderian and Bock take a selfie on the Kremlin. The Red Army is going to keep fighting, and all those divisions and brigades that pushed the Ostheer back to Velikiye Luki in the winter came from the interior of the country, not Moscow. The Ostheer's equipment is still getting weaker each month while the Red Army is getting stronger.

Actually, Moscow is just a point on a map, and had in Winter 1941 only a symbolic value, and some as a railroad hub.
WHAT is interesting is the territory between Moscow and the Volga, with the textile industry there (if I remember correctly, two thirds or four quarters of the textile came from there) plus Gorkij, and the only rubber plant in the SU in Yaroslavl.
However, reaching the Volga would mean another 350 or so kilometers. OTL HGr Mitte ran away from the railheads - in this ATL it would run faster and farther. Meaning, the supply situation would be even worse. Not taking Tula and the rail lines to Kalinin (plus Torshok) made bringing to supplies up to the front from... Rshew and Smolensk (and Wjasma) slow and tedious, both the rail lines and the roads were overloaded as they were.
You would need to repair and enchance the rail lines and roads much faster and further than OTL to teven have a chance to take Moscow. And/or take Tula and the rail lines to Kalinin (plus Torshok).
A "bit" faster does not cut it, you will have to extert a massive effort in rebuilding and enchancing.

***

Indeed, which combined with the lack of good intelligence on the defenses leads me to believe they would be butchered.

With the original plan and OTL, they would not have been butchered - since they would have never left France to begin with
To make Seelöwe happen, you would have to scrap the OTL sometimes Mid-June at the latest, and assume Hitler, OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, the Heeresgruppen, Armies, etc, etc, etc, etc are serious about the whole operation and do not see it as a coup-de-grace against a beaten enemy. And make some actual effort.

Theoretically they could have had thousands of MFP if only the development contract had been issued earlier than 5 December 1940.

But, you forgot the Destroyer Transport, Landing Ship, Tanks, heavy airlifting capacity (Me 323) and Admiral Thawn with his fleet of Star Destroyers!
Seriously, though, the PLB 38 was ready for manufacturing and the pioneers asked for just such a boat in January/February 1940. If Germany would have been serious about a possible landing there was a chance to have a few dozen in Early September. Put the Vorausabteilungen (or parts of them) into them and the whole idiotic idea to let the row to the shore could be put ad acta.
(actually, put them in shallow-draft motor boats and/or small barges - there were a few sizes below Peniche - let them beach themselves and assault on a narrow front - for around two companies, say, 500 meters or so on the flanks)

Well, sooner or later you're going to run out of barges then.

The question would be, if the British would be able to disable every last barge of 1st and 2nd Staffel AND sink enough of the following waves to make supplying to beachhead untenable.
I doubt it they could do it in time (or at all)

You may be a bit too sanguine about the ability of troops to unload and move heavy weapons from an extemporaneous landing craft, across a sand/shingle/clay beach and over sea walls, dunes, bluffs, and so forth, without getting exhausted and/or killed in the process as they struggle with them. Overloaded amphibious troops tend to die easily on the beach.

OTL they would still have to bring the heavy weapons past the beach defences on their own, since unloading of the vehicles was planned to be done one or two hours after the barges were beached. Or the heavy weapons would stay on the barges in that time and would be unable to support the troops. (or, if the vehicles were to be unloaded earlier, they would be shot to pieces by the still-intact beach defences)

It does make me wonder though. Normally such reinforcements would be drawn from Heerestruppen, so I suspect we're seeing a dearth of trained and equipped Pionier as Heerestruppen.

Honestly, I did not read through every last pionier btl on Lexikon der Wehrmacht to see what was there in Summer 1940 as Heerestruppen. I'm not a masochist
The overview of the types
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... oniere.htm
The list for "normal" PBs:
https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... oniere.htm
However, if I remember correctly, the Wehrmacht had few "normal" PBs as Heerestruppe, what they had in abundance were sepcialised ones.

[Peter89]

Theoretically they could have had thousands of MFP if only the development contract had been issued earlier than 5 December 1940.

But, you forgot the Destroyer Transport, Landing Ship, Tanks, heavy airlifting capacity (Me 323) and Admiral Thawn with his fleet of Star Destroyers!

Heavy airlifting capacity was practically nonexistent in 1941, what we are talking about is a dozen Ju 90 and another dozen aircraft of various types; nowhere near the sufficient quantity to make a difference. The Me 323 was not ready before the end of 1942 and it required a huge airstrip, like all other heavy transports. They were also easy targets for RAF attacks and extremely vulnerable in a contested airspace, thus German heavy airlifting capacity to Britain was close to zero.

[Huszar666]

Heavy airlifting capacity was practically nonexistent in 1941, what we are talking about is a dozen Ju 90 and another dozen aircraft of various types; nowhere near the sufficient quantity to make a difference. The Me 323 was not ready before the end of 1942 and it required a huge airstrip, like all other heavy transports. They were also easy targets for RAF attacks and extremely vulnerable in a contested airspace, thus German heavy airlifting capacity to Britain was close to zero.

I see, you don't have any problems with Admiral Thaw bringing the Star Destoyers.
But you have successfuly detected an ironic comment.

[Peter89]

Heavy airlifting capacity was practically nonexistent in 1941, what we are talking about is a dozen Ju 90 and another dozen aircraft of various types; nowhere near the sufficient quantity to make a difference. The Me 323 was not ready before the end of 1942 and it required a huge airstrip, like all other heavy transports. They were also easy targets for RAF attacks and extremely vulnerable in a contested airspace, thus German heavy airlifting capacity to Britain was close to zero.

I see, you don't have any problems with Admiral Thaw bringing the Star Destoyers.
But you have successfuly detected an ironic comment.

I thought I might salvage something sensible out of your comment but clearly it was an exercise in futility.

[ljadw]

In post 47 there are several doubtful claims, as
Gibraltar : the importance of Gibraltar on June 16 was almost meaningless as an attack of Gibraltar in July /August ( earlier was impossible ) would not convince Britain to surrender . Besides : at June 16 Britain no longer used the Mediterranean for transports to /from the ME ,India Far East .
About Italy attacking Gibraltar : it was to far from Italy and the Regia Marina would not risk its capital ships to help a rival . (Spain and Italy wanted both the French colonies of NA ).The mission of the RM was to protect the convoys to Libya and the even more important convoys to Greece/Albania.
Another one : ''All Spain needs to provide is Atlantic Coast Air Bases'' : Germany had already sufficient and better Atlantic Coast Air Bases in occupied France
''Mediterranean Naval Bases for the U Boats and Commerce Raiders '' : there was no need for German U Boats in the Mediterranean in 1940 and Germany had no Commerce Raiders available to chase non existent British cargo 's in the Western Mediterranean .
''Warm Bodies in terms of infantry to fight in Russia '' : the importance of the division Azul was meaningless : instead of 150 divisions, the Ostheer had now 151 divisions and the Barbarossa decision was taken only in the Winter of 1940/1941 and it took another year before the Azul division arrived at the front of Leningrad .
Last point : Cameroon :it was not taken from the Germans in WW1 by Britain ,but by Britain and France and was divided between these countries .
If Hitler would give Cameroon to Spain ,this could only happen AFTER the war, not in June 1940 and this would leak out and could result in the decision of Weygand, French commander in NA, to end the armistice and to continue the war .

[Richard Anderson]

With the original plan and OTL, they would not have been butchered - since they would have never left France to begin with
To make Seelöwe happen, you would have to scrap the OTL sometimes Mid-June at the latest, and assume Hitler, OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, the Heeresgruppen, Armies, etc, etc, etc, etc are serious about the whole operation and do not see it as a coup-de-grace against a beaten enemy. And make some actual effort.

You also have to assume that a landing c. 10 September would be successful whereas one c. 20 September would not. I don't think so.

Seriously, though, the PLB 38 was ready for manufacturing and the pioneers asked for just such a boat in January/February 1940. If Germany would have been serious about a possible landing there was a chance to have a few dozen in Early September. Put the Vorausabteilungen (or parts of them) into them and the whole idiotic idea to let the row to the shore could be put ad acta.

But in the end only five PiLaBo 39 were ordered in 1940 and the PiLaBo 38 was not chosen fro production. I suppose you could have them change their mind about the 38, but why would they build any significant quantity of it if they did chose to do so with the 39 even with SEELÖWE?

(actually, put them in shallow-draft motor boats and/or small barges - there were a few sizes below Peniche - let them beach themselves and assault on a narrow front - for around two companies, say, 500 meters or so on the flanks)

Well, they did...they were in Sturmboot and Gummi-Boot, which are smaller shallow-draft motor boats. Since they treated it as a big river crossing that makes sense. So now you want to use small converted civilian shallow-draft boats and samll barges...okay, how do you get them across the Channel? At least the Sturmboot and Gummis could be carried - sort of - on the VP and other vessels for the crossing. Do you tow the small barges? Do the troops sit in them on the crossing? Engines?

The question would be, if the British would be able to disable every last barge of 1st and 2nd Staffel AND sink enough of the following waves to make supplying to beachhead untenable.
I doubt it they could do it in time (or at all)

They don't need to since I suspect a significant number are going to hit the beach and never get extracted.

OTL they would still have to bring the heavy weapons past the beach defences on their own, since unloading of the vehicles was planned to be done one or two hours after the barges were beached. Or the heavy weapons would stay on the barges in that time and would be unable to support the troops. (or, if the vehicles were to be unloaded earlier, they would be shot to pieces by the still-intact beach defences)

Sure, because only the Voarausabteilungen seem to have any mission to penetrate inland early on with mostly just their hand weapons, which is wishful thinking.

Honestly, I did not read through every last pionier btl on Lexikon der Wehrmacht to see what was there in Summer 1940 as Heerestruppen. I'm not a masochist

[paulrward]

Hello All :

I have been spending too much time on this thread lately, it takes a LOT of research
time that I prefer to spend on other areas. However, Mr. TheMarcksPlan has responded
to the latest in this thread

here[/here].
If anyone would like to continue to discuss Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ideas - or anything else about WW2 - you can do so
[url=https://www.tapatalk.com/groups/ww2analysis/]here


However, I will make a final few remarks:

Yes, and USSBS took rubber recycling into account:

Since there is only one reason to create rubber crumb, ( To recycle that rubber) why are
you questioning the ability of Germany to recycle rubber? Just throwing out chaff?

Cite please. There were 394,000 workers in the automotive industry in 1943,

Mr. TheMarcksPlan already gave you cite in his last post in "Germany mobilizes earlier."
Given that USSBS Motor Vehicale Report states 130k workers, it's obvious the 400k workers
for "automotive industry" includes additional non-truck products like aero engines and tanks.

How do you get to 30%?

23,000 more trucks in Barbarossa was appx. 30% of Germany's annual truck production. And that's
a big overcount because, as discussed in USSBS truck report, the truck industry was underutilized
throughout this period. Building 30% more trucks before Barbarossa would feasibly require
ZERO additional workers, certainly less than 30% workforce delta.

Germany wasn't producing enough lorries to maintain its existing fleet

What is the relevance of this argument to Germany producing 23,000 more trucks to Barbarossa?
Please explain.

Any historian who challenges TMP's opinions is a dull reciter of facts

I can go along with the ' dull reciter ' portion, whether they are really ' facts ' is up for
discussion......

The Germans had a nickname for the French trucks that were requisitioned in 1941
and broke down before they got to Warsaw ... "elephants." GSWW Vol IV p. 1139.

Ok so Ostheer would have been better off with ZERO French trucks? They actually hurt
the German army? I cannot see how that makes much sense - even bad trucks, confined
to certain, limited roads can be put to use.
I feel that your vague indictments of French trucks have no analytical value. Even assuming
every single French truck breaks down after a few months, even if every French Truck fell to
pieces after just a few months, the Ostheer could have certainly executed a couple more
devastating Kessels in Ukraine.

And of course you're ignoring Mr. TheMarcksPlan's argument that no additional French trucks
are necessary, though they're sufficient. Also sufficient is German manufacture of 23,000
more military trucks, equipped with tires either from Germany's underestimated rubber supply
or from recycling of more looted French tires (with the French trucks left to rot, if it comes to that).
You will say the USSBS "accounted for" recycling but it didn't account for recycling of additional
looted French trucks - obviously.

A truck carrying supplies for an infantry division that marches 50 kilometers, then stops
to engage the enemy, is going to burn a lot less fuel then [sic] a truck carrying supplies
for a panzer division driving 300 kilometers over the same period and has to constantly
maneuver to engage the enemy the entire time, and then keeps on driving farther and
farther east.

Even conceding that is true, what's the relevance?

the Grosstransportraum trucks that have to drive 300 or 400 kilometers to drop off supplies
and then drive back

They don't have to ATL, as better railway support means supplies arrive nearer the front. Again,
total Ostheer fuel consumption is probably lower in Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ATL.

Yes, just assume everything will be easier,

This was your and others' tactic against MrTheMarksPlan : when he said something extensively
reasoned and supported by evidence, you call it an assumption. That gives him the option of
(1) restating the entire argument,
(2) walking away from the forum,
(3) getting visibly annoyed by this behavior.

Here you're pretending that Mr. TheMarcksPlan didn't detail the campaign's course and why AGS's
ability to destroy its opponents repeatedly - and without the assistance of AGC - lead to greater
RKKA casualties, lower Ostheer losses, and lower Soviet warmaking potential.

Maybe AGC reaches Moscow. So what.

Again you have to pretend you're arguing against something Mr.TheMarcksPlan never said. He
was always clear that merely taking Moscow isn't enough - that was his central criticism of
Halder et. al. for planning a bad campaign.

I can grant that the Red Army will be weaker in 1942 if Germany somehow pulls off this ATL.
The question is, how much weaker.

That is the question and it's something Mr. TheMarcksPlan discussed extensively. Again, I feel that
you have declined to engage substantively.

The Ostheer is going to be weaker than it was in 1941 ... all the planning and assuming in the world
can't make up for the reality of attrition on the Eastern Front.

This is just a re-statement of the Theology of the Invincible Soviet Union. It ignores the fact that,
in October of 1941, Stalin and the Soviet Government began making plans to secretly abandon Moscow
in the face of the advancing Wehrmacht, and only chose to stay in the city because they felt that
it might cause the entire Soviet Structure to collapse if they didn't.
Did the "reality of attrition" not exist during 1942? If it did exist, then why was Ostheer stronger
in 1943 than 1942?

The War on the Ostfront has been researched for nearly eight decades. The U.S. Army War College has
conducted WarGames on it. And other, very skilled researchers have also done gaming scenarios on
the various aspects of Barbarrossa. And, the one innescapable fact that always emerged was: If the
USSR lost Moscow, which was a central rail and road hub, as well as the administrative and coordinative
center of the USSR, the Soviet Forces would have collapsed by the end of 1942.


Paul R. Ward

[historygeek2021]

Since there is only one reason to create rubber crumb, ( To recycle that rubber) why are
you questioning the ability of Germany to recycle rubber? Just throwing out chaff?

Recycled rubber was used for purposes other than tires. It could not be used for tires.

Mr. TheMarcksPlan already gave you cite in his last post in "Germany mobilizes earlier."
Given that USSBS Motor Vehicale Report states 130k workers, it's obvious the 400k workers
for "automotive industry" includes additional non-truck products like aero engines and tanks.

Thanks. Link available here since none was provided earlier. See Table 17: https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html

23,000 more trucks in Barbarossa was appx. 30% of Germany's annual truck production. And that's
a big overcount because, as discussed in USSBS truck report, the truck industry was underutilized
throughout this period. Building 30% more trucks before Barbarossa would feasibly require
ZERO additional workers, certainly less than 30% workforce delta.

It's easy to say that it would be easy, but the reality is that even by 1943, by which point Germany had started taking the USSR seriously, had started conscripting workers from the occupied west, and had brought the synthetic rubber program to maturity, Germany still couldn't raise its truck production to the required level. USSBS Motor Vehicle Report explains:

Production of trucks in 1943 amounted to 109,085 of all standard types, but represented a failure to meet planned production by 27,360 trucks (20 percent). This failure was not the result of bombing attacks on the industry, because there were no precision plant attacks during 1943; it was principally due to a combination of the following factors:

(1) Component production wasn't expanded enough to allow the final assemblers to produce at the level required by schedules.
(2) Machine tools, jigs, tools, and fixtures necessary for the simultaneous conversion to so many new items were not made available fast enough.
(3) The total labor force decreased 12 percent. This included a 31 percent decrease in German male labor.

https://www.angelfire.com/super/ussbs/motvehrep.html

Germany wasn't producing enough lorries to maintain its existing fleet

What is the relevance of this argument to Germany producing 23,000 more trucks to Barbarossa?
Please explain.

Germany's fleet of lorries was declining due to normal wear and tear, even in the absence of an active military campaign. Therefore, in order to increase the total number of trucks available, Germany would first have to produce enough to maintain its existing fleet, which it was historically unable to do, and had to resort to (1) requisitioning trucks from occupied Europe and (2) transferring trucks from the infantry divisions to the motorized divisions.

I can go along with the ' dull reciter ' portion, whether they are really ' facts ' is up for
discussion......

Then provide evidence that the facts are incorrect. Saying you think the author has a superficial understanding of economics is just ad hominem.

Ok so Ostheer would have been better off with ZERO French trucks? They actually hurt
the German army? I cannot see how that makes much sense - even bad trucks, confined
to certain, limited roads can be put to use.
I feel that your vague indictments of French trucks have no analytical value. Even assuming
every single French truck breaks down after a few months, even if every French Truck fell to
pieces after just a few months, the Ostheer could have certainly executed a couple more
devastating Kessels in Ukraine.

Two main problems with French trucks: (1) you have to get them to the front. Since many of them broke down before they reached Warsaw, good luck getting them to northern Romania. (2) Since they will break down early in the campaign, Germany will find itself in the same position east of the Dnieper that it found itself in the OTL - largely immobile, capable of maybe going a few hundred kilometers to execute a Vyazma or Sea of Azov Kessel, but then becoming static or forced to retreat.

And of course you're ignoring Mr. TheMarcksPlan's argument that no additional French trucks
are necessary, though they're sufficient. Also sufficient is German manufacture of 23,000
more military trucks, equipped with tires either from Germany's underestimated rubber supply
or from recycling of more looted French tires (with the French trucks left to rot, if it comes to that).
You will say the USSBS "accounted for" recycling but it didn't account for recycling of additional
looted French trucks - obviously.

Recycled rubber could not be used to make tires in 1940. Germany did not have enough rubber to make 23,000 more trucks. All available rubber was consumed in 1940, as established in this thread.

A truck carrying supplies for an infantry division that marches 50 kilometers, then stops
to engage the enemy, is going to burn a lot less fuel then [sic] a truck carrying supplies
for a panzer division driving 300 kilometers over the same period and has to constantly
maneuver to engage the enemy the entire time, and then keeps on driving farther and
farther east.

Even conceding that is true, what's the relevance?

The relevance is that the 5th panzer group will be burning a lot more fuel than the "just 3%" crowd would have us believe.

the Grosstransportraum trucks that have to drive 300 or 400 kilometers to drop off supplies
and then drive back

They don't have to ATL, as better railway support means supplies arrive nearer the front. Again,
total Ostheer fuel consumption is probably lower in Mr. TheMarcksPlan's ATL.

It has not been established that the Reichsbahn's proposals would have been adequate for the conditions that were actually encountered in the Soviet Union.

Yes, just assume everything will be easier,

This was your and others' tactic against MrTheMarksPlan : when he said something extensively
reasoned and supported by evidence, you call it an assumption. That gives him the option of
(1) restating the entire argument,
(2) walking away from the forum,
(3) getting visibly annoyed by this behavior.

Here you're pretending that Mr. TheMarcksPlan didn't detail the campaign's course and why AGS's
ability to destroy its opponents repeatedly - and without the assistance of AGC - lead to greater
RKKA casualties, lower Ostheer losses, and lower Soviet warmaking potential.

I went into great detail on the state of the Soviet Union under various outcomes of this ATL in other threads, and I'm happy to go into it again.

Again, I feel that you have declined to engage substantively.

That's honestly pretty insulting for you to say, given the time I have spent going through sources to share substantive information on this thread and the previous threads.

The Ostheer is going to be weaker than it was in 1941 ... all the planning and assuming in the world
can't make up for the reality of attrition on the Eastern Front.

Did the "reality of attrition" not exist during 1942? If it did exist, then why was Ostheer stronger
in 1943 than 1942?

Good point. But by then Germany had time to "get serious" and devote more resources to improving the railroads. Germany had also started manufacturing trains that could function on the Soviet rail system: the type 52 and type 42. The Reichsbahn did not suggest building trains capable of operating on Soviet railroads, nor did it have the technical knowledge of the specifications necessary for trains to operate on the Soviet rail system, so it's doubtful that even with the Reichsbahn's 1940 recommendations, Germany still would have been able to supply its forces adequately in 1941 and 1942.

If the USSR lost Moscow, which was a central rail and road hub, as well as the administrative and coordinative center of the USSR, the Soviet Forces would have collapsed by the end of 1942.

You underestimate Mother Russia at your peril.

[Peter89]

With the original plan and OTL, they would not have been butchered - since they would have never left France to begin with
To make Seelöwe happen, you would have to scrap the OTL sometimes Mid-June at the latest, and assume Hitler, OKW, OKH, OKM, OKL, the Heeresgruppen, Armies, etc, etc, etc, etc are serious about the whole operation and do not see it as a coup-de-grace against a beaten enemy. And make some actual effort.

You also have to assume that a landing c. 10 September would be successful whereas one c. 20 September would not. I don't think so.

What I don't understand about the Seelöwe what-ifs is this: why do some people think that Germany wasn't aggressive enough? If any great army had a tradition to launch offensives - whether the offensive had a realistic chance or not - it was the German-Prussian army. And OTL the Germans tried and the Germans failed, and not for the lack of trying. The Luftwaffe got pretty badly beaten, even though they had a koste es was es wolle attitude.

In order to conjure up a remotely plausible Seelöwe, the Germans had to gain such an air superiority over the Channel and the invasion coast that could negate both the Royal Navy and the local superiority of British ground troops - and we know that they didn't even pull off a draw. So does it really worth to go into the possible dates of operation and barges?