Different German Oil Strategy

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
offizier1916
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by offizier1916 » 22 Jan 2019 21:06

whats your point RA? your answers are comming across agressive and its not totally what you are trying to emphasize?

Richard Anderson
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Jan 2019 01:10

offizier1916 wrote:
22 Jan 2019 21:06
whats your point RA?
That peek-a-boo referencing is bullshit. What makes it worse is this particular poster engages in it constantly...and when - if - you can actually run down the "reference" it invariably does not say what the poster claims it does. Even worse, this poster likes to "quote" garbage references...the quote, if it is an actual quote rather than a botched paraphrase dreamed up by this poster, is always to a different work or author.

Or hadn't you noticed that?
your answers are comming across agressive and its not totally what you are trying to emphasize?
My answers may be coming across to you as aggressive, but I assure yo there is good reason for it. I'm not sure I can answer the last part of your sentence because I simply can't figure out what you are trying to ask. I am "trying to emphasize" the bizarre a-historical nature of this posters replies and the outright dishonesty in them.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Jan 2019 02:04

ljadw wrote:
22 Jan 2019 17:29
i am not wrong about Milward's assessment : he said that the USSBS gave a distorted picture of German economic development . And the following proves the unreliabilitry of the USSBS claims about both periods :
Source is : A. Milward and a century of European change .
"The mean reason why the USSBS has underestimated the degree of preparation for war of the German economy in 1939 and overestimated the change after 1942 was because they had accepted [and here the author quotes Milward ] '' very uncritically the description of the German war economy given by the most-co-operative ,the most intelligent and most knowledgeable of the Allied POWs = Speer .''
The quotation of Milward comes from ''The End of Blitzkrieg 'P 500, note 20 .
Pardon me, but would you please cease using secondary sources for primary source quotations? Why not quote Milward directly? The End of the Blitzkrieg is easily available. Your pretense that you read it has already led you astray.
Thus , Milward said that not only the USSBS was giving a distorted picture,
What was the "distortion" though? Does Milward actually use that term and describe what the "distortion" was? Unless you actually read Milward, instead of some other guy quoting him, you have zero notion of what the context is. If you did, you would realize the error (not distortion), which he attributes to both the USSBS and B. H. Klein's, Germany's Economic Preparation for War, was not as you said that they "paid too little attention to the period immediately before Speer became Minister of Armaments and Munition". It was also not as you said that they were mistaken in saying that Germany was NOT operating a full-scale wartime economy in 1939 or in the first two years of the war. So why don't you read Milward to find out what the error he believed occurred was? Here is a hint...it is keyed to the title of his monograph.
but was also believing everything Speer and his henchman Wagenführ were saying .
No, he does not say that at all. For one thing, he doesn't mention Wagenführ other than to reference his manuscript. For another, I doubt that he would say that, since the evidence in The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the Germany Economy is that the authors of the USSBS did not accept everything Speer said uncritically. However, since you haven't actually read Milward, it is unsurprising that you are confused by that.
The USSBS was telling everyone that Speer was a genius who succeeded to increase the aircraft production .
Please reference the volume and pages where any USSBS report refers to Speer as a "genius who succeeded to increase the aircraft production" or anything else. In fact, what they do say, on page 8 of The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German Economy is "Some of the impediments to the expansion of German war production might have been removed by better coordinated planning. Speer's work was more the result of brilliant improvisations than the execution of a single well thought-out plan. His main achievement, the exploitation of mass production techniques, was not done in any pre arranged and systematic manner over industry as a whole, but in a piecemeal fashion, as urgent military needs called for the achievement of high output levels now in tanks, now in aircraft, now in guns or ammunition. Better coordination and over-all planning might have speeded up the rate of expansion somewhat; but it is doubtful if a significant improvement could have been obtained."
But what the USSBS was not saying was that this increase was caused by pré war decisions:
Actually, what the USSBS states was the sudden expansion was due to increased physical plant, streamlining, and widespread improvisation.
from Demystifying the German ''armament miracle ''during WWII :''The crucial changes that triggered the upswing in aircraft production already occurred before WWII .''
The increase of aircraft production was caused not by Speer,but by his predecessors, maybe someone could examine if the increase of tank production,of ammunition production, etc... were also not caused not by Speer but by other people .And,if it is so, what remains of the Speer myth ?
Why, yes, but given the USSBS never attributed the increase of aircraft production solely to Speer, and even stated, somewhat skeptically that it was an "achievement for which Speer and his associates take most of the credit", it is difficult to see how anyone would think the USSBS attributed the "cause" for the increase to Speer in the first place?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 23 Jan 2019 16:59

The USSBS knew what the function was of Wagenführ = chief propaganda of Speer, this means that the Wagenführ figures are not only suspect, but unreliable and that one must start from the POV that they are false, til the opposite is proved .This did not prevent the USSBS to use this figures for their report ,report which started the Speer myth .
The fact that Speer was not decisive in the increase of the aircraft production after 1942 , which would have increased also without Speer,proves that the Speer story is a myth , nothing more .
It proves also that Galbraith was deadly wrong when he wrote in Fortune in 1945 that 'the Nazi leaders were a gang of inept mobsters who had taken over a country and had no idea how to run it ''.There was no proof in 1945 for the claim of Galbraith, there is still no proof for it . We know who told this lie during the interrogations : -= Speer .The fact that Galbraith was willing to believe everything Speer was saying, disqualifies Galbraith as an objective witness.It indicates that he came to Europe with a bag ful of bias .And nothing more .
25 years later (January 10 1971 ) Galbraith repeated the old clichés about Speer, commenting Speers book ,he also revealed that in these 25 years,he had learnt nothing about the German economy .
He said that between taking office in early 1942 and the late summer of 1944, Speer achieved (yes : Galbraith said : achieved ) a very great increase in German arms production: weapons nearly fourfold, aircraft fourfold, munition treefold, tanks nearly sixfold .
We know that , for aircraft, the claim of/Galbraith Speer is not correct, thus why should it be correct for the other 3 items ?
The best one in this article is when Galbraith is writing very candidly (better naively ) about Klein :like the most of us ,he relied heavily on Speer .
Remember what I said about Speer whispering his fables into the ears of the USSBS members ?
And 10 years later, the same Galbraith was still talking about (the unproved ) success of Speer : in American Heritage : April/May 1981 .
An intelligent and non biased person would have arrived in Europe with the decision to believe nothing from Speer,unless it was proved, as an intelligent person would know that Speer would use his interrogationsto tell his interrogators about his successes and to blame everyone else for Germany's defeat .
But what said Galbraith ? He said : most of the USSBS relied heavily on Speer . Thus,how can we trust what the USSBS was saying ?

Richard Anderson
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Jan 2019 17:32

So we jump from Nitze, to Milward, and now to Galbraith...all with no answers to the questions asked, none of those so-called "references", miss-quotes, and miss-attributions corrected, no other evidence presented, but simply more spews of assumptions. You're back on ignore.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

corbulo
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by corbulo » 19 Oct 2019 17:41

ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:14
jesk wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:08
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 14:22
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?
But this is a reasoning without analyzing the fighting. In fact, Germany was strong enough to defeat Russia. Just like throwing into the sea the bridgeheads of the Allies in Normandy. Hitler ignored the calls of the military to weaken the coast of France elsewhere, for the sake of success in Normandy.
Germany was NOT strong enough to defeat the SU : German victory was depending on a Deus ex Machina .
Germany failed in the summer of 1941, it failed in the autumn of 1941 .
Germany was strong enough. The Wehrmacht was pound for pound way superior than the Red Army. The Soviets survived Barbarossa by skin of their teeth. They survived Case Blue by even less. The Red Army werent exactly likely to go anywhere prior to Kursk

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 19 Oct 2019 18:55

corbulo wrote:
19 Oct 2019 17:41
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:14
jesk wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:08
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 14:22
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?
But this is a reasoning without analyzing the fighting. In fact, Germany was strong enough to defeat Russia. Just like throwing into the sea the bridgeheads of the Allies in Normandy. Hitler ignored the calls of the military to weaken the coast of France elsewhere, for the sake of success in Normandy.
Germany was NOT strong enough to defeat the SU : German victory was depending on a Deus ex Machina .
Germany failed in the summer of 1941, it failed in the autumn of 1941 .
Germany was strong enough. The Wehrmacht was pound for pound way superior than the Red Army. The Soviets survived Barbarossa by skin of their teeth. They survived Case Blue by even less. The Red Army werent exactly likely to go anywhere prior to Kursk
The Germans did not parade in Moscow;the Soviets paraded in Berlin .

Peter89
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Peter89 » 19 Oct 2019 21:49

ljadw wrote:
19 Oct 2019 18:55

The Germans did not parade in Moscow;the Soviets paraded in Berlin .
As if parades would mean a thing. Napoleon paraded in Moscow, yet they became defeated.

The Germans paraded in Paris, yet they became defeated.

The Soviets paraded in every country they occupied, yet they got defeated (with cold war means, economy and welfare).

The Hungarians paraded in the cities regained in the First and Second Vienna awards, yet they got defeated...

Not to mention the British, French, Portuguese, etc colonial parades... now these countries are defeated by demographical and economical means.

Parades are rather the signs of an overconfident, unstable rule.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 20 Oct 2019 10:01

Peter89 wrote:
19 Oct 2019 21:49
ljadw wrote:
19 Oct 2019 18:55

The Germans did not parade in Moscow;the Soviets paraded in Berlin .
As if parades would mean a thing. Napoleon paraded in Moscow, yet they became defeated.

The Germans paraded in Paris, yet they became defeated.

The Soviets paraded in every country they occupied, yet they got defeated (with cold war means, economy and welfare).

The Hungarians paraded in the cities regained in the First and Second Vienna awards, yet they got defeated...

Not to mention the British, French, Portuguese, etc colonial parades... now these countries are defeated by demographical and economical means.

Parades are rather the signs of an overconfident, unstable rule.
My post was an answer on the post of Corbulo who said that the WM was superior then the Red Army : this was not so .The Soviets paraded and remained in Berlin because they had defeated Germany . The Germans paraded in Paris because they had defeated France . That the Germans were later defeated by the Soviets and the Wallies does not mean that they were not superior then the French .
If the WM was superior than the Red Army,it would have paraded in Moscow ,because the capture of Moscow was only possible if the SU had been defeated,which did not happen .

corbulo
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by corbulo » 23 Oct 2019 20:10

ljadw wrote:
19 Oct 2019 18:55
corbulo wrote:
19 Oct 2019 17:41
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:14
jesk wrote:
06 Sep 2018 20:08
ljadw wrote:
06 Sep 2018 14:22
There was no crazy blind attack on Moscow in the winter,or a crazy attrition war attack on Stalingrad,or a stupid offensive onwards Kursk :there were justified reasons for Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ( for which Hitler was not very enthusiastic ).
Germany could have survived, with difficulty, the victory in Poland,but not victory in the West, or a possible surrender of Britain, or victory in the east ,because Germany was to weak to dominate Europe : the SU could not occupy Eastern Europe indefinitely, how could Germany dominate the whole of Europe indefinitely ?
But this is a reasoning without analyzing the fighting. In fact, Germany was strong enough to defeat Russia. Just like throwing into the sea the bridgeheads of the Allies in Normandy. Hitler ignored the calls of the military to weaken the coast of France elsewhere, for the sake of success in Normandy.
Germany was NOT strong enough to defeat the SU : German victory was depending on a Deus ex Machina .
Germany failed in the summer of 1941, it failed in the autumn of 1941 .
Germany was strong enough. The Wehrmacht was pound for pound way superior than the Red Army. The Soviets survived Barbarossa by skin of their teeth. They survived Case Blue by even less. The Red Army werent exactly likely to go anywhere prior to Kursk
The Germans did not parade in Moscow;the Soviets paraded in Berlin .
Hear what youre saying but youre applying hindsight. There were strategic errors like spltting up Army Group South on tbe way to Stalingrad to attacking entrenched positions like Kursk, and bad luck with regards to timing like having to intervene in Yugoslavia and Greece prior to Barbarossa. But in terms of the capabilities of the Wehrmacht the Red Army wasnt anywhere near the equal. Even during and in the aftermath of Kursk tne Red Army lost 3 times as many men and 5 times the armoured vehicles, despite the Wehrmacht having to penetrate the nastiest defences in history (?). There are of course many counterfactuals to WW2 but the Wehrmacht were among the very best fighting forces in history alongside Alexander's phalanxes and Roman legions etc

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 24 Oct 2019 08:55

The splitting of AGS was not a strategic error but a necessity : the principal aim of Blau was not Stalingrad, but the Caucasus .
The intervention in Greece ( which was decided in December !) and in Yugoslavia had no influence on the delay of Barbarossa : even without these interventions,Barbarossa could not happen before June 22 . And the delay had no influence on the outcome of Barbarossa .

corbulo
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by corbulo » 24 Oct 2019 15:24

ljadw wrote:
24 Oct 2019 08:55
The splitting of AGS was not a strategic error but a necessity : the principal aim of Blau was not Stalingrad, but the Caucasus .
The intervention in Greece ( which was decided in December !) and in Yugoslavia had no influence on the delay of Barbarossa : even without these interventions,Barbarossa could not happen before June 22 . And the delay had no influence on the outcome of Barbarossa .
Hmmm....it was. With Stalingrad overwhelmed and the downstream Volga in effect taken including maybe Astrakhan, the Caucasus would have been cut off and would have been reasonably easily taken (?). Besides the area between tbe bends of the Don and Volga was such a great defensive position. As for the interventions in Yugoslavia and Greece, they took place in April 1941. Of course tbey had some effect on the date of Barbarossa. Things could have well turned out differently if Hitler had invaded the SU in May rather than June. It was always a racing game to get to Moscow before the winter came...

ljadw
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by ljadw » 24 Oct 2019 18:23

1 The fall of Stalingrad does not mean the fall of Astrakhan
2 The Germans had not the forces to defend the line Stalingrad-Astrakhan ,they could only hold this line if the Soviets were defeated and the fall of Stalingrad does not mean the end of the war
3 The fall of Stalingrad was irrelevant for the capture of the Caucasus : AGA had already failed before AGB failed
4 The Germans failed in July/August, thus an attack in May 1941 ( which was impossible because of the winter ) would not help them
5 Even before the intervention in the Balkans,there was no date for Barbarossa : Barbarossa could happen only when the rivers were free of ice,and no one knew when his would happen
6 It was never a race to go to Moscow before the winter : the territorial aim was not Moscow,but the Volga .

HistoryGeek2019
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 14 Nov 2019 03:52

For what it's worth, Rolf-Dieter Müller, in his analysis of Germany's war economy, strongly suggests that Germany could have just stockpiled rubber before the war rather than invest so heavily in the buna synthetic rubber industry. A single blockade runner from Japan in 1944 supplied Germany with enough rubber for the next 18 months. It would seem this would apply to any raw material except oil, where the volume is so large that adequate storage might be an issue.

You also have to factor in the effect that greater German imports would have on global oil prices. Germany was consuming along the lines of 8-10 million tons of oil per year before the war, and demand would only increase during the war, so would it really be practical to effectively double Germany's oil imports from 1936-1939 without prohibitively raising global oil prices?

Richard Anderson
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Re: Different German Oil Strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 14 Nov 2019 04:08

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
14 Nov 2019 03:52
For what it's worth, Rolf-Dieter Müller, in his analysis of Germany's war economy, strongly suggests that Germany could have just stockpiled rubber before the war rather than invest so heavily in the buna synthetic rubber industry. A single blockade runner from Japan in 1944 supplied Germany with enough rubber for the next 18 months. It would seem this would apply to any raw material except oil, where the volume is so large that adequate storage might be an issue.
Is there details? My understanding is that surface blockade running ended with Osorno entering the Gironde on 26 December 1943. She ran aground, was wrecked and about half her cargo was salvaged. However, 45,595 tonnes of raw rubber arrived prior to that in the 17 blockade runners that made it to France 1941-1943. Müller may be confusing the overall success with Osorno's arrival?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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