Four Panzer divisions in Normandy

[Juan G. C.]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

[Kingfish]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

Are you simply looking for that magical 'tipping point' where the Germans are able to throw the allies back into the sea?

[Sheldrake]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

Are you simply looking for that magical 'tipping point' where the Germans are able to throw the allies back into the sea?

The short answer is probably yes. Its the main theme of ATL on this forum.

If the Germans had concentrated the best half of their available armoured reserves between the Orne and Dives it could only have come about by a catastrophic security leak. In the unlikely event that such a concentration could have taken place without notice by resistance workers on the French railways, this might be a scenario how the Germans defeated D Day.

However, even through the flawed allied intelligence services could not establish exactly where the units of 352nd infantry diviison were, they knew it was somewhere in Normandy and they are likely to have noticed the arrival and concentration of between two and four Panzer Divisions in addition to the two already there.

If the Germans had concentrated in one area, they must be correspondingly weaker elsewhere.

The obvious counter move would be to postpone D Day for Op Overlord and launch Op Anvil, then wait until the six panzer divisions are committed in the South of France, then launch Op Overlord.

Here is the only real rationale for having the capability of launching Op Anvil and Op Overlord around the same time. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=256756

[Carl Schwamberger]

Duplicate

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
However, even through the flawed allied intelligence services could not establish exactly where the units of 352nd infantry diviison were, they knew it was somewhere in Normandy ...

Strictly speaking the movement was observed as it happened and noted. It looks to me that: 1. The relocation of the entire division was not understood, or misinterpreted at first. 2. When it became clear it was too late to do much about it. Bradly says he did not see the message until the 5th June & judged it pointless to pass on to the Collins the concerned the corps commander. He & staff could think of nothing practical he & his staff could at that late date.

The relocation of the 352 Div looks like a slow and gradual thing. Mention of a decision to move it turn up in April, but I've not traced the movement of the battalions.

The slow recognition of the movement of the 352 Div deems to be the exception. I'mont yet convinced it can be used a example of other 'hidden units' in a alternate deployment.

[Juan G. C.]

Are you simply looking for that magical 'tipping point' where the Germans are able to throw the allies back into the sea?

You caught me.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I wonder what the bomb mix was in those attacks.

Big and bigger?

Goodwood

https://film.iwmcollections.org.uk/record/1493

Looks like it. The usual story in the books is the idea for small bombs came out of Bradleys staff. I wonder if the Brits made the same arguments for the 6 June bomb mix?

[Cult Icon]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

There was no space for that many. The Normandy front was very constricted, some 20 miles by mid-June 1944.

Even 4 on the afternoon of June 6th is pushing it. If they have a strong replacement funnel 3 is enough. The key is that they need fresh battalions to replenish the decimated ones and maintain a very high momentum of attack, day and night. There wouldn't be time for knocked out tanks to be repaired and cycled into short-term repair, and back into service so a reserve should be maintained.

The Germans would defeat the landing and the Allies would simply land elsewhere...and this time without "4 panzer divisions" right then and there.

[Juan G. C.]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

There was no space for that many. The Normandy front was very constricted, some 20 miles by mid-June 1944.

Even 4 on the afternoon of June 6th is pushing it. If they have a strong replacement funnel 3 is enough. The key is that they need fresh battalions to replenish the decimated ones and maintain a very high momentum of attack, day and night. There wouldn't be time for knocked out tanks to be repaired and cycled into short-term repair, and back into service so a reserve should be maintained.

Then the other divisions could serve as reserve for replacement.

[Cult Icon]

In the short run, there is no reason to have that many though. Most of a division isn't the combat elements. A continuously replenished pool of inf battalions and replacement vehicles is sufficient. Unless the division's rear echelon is getting decimated, then perhaps. But this battle will be over in a few days at most.

Basically the approach should be more of a set-piece battle, like Stalingrad. The final attacks at Stalingrad was literally hell on earth- crated like the surface of the moon and coated with corpses. Extreme artillery concentrations on both sides, firing into a couple sq. miles while infantry and armor clashed over and over again.

[Juan G. C.]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

Are you simply looking for that magical 'tipping point' where the Germans are able to throw the allies back into the sea?

The short answer is probably yes. Its the main theme of ATL on this forum.

If the Germans had concentrated the best half of their available armoured reserves between the Orne and Dives it could only have come about by a catastrophic security leak. In the unlikely event that such a concentration could have taken place without notice by resistance workers on the French railways, this might be a scenario how the Germans defeated D Day.

However, even through the flawed allied intelligence services could not establish exactly where the units of 352nd infantry diviison were, they knew it was somewhere in Normandy and they are likely to have noticed the arrival and concentration of between two and four Panzer Divisions in addition to the two already there.

If the Germans had concentrated in one area, they must be correspondingly weaker elsewhere.

The obvious counter move would be to postpone D Day for Op Overlord and launch Op Anvil, then wait until the six panzer divisions are committed in the South of France, then launch Op Overlord.

Here is the only real rationale for having the capability of launching Op Anvil and Op Overlord around the same time. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=256756

What I had in mind wasn't to have the four (or five, six or seven) divisions in Normandy before the invasion, but having them in a central reserve around Paris, as Rundstedt wanted, and to rush it to Normandy after the airborne landings. So no arrival in Normandy before the landings to be noticed by Allied intelligence.

[maltesefalcon]

What if instead of four there have been five, six or seven by the afternoon of D-Day?

Are you simply looking for that magical 'tipping point' where the Germans are able to throw the allies back into the sea?

The short answer is probably yes. Its the main theme of ATL on this forum.

If the Germans had concentrated the best half of their available armoured reserves between the Orne and Dives it could only have come about by a catastrophic security leak. In the unlikely event that such a concentration could have taken place without notice by resistance workers on the French railways, this might be a scenario how the Germans defeated D Day.

However, even through the flawed allied intelligence services could not establish exactly where the units of 352nd infantry diviison were, they knew it was somewhere in Normandy and they are likely to have noticed the arrival and concentration of between two and four Panzer Divisions in addition to the two already there.

If the Germans had concentrated in one area, they must be correspondingly weaker elsewhere.

The obvious counter move would be to postpone D Day for Op Overlord and launch Op Anvil, then wait until the six panzer divisions are committed in the South of France, then launch Op Overlord.

Here is the only real rationale for having the capability of launching Op Anvil and Op Overlord around the same time. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=256756

What I had in mind wasn't to have the four (or five, six or seven) divisions in Normandy before the invasion, but having them in a central reserve around Paris, as Rundstedt wanted, and to rush it to Normandy after the airborne landings. So no arrival in Normandy before the landings to be noticed by Allied intelligence.

Moving a formation (or formations) of that magnitude from Paris to the coast in half a day's time is simply not realistic. To put this in perspective, IRL it took 2 days for 2nd SS Das Reich just to go from Montauban to Oradour sur Glane, which is roughly the same distance.

Plus the columns would be an absolute magnet for air attack moving in broad daylight.

[Michael Kenny]

How are you going to hide 6 Panzer Divisions around Paris? Do you not understand how efficient Allied intelligence was in this area?
That said how are 6 Panzer division going to get to Normandy whilst being attacked by TAC?
Let us remind ourselves that 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS, 10th SS, 12th SS, 17th SS 2nd Pz Div , 21st Pz Div, 116 Pz Div & Pz Lehr were at the front and they made no inroads into the enclave.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

Does everyone here not realize that the 21st Panzer division did push to the sea between Juno and Sword beaches, but they retreated for fear of being flanked and came out intact; they were not smashed by naval gunfire or air attack.

This truth is diligently submerged under a pile of repetitive hyperbole on Naval gunfire being omnipotent. And do mark that only some Pz Grenadier elements (ex 21 Panzer) went through the gap that day..not the Panzer companies.
Ask any naval gunner around here, how he would have managed to decimate enemy armour, at will, in a mobile battle, with rival forces in confused proximity.

Cheers
Sandeep

[sandeepmukherjee196]

How are you going to hide 6 Panzer Divisions around Paris? Do you not understand how efficient Allied intelligence was in this area?
That said how are 6 Panzer division going to get to Normandy whilst being attacked by TAC?
Let us remind ourselves that 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS, 10th SS, 12th SS, 17th SS 2nd Pz Div , 21st Pz Div, 116 Pz Div & Pz Lehr were at the front and they made no inroads into the enclave.

Sigh.. They had been thrown in piece meal .. in bits .. not together.. By the time they all came in, allied strength was many times more.
The OP is about 4 Pz Divs attacking the beachheads on the afternoon of the 6th.

And allied Intel knew nothing about the presence of 352nd Bang on the beach!

Cheers
Sandeep