''possibly '' 40 divisions means that the number of divisions committed to this major relief offensive ,was not known .There was thus no such promise .gebhk wrote: ↑17 May 2021 12:46Clearly yes, at the very least it was powerfully and repeatedly implied in May. I defy anybody who doesn't live in a parallel universe of their own making to explain how talk of a major offensive commencing on the 15th day of mobilisation involving possibly 40 divisions and mobilisation of heavy artillery by day 17 to defeat the Siegfried Line should have been interpreted as meaning 'we will do nothing' (which is what happened) or 'maintaining a mainly passive stance' (which was what had already been agreed with the British prior to the May Polish-French staff talks.Was there a promise for a major relief offensive ?
The Saar operation was one of the limited offensive activities agreed to commence from the 3rd day of mobilisations and is of zero relevance to the matter under consideration - the major offensive that was to have been launched on day 15 of mobilisation.
And ,it is obvious that no one has dared to search for the WHY of the trip of the Poles to France, probably because the truth would shatter their convictions of the importance of the convention .
It was GAMELIN who invited the Poles .
Why ? NOT to know what they would do if Poland/France was attacked,because Gamelin ,and the Germans , and all military attachés in Warsaw knew what the Poles would do :if Poland was attacked,it would fight , if France was attacked, it would not fight : the Polish attitude was dictated by the strength/weaknesses of the Polish Army and by the'' need ''of Poland to have France as an ally .
Why did the Poles accept the invitation for a routine trip to France (one year Poles went to France for what was mainly a superfluous voyage to drink Bourgogne/Bordeaux at the cost of the taxpayer,the other year the French went to Poland to drink vodka )? To have a good time .To hide all this, they said that they went to France to be observers of the annual French maneuvers . It was not to know what the French would do if Poland was attacked or to tell Gamelin what they would do if France was attacked . They knew it/Gamelin knew it : both countries had an embassy with military attachés and the French had a military mission directed by general Faury .
The whole story is much ado about nothing .
The French/Polish military strategy was not determined in May 1939 .
And, there was no urgent need to go to France in May, because in May 1939 there was no war threat .
The French knew already in 1938 that the Poles would come in May 1939.