At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Aida1]

You continue to state they could expect more better days if they attacked a month earlier but you have not proven that the weather could be expected to be better. When do the rains usually start? When did they start in 1942, 1943.

You are correct that the aim was to destroy the Red Army and attacking towards large concentrations of forces in front of Moscow could achieve this but army group Centre was too weak at this time. On top of this you leave an extra 600,000 Soviet troops near Kiev and many troops between AG Centre and Kiev which were attacking the flanks relentlessly. You will also have to either do without Panzer Group 4 or leave AG North tankless and unable to reach Leningrad. AG Centre was simply too weak.

You are far out on a limb when you implicitly pretend that statistically you can expect nothing but bad weather between end of august and beginning of october. It is not rocketscience to be aware that having a longer window between the end of summer and beginning of winter will on average give you more days of favourable weather. Anyway,it was not intentionally decided to wait until october. Hitler lost interest in Moscow and that is the only reason the attempt started too late.
You are conveniently forgetting that soviet forces near Kiev cannot just walk off and attack AGC in the flank. Anyway, the attack against Kiev had a long flank too and flank attacks were dealt with successfully.
Germany could only go for one objective which had to be Moscow. Germany had compelling strategic reasons to need to try to defeat the USSR in one campaign. The only way to attempt to decisively defeat the red army forces was going for Moscow. Any attempt to take other purely territorial objectives was an unnecessary diversion Germany did not have the resources for. So the basic idea of the German high command was correct. All post facto judgments on that are flawed by perfect hindsight. Real decisions are made with the intelligence information one has at the time.
All the post facto pretence about AGC materially not being able to attack towards Moscow at the end of august is pure fiction. No german commander believed that at the time. If PGR 2 was not able to attack towards Moscow then it could also not attack towards Kiev either. Infantry armies rather prefer to be part of an offensive where the hardest work is done by the mobile forces than being on the defensive and doing heavy defensive fighting. You did not see them complain about an offensive scenario.

[MarkF617]

I'm not pretending anything, you are staying that it's not rocket science that there will be on average more dry days early autumn, it this is so it will be easy to show some evidence to back this up. Where I come from September is frequently very wet what is usual for Russia?
Hitler did not lose interest in Moscow, he never had any interest in the first place. He wanted the destruction of the Red Army do the government would collapse. This they couldn't, do. There was no way the Germans could do a knock out blow. Attack towards Moscow and you leave enemy troops to the north and south plus more forming behind Moscow. Barbarossa failed in August, the Germans had lost their mad gamble. It was obvious at this point it would be a long war so economic targets made more sense at this point, on top of this a huge chunk of the Red Army was taken out. Typhoon was pure desparation.
So you are saying the Germans can match from Smolensk to Kiev but the Soviets can't match from Kiev to Smolensk? I have given evidence that the Panzer groups were in a poor state in August yet you continue to state that everyone wanted to attack. I have given proof of you wish to refute my numbers then please provide evidence especially the bit where the infantry would prefer to attack when they could barely supply where they were, please also explain how they could advance 300 miles with no stockpiles of supplies and trucks which were almost worn out?
I await some solid evidence from you but only expect more hand waving.

Thanks

Mark.

[Aida1]

I'm not pretending anything, you are staying that it's not rocket science that there will be on average more dry days early autumn, it this is so it will be easy to show some evidence to back this up. Where I come from September is frequently very wet what is usual for Russia?
Hitler did not lose interest in Moscow, he never had any interest in the first place. He wanted the destruction of the Red Army do the government would collapse. This they couldn't, do. There was no way the Germans could do a knock out blow. Attack towards Moscow and you leave enemy troops to the north and south plus more forming behind Moscow. Barbarossa failed in August, the Germans had lost their mad gamble. It was obvious at this point it would be a long war so economic targets made more sense at this point, on top of this a huge chunk of the Red Army was taken out. Typhoon was pure desparation.
So you are saying the Germans can match from Smolensk to Kiev but the Soviets can't match from Kiev to Smolensk? I have given evidence that the Panzer groups were in a poor state in August yet you continue to state that everyone wanted to attack. I have given proof of you wish to refute my numbers then please provide evidence especially the bit where the infantry would prefer to attack when they could barely supply where they were, please also explain how they could advance 300 miles with no stockpiles of supplies and trucks which were almost worn out?
I await some solid evidence from you but only expect more hand waving.

Thanks

Mark.

You are implicitly always pretending that a start end august gives you not more favourable days than early october which is nonsense as it means that supposedly every day from end august to end september would always give you bad weather. Was always a gamble to start Taifun when it did and the Germans were very aware that it was very late with the imminence of winter. I maintain that it is not rocket science to be aware that with a longer window you can on average expect more days of favourable weather. Explicitly referred to in the memorandum of the OKH of 18.8 in which the reasons were given for the attack on Moscow(Moskau 1941 Carl Wagener Podzun Pallas pp 21-22).
You have given no evidence that the Panzer groups were unable to attack. Their commanders certainly had a different opinion about their readiness than you based on even more numbers than you have( Wagener p20). If PGR 2 was supposedly unable to attack then it is very strange it was successful in the attack to the south. And even after all the wear and tear and losses during that operation it was still able to obtain success during Taifun too. So i do not have to refute your numbers. You give an opinion based on these numbers that is contradicted by the commanders at the time and by what the units actually achieved.

[MarkF617]

Of course Typhoon was a gamble, the whole of Barbarossa was one massive gamble taken in desperation as it was seen as the only way to beat Great Britain. In hindsight it had pretty much no chance of success.

So no actual data on expected weather, got it more handwavium.

I have given much data on the shape of the mobile forces. They needed rest, refit and supplies needed to be built up and the railhead extended. On top of this even if they didn't go to Kiev or Leningrad some sort of attack was needed to clear the flanks. The Germans were simply too weak to capture and hold Moscow no matter when they attacked.

[Aida1]

Of course Typhoon was a gamble, the whole of Barbarossa was one massive gamble taken in desperation as it was seen as the only way to beat Great Britain. In hindsight it had pretty much no chance of success.

So no actual data on expected weather, got it more handwavium.

I have given much data on the shape of the mobile forces. They needed rest, refit and supplies needed to be built up and the railhead extended. On top of this even if they didn't go to Kiev or Leningrad some sort of attack was needed to clear the flanks. The Germans were simply too weak to capture and hold Moscow no matter when they attacked.

It is funny that you would continue making it a good idea to wait until beginning october before starting an offensive on Moscow. The german high command knew better and in the memorandum of 18 august 1941 specifically mentioned the two months of favourable weather left before winter set in .
Where the mobile forces are concerned you simply ignore the dates given by the commanders of PGR 2 and Pgr3 for the combat readiness of their units which are mentioned in any history on the offesive against Moscow. And the material fact that PGR 2 took part successfully in the offensive against Kiev which implies combat readiness.
No German commander at the time came up with a supposed material unreadiness to attack towards Moscow in august 1941. It did simply not exist.

[MarkF617]

So you want to attack with your elite forces at half strength with no way to supply the infantry and most of the lorries ready to break down while leaving strong forces on your flanks? Sheer madness. I think you are missing my point. My point is that there was no good time to attack, Barbarossa failed in July and nothing was going to change that. There were too many Soviets and so much land to cover it was impossible to defeat the Soviet Union in battle. The German high command was hoping for the government to fall and the Soviets gave in. As long as they continued to fight and continued to mobilise troops the Germans were doomed.

[Aida1]

So you want to attack with your elite forces at half strength with no way to supply the infantry and most of the lorries ready to break down while leaving strong forces on your flanks? Sheer madness. I think you are missing my point. My point is that there was no good time to attack, Barbarossa failed in July and nothing was going to change that. There were too many Soviets and so much land to cover it was impossible to defeat the Soviet Union in battle. The German high command was hoping for the government to fall and the Soviets gave in. As long as they continued to fight and continued to mobilise troops the Germans were doomed.

These elite forces were very successfull during the attack towards Kiev and during Taifun so you are wrong. The german army was perfectly able to attack towards Moscow at the end of august instead of the other operations that took place before Taifun. PGR 2 had long flanks in the attack towards the south and dealt with that.

[Yuri]

So you want to attack with your elite forces at half strength with no way to supply the infantry and most of the lorries ready to break down while leaving strong forces on your flanks? Sheer madness. I think you are missing my point. My point is that there was no good time to attack, Barbarossa failed in July and nothing was going to change that. There were too many Soviets and so much land to cover it was impossible to defeat the Soviet Union in battle. The German high command was hoping for the government to fall and the Soviets gave in. As long as they continued to fight and continued to mobilise troops the Germans were doomed.

These elite forces were very successfull during the attack towards Kiev and during Taifun so you are wrong. The german army was perfectly able to attack towards Moscow at the end of august instead of the other operations that took place before Taifun. PGR 2 had long flanks in the attack towards the south and dealt with that.

Rubbish.
In July 1941, divisions of the 2nd Army, the only large (strategic) reserve of the Barbarossa, saved 2PzGr from defeat.
The success of Europeans (Germans, Romanians, Hungarians, Italians, Slovaks and Croats) in the South (Ukraine) in August-September 1941 was due to two factors:
a) magnificent actions of 1 PzGr (von Kleist) in the Kremenchug area;
b) a gross miscalculation of STAVKA of the Supreme High Command in late August and early September 1941 regarding the direction of the main forces of the Bryansk Front (General Eremenko):
- instead of a powerful blow to the southwest in the flank and rear of 2PzGr advancing on Kiev, the main forces of General Eremenko were thrown to the northwest against the infantry divisions (4th Army) of the AG "Center", who stood on the defensive.

[Appleknocker27]

Yuri, do you have a tactical map of General Eremenko's movements and attacks?
Thanks

[Aida1]

So you want to attack with your elite forces at half strength with no way to supply the infantry and most of the lorries ready to break down while leaving strong forces on your flanks? Sheer madness. I think you are missing my point. My point is that there was no good time to attack, Barbarossa failed in July and nothing was going to change that. There were too many Soviets and so much land to cover it was impossible to defeat the Soviet Union in battle. The German high command was hoping for the government to fall and the Soviets gave in. As long as they continued to fight and continued to mobilise troops the Germans were doomed.

These elite forces were very successfull during the attack towards Kiev and during Taifun so you are wrong. The german army was perfectly able to attack towards Moscow at the end of august instead of the other operations that took place before Taifun. PGR 2 had long flanks in the attack towards the south and dealt with that.

Rubbish.
In July 1941, divisions of the 2nd Army, the only large (strategic) reserve of the Barbarossa, saved 2PzGr from defeat.

The word 'saving' is totally inappropriate as mobile divisions have always to be rejoined by the infantry divisions.

[Aida1]

So you want to attack with your elite forces at half strength with no way to supply the infantry and most of the lorries ready to break down while leaving strong forces on your flanks? Sheer madness. I think you are missing my point. My point is that there was no good time to attack, Barbarossa failed in July and nothing was going to change that. There were too many Soviets and so much land to cover it was impossible to defeat the Soviet Union in battle. The German high command was hoping for the government to fall and the Soviets gave in. As long as they continued to fight and continued to mobilise troops the Germans were doomed.

These elite forces were very successfull during the attack towards Kiev and during Taifun so you are wrong. The german army was perfectly able to attack towards Moscow at the end of august instead of the other operations that took place before Taifun. PGR 2 had long flanks in the attack towards the south and dealt with that.

b) a gross miscalculation of STAVKA of the Supreme High Command in late August and early September 1941 regarding the direction of the main forces of the Bryansk Front (General Eremenko):
- instead of a powerful blow to the southwest in the flank and rear of 2PzGr advancing on Kiev, the main forces of General Eremenko were thrown to the northwest against the infantry divisions (4th Army) of the AG "Center", who stood on the defensive.

A perfectly undestandeable one as it was expected that the German army would go for Moscow .

[Aida1]

So you want to attack with your elite forces at half strength with no way to supply the infantry and most of the lorries ready to break down while leaving strong forces on your flanks? Sheer madness.

Mobile units were globally not at much higher strength by october despite two more pz div arriving. Particularly PGR 2 was very busy meanwhile which caused a lot of attrition. A unit is not unable to attack because its strength is down by half. The strength of your opponent is being depleted too. Supposedly waiting to have more strength can be counterproductive if your opponent can get stronger at a higher rate.Relatively speaking, you can end up with a worse strenght ratio .Anyway, there was historically not a decision to wait until october because of a supposed non existent need to get the strength of the mobile units up . All post facto inventions after the war.
If one looks at how close the germans came to taking Moscow in november despite being severely attritted by then and suiffering the negative effects of winter then it is not difficult to believe that the probability of taking Moscow would be much higher when starting earlier and concentrating resources on that objective.

[Aida1]

An excerpt from Moskau 1941, Carl Wagener Podzun 1965 pp 190-191.
"2)The offensive against Moskau happened 2 months late, came by this in insurmountable weather difficulties and because of this came upon a superior defender, a deep dense defensive net and the fresh reserves from the Far East. A german attack on Moskau in august would neither have been stopped by mud nor by winter weather. The defenses of Moskau were still in their beginnings. The reserves were not free yet because of the uncertain attitude of Jpan and could not contest the conqueror what was conquered. The own attack forces were fresher and less used up. The unbeaten enemy forces in the Ukraine would not have disturbed the offensive if the Army Group south would have had as only mission the flank protection of the attack on Moskau. The execution of the later russian counterattack in front of Moskau proves that the russian higher and lower command had could not yet master this. One wuld not have to be afraid to execute a limited retreat retreat with Army Group south if necessary.
3) The attack forces against Moskau were not strong enough. The attack lacked depth , especially on both flanks because according to Hitlers will Army Groups North and South kept threir own objectives. When the german command decided on the attack against Moskau in october, all other offensive undertakings in north and south should at least have been given up. A clear center of gravity should have been built at Army Group center. This did not happen. The attack forces were insufficient in number and situation.
4) In october the enemy had created before Moskau a defense system of such depth that any atttack would fizzle out in it. That is maybe the most important lesson from this battle. Any attack will get stuck in a sufficiently strong defense system. One can push through 1,2 , 3 positions but then inevitably comes the moment where the attack force is used up, where attack spirit and weapons effect diminish and supply fails. Even the moderately trained and equipped russian forces got a superior force through their deep arrangement.
When these reasons for the defeat are correct, then one can conclude from this that Moskau would have been reachable in the month of august under the mentioned conditions.
If one asks further what would have been gained by this for the course of the war, the answer is difficult. In this it is more about inponderables....."

[ljadw]

Whatever the WM apologists are claiming,the facts remain what they were in 1941
1 The Barbarossa offensive failed in July when there was good weather
2 In August the Soviets were counterattacking from Leningrad to the Black Sea
3 The conquest of Moscow would tie HGM, as did the attempt to conquer Stalingrad to HGS
4 The result would be that the Germans could not go farther than Moscow and that the decisive region for the continuation of the war ( East of Moscow/West of Ural ) could never be occupied .
5 The truth is that
a Moscow was totally secondary
b Moscow could only fall AFTER the fall of the Soviet Union :the capture of Moscow would not have as result the fall of the Soviet Union,but the fall of the Soviet Union would have as consequence the fall of Moscow and as there was no longer any possibility in August that the Soviets would collapse,the whole discussion is a faux probleme, invented by the apologists of the WM to prove that Hitler did throw away Germany's chance to win in the East .
The Ostheer lost 200000 men in August ,more than in July,more than in September, more than in October,more than in November, more than in December .
Game was already over and the capture of Moscow would change nothing .It would only increase the German problems .

[Art]

When these reasons for the defeat are correct, then one can conclude from this that Moskau would have been reachable in the month of august under the mentioned conditions.

It is rather unlikely that a hypothetical offensive toward Moscow could be launched before September. The OKH memorandum of 18 August talked about early September as a possible start, which was based on some rather optimistic assumptions, so additional delays were also possible. That means at the very best 4 weeks earlier than historical operation "Typhoon".

The reserves were not free yet because of the uncertain attitude of Jpan and could not contest the conqueror what was conquered.

That is not quite true. Soviet forces were transferred from the Far East frontier beginning from June 1941 by small packets. Any of these transfers didn't have critical influence on the situation due to its limited size.

When the german command decided on the attack against Moskau in october, all other offensive undertakings in north and south should at least have been given up.

So the offensive stops cold in two of three army groups after three or four months without prospects to renew it in foreseeable future (also leaving the largest and most important industrial region at the disposal of the Soviet Union). If it doesn't mean that "Barbarossa" failed to achieve its original objectives, than what does?
Irrespective of the prospects of a hypothetical offensive toward Moscow a transition to prolonged war was apparently inevitable and there was no magic trick to prevent it. The question was only on what line the advance would stop.