At what point did Germany lose WW2?

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ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 26 Apr 2020 16:22

Halder agreed with Hitler .Thus,what Hitler said was not caused by the desire to prove his superiority .

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Yuri
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Yuri » 28 Apr 2020 14:20

Incorrectly.
Halder (a Democrat and a Liberal in the same glass) exclaimed "We won!" July 3, a day earlier than dictator Hitler.
So in this matter, too, democracy is the first.

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 28 Apr 2020 15:29

Сontinuation

So, on July 4, 1941 Adolf made a conclusion that the colossus was crumbling and that soon it would end. And since the fate of the colossus is predetermined, then you can do anything you like, victory is guaranteed to him. And the Führer decided not to follow the lines of any von Bock, Halder or Guderian, that is, not to take Moscow. He decided to teach his generals and marshals a visual lesson in operational art. One of the principles of this art is the importance of protecting the flanks. The campaign in Russia should end not according to the plans of the generals and marshals in such a routine way as taking Moscow, whose days are numbered, but by the brilliant flanking maneuver of the Fuhrer, which will be included in the annals of military art.
To defend your own flanks and deprive the enemy of his industrial base, i. e. to kill two birds with one stone - what could be more ingenious?
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 01 May 2020 16:51

AbollonPolweder wrote:
28 Apr 2020 15:29
Сontinuation

So, on July 4, 1941 Adolf made a conclusion that the colossus was crumbling and that soon it would end. And since the fate of the colossus is predetermined, then you can do anything you like, victory is guaranteed to him. And the Führer decided not to follow the lines of any von Bock, Halder or Guderian, that is, not to take Moscow. He decided to teach his generals and marshals a visual lesson in operational art. One of the principles of this art is the importance of protecting the flanks. The campaign in Russia should end not according to the plans of the generals and marshals in such a routine way as taking Moscow, whose days are numbered, but by the brilliant flanking maneuver of the Fuhrer, which will be included in the annals of military art.
To defend your own flanks and deprive the enemy of his industrial base, i. e. to kill two birds with one stone - what could be more ingenious?
So, from the point of view of military science, the position of the Führer was impeccable. From the point of view of psychology he also had an advantage for not one of the generals or marshals could take responsibility for the safety of the flanks.
The question arises: did the OKH supreme command think about the consequences when it ordered tank groups to break through to the east without caring for the flanks and rear?
Es muss stets das Streben sein, hinter den Feind zu kommen und ohne Rueksicht auf Bedrohung in Flanke und Ruecken auch nachts geradeaus nach Osten weiter durchzustossen.
" Weisung fuer die Kampffuerung der Panzergruppe 3". 12.3.41
There should always be a desire to go behind enemy lines and ignore threats to the flanks and rear, even at night break through further directly to the east.
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/8
Probably Brauchitsch and the General Staff of the OKH, being sane, believed that the Soviet command was incapable of organizing large-scale attacks on the flank and rear of the German troops. And the almost-month-long practice of fighting showed that their calculation was correct. Moreover, not only commanders of mobile units, but also infantry commanders marched forward not paying attention to the flanks.
Here is what H. Heyer writes in his memoirs:
“I found the division's headquarters a few kilometers east of the Bug. They suspected that there were enemy formations in front and on the flanks. I ordered to move forward as quickly as possible without looking back at the enemy or the neighbors and take Bransk today. " (Heyer H. Mackensen E. From the Bug to the Caucasus. M., 2004, p. 54).
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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AbollonPolweder
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 04 May 2020 15:00

AbollonPolweder wrote:
01 May 2020 16:51
...
Сontinuation
...
Did Hitler know about this almost universal disregard of the defense of the flanks by the German commanders? Given the fact that he intervened in the planning and execution of operations almost to the divisional level, that answer will be affirmative.
In order to find out whether the Third Reich could achieve the goals stated in the Barbarossa plan, you need to look at this map:
http://maps.mapywig.org/m/German_maps/s ... .1942.jpg
or at this one:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/en/ ... / zoom / 7

These maps show that all railroads lead to Rome :o , sorry, to Moscow. As General Marcks wrote in his plan:
Among these regions Moscow is the economic, political and spiritual center of the USSR. Its capture destroys the integrity of the Russian empire.
That was the point! Integrity! For its (integrity) destruction, Moscow did not need to be captured; it was enough to surround it, isolate it from Russia or, more precisely, isolate Russia from Moscow. Isolate Russia from the influence of the dictatorship of Stalin, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the NKVD, etc.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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AbollonPolweder
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 07 May 2020 12:33

AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 May 2020 15:00

...
Сontinuation
...
So, what do we see when looking at these maps of the USSR railway network (see my previous post on May 04)? We see a scheme of a supercentralized logistic web. If you need to transfer, say, troops from Stalingrad to Kiev, then through Moscow. From Kiev to Minsk (according to the map) again through Moscow. From Leningrad to Kiev or from Arkhangelsk to Leningrad - all via Moscow.
This logistics network greatly slowed Stalin's maneuver of resources. With the isolation of Moscow, this maneuver was reduced to a minimum, almost to zero.
Now recall the first phrase of Barbarossa, which said about the Wehrmacht to be ready: "... Sowjetrussland in einem schnellen Feldzug niederzuwerfen." (... to knock down Soviet Russia in a quick campaign).
In fact, it turns out that Adolf did not remember what he ordered the Wehrmacht. He forgot that war should be quick as lightning. Did he forget about the blitzkrieg? It turns out that Germany was unlucky twice:
- its leader was a dictator;
- the dictator had a bad memory.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Ружичасти Слон
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 07 May 2020 13:58

AbollonPolweder wrote:
07 May 2020 12:33

So, what do we see when looking at these maps of the USSR railway network (see my previous post on May 04)? We see a scheme of a supercentralized logistic web. If you need to transfer, say, troops from Stalingrad to Kiev, then through Moscow. From Kiev to Minsk (according to the map) again through Moscow. From Leningrad to Kiev or from Arkhangelsk to Leningrad - all via Moscow.
This logistics network greatly slowed Stalin's maneuver of resources. With the isolation of Moscow, this maneuver was reduced to a minimum, almost to zero.
Is not correct.

Image

checkov
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by checkov » 08 May 2020 12:44

I'm looking at the map you provided and I don't see how it supports your argument that Moscow was not an essential rail hub center. Germany controlled the rail West of Moscow and there are very few rail lines going around Moscow to connect the N and S halves of the country. Maybe I'm missing something?

checkov
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by checkov » 08 May 2020 12:49

Also I'm only reading this page but are we forgetting Moscow was also of great importance for population, manufacturing, communications, C and C and culture?

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 09 May 2020 12:10

checkov wrote:
08 May 2020 12:44
I'm looking at the map you provided and I don't see how it supports your argument that Moscow was not an essential rail hub center.
I was not write argument. I was give map. I not can to help you when you not understand map.

checkov wrote:
08 May 2020 12:44
Maybe I'm missing something?
Yes.

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AbollonPolweder
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 16 May 2020 09:56

AbollonPolweder wrote:
07 May 2020 12:33
Continuation ...
So, if Hitler could isolate Moscow, it would immediately reduce Stalin's mobilization capabilities. Not only would maneuver be complicated by manpower and equipment along the railway network, but also the mobilization activities themselves in the regions, cities and villages of the USSR. For the red dictator ruled the country in manual mode. Plus a constant hard control. With the destroyed railway logistics and poor control, mobilization in the USSR from the moment of encircling Moscow would be practically undermined. And with that Stalinist tactic of using quantitative advantage in manpower, the situation on the battlefield would become critical. This is very clearly indicated by the German documents of the autumn of 1941.
Zu welchen Mitteln er dabei Zufluct nimmt, schildert am eindringlichsten ein Gefechtsbericht von der Attacke der 44. sowjetischen Kavallerie-Division bei Mussino am 17. November.
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/7
A battle report of the attack by the 44th Soviet Cavalry Division near Mussino on November 17 describes most vividly the means which he (enemy- AP) had used.
Does this not resemble the attack of the 6th light brigade of the British in the autumn of 1854 near Balaclava?
As Lord Tennyson wrote:
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die:
Into the valley of Death

I do not know if Lord Cardigan was awarded, but the chief of staff of the 44th cavalry division was awarded the Order of the Red Star on November 17, 1941.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 18 May 2020 22:41

AbollonPowleder wrote:Now recall the first phrase of Barbarossa, which said about the Wehrmacht to be ready: "... Sowjetrussland in einem schnellen Feldzug niederzuwerfen." (... to knock down Soviet Russia in a quick campaign).
In fact, it turns out that Adolf did not remember what he ordered the Wehrmacht.
"Win quickly" is not a strategy and it's farcical to portray it as such.

At best it's a statement of goals to be served by strategy.

At worst it's a grand delusion backed by catastrophic strategic misjudgment (the actual case was the worst case).

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Paul Lakowski » 10 Jun 2020 04:09

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
07 May 2020 13:58
AbollonPolweder wrote:
07 May 2020 12:33

So, what do we see when looking at these maps of the USSR railway network (see my previous post on May 04)? We see a scheme of a supercentralized logistic web. If you need to transfer, say, troops from Stalingrad to Kiev, then through Moscow. From Kiev to Minsk (according to the map) again through Moscow. From Leningrad to Kiev or from Arkhangelsk to Leningrad - all via Moscow.
This logistics network greatly slowed Stalin's maneuver of resources. With the isolation of Moscow, this maneuver was reduced to a minimum, almost to zero.
Is not correct.

Image
https://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/135 ... 17.1308120




https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10 ... ccess=true
The Red Army now had a fully integrated modern logistical organization, while the German one was fractured into individual services with little coordination between them. Just as importantly, the Soviet concept of supply was radically different from the German/European model of ‘demand from below’, where Divisional staffs sent requisitions up to Army supply officers to refill to standard levels, which resulted in all divisions being supplied more or less equally, while in the Red Army that only applied to the supply of rations and fodder.

All combat supplies used a ‘central dispatch’ model that allowed them to be sent to active Fronts and to starve inactive ones, while within the Front the same process saw active Armies supplied first and within the Army directed to units that were successful in combat. The effect of this policy was to concentrate limited supplies at the point of decision and for the Center to determine where its greatest effort would be made. Much of the seeming Soviet superiority of materiel came from better concentration; while the Germans made efforts from 1943 to direct the flows of supplies through Supply Officers at Heeresgruppe level, they never matched Soviet effectiveness.
First period of the war
German planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940 had to tackle two major issues — the operation being launched from outside the borders of Germany and that two decisive battles were going to be fought, one of which was beyond the range of motor vehicles to support from mobilization depots. The first issue was dealt with by a huge upgrade of the Polish railway network through the Otto program.53 This would allow a steady buildup of infantry divisions and supply depots on the border and then a last-minute, rapid mobilization of the armored units just before the launch of the invasion.

The second issue was dealt with by mobilizing heavy lorry/trailer combinations from the civilian sector, largely the Reichsbahn (and its haulage company Schenker) and the Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps (National Socialist Transport Corps, or NSKK) to provide additional columns to the existing three regiments of the Grosstransportraum (GTR).

The GTR would support the initial decisive battles fought in the border area, while the Eisenbahnpioniere would re-establish the railways in Soviet-occupied eastern Poland with a double-track line of at least 24 train pairs a day for each Heeresgruppe. A Versorgungsbezirk (Supply District)54 would be established at a depth of 400 km, in the case of Heeresgruppe Mitte at Minsk, which would be built up by moving the depots forward from the Polish border by railway. The GTR would support the armies for the second decisive battle around Smolensk from the Supply District at Minsk over a distance of 400 km.


The GTR was raised from 19,000 to 60,000 tonnes capacity for the operation, which represented 9 million tonne-km55 while the demand for 102 infantry and 33 motorized divisions was 32,000 tonnes a day,56 which would indicate that the lorries could support the army up to 300 km from the depots. The 24 trains a day for each Heeresgruppe represented 32,000 tonnes of supplies, which confirms these figures; however, this represented only fuel, ammunition, and limited food/fodder, making no allowance for replacement men, horses, or equipment. Later in the war, a Heeresgruppe would require 75 trains a day simply for ‘normal’ operations, while heavy fighting could raise this to over 100 trains.
The crisis came during the winter: With few covered locomotive depots, the German engines fell out of service and by February 1942, at least 70 percent were inoperative,64 and traffic ground to a standstill. The constant flow of engines eastwards had started to affect the wider German economy, and on 15 January 1942 this prompted Hitler to act.65 The Heer lost control of the railways, and the RVM and Organisation Todt stepped in to rebuild the railways with the Ostbau 42 program. However, friction between the military and railwaymen had been rising all winter, and in April the Gestapo arrested two senior operations managers from the HBD, Oberbahnrat Landenberger and Hahn, who were sent to a concentration camp
In the dark days of 1941, there remains one significant Soviet victory, and it was won by the NKPS over the Ostheer. Due to the size of the country, in Russia mobility at the operational level could only be provided by railways, and by denying it to the Wehrmacht and using it effectively itself, the NKPS ensured that the Soviet Union would survive the onslaught.
Once it had recovered from the initial shock of invasion, the railwaymen set about evacuating the motive power before it fell into the hands of the Germans: In total they lost around 2,000 locomotives, many of which were unserviceable, out of a total fleet of 24,20066 (1938).......The Soviets would lose around 40 percent of their network while losing 15 percent of the motive power, which meant that for the rest of the war they would have an abundance, especially as the wartime economy required less traffic, due to a switch to freight away from passenger traffic.

This allowed the simultaneous evacuation of the great cities by millions of Soviet citizens and the war industries’ move to the Urals. direction, over a network that the Germans were dismissing as old-fashioned and ramshackled. However, the key factor in keeping the Soviet Union fighting was its ability to raise new divisions, and this was only possible if the NKPS could gather up the men from the farthest reaches of the Union, deliver them to the depots and then onto the front; at the same time in late 1941, it was transporting the Far Eastern armies to the west. At a time when the German Ostheer was withering away from a lack of replacements, the NKPS was moving millions of men for the Red Army in the other

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 10 Jun 2020 05:53

The ''Far Eastern armies " were not transported to the west at the end of 1941 .Only a few divisions were transported and their role was insignificant .The great majority of the Soviet population lived west of the Urals and it were these reservists who decided the outcome of the war .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by AbollonPolweder » 10 Jun 2020 16:25

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
18 May 2020 22:41
AbollonPowleder wrote:Now recall the first phrase of Barbarossa, which said about the Wehrmacht to be ready: "... Sowjetrussland in einem schnellen Feldzug niederzuwerfen." (... to knock down Soviet Russia in a quick campaign).
In fact, it turns out that Adolf did not remember what he ordered the Wehrmacht.
"Win quickly" is not a strategy and it's farcical to portray it as such.

At best it's a statement of goals to be served by strategy.

At worst it's a grand delusion backed by catastrophic strategic misjudgment (the actual case was the worst case).
I assume, sir, that you are joking. If you seriously write such phrases, then I advise you to open the original text of Barbarossa. If you do this, you will see with your own eyes the words "schnellen Feldzug" and "Endziel" (final goal). And you will not need to guess.
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
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