De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939

[wm]

Stalin trading with Hitler is NOT a proof that he sought an understanding with Hitler .

[T]he Soviet government was striving for a political agreement with Germany, the main adversary of collective security.
This effort was not limited to the episode in winter 1937 which might, in a way, look like a variation of the Bjoerke affair; on the contrary, the Soviets had been launching initiatives in that direction persistently at least since July 1935, and probably since February.

One might almost say that parallel to each of the grand speeches of Maxim Litvinov in Geneva during those almost two years, there was a try in Berlin or in Moscow by some other representative of the Soviet government to achieve exactly the opposite of what the foreign commissar was publicly pleading for in the League of Nations.
...
Soviet propositions were never too specific, because no negotiations on the subject ever seriously started before summer 1939. Nevertheless, certain indications are documented—first of all, the proposed "development of the Berlin Treaty" of 1926, formally still in force after Hitler's ratification of the protocol (May 1933).
To develop a treaty must reasonably mean to extend the obligations arising from its clauses. It is not difficult to guess in which direction a treaty of neutrality and nonaggression could possibly be extended, and how that extension would be bound to affect the security clauses of other treaties that the Soviet Union had meantime signed, including the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Furthermore, we know that certain "changes of attitudes" were offered by the Russians as part of the proposed political détente with Germany, and one of these changes was specified as concerning the reoccupation of Rhineland. That seems to be clear enough to shed light on what kind of a deal the Soviets had in mind in their approaches to Germany.

It is particularly characteristic for these relations that in their economic sphere, both countries were significantly contributing to the war preparations of the other side. The Soviets were supplying the Germans with large quantities of strategic raw materials, indispensable for armament production, and the Germans were selling finished war machinery and even sophisticated devices for the Soviet armed forces that were helping their modernization. This last fact was no secret in Paris and in London, and could not fail to arouse serious doubts about the stand Soviet Russia would take in case of a German assault on her allies, France or Czechoslovakia.

The fact that no Soviet-German political agreement was signed in this period that would effectively annul Soviet membership in the League of Nations and the alliances with France and Czechoslovakia can be attributed solely to Hitler's refusal to enter into any but economic arrangements with the Russians, at least as long as anti-Communism could be employed as a useful device to soften the Western resistance to German plans in Central Europe.
The Soviets, on the other hand, considering how early they started wooing Hitler after the break of 1933-34, seem never to have thought of their association with the League of Nations and with France as a suitable replacement for their past relationship with Germany.
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 by Jiri Hochman

[Gorque]

5 About Standard Oil:
a what they did before the war was legal
b there is no proof that what they did during the war was illegal,as the justice of FDR (an enemy of Standard Oil ) did not put the leaders of Standard Oil in prison .

I believe that you are conflating two separate, distinct legal entities. As WM correctly pointed out previously and which, per your norm, have ignored, the enterprise doing business selling petroleum products in Germany was called "Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft" and not Standard Oil.

Granted Standard Oil did own 94% of Deutsch-Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft at one point, however, the latter was still a definite, separate, legal entity.

So here we go again with words and what those words mean and why it is important, if we are to have an meaningful conversation between each other, that we come to a common set of definitions about "words" such as de facto and de jure.

Such trifling little differences exist between the two aforementioned words but enough of a difference that it would affect the rights and responsibilities of those living within the effected areas.

[ljadw]

Stalin trading with Hitler is NOT a proof that he sought an understanding with Hitler .

[T]he Soviet government was striving for a political agreement with Germany, the main adversary of collective security.
This effort was not limited to the episode in winter 1937 which might, in a way, look like a variation of the Bjoerke affair; on the contrary, the Soviets had been launching initiatives in that direction persistently at least since July 1935, and probably since February.

One might almost say that parallel to each of the grand speeches of Maxim Litvinov in Geneva during those almost two years, there was a try in Berlin or in Moscow by some other representative of the Soviet government to achieve exactly the opposite of what the foreign commissar was publicly pleading for in the League of Nations.
...
Soviet propositions were never too specific, because no negotiations on the subject ever seriously started before summer 1939. Nevertheless, certain indications are documented—first of all, the proposed "development of the Berlin Treaty" of 1926, formally still in force after Hitler's ratification of the protocol (May 1933).
To develop a treaty must reasonably mean to extend the obligations arising from its clauses. It is not difficult to guess in which direction a treaty of neutrality and nonaggression could possibly be extended, and how that extension would be bound to affect the security clauses of other treaties that the Soviet Union had meantime signed, including the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Furthermore, we know that certain "changes of attitudes" were offered by the Russians as part of the proposed political détente with Germany, and one of these changes was specified as concerning the reoccupation of Rhineland. That seems to be clear enough to shed light on what kind of a deal the Soviets had in mind in their approaches to Germany.

It is particularly characteristic for these relations that in their economic sphere, both countries were significantly contributing to the war preparations of the other side. The Soviets were supplying the Germans with large quantities of strategic raw materials, indispensable for armament production, and the Germans were selling finished war machinery and even sophisticated devices for the Soviet armed forces that were helping their modernization. This last fact was no secret in Paris and in London, and could not fail to arouse serious doubts about the stand Soviet Russia would take in case of a German assault on her allies, France or Czechoslovakia.

The fact that no Soviet-German political agreement was signed in this period that would effectively annul Soviet membership in the League of Nations and the alliances with France and Czechoslovakia can be attributed solely to Hitler's refusal to enter into any but economic arrangements with the Russians, at least as long as anti-Communism could be employed as a useful device to soften the Western resistance to German plans in Central Europe.
The Soviets, on the other hand, considering how early they started wooing Hitler after the break of 1933-34, seem never to have thought of their association with the League of Nations and with France as a suitable replacement for their past relationship with Germany.
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 by Jiri Hochman

What Hochman is saying is unproved (he gives no concrete examples of negotiations between Germany and the USSR before WW 2 ,I like to see the proofs for the claim that the Soviets were supplying Germany with large quantities of strategic raw materials before the war ) and he makes several owngoals (: no political agreement was signed ).
Besides, Hochman fails to answer the deciding question ,which is : WHY would the Soviet Union try to have a political agreement with Germany ? There was a state that blocked all possible German attacks on the USSR : = POLAND .The existence of Poland meant that there was no common border between Germany and Russia .
The Soviets did not woo Hitler, but France and Britain .When Germany left the League, the Soviets entered .After Hitler took power, the Soviets ordered their henchmen in the West to vote for the military budgets in their countries and to demand a harsher attitude to Germany and to make Popular Fronts possible,and the useful idiots obeyed the orders of the Kremlin . The German communist party,OTOH,continued its struggle against the Nazis:if the Soviets wanted to woo Hitler, they would have ordered their foreign agents to combat collective security .If the Soviets wanted to woo Hitler,Litvinow would not be foreign secretary .
The Soviets were not afraid of Hitler ,but of a coalition of Hitler,France, Britain, US and Japan against the SU.Such coalition had existed after WW 1.Their answer was to tell Britain, France,US that Hitler was their enemy and that they should cooperate with their communists in a Popular Front against Hitler .

[wm]

What Hochman is saying is unproved (he gives no concrete examples of negotiations between Germany and the USSR before WW 2 ,I like to see the proofs for the claim that the Soviets were supplying Germany with large quantities of strategic raw materials before the war ) and he makes several owngoals (: no political agreement was signed ).

It's proven and he dedicates a few dozen pages to that, that was just a summary.

The reason for a political agreement was the lack of direct conflicts between Germany and the Soviet Union and the similarity of both systems (leading to the contemporary National Bolshevism).
Additionally, Hitler in the thirties many times proposed an anti-Soviet German-Polish understanding or even alliance.
And Göring during his many visits to Poland openly talked about the need or inevitability of war between Germany/Poland against the USSR.
So the Soviets had to try to preempt that.

but of a coalition of Hitler,France, Britain, US and Japan against the SU

Citation needed.
Considering that the US at that time was industrializing the USSR and built not only the famous Stalingrad Tractor Plant but even more famous Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works.
And the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant - in effect the US motorized the USSR and mechanized its agriculture (thanks to Ford's Fordsons).

[Boby]

).
Besides, Hochman fails to answer the deciding question ,which is : WHY would the Soviet Union try to have a political agreement with Germany ? There was a state that blocked all possible German attacks on the USSR : = POLAND .The existence of Poland meant that there was no common border between Germany and Russia .

Look at R.D. Müller "Enemy in the East". He is saying that the german idea of an attack on the SU would be through springboards in East Prussia and Romania, if Poland rejected to participate.

[wm]

To illustrate, in Poland (1935/05)

1935.jpg

source: NAC

[ljadw]

).
Besides, Hochman fails to answer the deciding question ,which is : WHY would the Soviet Union try to have a political agreement with Germany ? There was a state that blocked all possible German attacks on the USSR : = POLAND .The existence of Poland meant that there was no common border between Germany and Russia .

Look at R.D. Müller "Enemy in the East". He is saying that the german idea of an attack on the SU would be through springboards in East Prussia and Romania, if Poland rejected to participate.

Germany had no common border with the USSR and even if East Prussia had a border with the USSR, it had no border with Germany .And I don't see how Germany could supply its Northern Army Group using the East Sea and East Prussia .
About Romania (which was a French ally) : the distance from the Reich to Romania was much to long for Germany to be able to supply its forces in Romania .If Poland remained neutral, Germany had to pass by Slovakia and Hungary to go to Romania .The Polish border with Russia was longer than the combined borders of Romania and Lithuania with Russia .

[ljadw]

What Hochman is saying is unproved (he gives no concrete examples of negotiations between Germany and the USSR before WW 2 ,I like to see the proofs for the claim that the Soviets were supplying Germany with large quantities of strategic raw materials before the war ) and he makes several owngoals (: no political agreement was signed ).

It's proven and he dedicates a few dozen pages to that, that was just a summary.

The reason for a political agreement was the lack of direct conflicts between Germany and the Soviet Union and the similarity of both systems (leading to the contemporary National Bolshevism).
Additionally, Hitler in the thirties many times proposed an anti-Soviet German-Polish understanding or even alliance.
And Göring during his many visits to Poland openly talked about the need or inevitability of war between Germany/Poland against the USSR.
So the Soviets had to try to preempt that.

but of a coalition of Hitler,France, Britain, US and Japan against the SU

Citation needed.
Considering that the US at that time was industrializing the USSR and built not only the famous Stalingrad Tractor Plant but even more famous Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works.
And the Nizhny Novgorod Automobile Plant - in effect the US motorized the USSR and mechanized its agriculture (thanks to Ford's Fordsons).

A coalition of Germany and Poland against the Soviets was a chimera : Poland would NEVER ally with Germany against the Soviets or an other country :there were no reasons to do it and a lot of reasons not to do it .
About the other coalition (the capitalist countries against the SU ) : it existed after 1918 and there was a lot of paranoia in the USSR that,because of the depression,capitalism was vacillating,and that its only chance to survive was to attack and defeat the Communist Paradise .In 1925 Stalin said that the USSR was a socialist island,surrounded by capitalist countries . One of the reasons for the purges in the SU in the thirties was the general paranoia and even panic that wee ruling the country .
About the US industrializing the USSR : that is a big exaggeration,well spread in the US for different reasons: the industrialization in the USSR started before WW 1 -Without this industrialization Russia could not have fought 4 years against Germany - and was founded on and continued the industrialization started by the Tsars with the help of Imperial Germany. Magnitogorsk started in the thirties,the industrialization in the twenties and before .
The KIM (Moscow Automobile Plant ) started in 1930 and the Gaz-1 production in 1936 .

[Boby]

).
Besides, Hochman fails to answer the deciding question ,which is : WHY would the Soviet Union try to have a political agreement with Germany ? There was a state that blocked all possible German attacks on the USSR : = POLAND .The existence of Poland meant that there was no common border between Germany and Russia .

Look at R.D. Müller "Enemy in the East". He is saying that the german idea of an attack on the SU would be through springboards in East Prussia and Romania, if Poland rejected to participate.

Germany had no common border with the USSR and even if East Prussia had a border with the USSR, it had no border with Germany .And I don't see how Germany could supply its Northern Army Group using the East Sea and East Prussia .
About Romania (which was a French ally) : the distance from the Reich to Romania was much to long for Germany to be able to supply its forces in Romania .If Poland remained neutral, Germany had to pass by Slovakia and Hungary to go to Romania .The Polish border with Russia was longer than the combined borders of Romania and Lithuania with Russia .

If the germans wanted an attack on the SU without war in the west, it was only on this condition: a pincer push north-south, the sole remaining scenario would be crushing Poland, as long as there was no option of a polish intervention or troop passage to the border.

[wm]

As I understand the essential condition for the war was a collapse of the USSR resulting from its internal problems (lots of people expected that) or from lost war with Japan.
It wasn't going to be a full-scale Unternehmen Barbarossa.

[ljadw]

).
Besides, Hochman fails to answer the deciding question ,which is : WHY would the Soviet Union try to have a political agreement with Germany ? There was a state that blocked all possible German attacks on the USSR : = POLAND .The existence of Poland meant that there was no common border between Germany and Russia .

Look at R.D. Müller "Enemy in the East". He is saying that the german idea of an attack on the SU would be through springboards in East Prussia and Romania, if Poland rejected to participate.

Germany had no common border with the USSR and even if East Prussia had a border with the USSR, it had no border with Germany .And I don't see how Germany could supply its Northern Army Group using the East Sea and East Prussia .
About Romania (which was a French ally) : the distance from the Reich to Romania was much to long for Germany to be able to supply its forces in Romania .If Poland remained neutral, Germany had to pass by Slovakia and Hungary to go to Romania .The Polish border with Russia was longer than the combined borders of Romania and Lithuania with Russia .

If the germans wanted an attack on the SU without war in the west, it was only on this condition: a pincer push north-south, the sole remaining scenario would be crushing Poland, as long as there was no option of a polish intervention or troop passage to the border.

IF !
There is no proof that the Germans wanted before 1939 or between 1939 a war with the SU without or with war in the West . Hitler's aims were more modest .

[ljadw]

As I understand the essential condition for the war was a collapse of the USSR resulting from its internal problems (lots of people expected that) or from lost war with Japan.
It wasn't going to be a full-scale Unternehmen Barbarossa.

What people expected did not occur .Besides, even then, the defeat, occupation, colonization,exploitation of European Russia would be a task that was impossible for Germany and also unnecessary and it would weaken Germany to the point that it would result in the collapse of the Third Reich .
Germany had not the human potential to occupy,administer,exploit and colonize European Russia .
And Going East was not something that was seriously concerning the leaders of the Third Reich (Mein Kampf did not determine Germany's foreign policy ) before the war .

[Boby]

).
Besides, Hochman fails to answer the deciding question ,which is : WHY would the Soviet Union try to have a political agreement with Germany ? There was a state that blocked all possible German attacks on the USSR : = POLAND .The existence of Poland meant that there was no common border between Germany and Russia .

Look at R.D. Müller "Enemy in the East". He is saying that the german idea of an attack on the SU would be through springboards in East Prussia and Romania, if Poland rejected to participate.

Germany had no common border with the USSR and even if East Prussia had a border with the USSR, it had no border with Germany .And I don't see how Germany could supply its Northern Army Group using the East Sea and East Prussia .
About Romania (which was a French ally) : the distance from the Reich to Romania was much to long for Germany to be able to supply its forces in Romania .If Poland remained neutral, Germany had to pass by Slovakia and Hungary to go to Romania .The Polish border with Russia was longer than the combined borders of Romania and Lithuania with Russia .

If the germans wanted an attack on the SU without war in the west, it was only on this condition: a pincer push north-south, the sole remaining scenario would be crushing Poland, as long as there was no option of a polish intervention or troop passage to the border.

IF !
There is no proof that the Germans wanted before 1939 or between 1939 a war with the SU without or with war in the West . Hitler's aims were more modest .

Not 1939, but later. It is clear that the entire foreign policy of Hitler was to form an alliance of all eastern european countries against the SU. Of course this cannot be done overnight, it needed time.

[ljadw]

What De Gaulle and Churchill said before the war,was given their position,totally irrelevant .

The question is what De Gaulle said/thought not whether it was 'relevant', whatever that means.

It was also wrong .

So presumably, to have an opinion on what De Gaulle said, you know what he said on the subject? Unlike the rest of us. Please share, since that is what this topic is about, after all, supposedly.

About Standard Oil:
a what they did before the war was legal

So what? Doesn't change the fact that they facilitated German and Japanese aggresion, aided their war efforts and hampered the US war effort.

there is no proof that what they did during the war was illegal,as the justice of FDR (an enemy of Standard Oil ) did not put the leaders of Standard Oil in prison .

Err, the fact that the SO lawyers negotiated paying out-of-court fines to avoid litigation and that the company's president was forced to resign, rather suggests there was. In any event, legal or not, it doesn't change the fact that an American company (and not the only one) made a very significant contribution to the war efforts of the US's enemies, both before the war and during it.

Before the war,Germany and Japan were not enemies of the US .Thus trade with these countries was perfectly legal.
If during the war,Standard Oil had helped the war effort of the enemies of the US, its president would not have resigned,but would have been hanged .

[ljadw]

REICH IN MOURNING FOR POLISH ALLY.png

NYT nonsense
1 Poland was not a German ally in 1935
2 The position of Germany was not precarious in 1935