At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Ружичасти Слон]

Capturing Moscow does not mean losing all the railways, but it does mean losing a big hub to move stuff around.

Losing the Moscow rail hub would have meant that moving resources from the south of Moscow to the north of Moscow would have been equivalent in Western European terms to moving from south of Paris to north of Paris via Berlin.
Doubtless new N-S link lines would have been constructed east of Moscow, but until then Stavka’s operational flexibility on the Moscow axis would have been severely constrained.

It is true Moscow rail hub was be much important to Soviet supplys system.

It can to be mostest true for to say mostest difficult for to move mens or equipments or supplies from Tula on south to Kalinin on north when Germany army was drop fallschim on Moscow for to capture Moscow rail hub.

I don't know about you, but when I look at that map I saw Moscow as a vital junction in Army Group Center's objective, if captured - I see any reinforcements had to be diverted to other railway gauges hundreds of kms to the south. So he's kinda right in his assumptions.

Capturing Moscow does not mean losing all the railways, but it does mean losing a big hub to move stuff around.

Yes. When lose Moscow rail hub move supplys was can be much difficult. But question must for to be how much difficult for to understand problem not make big waves on hand that it must to be paralysed complete system.

More maps for you to look on





1. When Germany army was capture Kalinin was paralysed Red army on Kalinin front ?

For Red army on Kalinin front on north on Kalinin when Germany army was capture Kalinin it was be same like capture Moscow rail hub.

2. When Germany army was move east from Tula they was capture and block all rail lines on south direction was paralysed Red army on Southwest front ?

For Red army on Southwest front on south on Tula when Germany army was block rail lines it was be same like capture Moscow rail hub.


On real history Germany army was capture all rail lines for to block easy moves north to south and south to north. It was be same as capture Moscow rail hub. On real history was be Soviet union paralysed ?

No. Soviet union was not be paralysed. For to move mens and equipments and supplys was be more difficult but was not be much difficult.

[Erwinn]

Moving supplies to the front would be so much difficult and at that time in 1941 Red Army was really desperate for reinforcements. So how many lines left to transfer troops and equipment needed for the defence? At the same time some evacuation were still taking place. Also Moscow was an ammunition manufacture center, losing it means those ammo needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Moscow or some thousand kms away Urals?

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets, Germans failed to take it and wasted their resources on other objectives which doomed them even further.

[Max Payload]

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets, Germans failed to take it and wasted their resources on other objectives ...

The implication of this is that the failure to take Moscow was a missed opportunity. Another viewpoint, previously widely discussed, is that under any circumstances after the commencement of Barbarossa the capture of Moscow would have been an unlikely outcome.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Moving supplies to the front would be so much difficult and at that time in 1941 Red Army was really desperate for reinforcements.

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets,

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

Also Moscow was an ammunition manufacture center, losing it means those ammo needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Moscow or some thousand kms away Urals?

Also Kharkov and Leningrad was an tank manufacture center, losing it means those tank needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Kharkov and Leningrad or some thousand kms away Urals?

Why must peoples think ammunition manufactures was be mostest important on tank manufactures for to cripple Soviet union ?

Maybe you can to give some historical datas and evidences for to show ammunition manufacture was be so much important.

[Ружичасти Слон]

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets, Germans failed to take it and wasted their resources on other objectives ...

The implication of this is that the failure to take Moscow was a missed opportunity. Another viewpoint, previously widely discussed, is that under any circumstances after the commencement of Barbarossa the capture of Moscow would have been an unlikely outcome.

Implication of what erwinn was write was be he have opinion that German must to win war when capture Moscow.

Many peoples have same opinion like erwinn.

No peoples was ever give historical datas or evidences for to show it must to happen. Only waves on hand.

[mezsat2]

I have at minimum 15 volumes of hard historical evidence to back up any assertions I have made.

Very excellent !

One look at the Soviet transportation grid in June 41 shows clearly how an all-out strike and occupation of this hub would paralyze the entire existence of the USSR. Large scale evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east (which in view of the eastern front only, doomed the Wehrmacht) would be impossible. Anything like rapid troop deployment and communications with these formations would likewise be impossible.

You can please give historical datas and evidences from your 15 volumes of hard historical evidence to back up your assertion an all-out strike and occupation of this hub would paralyze the entire existence of the USSR.

You can please give historical datas and evidences from your 15 volumes of hard historical evidence to back up your assertion Large scale evacuation of heavy industry and equipment to the east (which in view of the eastern front only, doomed the Wehrmacht) would be impossible.

The vast majority of the details of these events are common-knowledge even to the layman. I
need not provide a reference to an astronomical station's observations that the sun and moon still exist.

I was not ask on sun and moon. I was not ask on details of these events are common-knowledge even to the layman.

You was write One look at the Soviet transportation grid in June 41 shows clearly h


Here is map on Soviet transportation grid on june 1941.


Maybe you can to use your 15 volumes of hard historical evidence to back up your assertion because when i was have many looks on map it seems to me you was be complete wrong.

I don't know about you, but when I look at that map I saw Moscow as a vital junction in Army Group Center's objective, if captured - I see any reinforcements had to be diverted to other railway gauges hundreds of kms to the south. So he's kinda right in his assumptions.

Capturing Moscow does not mean losing all the railways, but it does mean losing a big hub to move stuff around.

Listen, my friend. I'm not discussing absolutes here, but probabilities. The overall long-term probability of success for Operation Barbarossa was vanishingly small to begin with. My point was only that the probability of success may have increased from roughly 20% to around 40%. That's all.

[Ружичасти Слон]

The vast majority of the details of these events are common-knowledge even to the layman. I
need not provide a reference to an astronomical station's observations that the sun and moon still exist.

Listen, my friend. I'm not discussing absolutes here, but probabilities. The overall long-term probability of success for Operation Barbarossa was vanishingly small to begin with. My point was only that the probability of success may have increased from roughly 20% to around 40%. That's all.

Ok.

So probibility on moon and sun exist on real history was be 20% .
But probibility on moon and sun exist on mezsat2 imagination story on war can to be 40% .

[AnchorSteam]

Nice map, I wish there was a key to it but I am pretty sure the single lines mean single-track RR.
Ouch....

So, the choice still remains; clear the Kiev salient or AGC can spend September getting to Moscow and October taking it.... but Kiev still remains.
How do you clear it during Novemeber with the forces you have, without losing half of what you have taken?

If the German General Staff had a good answer for that, things might have been different, but i don't have one myself.

[glenn239]

Listen, my friend. I'm not discussing absolutes here, but probabilities. The overall long-term probability of success for Operation Barbarossa was vanishingly small to begin with. My point was only that the probability of success may have increased from roughly 20% to around 40%. That's all.

How did you come to the conclusion that if the Red Army holds Kiev into 1942, that the probability for the overall success of Barbarossa would increase?

[Erwinn]

Nice map, I wish there was a key to it but I am pretty sure the single lines mean single-track RR.
Ouch....

So, the choice still remains; clear the Kiev salient or AGC can spend September getting to Moscow and October taking it.... but Kiev still remains.
How do you clear it during Novemeber with the forces you have, without losing half of what you have taken?

If the German General Staff had a good answer for that, things might have been different, but i don't have one myself.

When you take out Moscow you also limit Russian resupply capabilities. What good of a million men do without the needed supplies? Of course they can still get supplies from other railways but it will really strain their limit.

[mezsat2]

Listen, my friend. I'm not discussing absolutes here, but probabilities. The overall long-term probability of success for Operation Barbarossa was vanishingly small to begin with. My point was only that the probability of success may have increased from roughly 20% to around 40%. That's all.

How did you come to the conclusion that if the Red Army holds Kiev into 1942, that the probability for the overall success of Barbarossa would increase?

[Erwinn]

Listen, my friend. I'm not discussing absolutes here, but probabilities. The overall long-term probability of success for Operation Barbarossa was vanishingly small to begin with. My point was only that the probability of success may have increased from roughly 20% to around 40%. That's all.

How did you come to the conclusion that if the Red Army holds Kiev into 1942, that the probability for the overall success of Barbarossa would increase?

Guderian's 1941 Drive to South might still be accomplished because of the huge bulge it presents. I'm pretty sure he thinks that would still be possible.

[Erwinn]

Moving supplies to the front would be so much difficult and at that time in 1941 Red Army was really desperate for reinforcements.

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets,

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

Also Moscow was an ammunition manufacture center, losing it means those ammo needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Moscow or some thousand kms away Urals?

Also Kharkov and Leningrad was an tank manufacture center, losing it means those tank needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Kharkov and Leningrad or some thousand kms away Urals?

Why must peoples think ammunition manufactures was be mostest important on tank manufactures for to cripple Soviet union ?

Maybe you can to give some historical datas and evidences for to show ammunition manufacture was be so much important.

I don't need a Russian opinion on a matter which is clearly discussed a thousand times. How's my opinion is an idea and without any data and your claims based on, what? We're talking about 1941 Russia, not 42 or 43. They even had problems with manufacturing stuff in '42.

SU in 41 does not have massive amount of trucks which were delivered by LL.
SU in 44 had supply problem after massive breakthroughs and had to wait months for situation to stabilize. And this is with all those LL Trucks.

So, in 1941, losing a big transportation hub-this alone- how would it not effect their war effort? How will they move troops and supplies on a massive front? Losing that city adds hundreds of kms to the supply chain.

Also Moscow had it's means of manufacturing stuff even after evacuation of industries there.

Anyway, imo and based on countless sources, losing Moscow would have been a critical hit for the Soviets. Maybe they still manage to maintain the war and win at the end, but they surely doesn't win in 1945.

[KDF33]

Anyway, imo and based on countless sources, losing Moscow would have been a critical hit for the Soviets. Maybe they still manage to maintain the war and win at the end, but they surely doesn't win in 1945.

I fail to see how losing Moscow is decisive. Although it was indeed central, there were multiple railway connections behind it, as seen here.

[ljadw]

Listen, my friend. I'm not discussing absolutes here, but probabilities. The overall long-term probability of success for Operation Barbarossa was vanishingly small to begin with. My point was only that the probability of success may have increased from roughly 20% to around 40%. That's all.

How did you come to the conclusion that if the Red Army holds Kiev into 1942, that the probability for the overall success of Barbarossa would increase?

Guderian's 1941 Drive to South might still be accomplished because of the huge bulge it presents. I'm pretty sure he thinks that would still be possible.

And,what would have been the result of his drive to the South ?