You are far out on a limb when you implicitly pretend that statistically you can expect nothing but bad weather between end of august and beginning of october. It is not rocketscience to be aware that having a longer window between the end of summer and beginning of winter will on average give you more days of favourable weather. Anyway,it was not intentionally decided to wait until october. Hitler lost interest in Moscow and that is the only reason the attempt started too late.MarkF617 wrote: ↑09 Dec 2022 14:22You continue to state they could expect more better days if they attacked a month earlier but you have not proven that the weather could be expected to be better. When do the rains usually start? When did they start in 1942, 1943.
You are correct that the aim was to destroy the Red Army and attacking towards large concentrations of forces in front of Moscow could achieve this but army group Centre was too weak at this time. On top of this you leave an extra 600,000 Soviet troops near Kiev and many troops between AG Centre and Kiev which were attacking the flanks relentlessly. You will also have to either do without Panzer Group 4 or leave AG North tankless and unable to reach Leningrad. AG Centre was simply too weak.
You are conveniently forgetting that soviet forces near Kiev cannot just walk off and attack AGC in the flank. Anyway, the attack against Kiev had a long flank too and flank attacks were dealt with successfully.
Germany could only go for one objective which had to be Moscow. Germany had compelling strategic reasons to need to try to defeat the USSR in one campaign. The only way to attempt to decisively defeat the red army forces was going for Moscow. Any attempt to take other purely territorial objectives was an unnecessary diversion Germany did not have the resources for. So the basic idea of the German high command was correct. All post facto judgments on that are flawed by perfect hindsight. Real decisions are made with the intelligence information one has at the time.
All the post facto pretence about AGC materially not being able to attack towards Moscow at the end of august is pure fiction. No german commander believed that at the time. If PGR 2 was not able to attack towards Moscow then it could also not attack towards Kiev either. Infantry armies rather prefer to be part of an offensive where the hardest work is done by the mobile forces than being on the defensive and doing heavy defensive fighting. You did not see them complain about an offensive scenario.