Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 07 Apr 2021 17:56

There are no bad armies .In all armies there are a lot of people who have no place in wartime .

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Terry Duncan
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Terry Duncan » 07 Apr 2021 19:03

ljadw wrote:
07 Apr 2021 17:56
There are no bad armies .In all armies there are a lot of people who have no place in wartime .
Maybe it would be of more help if you could give some detail explaining what you mean.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 07 Apr 2021 19:09

Hi Terry,

Believe me, it wouldn't. On your own head be it!

Got your pooper-scooper ready and a head torch for the rabbit hole?

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 07 Apr 2021 21:03

Terry Duncan wrote:
07 Apr 2021 19:03
ljadw wrote:
07 Apr 2021 17:56
There are no bad armies .In all armies there are a lot of people who have no place in wartime .
Maybe it would be of more help if you could give some detail explaining what you mean.
Fredendall was unfit for war and had to be replaced by Patton .
In 1914 a great part of the peace time French commanders were fired and sent to Limoges and other cities . ( les Limogés ).Between August 1914 and January 1915 162 generals were sacked .
A well known example on German side was Moltke .On British side French fired in December 1915, too late , he should have been fired in August 1914 .
A lot of German generals were fired in the winter of 1941-1942 .
Gamelin and Ironside were fired in May 1940 .
In WWII 5 US Corps Commanders were fired and 16 of the 155 generals who commanded divisions in combat .
In June 1944 the commander of the 90 th Division was fired, his successor a few weeks later .
Source : The Atlantic : General Failure .
The reason is that in peacetime a lot of officers become feeble, weak and that when war erupts,they have no longer the guts to do what is necessary in war .An other reason is that armies prepare in peacetime for wars of the past, not for wars of the future and that military are conservative in peacetime, while the world changes also in peacetime .
And this occurs in all armies in all wars .

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 08 Apr 2021 01:51

ljadw wrote:
07 Apr 2021 21:03
And this occurs
What is occurring is that you still haven't acknowledged your confabulations and outright distortions regarding:

1. The Göring-Programm
2. British female AAA gunners
3. The presence of mutilated officers in the British Army as well as the Wehrmacht

Will you ever admit to it, grow and move forward, or instead sulk and never reply? The world wonders.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 08 Apr 2021 12:53

The aim of the Goering Program was to quadruple the strength of the LW til January 1944 .
It was not specified what was meant with quadruple .
Neither was it explained what they meant with strength.
It was also not explained how they would do this .
An increase of aircraft production (which aircraft ? ) from 1200 in May 1941 to 3000 in May 1942 does not mean an increase of the LW strength by 400 % in January 1944, it does not even mean an increase of the LW strength at all .
Saying that this would mean a quadrupling of the strength of the LW in January 1944 is the same as saying ,as Guderian, that an increase of the tank production would result in an increase of the strength of the Panzerwaffe . Something which is totally wrong .
There is no proof that 3000 aircraft in May 1942 would result in a stronger LW in 1944 .
The LW was MORE than aircraft .

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 08 Apr 2021 14:47

ljadw wrote:
08 Apr 2021 12:53
The aim of the Goering Program was to quadruple the strength of the LW til January 1944 .
It was not specified what was meant with quadruple .
Neither was it explained what they meant with strength.
And so you finally concede that you were misrepresenting the Göring-Programm. Let me remind you of how this conversation started:

1. You wrote in post 138:
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
And, there is no hyperbole and little fact : already before Barbarossa the LW argued that it needed a 400% increase of its manpower to defend the German cities
2. I asked you to source this startling claim in post 141:
KDF33 wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:05
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
And, there is no hyperbole and little fact : already before Barbarossa the LW argued that it needed a 400% increase of its manpower to defend the German cities
Source this.
3. You answered in the next post, 142:
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
Never heard of the Göring Programm ?

From ''Vabanque " P 44 :
''Am 26.Juni 1941 fand eine Besprechung statt,an der u.a.Generalfeldmarschall Milch und Oberst Hünermann teilnahmen .Davon ausgehend dass der Krieg '' durch den Einsatz der Luftwaffe entschieden werden'' müsse,die durch das Göring -Programm zu vervierfachen sei, .......''
Vervierfachen means to quadruple = 400 % increase .
Now, you belatedly acknowledge that your source on the Göring-Programm makes no mention of a quadrupling of the manpower strength of the Luftwaffe.

I guess that's a win for the reality-based community. Now, we can move on to you acknowledging your dissembling on the additional issues of (1) British female AAA gunners and (2) the presence of mutilated officers in the British Army as well as the Wehrmacht.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 08 Apr 2021 20:50

And YOUR source ( which is the English translation of my source ) does not say that the LW strength would be quadrupled by the quadrupling, or doubling or tripling of the aircraft production .An increase of operational aircraft does not depend on the increase of the aircraft production .
The manpower needed to defend the German cities and industry would have to be increased by 400 % ,if after the fall of the USSR the war with Britain continued and Britain would be joined by the US .
I am saying that the strength of the LW ( a defensive strength ) could be increased only by the increase of the FLAK.
YOU, OTOH, are saying that it would be done by an 400 % increase of the production of aircraft, something that was impossible and, if possible, would not help Germany : a production of 8000 aircraft in January 1944 does not mean that during that month 8000 pilots would leave the aviation schools .

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 09 Apr 2021 00:30

ljadw wrote:
08 Apr 2021 20:50
And YOUR source ( which is the English translation of my source ) does not say that the LW strength would be quadrupled by the quadrupling, or doubling or tripling of the aircraft production .
Indeed it doesn't. As you belatedly acknowledged in your previous post, Eichholtz doesn't specify what exactly is the "strength" undergoing the expected quadrupling. The fact that the entire chapter speaks of aircraft, aluminum and avgas production - but never of Flak - suggests that the strength in question is related to aircraft. Further ancillary evidence (i.e., previous expansion plans) suggests that the benchmark is the geschwader, but AFAIK there is (frustratingly) no clear definition provided in the book.

What can be said unequivocally is that Eichholtz's book doesn't lend credence to your view that the Luftwaffe expected to quadruple its manpower strength.
ljadw wrote:
08 Apr 2021 20:50
The manpower needed to defend the German cities and industry would have to be increased by 400 % ,if after the fall of the USSR the war with Britain continued and Britain would be joined by the US .
Source?
ljadw wrote:
08 Apr 2021 20:50
I am saying that the strength of the LW ( a defensive strength ) could be increased only by the increase of the FLAK.
It is far from obvious that the Göring-Programm aimed to increase 'a defensive strength', as you put it. In any event, that said strength could only be expanded via Flak is still your unsourced, unsupported opinion.
ljadw wrote:
08 Apr 2021 20:50
YOU, OTOH, are saying that it would be done by an 400 % increase of the production of aircraft
Nope. Again, I never claimed this. You, on the other hand, are adamant that 'the LW argued that it needed a 400% increase of its manpower to defend the German cities'.

I am waiting for your source.

P.S.: Female AAA gunners + mutilated officers?

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 09 Apr 2021 07:00

An increase of the LW strength could only be an increase of its defensive strength, because an increase of the LW strength in 1944 would be needed only if
a Barbarossa failed ( as it did in the HTL )
b Barbarossa succeeded,but Britain, joined by the US, continued the war .
There was no need in both scenarios for an increase of its offensive strength ,neither could it be done :in the HTL the LW was forced to a defensive strategy in January 1944 .
If the war continued,Germany was condemned to a defensive strategy. This is proved by the HTL.
If the war was over ,the LW would have no more opponents .
The only way to increase its defense power was to increase the FLAK, because the LW could never have enough operational fighters to protect Germany and the occupied territories against allied air attacks .
And to increase the FLAK,Germany had to increase the manpower of the Flak .
LF Reich had at the en d of 1943 366 serviceable fighters ( down 159 from September ) ,while at the same period the number of Flak batteries in the Reich was 2123 (up 300 since June 1943 ) and these units were responsible for more than 50 % of USAAF losses and 41 % of RAF losses .
It was easier to increase the strength of the FLAK,while the production of fighters and the training of pilots could not match the losses of fighters and pilots .
Children of 14 year could be used for the Flak ( Manfred Rommel ) but not as pilots.
The son of Montgomery ( who had the same age as the son of Rommel ) was not used for the British Flak .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 10 Apr 2021 11:36

Hi ljadw,

It would be equally pointless for the Luftwaffe to have had the pilots but not the aircraft.

What we need to look at is not the expansion of aircraft production - potentially a good thing - but the inability to turn out enough trained pilots to fly them all - actually a bad thing.

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 10 Apr 2021 13:17

But it was easier to build an aircraft than to train a pilot : the training took 2 years,to build an aircraft a few months .
And, to have 1000 pilots /crew leaving the training schools in June 1942, more than 1000 pilots/crew had to start the training in June 1940 .Thus, it would be impossible to take measures in June 1941 to increase the number of new pilots/crew for a year later .
But, this was possible for the Flak manpower as there the instruction did not take 2 years : the son of Rommel was mobilized at 14 years to help in a Flak unit.He could not help in a Geschwader .In December 1942 Hitler ordered to transfer 120000 men from the FLAK to the army front units ,which was a proof that the German manpower reserve was empty. To replace these 120000 men, boys as Manfred Rommel were called up .followed by women, young girls, POWs, etc . An other proof that the reserve was empty .
And, new aircraft/more aircraft did not only demand pilots/crew, but also fuel, airfields, technicians .
AND, we are not even talking about the losses :as long as the losses increased at the same speed as the production, there would be no increase of the number of operational aircraft.
The LW lost in the second half of 1941 2500 aircraft in the east , an other 1900 were damaged, they lost also 250 aircraft in the west, and this is without the heavy losses in the Mediterranean,and the big non combat losses .
OTOH,they produced in 1941 11776 aircraft of which 8400 combat aircraft .
The average monthly aircraft production was
850 in 1940
1000 in 1941
1300 in 1942
2000 in 1943
3300 in 1944 .
The big question is : why was the LW leadership talking BEFORE Barbarossa about an increase of the aircraft production til 3000 in May 1942 ,while 3000 was impossible and if possible, not useful ?
There are two reasons
1 The expected losses during Barbarossa
2 Their knowledge of the increasing British/US aircraft production which would be the double, triple, quadruple of the German production, and this with much less losses .
With the present aircraft production, the number of operational aircraft of the LW would even not remain stable, but would increase .
Thus, the whole thing had nothing to do with a quadruple strength of the LW in January 1944 ,but only to try to replace the past,present and future losses .
About the efficiency of the Flak ( hidden by the admirers of Mölders,etc ) : the USAAF lost in its war against Germany 18,418 aircraft of which 7821 by the Flak and 6,800 by German fighters .
The source is : Archie, Flak, AAA and SAM ( note 60 ).
And the most important result of the Flak was that it forced the allied bombers to fly higher,thus that the bombings would be less accurate .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 10 Apr 2021 15:33

Hi ljadw,

And yet Germany still couldn't supply all its allies, who already had trained pilots, with modern fighters. For example, most Romanian fighter groups were still on IAR80/81s in August 1944.

Where was all this excess production going?

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 11 Apr 2021 09:48

Sid Guttridge wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:33
Hi ljadw,

And yet Germany still couldn't supply all its allies, who already had trained pilots, with modern fighters. For example, most Romanian fighter groups were still on IAR80/81s in August 1944.

Where was all this excess production going?

Cheers,

Sid.
Good question,but
1 Did Romania ask that Germany would train Romanian pilots and give them German aircraft ?
2 How long would it take to train X Romanian pilots.crew ?Language would be an obstacle and could the German training schools train additional Romanian pilots ?And, meanwhile,Romania would have to do without these pilots ?
3 And, would more modern aircraft make a difference, as the number of aircraft lost in air combat was only a minority of the total ?
4 Did Romania need more pilots or more technicians ?
OTOH, Germany WAS training Romanians(some 2000 ), but it is not specified how many of them were pilots .
In Jüterbog : 125
In München : 382
In Krosno : 362
In Nordhausen : 700
In Halle-Merseburg : 404
Source : Am Himmel Europas P 332
Aircraft production of Romania ( 39-44 ) : 1302 Same source : P 328
And, still from the same source P 103, Germany delivered aircraft to Romania
1942 :
He 111 10
Bf 109 15
Do 17 10
Ju 52 18
He 114 10
Fi 156 14
And in September 1941 3 Hurricanes and 3 Blenheims (booty from 1940 )
Before the war ,Romania bought aircraft in France, Poland, Britain , Germany
And,on the question : what happened to the excess production . No one knows . But one can assume that a lot were destroyed on the ground,without ever having been used .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Apr 2021 10:05

Hi ljadw,

Romania and all German satellites were asking for German aircraft (and other equipment) throughout the war. In August 1944 it had two groups of Bf109Gs, but five groups of increasingly obsolescent IAR80/81s. The latter all contained trained fighter pilots, though the best were posted to the two Bf109G groups. Only conversion training was needed.

One wonders why, if German production so exceeded pilot training in 1944, more wasn't done to supply the minor Axis powers?

It is often forgotten that normal attrition usually greatly exceeds combat attrition. The US 6th Air Force in the circum-Caribbean entered 1942 with 359 aircraft. By the end of September 1943 it had grown to 600 aircraft but had lost at least 301 aircraft (just over half of them fighters) from all causes in the intervening 21 months – almost the equivalent of its initial strength. And the circum-Caribbean wasn't even a competitive air combat theatre!

Cheers,

Sid

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