De Gaulle and French betrayal of Poland in Semptember 1939

[ljadw]

24 March. Record of the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs made during a political briefing at his office on 24 March 1939
SECRET

MINISTER: The tension of the situation requires an investigation of the whole complex of problems.
The situation is serious and it cannot be ignored. And it is serious because one of the elements hitherto timely for the definition of the state's situation, that is, Germany, has lost its calculability, with which it was endowed even amidst difficult problems.

Therefore a number of new elements have appeared in our politics and a number of new problems in the state. As far as the basic line of action is concerned, a straight and clear line has been established with the top factors in the state. We defined with precision the limits of our direct interests, and beyond this line we conduct a normal policy and undertake action dealing with it as with normal current work.
Below this line comes our Polish non possumus. This is clear: we will fight.
Once the matter is put this way, chaos is overcome by a considerable share of calm, and thinking becomes orderly.

Where is the line? It is our territory, but not only that. The line also involves the non-acceptance by our state, regarding the drastic spot that Danzig has always been, of any unilateral suggestion to be imposed on us. And, regardless of what Danzig is worth as an object (in my opinion it may perhaps be worth quite a lot, but this is of no concern at the moment), under the present circumstances it has become a symbol. This means that, if we join that category of eastern states that allow rules to be dictated to them, then I do not know where the matter will end.
That is why it is wiser to go forward to meet the enemy than to wait for him at home.
Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939

This is an own-goal : a politician meeting civil servants,doing a lot of talking and as result ..that nothing is done.
The situation in March was not worse than in December and there was no crisis in March but only sensational articles in newspapers with as source anti-appeasers in MI 6 and the FO .
If Beck believed what he said, he had several possibilities
1 He could blackmail the Germans saying : we will sign a treaty with Moscow and Soviet forces will be stationed at the border with Germany
2 He could blackmail the Soviets saying : if you do not help us,we will sign a treaty with Germany and the Wehrmacht will be stationed at our border with the USSR
3 He could blackmail the French and British saying : if you do not send the Foreign Legion, the Guards and 5 squadrons of the RAF to Poland and a part of the RN to Danzig, we will
a sign a treaty with the Soviets
or b sign a treaty with Hitler
or c provoke the Germans in Danzig which will result in war which will be very bad for you .
And, what did Beck ? Nothing .He satisfied himself with meaningless British promises that Britain would do nothing to prevent war but would give Poland all possible aid if there was a war ,which meant nothing .And the French promises were at the same level .
Beck said that the situation was serious (which it was not ) and did nothing .Thus,he was convinced that the situation was not serious .
Politicians are talking a lot but do nothing .That's the good thing on democracy .

[ljadw]

And : what means : it is wiser to go forward to meet the enemy than to wait for him at home?
And, what did Poland :was it going forward to meet the enemy or did it wait for him at home ?

[wm]

It meant active diplomacy, seeking allies, accepting the guarantees.

After the Polish defeat, Rydz said :after the death of Pilsudski,the condition of the army was catastrophic.There was no money for fortifications,we could not afford the partial mobilization.The nation hated it .Thousand Silesians deserted to Germany .
If he knew this before the war, he should have kept his mouth shut,instead of doing incendiary declarations who only made him a fool .
And, is it not true that Rydz did not determine Poland's policy and that there was thus no reason for the crypto-communist US journalist to interview him ? Why she did not interview Beck ?Maybe he wanted not to wast his time with answering the questions of a biased and incompetent US journalist ?
The content of the interview was at the level of the first class of a primary school.

The condition was catastrophic because it was at height of the Great Depression, when even in the US people were starving, most countries couldn't afford non-catastrophic armies at that time.

It wasn't Silesians but Polish Germans in 1939 and it was expected.

Beck and a few others were powerful and enjoyed a lot of leeways but Rydz was the warlord, the only one. If he didn't like something - it wasn't going to happen.
And even Rydz with his merry men wouldn't be able to go against the public sentiment that made handing over Danzig and that exterritorial thing for free impossible.
The opposition, supported by the French, just waited for such mistakes.

[wm]

Personal letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassador in Rome
Warsaw, 10 May 1939
Top secret.
Personal.

...
During my visit with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, I noticed a dangerous change in that man whom, on the basis of concrete evidence, I had grounds to consider in 1934 as one of the rare examples in Germany of reason in foreign policy.
Too easy successes due to the indolence and the indecisiveness of his counter-partners, large and small alike, have brought this man, with whom it was possible to speak reasonably about European politics just a year ago, to a state that constitutes a direct threat to our interests.
...
this man has lost all sense of measure which, after Bismarck, in my opinion he tried to represent in Germany for the first time.
This was decisive for me. After a heavy inner struggle, I took the decision to shift our policy from a path of reasonable understanding with this neighbor, to one of reassurance.
Our public opinion has an exaggerated liking for this, though personally I am aware of the risk this decision entails.

During my visit to England, I became aware that the attitude of this, be it as it may, serious nation, had undergone a serious change. To British proposals of a guarantee I responded with the principle of reciprocity, considering that, despite our poverty and weakness, we have no halfway solutions.
Either we pull up our country to the position of a power or, in one way or another, nolens volens, we will become some sort of Slovakia or something of that order.
...
In those conditions, and being fully aware of the risks of the decisions taken, I have decided to take a firm stand on German plans with regard to Poland.
Pilsudski once predicted the problems that would arise from any 'unhealthy romancing with Germany'. He thought, however, that we wouldn't reach a reasonable arrangement with the countries of Western Europe if we didn't create our own Polish-German policy, if even for a time.
Polish Documents on Foreign Policy. 24 October 1938 – 30 September 1939

[ljadw]

It meant active diplomacy, seeking allies, accepting the guarantees.

After the Polish defeat, Rydz said :after the death of Pilsudski,the condition of the army was catastrophic.There was no money for fortifications,we could not afford the partial mobilization.The nation hated it .Thousand Silesians deserted to Germany .
If he knew this before the war, he should have kept his mouth shut,instead of doing incendiary declarations who only made him a fool .
And, is it not true that Rydz did not determine Poland's policy and that there was thus no reason for the crypto-communist US journalist to interview him ? Why she did not interview Beck ?Maybe he wanted not to wast his time with answering the questions of a biased and incompetent US journalist ?
The content of the interview was at the level of the first class of a primary school.

The condition was catastrophic because it was at height of the Great Depression, when even in the US people were starving, most countries couldn't afford non-catastrophic armies at that time.

It wasn't Silesians but Polish Germans in 1939 and it was expected.

Beck and a few others were powerful and enjoyed a lot of leeways but Rydz was the warlord, the only one. If he didn't like something - it wasn't going to happen.
And even Rydz with his merry men wouldn't be able to go against the public sentiment that made handing over Danzig and that exterritorial thing for free impossible.
The opposition, supported by the French, just waited for such mistakes.

There was no active Polish diplomacy,Poland was not seeking allies , it was not demanding concrete help .

Meanwhile I have found the Polish and French text of the treaty between Gamelin and Kasprzycki (on Forum :Le Monde en Guerre )
An excerpt of the French text :
'' Dés que le principal effort de l'Allemagne contre la Pologne sera marqué,la France développera progressivement des actions offensives contre l'Allemagne par l' intermédiaire de ses forces principales . A partir du quiziéme jour )''
Rough translation :
Immediately one knows the principal effort of Germany against Poland, France will progressively develop offensive actions against Germany using the bulk of its forces .And these actions will start after 15 days .
That, this meaningless blah blah was what Kasprzycki received from the French .
France would not attack Germany, but it would develop progressively ( which is an other word for slowly ) offensive actions,15 days after.. After what ? with the bulk of its forces (note that the number of divisions is not specified;8/9 were committed for the Saar offensive ).What are offensive actions ?
If the situation was that critical, why did Kasprzycki not demand specified promises ?
Gamelin said to Kasprzycki : if you are attacked , we will not attack Germany, but we will start slowly offensive actions with an unknown number of divisions .
And Kasprzycki was satisfied .
If I was Kasprzycki,I would have answered : you can take these promises where the sun don't shine .
The fact that Kasprzycki was satisfied with these hollow promises is a proof that the situation was not critical for Poland in May 1939 .

[ljadw]

An other example : Vuillemain promised to despatch 60 bombers to operate from Polish air bases in event of war .
Not only 60 bombers, but also their crew,technicians, bombs.
Source : Case Red : the collapse of France P 100 ( R.Forczyk).
Did even one of these bombers arrive in Poland on August 31 1939 ?
If not : why ?
Why did the Poles not pressure the French ?
We can conclude that this was also a hollow promise .And that Poland did not react angrily to the French .

[wm]

There was no active Polish diplomacy,Poland was not seeking allies , it was not demanding concrete help .

After the French decision to construct the Maginot Line, it was obvious for Poland that France would not/could not help Poland if Poland was attacked by Germany.

So the Poles were going to demand concrete help although it wasn't available.
Are you really believe Beck wasn't aware of that?
With such ideas, he wouldn't offer you a window cleaning job at his Ministry.

He explains that above, without offering something of value the Allies weren't going to help Poland.
The things of value he had were reciprocity (i.e., the commitment to die for Belgium and the other small countries if needed) and the Polish Army.

The idea of blackmailing Hitler with Stalin is even more useless.
Both Hitler and Beck were aware Stalin sought an understanding with Germany in the thirties. And that Stalin didn't need understanding with Poland or Romania for anything.
Additionally, Beck was reliably informed about the possibility of such understanding since 1938 and about the progress of that in 1939.
The talks and the Hitler-Stalin pact were no surprise at all.

[wm]

So we are going to believe that the (relieving) offensive with the bulk of French ground units (meaning three-quarters of the mobilized French army deployed and about half of it participating in the relieve offensives) meant small forces or no forces at all.
And in the end, it was all about a friendly, relieving enema.

[ljadw]

So we are going to believe that the (relieving) offensive with the bulk of French ground units (meaning three-quarters of the mobilized French army deployed and about half of it participating in the relieve offensives) meant small forces or no forces at all.
And in the end, it was all about a friendly, relieving enema.

Proof for the claim of three-quarters of the mobilized French army deployed and about half of it participating in the relieve offensives ?(offensive or offensives ? )
The fact that Gamelin was unable /unwilling to tell how many divisions would participate on the offensive,is striking and ominous . Forces principales was 9/10 divisions, and if he could use less than 9 divisions ,he would have done it .
Idem for the fact that he was unwilling to use the word OFFENSIVE.
But Poland did not care .

[ljadw]

The things of value he had were reciprocity (i.e., the commitment to die for Belgium and the other small countries if needed) and the Polish Army.

The idea of blackmailing Hitler with Stalin is even more useless.
Both Hitler and Beck were aware Stalin sought an understanding with Germany in the thirties. And that Stalin didn't need understanding with Poland or Romania for anything.
Additionally, Beck was reliably informed about the possibility of such understanding since 1938 and about the progress of that in 1939.
The talks and the Hitler-Stalin pact were no surprise at all.

1 Reciprocity : no one believed that Hitler would attack in the West, thus ...
2 Proof that Stalin sought an understanding with Hitler ?
There are proofs for the opposite : after January 31 1933, Stalin tried to convince ( with a lot of success ) the West that he was a good guy: a left wing liberal.And his henchmen in the media and the dean of Canterbury and the Duchess of Atholl,and the intellectuals ( intellectuals are always ready to believe fables ) parroted him .
3 Proof that Beck was reliably informed about the possibility of such understanding ?
4 The Hitler-Stalin treaty ( not a pact ) was a total surprise :
''The British were unshakably convinced that Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany were irreconcilable enemies .''
Source : Taylor : The Origins of the Second World War P 257 .
And : ''The British continued to assume that the ideological barrier was too great to be overcome .''
Same source P 292 .The willingness of people in the West to believe what they wanted to believe,is,80 years after the facts,still unbelievable.The ideological barrier between fascism and communism did not prevent Stalin from selling oil to Mussolini,or the Argentine generals to sell food to the Soviets, etc,etc,..
Most people in the West refused to believe the news of the Ribbentrop-Molotov treaty.Even the French communists .

[wm]

1 Reciprocity : no one believed that Hitler would attack in the West, thus ...

If we do not stand up to the dictators now, we shall only prepare the day when we shall have to stand up to them under far more adverse conditions.
Two years ago it was safe, three years ago it was easy. and four years ago a mere dispatch might have rectified the position.
Now the victors are the vanquished, and those who threw down their arms in the field and sued for an armistice are striding on to world mastery.
Winston Churchill, March 1938

2 Proof that Stalin sought an understanding with Hitler ?

In "The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938" by Jiri Hochman there are a few chapters dedicated solely to that.

3 Proof that Beck was reliably informed about the possibility of such understanding ?

The Consul General in Berlin about reports of a German-Soviet rapprochement Berlin,
11 July 1939
To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw Minister's Office

Alleged Russian-German negotiations. Following report No. T.50/N/1.6 of 3 July 1939, I wish to communicate that the news of a German-Russian rapprochement has been repeated in a decisive form by the same source.
The informer stated that 'within two weeks the world will be astounded by the Russian-Gerrnan accord'.
This accord is apparently to be concluded at Poland's expense.
...
I was promised the names of the delegates sent for this purpose to Moscow by 12-13 July.
...
Consul General Stanisław Kara

Proof for the claim of three-quarters of the mobilized French army deployed and about half of it participating in the relieve offensives ?(offensive or offensives ? )

Official minutes of the military and air talks 'Relations militaires franco-polonaises', pp. 42-9; Le Goyet, Mystere Gamelin, pp. 187-92.

[wm]

''The British were unshakably convinced that Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany were irreconcilable enemies .''

Both the British and French governments followed the development of Soviet-German relations with cautious attention. Entente between the USSR and Germany was at no point of the 1934-38 period ruled out by these powers; on the contrary, it was considered entirely feasible. Its symptoms were therefore thoroughly analyzed and forces presumably sympathetic to Soviet-German rapprochement were realistically appraised.
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 by Jiri Hochman

As regards Germany, a possibility of detente with the Soviet Union cannot be neglected, in spite of Herr Hitler's anti-Communist obsessions and the extent to which anti-Communism is a fundamental tenet for the National-Socialist Party. . . .
It is difficult to see what advantages can Germany hope to achieve in the long run by antagonism to Russia.
On the Russian side, there is understood to be a party in Moscow which would be prepared to bring about a detente in Soviet-German relations for the sake of a free hand elsewhere. Main reasons for its lack of success hitherto have been the fanatical anti-Russia attitude of the Nazi Party and of Herr Hitler himself, and the schemes of Herr Rosenberg which have long been regarded as fantastic.
Sir R. Vansittart's memorandum on the international position of Russia (February 21, 1935)

[ljadw]

''The British were unshakably convinced that Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany were irreconcilable enemies .''

Both the British and French governments followed the development of Soviet-German relations with cautious attention. Entente between the USSR and Germany was at no point of the 1934-38 period ruled out by these powers; on the contrary, it was considered entirely feasible. Its symptoms were therefore thoroughly analyzed and forces presumably sympathetic to Soviet-German rapprochement were realistically appraised.
The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934-1938 by Jiri Hochman

As regards Germany, a possibility of detente with the Soviet Union cannot be neglected, in spite of Herr Hitler's anti-Communist obsessions and the extent to which anti-Communism is a fundamental tenet for the National-Socialist Party. . . .
It is difficult to see what advantages can Germany hope to achieve in the long run by antagonism to Russia.
On the Russian side, there is understood to be a party in Moscow which would be prepared to bring about a detente in Soviet-German relations for the sake of a free hand elsewhere. Main reasons for its lack of success hitherto have been the fanatical anti-Russia attitude of the Nazi Party and of Herr Hitler himself, and the schemes of Herr Rosenberg which have long been regarded as fantastic.
Sir R. Vansittart's memorandum on the international position of Russia (February 21, 1935)

About Vansittart : he did not represent HMG and was fired by Eden in 1938 and what he said were only assumptions,without any proof .And when Vansittart said that it was difficult to see the advantages for Germany by antagonizing Stalin, he proves his incompetence : the advantage was very clear and obvious :when/if he paraded as the defendor of the western civilisation against (judeo) bolschevism, he would have the support in France of the Action Francaise, in Britain of the Cliveden group, of strong groups in Poland, and it would be difficult for the Vatican to attack someone who fought against godless communism in Spain
What Hochman is claiming is also debunked by the FACT that Stalin sought a rapprochement with the West :his henchmen in the West proposed the idea of a Front Populaire (popular front ) in which ''antifascist liberals '' would cooperate with the communists and they demanded very strong measures from the West against Germany .
There is also the FACT that when Hitler and Stalin signed a treaty,all the left wing liberals and other fellow travelers,were very angry at him .Their God had signed a treaty with the devil .
The reason was that Stalin was afraid of a coalition of all capitalist countries against the USSR as in 1919-1920 .
There is also the FACT that both waited til August 1939 to sign a treaty,with as reason (for Stalin ) that he was convinced that the West wanted a war between Germany and the USSR,while the West would remain neutral .And the treaty did not transform Hitler and Stalin in friends .

[ljadw]

The failure of collective security
1 Collective security was a chimera
2 Collective security was not needed
3 The inability of the Soviet Union to intervene against Hitler was caused by the existence of Poland and Romania which had been constructed as a barrier against the Soviets .
4 Only the disappearance of Poland would give Germany and the USSR a common border .
5 Britain and France had no objection against a German expansion east of the Rhine ,as long as it happened without fighting .
6 Stalin was afraid of this expansion and even more afraid that Germany would attack him at the order of international capitalism .And that the West would remain neutral .The negotiations with France and Britain convinced Stalin of this danger .
7 A war between the West and Germany would be good for Stalin .
8 A war between Germany and the Soviets would be good for the West .
9 There is no proof that Stalin wanted point 7,he wanted peace.At his conditions .
10 There is no proof that the West wanted point 8 (the communist propaganda has failed to give even ONE proof ):Britain and France wanted peace,even more than Stalin .But at their conditions .
11 The complaints of Britain, France and ( especially ) the US about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact are nothing more than hypocrisy :they had the possibility of a pact with Stalin, but refused to pay the price Stalin demanded .

[wm]

About Vansittart : he did not represent HMG and was fired by Eden in 1938 and what he said were only assumptions,without any proof .And when Vansittart said that it was difficult to see the advantages for Germany by antagonizing Stalin, he proves his incompetence :

So the Times knew but Vansittart didn't!
Those British - ignorant as usual!

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