The ideal Axis strategy

[mezsat2]

As Hitler himself clearly understood, Britain's only hope was the Soviet chess piece on the board.

The problem with knocking out GB and leaving Stalin at large is they have a permanent enormous threat to the East. Stalin had no intention of honoring the non-aggression pact. This is beyond discussion based on the historical record- he was buying time only.

Certainly, the assumption has to be that GB will not ever accept permanent German rule under these circumstances. The fleet remains intact. Much of their empire remains. The majority of Africa is wide open to a vast, uncontested landing by U.S. and imperial forces.

I've made no headway through the years with this argument, but Hitler's only chance of success in this conflict would be to simply withdraw from the British tussle once their army is kicked off the continent. The entire focus then becomes the USSR. With just a modicum of assistance of the Japanese in drawing off Stalin's reserve forces in Siberia and temporarily (perhaps permanently) foregoing aggression against the USA, Barbarossa succeeds.

The people of the US were staunchly against any kind of involvement and would have remained that way under this scenario. Churchill probably steps down in 42. Of course, Hitler's preposterous declaration of war on the US was a final act of desperation (perhaps a last shot at victory by intimidation) by a man who most likely understood, deep down, that his goose was cooked by the end of Dec. 41.

It needn't have been, but it's good that it did. The future would be hazy in the event, but frightening to consider.

[ljadw]

As Hitler himself clearly understood, Britain's only hope was the Soviet chess piece on the board.

The problem with knocking out GB and leaving Stalin at large is they have a permanent enormous threat to the East. Stalin had no intention of honoring the non-aggression pact. This is beyond discussion based on the historical record- he was buying time only.

Certainly, the assumption has to be that GB will not ever accept permanent German rule under these circumstances. The fleet remains intact. Much of their empire remains. The majority of Africa is wide open to a vast, uncontested landing by U.S. and imperial forces.

I've made no headway through the years with this argument, but Hitler's only chance of success in this conflict would be to simply withdraw from the British tussle once their army is kicked off the continent. The entire focus then becomes the USSR. With just a modicum of assistance of the Japanese in drawing off Stalin's reserve forces in Siberia and temporarily (perhaps permanently) foregoing aggression against the USA, Barbarossa succeeds.

The people of the US were staunchly against any kind of involvement and would have remained that way under this scenario. Churchill probably steps down in 42. Of course, Hitler's preposterous declaration of war on the US was a final act of desperation (perhaps a last shot at victory by intimidation) by a man who most likely understood, deep down, that his goose was cooked by the end of Dec. 41.

It needn't have been, but it's good that it did. The future would be hazy in the event, but frightening to consider.

1 There was no need for Japan to join Germany in the war against Moscow.
2 The role of the Siberian divisions was meaningless : see on this forum : Did Siberian divisions save Moscow ?
3 US were already committed to intervene BEFORE June 1941 : Lend Lease was already operating before Barbarossa .
4 It is NOT so that Stalin had the intention of violating his pact with Germany : he would remain neutral while the capitalist countries would exhaust each other .

[Peter89]

It's actually extremely difficult for the German to build a Navy that could really challenge Britain. Germany lacked shipyards, Naval construction and design expertise,

Absolutely wrong. See: Hochseeflotte, the Z-Plan and the Anglo-German naval race.

Z-Plan was fantasy that did not take into account of actual German ship building capabilities. Ability to produce paper documents about production is not production. The Capabilities of Imperial German ship building are different form Germany in the late 1930s. The no longer had the shipyards or the design and building experience..

You are wrong, the Germans did have the shipbuilding capacity, the shipyards and the design & building experience. Just take a look at the manufacturers and prices of the major warships of the Hocheseeflotte and the Kriegsmarine.
* = same companies after mergers or name changes
(19xx) = laid down years
[yy] = cost

High Seas Fleet

Bayern-class
SMS Bayern: Howaldtswerke, Kiel (1913) [49m GM]
SMS Baden: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1913) [49m GM]

König-class
SMS König: Kaiserliche Werft*,Wilhelmshaven (1911) [45m GM]
SMS Grosser Kurfürst: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1911) [45m GM]
SMS Markgraf: AG Weser, Bremen (1911) [45m GM]
SMS Kronprinz: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1911) [45m GM]

Kaiser-class
SMS Kaiser: Kaiserliche Werft*, Kiel (1909) [45m GM]
SMS Friedrich der Grosse: G Vulcan, Hamburg (1910) [45m GM]
SMS Kaiserin: Howaldtswerke, Kiel (1910) [45m GM]
SMS Prinzregent Luitpold: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1910) [46m GM]
SMS König Albert: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1910) [46m GM]

Helgoland-class
SMS Helgoland: Howaldtswerke, Kiel (1908) [46m GM]
SMS Ostfriesland: Kaiserliche Werft*, Wilhelmshaven (1908) [43.5m GM]
SMS Thüringen: AG Weser, Bremen (1908) [46m GM]
SMS Oldenburg: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1909) [46m GM]

Battlecruisers
SMS Von der Tann: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1909) [36.5m GM]
SMS Moltke: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1910) [42.5m GM]
SMS Seydlitz: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1911) [44.5m GM]
SMS Goeben: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1911) [41.5m GM]
SMS Derfflinger: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1913) [56m GM]
SMS Lützow: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1913) [58m GM]
SMS Hindenburg: Kaiserliche Werft, Wilhelmshaven (1915) [59m GM]

SUM: [1024.5m GM]


Kriegsmarine

Bismarck-class
Bismarck: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1936) [197m RM]
Tirpitz: Kriegsmarinewerft*, Wilhelmshaven (1936) [182m RM]

Scharnhorst-class
Scharnhorst: Kriegsmarinewerft*, Wilhelmshaven (1935) [143.5m RM]
Gneisenau: Deutsche Werke*, Kiel (1935) [146m RM]

Admiral Hipper-class
Admiral Hipper: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1935) [86m RM]
Prinz Eugen: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1936) [104.5m RM]
Blücher: Deutsche Werke*, Kiel (1937) [89m RM]

Deutschland-class
Deutschland: Deutsche Werke*, Kiel (1929) [80m RM]
Admiral Scheer: Kriegsmarinewerft*, Wilhelmshaven (1931) [90m RM]
Admiral Graf Spee: Reichsmarinewerft*, Wilhelmshaven (1932) [82m RM]

SUM: [1200m RM]

The major German warships were mostly built in the same shipyards, designed by the same companies, operated by the same naval officiers in both world wars.

And Z-Plan was not a fantasy (although it was fundamentally flawed), and the Germans did have the resources to increase their navy with sufficient speed.

Most of the capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers in this instance) of the RN were WW1 veteran ships, excluding only the Nelson, the Rodney, the Hood and the King George V class.

But still quite capable battleships, in the context of control of the seas, the Germans could only run.

History tells us otherwise. The Hood exploded, and the Prince of Wales had to run after a serious battering.
The design of the Nelson and the Rodney was the "all or nothing" armor allocation. One lucky hit on the vulnerable parts, and they could be incapacitated.

But truth to be told, the Hood was a WW1 design, and its fate was very similar to those battlecruisers lost in the Battle of Jütland. Rodney and Nelson had quite a flawed design as well.

As were the German designs. The Germans lacked design experience. For instance the Bismark fire control systems ran above the Armour, in any substantial combat the fire control was likely to pretty much gone early. Another is the Destroyers huge huge problems with their engines.

Flaws of Jutland had been addressed. Not perfectly but they were not as vulnerable as that. The Hood had not been upgrade for quite some time. If the British had got the Hood into dock some things would have been addressed.

Like I told wrote before, the Germans did not lack design experience in naval warfare.

The flaw the RN fixed after the Battle of Jütland was the more careful handling of the explosives. The armor allocation of their ships were still flawed, like in the case of the Queen Elisabeth-class or the Hood.

Air supremacy, the integration of the French / Italian fleets, the better coordination of the Atlantikschlacht... options were unlimited before the attack on the SU.

The French fleet would have scuttled rather than be handed over. Exactly how does the Germans get the French fleet? Then there are the problems of finding the crew, training and spare parts and ammunition.

The Italian fleet was not designed to operate in the Atlantic. Much of the fleet had short range. And Italian-German co-operation was problematic.

The British had significant advantages at sea, Radar, Aircraft carriers, Intelligence and a very large fleet. The Italian fleet could be mauled before it gets anywhere uniting withe the Germans.

Options are not unlimited. there are constraints of what is possible, while there are infinite number of possible options, it does not mean that everything is possible,

Who talks about handing over complete fleets? The French Empire was attacked everywhere by the British, from Madagascar to Dakar. Their ships were bombed by the British, etc. They could have been used to the German interest much more if the German leadership was not so arrogant.

The Italian fleet could have won the Battle of the Mediterraneum, but they failed every time even under the most favourable conditions.

This might come from a Battlefield documentary or something? The British Empire was NOT defenseless, disorganized or anything. The lost Battle of France was a huge blow, but not a fatal one. Britain had plans for running a war economy, and they implemented them quite well. Like you said they had an integrated air defense system, a very powerful navy, an international alliance, probably the best military intelligence... they were not disorganized by any means.

DId not say that. The British Army.

The British army post Dunkirk had a lot of heavy equipment. Formations had less than half of the heavy equipment they should have had. tanks, Trucks, AA guns, AT guns, Artillery, Machine guns. This situation was a passing one and by 1941 mostly addressed.

The British ground army had just what it needed. As the Dieppe raid showed, a static infantry formation can repulse a minor landing, and they had plenty of those. The British ground forces totalled over 1 million as early as 1940, and even though they were a bit undergunned, they had enough firepower to guard the shores.

The armoured formations were quickly established as well.
On the British Isles, the 1st,2nd, 6th and 8th Armoured Divisions were formed, and the 7th was formed in Egypt.

They were not disorganized or too weak.

And by 1944 the Germans outbuilt the British in aircrafts, after years of heavy bombardments, millions of dead, etc.

By concentrating of single engine fighters while the British were building lots of larger aircraft. Just the raw numbers of Aircraft built is not the whole story. Lies, Dammed Lies.... The Germans also did not build enough spares. After the German Naval building was basically stopped.

I do not lie. I might be wrong, but I do not say untrue things on purpose.

The Germans built 51,914 single-engine fighters (including those which served as a multi-purpose fighter) and 4881 single-engined Ju 87 dive bombers. They also built 25,447 twin-engine bombers (including those which served as a heavy fighter) and 4897 twin-engine fighters. It implies a rough 2/3 : 1/3 ratio.

The British built roughly 37,000 single-engine fighters (including those which served as a multi-purpose fighter), 34,017 bombers and 11,277 twin-engine fighters.

See: http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=61

The German aircraft production shifted towards the single-engine fighters, but it still produced a lot a twin-engine bombers, transport planes, etc.

I don't agree, the RAF itself wasn't stronger than the LW, the air strategy and the British infrastructure was stronger.

It was stronger over Britain. The RAF was a better training, repair, maintenance, development organization that the Luftwaffe which counted in a war of attrition.

[/quote]

We were talking about the same thing. Please don't argue just the sake of arguing.

[pugsville]

You are wrong, the Germans did have the shipbuilding capacity, the shipyards and the design & building experience. Just take a look at the manufacturers and prices of the major warships of the Hocheseeflotte and the Kriegsmarine.
* = same companies after mergers or name changes
(19xx) = laid down years
[yy] = cost

High Seas Fleet

Bayern-class
SMS Bayern: Howaldtswerke, Kiel (1913) [49m GM]
SMS Baden: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1913) [49m GM]

König-class
SMS König: Kaiserliche Werft*,Wilhelmshaven (1911) [45m GM]
SMS Grosser Kurfürst: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1911) [45m GM]
SMS Markgraf: AG Weser, Bremen (1911) [45m GM]
SMS Kronprinz: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1911) [45m GM]

Kaiser-class
SMS Kaiser: Kaiserliche Werft*, Kiel (1909) [45m GM]
SMS Friedrich der Grosse: G Vulcan, Hamburg (1910) [45m GM]
SMS Kaiserin: Howaldtswerke, Kiel (1910) [45m GM]
SMS Prinzregent Luitpold: Germaniawerft, Kiel (1910) [46m GM]
SMS König Albert: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1910) [46m GM]

Helgoland-class
SMS Helgoland: Howaldtswerke, Kiel (1908) [46m GM]
SMS Ostfriesland: Kaiserliche Werft*, Wilhelmshaven (1908) [43.5m GM]
SMS Thüringen: AG Weser, Bremen (1908) [46m GM]
SMS Oldenburg: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1909) [46m GM]

Battlecruisers
SMS Von der Tann: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1909) [36.5m GM]
SMS Moltke: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1910) [42.5m GM]
SMS Seydlitz: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1911) [44.5m GM]
SMS Goeben: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1911) [41.5m GM]
SMS Derfflinger: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg (1913) [56m GM]
SMS Lützow: Schichau-Werke, Danzig (1913) [58m GM]
SMS Hindenburg: Kaiserliche Werft, Wilhelmshaven (1915) [59m GM]

SUM: [1024.5m GM]

Capacity in 1914 is Not capacity in 1939. You build a shipyard it's not there forever if you don't maintain it.

When skilled workers, engineers, and designers stpoop wokring and veyr is little is built for a longtime, they retire do other things there are not aorund 20 years, later,

Like I told wrote before, the Germans did not lack design experience in naval warfare.

How many designers had experience in 1933 in actual designer battleships. How many people constructing and overseeing these projects. All the people doing these things were newbies, inexperienced.

The British ground army had just what it needed. As the Dieppe raid showed, a static infantry formation can repulse a minor landing, and they had plenty of those. The British ground forces totalled over 1 million as early as 1940, and even though they were a bit undergunned, they had enough firepower to guard the shores.

Missing more than half there heavy equipment and transport.

The armoured formations were quickly established as well.
On the British Isles, the 1st,2nd, 6th and 8th Armoured Divisions were formed, and the 7th was formed in Egypt.

How many actual tanks in septmeber 1940. These formation were massively under strength.

Both these things were a transitory situation post Dunkirk 1940 the British Army was very under equipped,

I do not lie. I might be wrong, but I do not say untrue things on purpose.

There are lies , there are dammed lies and there are statistics,
I was not saying you were lying just statistics without context can be misleading. Whats the production in weight of air frame , number of engines. The mere headline aircraft produced can be misleading. Also Germany was not producing some other things that it had earlier in the war. The UK had also peaked and was not trying to produce as much as possible.

[pugsville]

The Germans built 51,914 single-engine fighters (including those which served as a multi-purpose fighter) and 4881 single-engined Ju 87 dive bombers. They also built 25,447 twin-engine bombers (including those which served as a heavy fighter) and 4897 twin-engine fighters. It implies a rough 2/3 : 1/3 ratio.

The British built roughly 37,000 single-engine fighters (including those which served as a multi-purpose fighter), 34,017 bombers and 11,277 twin-engine fighters.

See: http://www.wwiiequipment.com/index.php? ... &Itemid=61

The German aircraft production shifted towards the single-engine fighters, but it still produced a lot a twin-engine bombers, transport planes, etc.

"If the more accurate index of airframe weight be used, U.S. production in all probability greatly exceeded the combined total for the rest of the world in 1944. The American industry produced 1,101,116,000 pounds, including spares; the British 208,520,000 pounds; and the German 174,939,000 pounds."

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/VI/AAF-VI-10.html

This site has the UK producing a greater weight of Air frame than Germany, Roughly 20%. No that is not the be all and end all. But SImple number of aircraft produced is not either,

Statistics without context can be misleading,

[HistoryGeek2019]

This thread opens up the possibility of planning for war in advance. Theoretically this could go back to 1919. How could the Axis have best planned for the next war starting in 1919? Thus, we aren't wedded to OTL production figures. With a different set of strategic priorities, the Axis could augment production in certain areas and decrease it in others.

Of what 200,00 trucks in 1925? 10,000 aircraft in 1930? 5,00 tanks in 1928?

Firstly stuff but well before the war is mostly just obsolete junk by 1940. About the only thing that's got a reasonable use by date is ships the one they are least able to get around to making without broadcasting their intentions to the world.

Secondly almost everything was banned by the armistice treaty and the commissioners were not withdrawn till about 1930. Building stuff just would not be allowed and ripping up versaillies in 1928 is not as easy as 1936. Germany losses badly in 1930.

Thirdly the German army interwar planning for much expanded army was pretty darn shiny. The planning, the selection of men, the training , it really was one of the great things they did right. They did experiment tanks, aircraft, submarines in a clandestine way.

In the OTL, Germany started the war with 1,500 magnetic mines and was producing 100 per month (per Robert Forczyk). They were more expensive than contact mines. Nevertheless, the UK had no counter-measure for magnetic mines until the Luftewaffe dropped one on a British army base in November 1939. Germany could have avoided this by waiting to deploy magnetic mines until the invasion.

Waiting for a situation they did not know was going to occur, we're going to give the German some sort of fortune telling see the future ability? They will not use a weapon in nov 1939 because in sept 1940 they will placed to invade England, giving 100% precognition of the entire course of the war and the french campaign in Nov 1939 they are pulling their punches because they just know?

I agree with a lot of the criticisms that pugsville makes of my proposed strategy. It most likely would not have worked. It took an incredible stroke of luck for Germany to beat France in May 1940. Nevertheless, the question posed by this thread is, what would have been the best strategy for the Axis powers to pursue, assuming they were going to wage war against the Allies? The way I see it, their top priority had to be denying the United States land bases anywhere near their homelands. This means that knocking out Britain and seizing Gibraltar and Morocco is essential. Their secondary priority has to be securing a trade bloc with transport capabilities through the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. This would of course be very difficult, but I don't see a better alternative. The only alternative I see is for the Axis to coordinate a land invasion of Russia, but this would incur millions of casualties and couldn't take place fast enough before the United States could establish bases in the UK and North Africa from which to strike Europe.

So let me ask you: What do you think would have been the best strategy for the Axis to pursue for war against the Allies (aside from the obvious answer of not to fight at all).

The Southern Mediterranean strategy has large problems.

(1) Conquest of Egypt

(a) it's really hard to logistically support significantly more Axis forces in North Africa than they had.
(b) Every advance in North Africa makes the Axis supply lines longer and harder to maintain the to of the spear the further it gets, and the British supply get shorter and the British can simply support much greater forces than the Axis can deploy.

(2) Then What? Resources acquired to help win the War for the Axis about Zero, Resources lost to the British war effort about zero
(a) slog even further across to the Persian Gulf by land? Supporting these forces how?
(b) Suez canal red sea route, well it's near certain the British would wreck the canal (so time in the length of the French campaign assuming it works, the length of North African campaign assuming it works, then the how long it takes to clear the canal...) then there is British bases like Aden, and mining the red sea. while the seuz is closed

(3) Getting teh Oil Where?
Say the Axis get control of the Persian Gulf Oil how do they get it anywhere useful? There is no railway. The British will blow the pipeline, (and LRDG, SAS, Haganah, the Arab Legion will just blow it up again how do you protect 1,000km pipelines against guerilla operations? Consider the range of British allied organizations to do so...

The Axis don't have the tankers. Have to get it through hostile sea, don't have the escorts, don;t have the bases aorund the Indian ocean but the British do

How long and How many resources and political credit do the Axis have to burn in the southern Mediterranean strategy before it actually delivers anything in concrete terms that strengthens the Axis ability to wage war and reduces the Allied?

It requires doing quite difficult things that teh Axis really are not set up to do and engage the British mostly were the British are string and the Axis are weak, and it;s really really hard to increase the ability of the Axis to be able to get their power to ground in these areas no matter how much is setting around in central Europe.

The Logistics, the Bases, the Strategic topgrahy all make this not an easy strategy for the Axis to do. And the investment is long and the payoff only starts if a large number things have gone very right for a long time.

Conversely how long until the Soviet Union is a threat the German Army cannot deal with? If Germany does not attack and the red Amry recovers form the purges, and requirements with it;s more modern equipment, 300 Divisions, 20,000 T34s in 1943. It's not something the Germans can indefeintely just turn their back on.... surely?

Is there effectively a clock on any non =soviet based Axis strategy that must deliver by some date (1942? 1943?) before it just runs out of time?

Ok, so what strategy would you propose that would have been best for the Axis to pursue (aside from not fighting at all)?

[ljadw]

The best Axis strategy was the one they followed in the OTL. The fact that they failed proves that any other strategy also would fail .
Strategy = pieces of paper depending for success on the question if the enemy is stronger/weaker .The enemy was stronger, the Axis lost .
About the SU : it was never a threat for Germany,it would never be one .Because the SU would never attack Germany on its own, and if it did, it would have no allies .

[HistoryGeek2019]

The best Axis strategy was the one they followed in the OTL. The fact that they failed proves that any other strategy also would fail .
Strategy = pieces op paper depending for success on the question if the enemy is stronger/weaker .The enemy was stronger, the Axis lost .
About the SU : it was never a threat for Germany,it would never be one .Because the SU would never attack Germany on its own, and if it did, it would have no allies .

If the SU was not a threat to Germany (which I agree with), then attacking the SU was the wrong German strategy.

[ljadw]

In post 18 Peter is saying that Italy could have won the Battle of the Mediterranean,but that it failed .
This is not so .There was no battle to dominate the Mediterranean, Tsushima was something from the past .The Regia Marina never had the intention to dominate the Mediterranean .Its mission was to supply the forces in the Balkans and in NA , and it successfully executed this mission .

[ljadw]

The best Axis strategy was the one they followed in the OTL. The fact that they failed proves that any other strategy also would fail .
Strategy = pieces op paper depending for success on the question if the enemy is stronger/weaker .The enemy was stronger, the Axis lost .
About the SU : it was never a threat for Germany,it would never be one .Because the SU would never attack Germany on its own, and if it did, it would have no allies .

If the SU was not a threat to Germany (which I agree with), then attacking the SU was the wrong German strategy.

No : it failed, but this does not mean that it was the wrong strategy .
In August 1940 (GOP convention ) the Germans knew that war with the US was inevitable,and the outcome of such a war was a well-known fact . The only possibility to prevent such a war was to eliminate Britain . Very quickly .
As the Germans could do nothing against the US ( and doing something was not wise ) ,and as they could do nothing against Britain that would force Britain to give up, the only possibility was to eliminate the USSR,hoping that this would strengthen the Japanese position vis-á-vis the US and that Britain would than give up .
The chances for Barbarossa to succeed were less than 1%, but it was all that remained, unless waiting til Spaatz and Harris would destroy the German cities .

[HistoryGeek2019]

The best Axis strategy was the one they followed in the OTL. The fact that they failed proves that any other strategy also would fail .
Strategy = pieces op paper depending for success on the question if the enemy is stronger/weaker .The enemy was stronger, the Axis lost .
About the SU : it was never a threat for Germany,it would never be one .Because the SU would never attack Germany on its own, and if it did, it would have no allies .

If the SU was not a threat to Germany (which I agree with), then attacking the SU was the wrong German strategy.

No : it failed, but this does not mean that it was the wrong strategy .
In August 1940 (GOP convention ) the Germans knew that war with the US was inevitable,and the outcome of such a war was a well-known fact . The only possibility to prevent such a war was to eliminate Britain . Very quickly .
As the Germans could do nothing against the US ( and doing something was not wise ) ,and as they could do nothing against Britain that would force Britain to give up, the only possibility was to eliminate the USSR,hoping that this would strengthen the Japanese position vis-á-vis the US and that Britain would than give up .
The chances for Barbarossa to succeed were less than 1%, but it was all that remained, unless waiting til Spaatz and Harris would destroy the German cities .

So the strategy is to roll the dice on a 1% hope of eliminating the USSR, in the hope that this will free up Japan against the United States, in the hope that Japan will be able to weaken the United States to a greater extent than all the German forces sucked up by the Soviet Union could have?

Better to just use the forces that were deployed in Barbarossa against the USA directly.

[mezsat2]

As Hitler himself clearly understood, Britain's only hope was the Soviet chess piece on the board.

The problem with knocking out GB and leaving Stalin at large is they have a permanent enormous threat to the East. Stalin had no intention of honoring the non-aggression pact. This is beyond discussion based on the historical record- he was buying time only.

Certainly, the assumption has to be that GB will not ever accept permanent German rule under these circumstances. The fleet remains intact. Much of their empire remains. The majority of Africa is wide open to a vast, uncontested landing by U.S. and imperial forces.

I've made no headway through the years with this argument, but Hitler's only chance of success in this conflict would be to simply withdraw from the British tussle once their army is kicked off the continent. The entire focus then becomes the USSR. With just a modicum of assistance of the Japanese in drawing off Stalin's reserve forces in Siberia and temporarily (perhaps permanently) foregoing aggression against the USA, Barbarossa succeeds.

The people of the US were staunchly against any kind of involvement and would have remained that way under this scenario. Churchill probably steps down in 42. Of course, Hitler's preposterous declaration of war on the US was a final act of desperation (perhaps a last shot at victory by intimidation) by a man who most likely understood, deep down, that his goose was cooked by the end of Dec. 41.

It needn't have been, but it's good that it did. The future would be hazy in the event, but frightening to consider.

1 There was no need for Japan to join Germany in the war against Moscow.
2 The role of the Siberian divisions was meaningless : see on this forum : Did Siberian divisions save Moscow ?
3 US were already committed to intervene BEFORE June 1941 : Lend Lease was already operating before Barbarossa .
4 It is NOT so that Stalin had the intention of violating his pact with Germany : he would remain neutral while the capitalist countries would exhaust each other .

The serious question is not Japan withdrawing "meaningless" Siberian divisons (which the historical record indicates they were anything but). The primary question is keeping the United States OUT of the war. In essence, this would mean a massive air attack and subsequent occupation of Vladivostok, not Pearl Harbor. True, the Japanese did not possess significant armored forces. They did, however, possess tremendous air prowess which may have proven lethal to Stalin's eastern units during the decent flying weather of 6/41 to 9/41.

[ljadw]

NO : the primary question for Japan was to be/become the dominant party in China/SW Asia ,and there was one big obstacle to this dream : the US, NOT the USSR .
An attack against Vladivostok would made impossible an attack against PH ,and without an attack on PH, Japan could not have the oil of the DEI,and without this oil, Japan could not become a world power .
For the SU : it won against Germany WITHOUT the commitment of the Siberian divisions .

[ljadw]

The best Axis strategy was the one they followed in the OTL. The fact that they failed proves that any other strategy also would fail .
Strategy = pieces op paper depending for success on the question if the enemy is stronger/weaker .The enemy was stronger, the Axis lost .
About the SU : it was never a threat for Germany,it would never be one .Because the SU would never attack Germany on its own, and if it did, it would have no allies .

If the SU was not a threat to Germany (which I agree with), then attacking the SU was the wrong German strategy.

No : it failed, but this does not mean that it was the wrong strategy .
In August 1940 (GOP convention ) the Germans knew that war with the US was inevitable,and the outcome of such a war was a well-known fact . The only possibility to prevent such a war was to eliminate Britain . Very quickly .
As the Germans could do nothing against the US ( and doing something was not wise ) ,and as they could do nothing against Britain that would force Britain to give up, the only possibility was to eliminate the USSR,hoping that this would strengthen the Japanese position vis-á-vis the US and that Britain would than give up .
The chances for Barbarossa to succeed were less than 1%, but it was all that remained, unless waiting til Spaatz and Harris would destroy the German cities .

So the strategy is to roll the dice on a 1% hope of eliminating the USSR, in the hope that this will free up Japan against the United States, in the hope that Japan will be able to weaken the United States to a greater extent than all the German forces sucked up by the Soviet Union could have?

Better to just use the forces that were deployed in Barbarossa against the USA directly.

Germany could not invade Britain, it could not invade the US, but it could invade the USSR,what it did .
In August 1940 Germany was in a desperate situation, something which required a desperate solution , It was a VaBanque . Hitler was forced to stake the survival of Germany on an invasion of the USSR.It was the only card that remained : already before Barbarossa, US,still at peace, were outproducing the LW .

[Peter89]

In post 18 Peter is saying that Italy could have won the Battle of the Mediterranean,but that it failed .
This is not so .There was no battle to dominate the Mediterranean, Tsushima was something from the past .The Regia Marina never had the intention to dominate the Mediterranean .Its mission was to supply the forces in the Balkans and in NA , and it successfully executed this mission .

Yes, that is right. I used the "Battle" in the sense of "campaign". We use terms like the "Battle of the Atlantic".