At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[ljadw]

Moving supplies to the front would be so much difficult and at that time in 1941 Red Army was really desperate for reinforcements.

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets,

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

Also Moscow was an ammunition manufacture center, losing it means those ammo needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Moscow or some thousand kms away Urals?

Also Kharkov and Leningrad was an tank manufacture center, losing it means those tank needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Kharkov and Leningrad or some thousand kms away Urals?

Why must peoples think ammunition manufactures was be mostest important on tank manufactures for to cripple Soviet union ?

Maybe you can to give some historical datas and evidences for to show ammunition manufacture was be so much important.

I don't need a Russian opinion on a matter which is clearly discussed a thousand times. How's my opinion is an idea and without any data and your claims based on, what? We're talking about 1941 Russia, not 42 or 43. They even had problems with manufacturing stuff in '42.

SU in 41 does not have massive amount of trucks which were delivered by LL.
SU in 44 had supply problem after massive breakthroughs and had to wait months for situation to stabilize. And this is with all those LL Trucks.

1 The SU stopped the Germans in 1941,without LL trucks
2 The Wallies also had supply problems in 1944 with their trucks. That was the reason for Market Garden .
Supply problems are decided/solved by railways, not by trucks : a train can carry 100 tons, a truck 1 or 2 .

[Ружичасти Слон]

Moving supplies to the front would be so much difficult and at that time in 1941 Red Army was really desperate for reinforcements.

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets,

You was write erwinn opinion and only erwinn opinion.

When you can to give some historical datas and evidences peoples can to analise datas for to decide erwinn opinion true or not true.

Also Moscow was an ammunition manufacture center, losing it means those ammo needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Moscow or some thousand kms away Urals?

Also Kharkov and Leningrad was an tank manufacture center, losing it means those tank needs to be supplied from somewhere else. Do you prefer to get supplied by the nearest Kharkov and Leningrad or some thousand kms away Urals?

Why must peoples think ammunition manufactures was be mostest important on tank manufactures for to cripple Soviet union ?

Maybe you can to give some historical datas and evidences for to show ammunition manufacture was be so much important.

I don't need a Russian opinion on a matter which is clearly discussed a thousand times. How's my opinion is an idea and without any data and your claims based on, what? We're talking about 1941 Russia, not 42 or 43. They even had problems with manufacturing stuff in '42.

Nobody was need Turkey opinion on a matter when not have historical datas or evidences.

Holocaust was deny 1.000 times. 1.000 times deny not mean holocaust was not be on history.
Holodomor was deny 1.000 times. 1.000 times deny not mean holodomor was not be on history.
Genocide on Armenian was deny 1.000 times. 1.000 times deny not mean genocide on Armenian was not be on history.

Peoples can to discuss 1.000.000.000.000 times and not mean something must to be true.

Erwinn can to discuss 1.000 times

1941 Moscow was really important to cripple Soviets,

and not mean must to be true.

When erwinn can to give some historical datas or evidences then peoples can to analyse and can to decide when erwinn opinion can to be true or false.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

You post, "1 The SU stopped the Germans in 1941, without LL trucks." True. though the 500,000 L-L motor vehicles certainly speeded up its later advances.

You post, " 2 The Wallies also had supply problems in 1944 with their trucks. That was the reason for Market Garden." No. the supply problem was not with their trucks, it was that the Germans had often had the single road they had to use under fire, or blocked. That was a tactical problem that impacted on logistics.

You post, "Supply problems are decided/solved by railways, not by trucks : a train can carry 100 tons, a truck 1 or 2." This is not an either/or situation. Railways are best for bulk carriage over distance. However, they do not run everywhere, unlike the road system. This is particularly so the further East one goes. In 1944 in Western Europe, where Allied bombing had paralyzed the French railway system and large numbers of trucks were available, the breakout from Normandy to the German border was sustained by trucks alone. (See the Red Ball Express).

Cheers,

Sid.

[ljadw]

Hi ljadw,

You post, "1 The SU stopped the Germans in 1941, without LL trucks." True. though the 500,000 L-L motor vehicles certainly speeded up its later advances.

You post, " 2 The Wallies also had supply problems in 1944 with their trucks. That was the reason for Market Garden." No. the supply problem was not with their trucks, it was that the Germans had often had the single road they had to use under fire, or blocked. That was a tactical problem that impacted on logistics.

You post, "Supply problems are decided/solved by railways, not by trucks : a train can carry 100 tons, a truck 1 or 2." This is not an either/or situation. Railways are best for bulk carriage over distance. However, they do not run everywhere, unlike the road system. This is particularly so the further East one goes. In 1944 in Western Europe, where Allied bombing had paralyzed the French railway system and large numbers of trucks were available, the breakout from Normandy to the German border was sustained by trucks alone. (See the Red Ball Express).

Cheers,


Sid.

The Red Ball Express was activated only on August 25 ,the reason being the unexpected fast allied advance which could not be sustained by the railways .And the Red Ball Express failed (its maximum was only 12500 tons a day ) ,the Allies were not in Berlin in 1944.When the railways were operational again (from September on) they also failed .
About MG : it failed because the ground forces were too weak and needed the intervention of the airborne .Why were they too weak ?Because for their supplies they depended mainly on trucks who could supply only a small number of divisions .
The ground forces needed trucks, tanks,artillery, fuel, heavy ammunition,bridging equipment...and these things could not be transported by trucks, but only by trains .It would take weeks to transport by truck the needed supplies for MG ,and Montgomery had no weeks.
MG started with a heavy artillery bombardment , a lot of tons of ammunition ,and trucks could not bring them from Normandy to the Dutch-Belgian border.

[MarkF617]

Sorry to resurrect this monster but I have just re-read it and i feel the need to comment on a couple of things.
1. More than one poster commented that the generals at the time including Zhukov, Manstein and Guderian stated that they all felt Moscow would fall if the Germans attacked towards Moscow in mid August and that anyone disagreeing with them is wrong because they were not there and not generals. My belief is that the generals knew less than a 21 century poster exactly because they were there and didn't and didn't have access to all the data we have now.

What did Manstein know about the situation at Smolensk? He wasn't even part of AG Centre. Did Zhukov know the real state that AG Centre was in at this time? All he probably knew was that all Soviet attacks were failing with heavy losses so the Germans must be strong. He probably had no idea that AG Centre was worn out, under supplied and under strength, however we know this as we have access to German documents which he didn't. Guderian was just a cocky SOB. He thought the panzers could just race off and destroy all before them, then got upset when the leg infantry couldn't keep up well he needed the leg infantry if an attack on Moscow was to be attempted and these were not ready. I bet he didn't know or care wahat state they were on.
In general I don't think the Germans had any idea what state the Soviet forces were in they just assumed they must be weak as they had killed and captured so many already one last push would finish them.

2. Another assumption is that capturing Moscow would cripple Soviet communications as the north/south rail lines would be cut. I think these posters are missing a major point: Soviet forces at this point would not be trying to bypass Moscow but would be converging on Moscow for a massive counter attack which there was no way in hell the Germans strung out across hundreds of miles and worn down after a massive battle to capture the City could withstand. This was predicted in the wargames Paulus played when planning Barbarossa and one of the reasons Moscow was not an initial objective. To be honest it was probably better for the Germans that they were stopped short.

3. (I know I said 2 but I just remembered this). I am just wondering if all the advocates of an early attack have checked what the weather was like in September? It was wet and very muddy. Just look at the mud that Guderian had to overcome to reach Kiev. Early October was actually a brief dry period and the best time to attack.

Thanks

Mark.

[Aida1]

Sorry to resurrect this monster but I have just re-read it and i feel the need to comment on a couple of things.
1. More than one poster commented that the generals at the time including Zhukov, Manstein and Guderian stated that they all felt Moscow would fall if the Germans attacked towards Moscow in mid August and that anyone disagreeing with them is wrong because they were not there and not generals. My belief is that the generals knew less than a 21 century poster exactly because they were there and didn't and didn't have access to all the data we have now.


Mark.

Manstein made no statements about the decisionmaking in august as he was not involved in that. So anybody who would say he did clearly never read Mansteins memoirs. Guderian was certainly in favour of going for Moscow in august for a number of reasons.

[Aida1]

. Guderian was just a cocky SOB. He thought the panzers could just race off and destroy all before them, then got upset when the leg infantry couldn't keep up well he needed the leg infantry if an attack on Moscow was to be attempted and these were not ready. I bet he didn't know or care wahat state they were on.

Mark.

Guderian never said anything of the sort. And the foot infantry would have been more happy with an attack on Moscow where they would move behind the advancing mobile troops than a defensive scenario where they do heavy defensive fighting which is much harder on the infantry than pursuing beaten enemy forces and cleaning out pockets.

[Aida1]

2. Another assumption is that capturing Moscow would cripple Soviet communications as the north/south rail lines would be cut. I think these posters are missing a major point: Soviet forces at this point would not be trying to bypass Moscow but would be converging on Moscow for a massive counter attack which there was no way in hell the Germans strung out across hundreds of miles and worn down after a massive battle to capture the City could withstand. This was predicted in the wargames Paulus played when planning Barbarossa and one of the reasons Moscow was not an initial objective. To be honest it was probably better for the Germans that they were stopped short.

Thanks

Mark.

Going for Moscow and maybe capturing it(probably just surrounding it) would would be a means to an end which was destroying large enemy forces. Taking it out as a comminacitions hub would certainly be a disadvantage for the red army in moving its forces about.

[Aida1]

3. (I know I said 2 but I just remembered this). I am just wondering if all the advocates of an early attack have checked what the weather was like in September? It was wet and very muddy. Just look at the mud that Guderian had to overcome to reach Kiev. Early October was actually a brief dry period and the best time to attack.

Thanks

Mark.

Wrong with a lot of metereological hindsight. If you start towards the end of august you can expect a much longer window of opportunity. In october you have a very brief insufficient one which can end any moment . And some of your forces will have done a lot of fighting and moving before you even start in october.

[MarkF617]

Aida 1

Post 1637 Chekov wrote:

Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

In this post and others, it states that Manstein commented that Moscow would fall if Hitler hadn't intervened. This comment may not have been in his memoir, I don't know as it was not sourced.

Guderian was always eager to carry on attacks without the foot infantry. He was really put out when he was repeatedly told to help seal the Kessels at Minsk and Smolensk repeatedly disobeying orders and allowing hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers to escape. How on earth he wasn't sacked after the Yelnia debacle I don't know.

Yes, the foot infantry would have loved to have advanced, but they simply couldn't. They couldn't even hold Yelnia let alone attack. They were living hand to mouth for supplies, when you are struggling to supply the army group for that army group to move further from their railheads is suicide. They couldn't attack until the railhead had been extended and stockpiles of supplies built.

Seriously, you want the Germans to advance another 300 miles then surround Moscow? Do you realise how big Moscow is? the Germans would be spread so thin that there would be massive gaps in the Kessel and any Soviet counterattack could gain massive local superiority anywhere they choose along the supply lines or section of the Kessel. The Germans would be butchered piecemeal.

Many posters on this thread have stated that it was the mud that stopped the Germans then attacking earlier will give 2 periods of mud rather than mud followed by cold. Basically, you have an army group stretched beyond their supply limit, exhausted, depleted under constant attacks facing a foe who has been proven to be resilient and who is launching relentless counter attacks and who's numbers seemed to be limitless. There was no way they were going to Moscow and if they did, by some miracle, get to surround Moscow the Soviet counterattack would utterly destroy AG Centre.

Thanks

Mark.

[dgfred]

Do you think holding rail lines both N and S of Moscow and digging in around Moscow might have worked out? Attack early round 2 (next year) to take it if needed. Sort of like Leningrad?

[Aida1]

Aida 1

Post 1637 Chekov wrote:

Wildly different, but in both cases supremely competent and high ranking Generals, Manstein, Guderian, and on the Soviet side Zhukov said Moscow would have likely fallen had Hitler not chosen differently. A sustained drive on Moscow would have had great chances for success if carried on as the primary goal.

In this post and others, it states that Manstein commented that Moscow would fall if Hitler hadn't intervened. This comment may not have been in his memoir, I don't know as it was not sourced.



Mark.

If a posting is not sourced then you have every reason to doubt it. Anyway, you cannot use the posting of another user as a source.

[Aida1]

Guderian was always eager to carry on attacks without the foot infantry. He was really put out when he was repeatedly told to help seal the Kessels at Minsk and Smolensk repeatedly disobeying orders and allowing hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers to escape. How on earth he wasn't sacked after the Yelnia debacle I don't know.



Mark.

Pushing back the enemy as far as possible making it difficult for him to set up a new defense line is far more important than short pincers and sealing off pockets. So certainly Guderian wanted for example to cross the Dnjepr and make bridgheads there instead of waiting for the infantry to come up which would take too long and allow the enemy to set up a strong defense. All commanders of mobile forces want this. Deep operational breakthroughs cannot succeed if you advance at the tempo of foot infantry. That Guderian did not help sealing off the Kessel of Misnsk is certainly not true. And he certainly did not want to hold Yelnia anymore when the decision was made not to go for Moscow as it was only useful as a springboard for an attack on, Moscow.

[Aida1]

Yes, the foot infantry would have loved to have advanced, but they simply couldn't. They couldn't even hold Yelnia let alone attack. They were living hand to mouth for supplies, when you are struggling to supply the army group for that army group to move further from their railheads is suicide. They couldn't attack until the railhead had been extended and stockpiles of supplies built.

Seriously, you want the Germans to advance another 300 miles then surround Moscow? Do you realise how big Moscow is? the Germans would be spread so thin that there would be massive gaps in the Kessel and any Soviet counterattack could gain massive local superiority anywhere they choose along the supply lines or section of the Kessel. The Germans would be butchered piecemeal.

Many posters on this thread have stated that it was the mud that stopped the Germans then attacking earlier will give 2 periods of mud rather than mud followed by cold. Basically, you have an army group stretched beyond their supply limit, exhausted, depleted under constant attacks facing a foe who has been proven to be resilient and who is launching relentless counter attacks and who's numbers seemed to be limitless. There was no way they were going to Moscow and if they did, by some miracle, get to surround Moscow the Soviet counterattack would utterly destroy AG Centre.

Thanks

Mark.

Nothing is true of this. It was not decided not to go for Moscow in august because of alleged logistical restrictions which were never mentioned in the discussions which then happened. Hitler simply lost his interest in Moscow and focused on Leningrad and Kiev instead. As i stated before defensive fighting is much harder on the infantry than advancing behind mobile forces so the infantry supposedly not being able to advance never came up at the time. Infantrydivisions would have preferred offensive to defensive. The German army certainly did not have a rest until Taifun , rather the contrary .
If your reasoning would be correct then even the operation towards Kiev would have been impossible for logistical reasons.
Advancing towards Moscow is a means to defeat large enemy forces and the scope for that is better whan you start much earlier. Starting in october was far too late.
You seriously underestimate the ability of the german army to deal with later red army counter attacks. In a scenario where you go earlier for Moscow you will find the German army in a better shape before the winter.

[fletcher_101]

Jan 30, 1933