Sheldrake wrote: ↑
16 Apr 2021 00:18
sandeepmukherjee196 wrote: ↑
15 Apr 2021 19:12
This truth is diligently submerged under a pile of repetitive hyperbole on Naval gunfire being omnipotent. And do mark that only some Pz Grenadier elements (ex 21 Panzer) went through the gap that day..not the Panzer companies.
Ask any naval gunner around here, how he would have managed to decimate enemy armour, at will, in a mobile battle, with rival forces in confused proximity.
That is a good point. From what I have seen so far, naval gunfire worked well on D Day against pre planned targets such as the coastal artillery installations. It was much less effective against mobile and fleeting targets on D Day. Indeed on the Britsh sector its main contribution seems to have been friendly fire that stopped 4/7 Dragoon Guards short of Bayeux.
The problem was communications between soldiers on the ground who could see what was happening, commanders who could make sense of conflicting reports and all the firepower off shore. There was a particular problem on D Day because the Corps and Divisional HQs had not set up yet and there was no one ashore to reconcile conflicting reports. HQ ships were not the same. By D+1 or D+2 the HQs were ashore AOPs had started to arrive and the Army was in a position to apply naval gunfire.
Possible the most dangerous time for a full blooded German armoured counter attack might have been the night 6-7 June
The OP is about 4 Pz Divs counterattacking in the afternoon of D Day.. Rommel's Golden Hours. Night of 6-7 June? Am not sure that it wasn't too late by then.
Now if it had to be within 10 hrs of H Hour i.e., by late afternoon of 6th..One has to see whether in the actual event, 4 Panzer Divisions could realistically have been there, within the realms of possibility.
I have gamed this in my mind, many times. The only way 3 Pz Divs (not 4) could have been available by afternoon, is IF :
* Rommel had stayed back in Normandy or even Paris, for his birthday, instead of going home (perhaps have Lucy over).
* Rommel had prevailed upon Hitler to issue an order to the effect : Deployment of 12 SS HJ and Panzer Lehr Divs would be the call of HG-B once the code Alarm Küste (signalling the invasion) is given out.
* With Rommel present in France, Feuchtinger would likely have kept it in his trousers (sorry) and stayed back in the Caen area on 5-6 June night.
* It's to be noted that 15 Armee logs mention 2115, 5th June as the time when the Intel confirmation was received about the invasion.
* 21 Panzers was alerted at 0100 hrs.
* Naval HQ West announced the invasion at 0150 hrs., following Radar confirmation. Followed by Alarm Küste code issued by LXXXIV Korps HQ .. following which the Pz Companies of 21 Panzers started deploying on the roads and lanes next to their billets.
* In the meanwhile, at 0115, 716 Div had reported Para drops in their area, to LXXXIV Korps. Followed by 709 Div at 0145.
* Rommel, in the What If circumstances, mentioned above, would have got HJ and Pz Lehr moving by 0150. In that case the Pz Divs may have showed up near the British - Canadian beaches by afternoon on the 6th.