STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 29 Oct 2022 17:19

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
27 Oct 2022 08:39
Also its interesting that there was one channel for the Front and Army commands and another for the Deputy Front and Army Commands of the Rear and Military Districts:

"The principal communications with the staffs of the fronts and armies was provided by the Center’s telegraph, opened in July 1941 at the Kirovskaya metro station, and with the second echelons and rear districts - at the Belorusskaya metro station.
That seems to be a result of impromtu transfer of telephone and telegraph equipment to an underground location from its pre-war place in the 1st House of the NKO. While this movement was in process another place was chosen as a location of the main communications centers which was close to the overground command posts of Stavka and General Staff on the Kirov st. Part of the equipment moved to Belorusskaya station was employed as a reserve communication center and for not-so-urgent communications.

It's curous how little thought was given to having well-protected and throroughly equipped command centers prior to the war.
"By the start of the war the General Staff didn't even have a plan for organization and security of command in case of the building of the General Staff being incapaciated by aerial attack. Such a plan was approved only on the 16th day of the war and provided for using the staffs of Air Forces, Air Defense Forces and Navy as reserve communication centers."
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/organ ... noy/viewer

I suspect that by "staff of air defense" they mean the bulding and an undeground bunker on the Kirov st. which were used as a Stavka/General Staff command center later.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 03 Nov 2022 20:20

I've found only some popular articles on the subject (1, 2) from wich it appears that an underground command center of the Moscow air defense was built below the Kirov st. in 1934-1937. The center was equipped for autonomous operation, included necesseary communications and was connected by an underground gallery with the "Kirovskaya" metro station, which was at that moment the most deeply situated of the Moscow metro stations. Further on a bulding for the staff of the Moscow air defense was constructed on the site right above this bunker (Kirov st. 33, or presently Myasnitskaya st. 37A ) beginning from 1938 and was completed just before the war. The building was connected by an undeground passsage with the underground command center and with the metro station. As a result when the war started this complex turned out to be best suited to perform the role of a main command center. As a result in July 1941 the RA General Staff (at least a part of it) moved to the anti-aicraft staff building on Kirov, 33 and its main communication center was deployed on the Kirovskaya metro station below, which was also used a bomb shelter for GS personnel. A small house nearby (formely a Soldatenkov's mansion) on Kirov st. 37 (presently Myasnitskaya st. 37) was chosen a location of office of Stalin and Shaposhnikov (chief of the GS then). All that arrangement seems to be improvised rather followed a well-developed plan.

On the general topic of signal troops subordinated to the Supreme Command:
A.P. Zharskiy "Development of forces and means of communications of the General Staff in the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45)":
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/razvi ... yny/viewer

A.P. Zharksiy, V.N. Sheptura "Bulding and development of the General Staff's complement of signal troops in the years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45)":
http://www.viek.ru/31/58-65.pdf

Seems slightly modifed versions of the same article.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Der Alte Fritz » 06 Nov 2022 08:07

Fascinating stuff. Like you I am very surprised given the preparations the Soviet Union made during the interwar period and given their expetctation of war that little preparation was made to 'harden' any of the command and signals offices. It is all roughly in the same sort of area but the reality is that is was not centralised and quite scattered. Functionally the bits seem to have been self contained in their own offices with communications, but the General Staff as a whole was quite scattered and used a number of communications centres? In addiiton there is change over time.
No wonder Stalin just sat in his office and called people to himself, otherwise he would have been marching all over town!

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 08 Nov 2022 10:02

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
06 Nov 2022 08:07
Functionally the bits seem to have been self contained in their own offices with communications, but the General Staff as a whole was quite scattered and used a number of communications centres?
As of 22 June 1941 the General Staff occupied one building (1st House of the NKO) and operated a communication center was was administratively a single entity but consisted of several separated bodies: a telegraph and telephone facility in the 1st House together with the General Staff personnel and radio facilities which were outside of Moscow or on the edge of Moscow (Sokol'niki). After the start of war the situation becomes murky somewhat. A new telephone and telegraph facility was opened underground at the Belorusskaya station and according to Shtemenko's memoir officers of the Operations Administrations/GS worked night shifts at this locations but in daylight the GS still operated at its former location (1st House of the NKO). In early July an order on dispersal and relocation of the central offices of the NKO and GS was issued (see document 47 in the "Главное Автобронетанковое Управление" Vol.2). According to this order part of the offices were to relocate to buildings of military schools and academies in Moscow and Moscow region. I don't remember seeing a complete list who moved where and when. In mid-July a new telegraph and telephone facility was opened at the Kirovskaya metro station (it's not clear if any signal equipment was left at the old place in the 1st House). Apparently nearly simultaneously the GS (or at least its Operations Administration) relocated to the building on Kirov st. 33 above the communication center (not clear if it was related to the relocation order described above). In October the bulk of the General Staff was evacuated from Moscow to Arzamas where a reserve command center having its own communication center was opened. Only a small operations group headed by Vasilevsky remained in Moscow (apparently on Kirov st. near the Stalin's office) until late November when the bulk of the GS returned from Arzamas. I don't know, what was exact location of its various parts. It seems that the Operations Administrations remained on the Kirov st. near the main signal center until the end of the war. It was rather small that time, not more than 150 men, plus some personnel who encoded/decoded telegrams.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 10 Nov 2022 09:02

According to an official history of war:
For communications with the staffs of fronts, military districts, separate armies and formations in its reserve the Stavka used telegraph, telephone and radio communications and also liaison aviation. The working body of Stavka was the General Staff which used the communication center of the People's Commissariat for Defense. Other signal units, including reserve centers, belonging to the General Staff were absent. Via underground cables the NKO communication center was connected wit the Central Telegraph of the USSR, Central Intercity Station of the People's Commissariat for Communications, automatic stations of the Moscow city telephone network and also communication centers of the air forces, Air Defense forces and People's Commissariat for Navy. That enabled wide-scale use of the nationwide telegraph-telephone channels for communications with staffs of all fronts and military districts and exchange telepgraph correspondence with staffs of the Air Forces, Air Defense and Navy.

It should be noted that in the first days of the war the communication center of the NKO was a single center and serviced all its needs. Owing to a sharp increase on telegraph traffic the center had to be divided into two parts. The main part of the center - operational communication center at the end of July 1941 was situated on the platform of the "Kirovskaya" metro station (nowadays "Chistiye prudy") and) serviced Stavka and the Operations Administration of the General Staff. With its assistance one managed to maintain telegraph communications with staffs of fronts, armies and Stavka's reserve, transmitting operational documents to fronts and back. This center enabled communications with Stavka's representatives. In most cases it was used by generals and officers of the General Staff which were constantly at the telegraph machines.

For the Supreme commander six communication points were organized: four in Moscow, one at the near dacha at Kuntsevo and the one at the far dacha on the 70th kilometer of the Dmitrov highway. In Kremlin there were two communication centers - one near the Stalin's cabinet, and another in the bomb shelter. At the start of September 1941 signal personnel had to hastily equip two telegraph communication points: one - in the two-story mansion (1) in the backyard of the building No.33 on the Kirov Street (nowadays Myasnitskaya Street), and the other - in the tunnel of the "Kirovskya" metro station. The last point was widely used until the start of 1943. In the mansion opposite to the fifth entrance of the General Staff building (2) Baudot telegraph machines for the people's commissar S.K. Timoshenko and his deputies were installed on 22-23 June 1941.

The other part of the center (object "Truba") was situated in a usual passenger rail car which was moved to the dead end of the "Belorusskaya" metro station. It was meant for the providing telegraph communications to the central administrations and supply organs of the NKO. Via the center and exchange of the other part of correspondence with the staffs of fronts went. Both these centers were connected with the powerful cable lines with signal hubs of the Air Force, Aid Defense, Navy and the Central Telegraph.

As a reserve of the Central Telegraph, intercity and city automatic telephone station a protected communication center - object 01 of the People's Commissariat for Communications was built in October 1941. Well equipped technically it became the single facility of this type in the country. Although it had communications with Kremlin, NKO, the communication center, object "Truba" and the People's Commissariat for Navy it still 't couldn't fully replace the Central Telegraph, Central Intercity Telephone Station, and Moscow telephone network station, and most importantly - it didn't have a duplicate deep in the country. Only in April 1942 the reserve communication center of the country in Ufa started operation.

Evacuation to Kuibyshev of the apparatus of the VKP (b) Central Committee and Council of People's Commissars and some departments of the People's Commissariats for Defense and Navy required developing of the filial of the NKO communication center and equipping and automatic telephone station of 600 numbers there. For the main group of the General Staff evacuated to Arzamas by initiative of the head of the Main Signals Administration of the Red Army I.T. Peresypkin in October a reserve communication center of the Stavka was built in October in five days instead of planned 15-20 days.
https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/files/morf/ ... vaniya.pdf

(1) i.e. Soldatenkov's mansion
(2) Shchukin's mansion described above (location of the Commissar for Defense office)

So there were two reserve communication centers created after evacuation in October 1941 - one at Arzamas for the General Staff and another at Kuibyshev (Samara) for the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Defense. A wisdom of separating command structure seems rather dubious. At appears that the center at Arzamas wasn't much used anyway.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 13 Nov 2022 11:24

and from another chapter of the official history:
On the eve of the war maintenance of communications of the High Command was responsibility of the four organs: Communications Administration of the Red Army, communications department of the General Staff’s Operations Administration, People’s Commissariat for Communications of the USSR, and People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR. Communications departments of the Navy, Air Force and Air Defense of the country were operated relatively independently. Communications Administration of the Red Army (USKA) was the central organ of the People’s Commissariat for Defense on control of battle training of signals troops, organization of communications in the Red Army and supply of troops with signals equipment. It was directly subordinate to the chief of the General Staff army general G.K. Zhukov. Directly subordinate to the head of the administration were: signals units of the GHQ reserve, Research institute of communications and special technique, central school of dog-breeding, central signals warehouses (1). It was expected that in case of war the communications of the High Command with fronts and military districts would be carried out via stationary communication network of the People’s Commissariat for Communications of the USSR from places of permanent location.
….
For improvement of work on control and material-technical security of signals troops on 28 July 1941 the Communications Administration was reorganized as the Main Communications Administration of the Red Army (GUSKA) and the NKO communication center was included in its composition for full provision of communications for the General Staff of the Red Army. On the same day the NKO order approved the “Regulation of the Main Communications Administration of the Red Army” as well as its establishment which was three time larger then the former size of the Communications Administration. Its principal functions were: control of work on organization and maintenance of the High Command communications; control of work on organization and maintenance of communications in the formations and units of the Red Army; preparation and use of all communications resources of the country for needs of the military command, fulfillment of orders of communication equipment by the industry; storage of communication equipment in warehouses; inspection of signal troops; selection of highest and higher command personnel.

Priority area of activity of the Main Communication Administration from the first days of the war was provision of communications for the Main Command Stavka (from 8 August 1941 – Supreme Main Command Stavka) with fronts and armies…For this purpose the communication center of the General Staff was used, as the Stavka itself didn’t have its own command apparatus and means of communications. After the GKO decree No.300 was issued the General Staff’s communication center became subordinated to the GUSKA and started to provide communication to the Commissariat for Defense, including the General Staff.

At the start of the war the communication center was a single entity and met all needs of the Commissariat for Defense, then it was split into two parts: the main part which provided communication to the Supreme command and the General Staff’s Operations Administration, while the other part was situated separately and serviced main and central administrations and supply organs of the Commissariat for Defense (2).

For reliable and constant provision of communications to the High Command based on the GKO decree of 8 July 1941 a mobile communication center was formed, which was staffed with communication personnel from Moscow. Using this center based on a railway train one could have communications with fronts’ staffs at any time. Somewhat later a powerful automobile-based communication center was formed. During the war these centers were successfully employed for provision of communications for Stavka’s representative on their visits to fronts.

For communications of the Stavka and the General Staff with troops other means were too, first of all liaison aviation. Initially special airplanes of the Civil Air Fleet (GVF) were used for this purpose. In December 1941 a separate GVF aviation squadron was formed which was meant specifically for High Command communications. At the start of December 1942 by a proposal of the Chief of the General Staff a 3rd Separate Aviation Liaison Division of the GVF was formed, which was operationally subordinated to the head of the GUSKA. In fronts aviation liaison squadrons and later regiments were created.

In addition to provision of communications for the Stavka and General Staff the GUSKA helped in all respects to organize reliable work of communication centers of the staffs of the Air Force, Air Defense, People’s Commissariat for Navy and Central Staff of the Partisan Movement. Chiefs of communications of the Air Force, Long-Range Air Force and Air Defense were independent in operational respects of the head of the GUSKA. And only beginning from 6 July 1943 by the NKO directive “On employment of communication means of special arms” they were subordinated in operational respects to the head of the GUSKA which considerably improved control of signal troops in general and control of operations of military forces.

For maintenance of communications of the General Staff with the fronts staffs and recovery of trunk lines and hubs of communication network communication battalions were formed. Simultaneously separate repair-recovery, telegraph-telephone, radio and line communication battalions of the GHQ were created. Only in the first half of the war more than a thousand of various signals units were formed.

In order the increase stability and reliability of communications the GUSKA developed and practically employed special purpose communications centers (USON). Their task was to maintain communications of the General Staff with staffs of formation in the High Command reserve on given strategic direction. For their servicing special units – separate communications battalions of the GHQ reserve and later separate communication regiments were formed.

A considerable role in improvement of General Staff’s communications with fronts and armies and increase in responsibility for its state was played by GUSKA’s introduction in late 1943 of a position of chief of operational direction (axis) of communications, appointed to which as a rule were chiefs of signal troops of fronts and armies. Chief of the operational axis of communications was responsible for maintenance of stable communications with a front or a group of fronts on a certain strategic direction. Subordinated to him were all signal units servicing this direction.

Since the number of signal units directly subordinated to the GUSKA had increased considerably, difficulties in control of them emerged. For this reason by the NKO order of 28 December 1944 all separate signal units were organizationally combined into GHQ reserve brigades. The advantage of the brigade organization in servicing operational axes of communication was in the fact that they united all signal units, including units of special purpose signals centers.
(1) here the reference goes to a projected "Regulation on the People's Commissariat for Defense" from 1940. This project wasn't formally approved, as another part of the same chapter states quite directly. According to the same regulation the NKO communication center was also directly subordinated to the head of the USKA. It is not clear if this provision was actually applied before the war.

(2) apparently meaning communication facilities at Kirovskaya and Belorusskaya metro station in Moscow described above.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 22 Nov 2022 08:55

A telegram from Stalin to Khrushchev, sent on 10 February 1943
I believe it is a shame that the command of the South Front doesn't exhibit sufficient care about establishing solid telephone communications with Moscow. Don't you understand that the telegraph communications alone do not suffice and one needs to have telephone communications for everyday conversation on issues of your front? I have solid telephone communications with all fronts and they only benefit from that. Only your front alone is criminally careless in that matter. We can't allocate [supplies] by your requests unless we ascertain specific needs of your front and for that the telegraph is not sufficient, telephone communications are also needed. I order you and Malinovsky to have solid telephone communications with Moscow and first of all with me.
http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... e/1/zoom/6

Which demonstrates meaning acquired by protected telephone lines for military command by that moment.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 26 Nov 2022 12:02

From an interview with general Pokrovsky (chief of staff of the West, 3rd Belorussian Front during the war)
There was a rule under which oral reports to the Stavka were made every two hours using HF [encoded] telephone lines, and the final report was submitted at twenty-four hours daily.

The regular routine approved from above was as follows. By 22.00, the operational report was sent to the General Staff signed by the chief of staff of the front. At 24.00, the final report signed by the front commander, a member of the Military Council and the chief of staff went to the General Staff. By 3:00 a.m., an intelligence report signed by the chief of staff and the head of the intelligence department was to be sent.

How do I organize my work? Having sent an operational report at 22 o'clock, I went to the commander, a member of the Military Council was usually there at that time, sometimes the chiefs of arms - there were discussions on results of the day and preparation of the final report. The main, crucial discussions about past and future events also took place here. The final report was sent at 24 o'clock, and this conversation, as a rule, continued until about one o'clock, with an outline of plan for the upcoming day.

Then the commander went to bed, and the chief of staff went to his office to work. Work on the details of the day ahead. He finished working at six or seven in the morning and went to rest. The commander at about seven in the morning, as a rule, went to the troops. I went to bed just about that time. An experienced operator remained on the telephone, collected information from the armies and transmitted them to the General Staff.

I got up at about twelve o'clock in the afternoon, and soon they called me from the General Staff for a report to Stalin. All these years, while I was chief of staff, I was called by the same person - now Colonel General Lomov. Now he is at the Academy of the General Staff in the department of strategy, and then he was the direction officer of our front. There in the General Staff, there were several generals, each of whom had one, or two, or three fronts, a number of fronts, and they were constantly aware of our situation.

He called to compile a report to Stalin. We talked to him every day for years. Every day, without exception. And we saw each other for the first time after the war, in 1946. We never saw each other in the eyes, but I knew his voice, like no one else’s.

By two or three o'clock the Supreme Commander already had a map with the situation on all fronts. And it was in order to draw this situation map that they called me at about twelve o'clock.

But if we were in offensive, then it was supposed to report situation to the General Staff every two hours around the clock.

I think that in this good order there was one negative feature. The reports were required to be too detailed. This was not necessary in terms of overall strategic command.
which, I guess, describes a normal routine beginning from the year 1943 and on.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 28 Nov 2022 15:33

Art wrote:
27 Oct 2022 07:38
The question which seems very obscure to me is if the Soviet Navy, which became a separate Commissariat after 1937, had its own communication system or relied on Communication Center of the NKO
By decree of the Defence Committee of 5 May 1940 the Commissariat for Navy was granted access to some civil signal infrastructure. In particular it had the right to use by time-sharing protocol two transmitting radio stations at the civil radio center at Kupavna (east of Moscow) and was also allowed to install its own radios and built its own receiving radio center in the same place. Kupavna was a small settlement near Moscow which hosted a military garrison which served various needs of the central apparatus of the Soviet Navy in Moscow, hence the choise of the place, I guess. The civil radio center at Gorki (south of Moscow) was to be released for Navy's use somewhat later.
https://www.prlib.ru/item/1312386

According to web sources the communication center of the People's Commissariat for Navy was formally established on 17 September 1940 and included a radio transmitting center at Kupavna, a radio receiving center at Gorki and a radio center titled "Moscow" (within the city limits as the title suggest). The last was also based on the civil radio center of the Commissariat for Communications, in its own turn it originated from a long-range radio established in 1914 for communications with western allies. In October 1941 most facitilites of the Navy's communication center were evacuated to Kuibyshev (Samara) together with the bulk of the Navy Commissariat's apparatus, yet the radio center at Kupavna still remained operational.

BTW regulation on the Communication Center of the People's Commissariat for Defense (discussed earlier) enacted on 19 September 1941 is online:
http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... e/1/zoom/6
not that it adds something really new.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 03 Dec 2022 12:14

Der Alte Fritz wrote:
06 Nov 2022 08:07
Like you I am very surprised given the preparations the Soviet Union made during the interwar period and given their expetctation of war that little preparation was made to 'harden' any of the command and signals offices.
General Gapich (head of the RKKA's Commnications Administration in 1941) desrcibed command centers prepared in peace-time (from a post-humous article in the Soviet Military History Journal):
A great disadvantage of the prepared communication hubs [of fronts and armies] was that they were situated in weak shelters of a light field type. The construction of well-defended, improved in every respect and expensive command posts was considered unnecessary, since it was assumed that the war would be maneuverable, and only offensive operations were considered the basis of our strategy.

The repeated proposals of the chiefs of communications of the border military districts, supported by the headquarters of the districts, on the construction of protected communication centers of the headquarters of the fronts and armies in the areas of deployment and concentration of troops, were rejected by the center [i.e. Moscow]. In particular, in 1935, on behalf of the commander of the Belarusian Military District, I.P. Uborevich, I, as the chief of communications of the district, was in Moscow and personally reported to the Chief of the General Staff A.I. Yegorov about the need to build wartime communication centers for the needs of the front in Smolensk and Mogilev (taking into account the old border) and asked to release funds and equipment for this purpose. I was told that this issue would be considered by the General Staff later. We had to limit ourselves to the construction of such a hub in the basement of the district headquarters with limited funds, and with very scarce equipment. In the summer of 1940, the headquarters of the Kiev Special Military District also filed a proposal to the General Staff for the release of funds and materials for the construction of front-line and army field communications centers. But it was not considered either.
which doens't seem fully accurate. It's known that an underground command center was built for the Kiev military district in Svyatoshino near Kiev during 30s. A new district's underground command facility was under construction at Tarnopol but wasn't completed. Khrushchev in his memoirs said that in June 1941 it was a "giant hole in the earth". The proposal of the district's staff to employ existing concrete shelter belonging to the Novograd-Volynskiy fortified region as wartime location of the front HQ was rejected.
As a result the disrtict/front HQ relocated from Kiev to Tarnopol on between 19 and 22 June 1941 but was quatered in an impromtu fashion - according to different versions in barracks of a local military garrisons, in civil buildings or in the park outside the town - all versions can be partly true.
In a similar way HQ of the Baltic distrcit/North-West Front moved from Riga to its wartime location a forest east of Panevėžys, where light earth shelter were prepared for its accomodation. HQ of the West district/West Front was supposed to be relocated from Minsk to Baranovichi in wartime, but didn't do it for some reasons.

the bottom line is that wartime location of large staffs (such as fronts and districts) was chosen in advance and signal infrastructure was prepared in peacetime, which was based on existing civil large communication hubs. These hubs and signal lines were not protected against aerial attacks. Also these pre-prepared command facilities were advanced well forward - army levels staffs were frequently situated several tens km from the border, whcih made them vulnerable to advance on the ground. On the other hand such advance location factilited communications by messengers and direct liaison, whcih was useful given a failture of communications by wire.

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Re: STAVKA communications with Fronts, Armies and individuals

Post by Art » 27 Jan 2023 16:35

On 5 July 1939 the RKKA Main Military Council complained about insufficient control over organization of communications and recommmended to reorganize the General Staff as well as district/army group/corps staffs. The questions of organization of the communication service, intelligence, information and reconnaissance were to be given to the Operations Administration of the General Staff and operations departments of districts', army groups and corps staffs
http://docs.historyrussia.org/ru/nodes/ ... e/1/zoom/5

On 19 July 1939 this decision was officially endorsed by the NKO order No.0105
https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/%D0%9F%D ... 84%96_0105

Accordingly the communications department was created within the Operations Administration of the General Staff. This department was responsible for communications between the GS and operational army. At the same time the Communications Administration of the NKO responsible for provision of communication equipment and control of the commuications service was still retained. Soon it became obvious that such dual control was ineffective.

The commision on communication service convened after the Soviet-Finnish War admitted that the reorganization carried out according to the order No. 0105 was faulty. The existence of separate communication sections under operations departments led to many tensions and required endless coordination and "okaying" which took plenty of time. Accordingly the commision recommened to unite all questions of communications under a single chief of communications (of the Red Army, front, army etc). The communications department of the Operations Administration/GS was to be included into the RKKA Communication Administration.
https://history.wikireading.ru/216889

These proposals like many others were in vain and the new leadership of the NKO dimsissed them. As a result this system of dual control survived and the communications department whithin the General Staff remained responsible for planning and organization of communications between the GS and fronts.
General Gapich (chief the Communiations Administration of the RKKA in June 1941) recollected after the war:
"In the General Staff, all issues were in charge of a small body - the communications department, which was not able to develop communications issues with the required completeness"
Gapich also said that he was not fully informed of the planning for communications in wartime. He was given a plan for wartime communications developed by the GS only on the morning of 22 June 1941. This plan was not discussed in advance with the Communications Administrations which apparently led to some clashes as Gapich accused kombrig Ivanov - chief of the communications department of the General Staff of incompetence and unreaslistic planning.
https://www.noo-journal.ru/nauka-obsest ... icle-0287/

As I understand only in July 1941 with the reorganization of the (Main) Communications Administration it was given a full control over all issues of communications between the GS in Moscow and the operational army (including control of the GS Communications Center). The communications department whithin the Operations Administration/GS was retained apparently with much reduced functions until being disbanded by the NKO order of 19 April 1942
https://bdsa.ru/dokumenti/prikazi-nko-1942/297-1

So in essence we see a story typical story for a pre-war Soviet military administration system: aggrandizement of many control bodies with parrallel and poorly separated functions leading to frictions and dissolution of responsibility.

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