German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

[Peter89]

Valuable information about the Greek campaign, which took place at the time that, if Hitler would have decided so, it also could be started a big operation to close the Mediterranean... and to reach Turkey and the Dardanelles strait (a gun to the USSR head).

I'm sorry, but how is that supposed to make any kind of strategic sense? Instead of building up forces on the Soviet border, the Germans go after "Turkey and the Dardanelles"? Okay then, what happens when Uncle Joe seizes the opportunity to take that gun and put to the German head by seizing Ostprüssen and the Protectorate? Or don't other actors get to act in your what if?

So, even if the RAF units were coming to Greece in November 1940 and the Germans in April, Allies were unable to stop the Axis onslaught.

The disparity of forces and the rather hopeless tactical situation, which took out half the ground forces available to the Allies in a few days, rather outweighed any benefit the British accrued from having four squadrons of aircraft in Greece for four months.

They did have months to prepare everything.

No, they did not. It was unclear what the situation was...the RAF was in Greece to support Greece against the Italians...the situation vis a vis Yugoslavia changed 27 March 1941 when the coup d'état that led to the German invasion took place.

The Germans were in a hurry and did not reach Bulgaria up to March... And they got overwhelming superiority.

The Germans forced Bulgaria into the Tripartite Pact on 1 March 1941 and German forces entered Bulgaria the same day. And, yes, overwhelming superiority and a deteriorated strategic and operational situation is what screwed the British.

This is factually correct, but Germans have been investing in the infrastructure and supply network towards the Balkans for half a year by then. If anything, the RAF mission in Greece underlines the problem of deploying the Luftwaffe on the hostile side of the sea.

I think that demonstrates that, if calling off the "Blitz" and moving two Luftflotten to the Mediterranean (Spain, Sicily, Greece, Lybia...), the Germans would have got the Mediterranean 99% Of course, some airfields would not be in the best conditions and they should improvise many things, but they had many aircrafts and were competent enough. At the same time, the british resources were shorter than theirs. That was a winning strategy.

What "demonstrates that"? No Spitfires?

Yet again, "Luftflotten" are headquarters. If you are talking about moving Luftflotte 2. and 3. with all their assigned units and aircraft, then, no, they are not going to magically transpose to Spain - no bases there and no agreement for bases there - Greece - they need to get past the Greek objection first - Sicily - there is only room, after negotiations with the Italians, for perhaps a single Kampfgeschwader - Libya - there is even fewer facilities and less support there. Competence and many aircraft does not replace basing and logistical requirements. The British had similar problems in that virtually all their air strength was, of necessity, in the Delta and Palestine. Meanwhile, British air resources were growing much faster than the German.

I think our fellow member has not yet reached the point in his studies where he could be acquinted with the methods how air superiority was won in WW2 over enemy territory, and how desense was significantly easier than attack.

[Counter]

According to my personal experience the above statements of Peter89, Ironmachine and Richard Anderson are fairly nonsensical and contradictory, easy to refute. But the problem is that, if this is supposed to be a serious exchange between honest and well-informed people about historical matters, maybe it is lacking of sense for me to continue... as I am now the only one doing what we are supposed to do in this forum.

I could refute one by one the fallacious "arguments" exposed. For example, Richard Anderson writing that, although the RAF had six months to prepare to defend the Balkans from the coming German invasion (because the Hitler´s decision to intervene in Greece was already of November 1940... as Richard knows perfectly) and the germans only came to Bulgaria in March... that does not demonstrate that at that time the Germans had an overwhelming aerial superiority that they could move to any part around the Mediterranean where they could find available airfields and the corresponding ground assistance (even if that sometimes should be quickly improvised...).

Or Ironmachine writing that Germany could not assist Spain economically to win the war because the germans did not give to Spaniards what they asked

And so on...

So be happy. There is enough written in this thread to show what I just stated above.

[Ironmachine]

According to my personal experience the above statements of Peter89, Ironmachine and Richard Anderson are fairly nonsensical and contradictory, easy to refute.

According to my personal experience, this kind of attitude is typical of someone who has no more arguments to support his opinion, but is still unable to concede that he may be wrong.

But the problem is that, if this is supposed to be a serious exchange between honest and well-informed people about historical matters,

Honest like you, lying about what I wrote as I will show later in this post?
Well-informed people like you, who claimed that you had never seen a mention of the German impossibility to supply the material resources that Spain asked for? (and who, when showed the sources that supported that impossibility, claimed that you already knew them?)

maybe it is lacking of sense for me to continue...

You were shown to be wrong, tried to move the goalposts and it didn't work, now you leave the field while claiming victory. Quite an example of a mature attitude!

as I am now the only one doing what we are supposed to do in this forum.
[...]
Or Ironmachine writing that Germany could not assist Spain economically to win the war because the germans did not give to Spaniards what they asked

You boast that you are the only one doing what we are supposed to do in this forum. Well, it may be that you think that lying is what we are supposed in this forum, because you are the only one that, AFAIK, is lying here. And you are lying when you say that Ironmachine wrote that Germany could not assist Spain economically to win the war, because Ironmachine never wrote that (and I should know, as I'm Ironmachine). What I wrote was that Germany could not provide what Spain asked for, and I showed sources supporting that opinion, including the Germans themselves confirming that fact.
Anyway, as for the Germans being able to assist Spain economically to win the war, well, they were unable to assist themselves to win the war, were they?

So be happy.

Always.

There is enough written in this thread to show what I just stated above.

Ditto.

[Richard Anderson]

I could refute one by one the fallacious "arguments" exposed. For example, Richard Anderson writing that, although the RAF had six months to prepare to defend the Balkans from the coming German invasion (because the Hitler´s decision to intervene in Greece was already of November 1940... as Richard knows perfectly) and the germans only came to Bulgaria in March... that does not demonstrate that at that time the Germans had an overwhelming aerial superiority that they could move to any part around the Mediterranean where they could find available airfields and the corresponding ground assistance (even if that sometimes should be quickly improvised...).

The RAF had six months to prepare? Do tell. RAF Middle East Command covered Egypt, Sudan, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, East Africa, Aden and Somaliland, Iraq and adjacent territories, Cyprus, Turkey, the Balkans (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece), the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf'. On 28 October the Italians attacked Greece and plans began to provide some form of reinforcement from the resources available. Nevertheless, No. 30 Squadron was sent immediately and four days later orders from London directed the sending of additional forces. The squadrons sent to Greece were partly compensated for by three squadrons arriving from Britain, but RAF action in Greece was also limited by the lack of all-weather airfields in western Greece, one of which had to be constructed.

Meanwhile, available ground forces were stretched even thinner as the proposed counterattack on the Italians awaited arrival of reinforcements from England and elsewhere, and as Italian East Africa was invested. In any case, in January Greece refused British ground forces, unless Germany placed ground forces in Bulgaria.

Yes, Hitler decided on a southward move on 12 November and ordered the formulation of MARITA on 13 December, but until the Greek's agreed to British ground forces in Greece there wasn't much the British could do. The Germans began entering Bulgaria on 1 March, British ground forces began landing in Greece on 7 March.

Without forces on the ground, serious British preparations could only begin 7 March, which means they had 30 days to prepare, not six months. What part of that chain of events is "fallacious"?

What part of that is difficult for you to understand?

[Peter89]

According to my personal experience the above statements of Peter89, Ironmachine and Richard Anderson are fairly nonsensical and contradictory, easy to refute. But the problem is that, if this is supposed to be a serious exchange between honest and well-informed people about historical matters, maybe it is lacking of sense for me to continue... as I am now the only one doing what we are supposed to do in this forum.

I could refute one by one the fallacious "arguments" exposed. For example, Richard Anderson writing that, although the RAF had six months to prepare to defend the Balkans from the coming German invasion (because the Hitler´s decision to intervene in Greece was already of November 1940... as Richard knows perfectly) and the germans only came to Bulgaria in March... that does not demonstrate that at that time the Germans had an overwhelming aerial superiority that they could move to any part around the Mediterranean where they could find available airfields and the corresponding ground assistance (even if that sometimes should be quickly improvised...).

Or Ironmachine writing that Germany could not assist Spain economically to win the war because the germans did not give to Spaniards what they asked

And so on...

So be happy. There is enough written in this thread to show what I just stated above.

Ironmachine is right. Franco asked for 400,000 tons of gasoline, which was approximately 1 year of consumption (they had stocks for about 2 months in October 1940 and about 1 month by May 1941 with Allied deliveries). Thus he said: could the Germans win the war in one year?

No, they couldn't.

And if Spain joins them, that could not turn the tide of battle either.

Could Germany cover Spain's needs on a long term?

In 1940 Germany and its occupied territories were producing about 330,250 tons of gasoline per month, while Germany's gasoline deficit averaged about 157,750 tons per month. Even promising half of what Franco wanted, would add a 20% deficit to the already growing German deficit. (Caurana & Rockoff, p. 15)

As for food, Spain requested 1,069 thousand tons (FCO AA2174/471436-41.) in February 1941 (from March to July 1941), which would be in context with the total Soviet import of 821 thousand tons in 1940 and 547 thousand tons in 1941 (Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich). Also Germany faced a 1,600 thousand tons shortfall by the end of 1940. That shortfall had to be made good by import deliveries - exporting Franco's demanded amount of grain equalled 2.1 million people's entire grain consumption (Kay, p. 118), or in other words, it would add 40% to German grain deficit (Ericson, p. 101). Thus, even promising half of what Franco wanted, would add another 20% deficit to the deficit that already threatened Germany supply.

One could argue that Spain was a net food exporter, but first of all, it was in value and not calories; second, foodstuffs were not entirely interchangeable - one can not live on citric fruits, for example. This is why Ironmachine wrote that we will never know whether the Spaniards really wanted to join the Axis or just played for time. These demands could only be understood in the context of a larger strategy, ie. to occupy oil-producing regions and to connect Axis Europe with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, etc. namely with countries that had agricultural surplus. But these numbers and opportunities paled in comparison with the hoped plunder from the Soviet Union, estimated to be at 4000, 8700 or even 25-30,000 thousand tons of grain (Kay, p. 110).

On the other hand, despite being subjected to embargoes all along the war, Spain received 30-50,000 tons per month of POL from the Allies. (Caurana & Rockoff, p. 40) As for grain, it is very hard to tell, because interestingly while the people of Spain were starving, Spain also exported wheat and olive oil. The problem was that as a result of the Civil War, weather and wrong food policies, the Spanish yields were half that of England or Germany. Also it must be noted that Spanish wheat production alone fell from 4000 thousand tons in 1935 to 3000 thousand tons in 1944-1945. It is not important to go through all the foodstuffs, but even the strict rationing of sugar - 250 thousand tons - was met with 89.4 thousand tons of actual production in 1941 (Bowen, p. 109-112). So the problem went beyond grain. Also there were problems with the loss of railway vehicles, which number fell from 3000 to 1800 during the war. The list could go on and on.

Spain faced a complex crisis caused by a devastating civil war and a leadership with less than optimal ideas of social development. Germany could not handle Spain's problems.

[Counter]

I was a little sick of all this nonsense started by Peter89 in order not to discuss "Germany strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR" (this is a sub-forum for Strategy, not for "What-if" stories) and I know that I will never convince this amazing trio (Peter89, Ironmachine and Richard). But anyway, now I have time and I can amuse myself

This forum should be a place for a serious exchange of information concerning historical items and I wanted to learn something about why Hitler dismissed the Mediterranean strategy proposed by Raeder in september 1940. Instead, I found a desperate attempt to build up a fantastic scenario of a historical period -the time of the Blitz, january-may 1941- in which Nazi Germany had a total military superiority in all western and Mediterranean area in Europe- According to Ian Kershaw, for example, the best Hitler could have done at that time -for his own sinister interest- was simply "not doing anything": USA was in the isolationist period, the alliance with the USSR was solid and to the british, fighting alone, only rested the colonial army.

But everything went different in the fantastic Peter89´s mind

This started this way.

I did my proposal of debate in page 2 of this thread (post 18)

That was the right strategy they missed (fortunately):

An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as Turkey is necessary. If we reach that point, Turkey will be in our power. The Russian problem will then appear in a different light ... It is doubtful whether an advance against Russia from the north will be necessary

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Rae ... an_plan%22

Then, Peter89 did a strange claim -strange for anyone HONEST and well-informed_

That was an idiotic strategy with no means to carry out.

"Idiotic", a very erudite judgment...

I answered logically, that numerical superiority of the nazi forces at that time (UK fighting alone) was undisputed (particularly the aerial and terrestrial superiority)...

And then... it started the fantasy

The Luftwaffe was essentially crippled during the Battle of Britain, and let's not assume that it was deployable anywhere at will in Europe or Africa, especially not on the fringes of the continent. What little recuperation it enjoyed, could not make up for the losses and the badly mauled morale. The Luftwaffe's performance in the Eastern Front could not be imagined anywhere, especially not in this region. I suggest you to read operational reports from Iraq / Syria, Crete or in North Africa. The lack of proper air filters, oil and tropical equipment would ground a good portion of the aircrafts without any enemy action.

So, the explanation was the "air filters"... and so on

Then, Ironmachine and Richard, apparently came to help their supposed friend. They added the Francoist legend -that Franco never wanted to join Axis - and a lot of pedantry about stupendous or not so stupendous airfields and other kind of little irrelevant details. A kind of slippery slope...

The three final posts of the individuals involved are very easy to refute (as "arguments"), as usual, but it is important to show first how what can have been a good discussion about geopolitical strategy can be ruined only by some inappropiate personal traits.

Today I have time. Just coming next

[Counter]

What part of that is difficult for you to understand?

It´s not me who does not understand, Richard...

The Germans began entering Bulgaria on 1 March, British ground forces began landing in Greece on 7 March.

It is interesting discussing -at least- the campaign of the Balcans because it is a very good example of the overwhelming nazi superiority in the area of Mediterranean at that time -the time as Raeder did his proposal-

The Luftwaffe in the Balkans Campaign was based out of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, all of which had reasonable facilities connected by rail to the Reich. The Luftwaffe fielded 836 operational aircraft and the Italians another 557 (on hand, operational was probably much less), against fewer than 200 Greek and Yugoslav aircraft, "reinforced" by nine and a fraction RAF squadrons with 82 operational aircraft.

British ground forces are not the item here. Aerial forces are. Six months had the RAF to prepare airfields and ground services in Greece -as Greece was an ally of UK- and that could not save the RAF from the inevitable coming of the numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe at that time. And for doing the Balcans campaign the Luftwaffe only called off partially the Blitz- In May, for Barbarrosa, the unuseful and wasting Blitz was finally called off.

Obviously, as Raeder did his proposal, in September 1940, and if that would have been accepted, no Blitz would have ever happened. Numerical superiority of the Luftwaffe would have done in the whole Mediterranean shores what in April they actually did in the Balcans.

But not in Peter89´s fantasy land

Why not? Because of the air-filters? Because of the not-so stupendous airfields? Air-filters and precarious airfields in the desert were not a problem for Hans-Joachim Marseille to shoot down more than 100 british aircrafts...

[Counter]

But the problem is that, if this is supposed to be a serious exchange between honest and well-informed people about historical matters,

Honest like you, lying about what I wrote as I will show later in this post?
Well-informed people like you, who claimed that you had never seen a mention of the German impossibility to supply the material resources that Spain asked for? (and who, when showed the sources that supported that impossibility, claimed that you already knew them?)

Ironmachine is even dramatic...

Where is the argument about German impossibility to supply the material resources that Spain asked for ?

I presume that Ironmachine is referring to the texts he inserted in page 6, post 82, in this thread. This is from a very well known book -Germany and the Second World War- why should I not know it?- In any part of those pages it is written that there was an impossibility of providing Spain the economic assistance that Spain needed.

Ironmachine has the extravagant idea that if Spain is joining the Axis would have been the only Hitler´s ally not getting the required assistance to turn Spain a serviceable factor in the war.

What you find in that text -and in every text about that historical question- is the complain of Hitler about Spain asking too much and offering little to Germany. Never that Spain could not get the grain or the fuel required.

Ironmachine added a text with date February 12 1941 stating that Germany could not provide Spain with "rubber, cotton and jute" but about the rest obviously that can be negotiated depending on the "Top-level decision". Anyway, that was two months after Franco decided not to join Axis due to the lack of interest of Hitler (no offer of a considerable colonial booty for Spain... and not a proportionate threat against the Franco´s government either).

If instead trying to uphold the Peter89 What-if story -idiotic strategy- that would have been a serious discussion about strategy, it could have been discussed in particular the question of time implied in the Raeder proposal: how long would have require Germany to assist Spain economically?

No one knew better than the british which were the economic necesities of import for Spain. The Royal Navy was allocating the "Navicerts" for everymerchant ship bringing oil and grain for Spain (from Argentina or Canada). A short war -up to UK accepting armistice- would have not costed so much for Germany. And other circumstances: closing the Mediterranean would have saved much oil for the Italian Navy, for example; seizing the British Petroleum oil-wells in Kirkuk was feasible; and what Raeder himself pointed at in his proposal: the USSR would be dominated -threatened- from the southern area and would try to compromise by provinding more raw materials to the Axis.

All this could have been part of a sensible discussion about Strategy but...

Finally, about grain: spanish requirements -imports- were of average 50,000 tons monthly. German consumption was 2 million tons monthly of average. What Spain needed was, at the most, 2-3% of german consumption. Not little, but feasible... depending on "Top-level decision"

[Peter89]

This started this way.

I did my proposal of debate in page 2 of this thread (post 18)

That was the right strategy they missed (fortunately):

An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as Turkey is necessary. If we reach that point, Turkey will be in our power. The Russian problem will then appear in a different light ... It is doubtful whether an advance against Russia from the north will be necessary

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Rae ... an_plan%22

Your wikipedia quote kinda forgot about the Royal Navy's fleet and Churchill's forces.

Then, Peter89 did a strange claim -strange for anyone HONEST and well-informed_

That was an idiotic strategy with no means to carry out.

I answered logically, that numerical superiority of the nazi forces at that time (UK fighting alone) was undisputed (particularly the aerial and terrestrial superiority)...

The German forces had a superiority on the European continent; you kinda forgot about the sea between Europe, Africa and Asia, a neutral Turkey and Spain, the British Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, plus the Royal Navy's fleet and Churchill's forces.

The Luftwaffe was essentially crippled during the Battle of Britain, and let's not assume that it was deployable anywhere at will in Europe or Africa, especially not on the fringes of the continent. What little recuperation it enjoyed, could not make up for the losses and the badly mauled morale. The Luftwaffe's performance in the Eastern Front could not be imagined anywhere, especially not in this region. I suggest you to read operational reports from Iraq / Syria, Crete or in North Africa. The lack of proper air filters, oil and tropical equipment would ground a good portion of the aircrafts without any enemy action.

So, the explanation was the "air filters"... and so on

Were your manners a little bit more smooth, I wouldn't mind to look up for you some quotes about the effect of sand on mechanized forces. For example, it cut the motor engine life by half. I could also provide you numbers about the fuel requirements of air units - fuel that could arrive in quantity only over the sea. The Royal Navy's sea; I hope you didn't kinda forget about the Royal Navy's fleet and Churchill's forces?

Instead of creative writing, you could answer the most obvious question: how do you think it was possible to carry out Raeder's strategy?

[Richard Anderson]

I was a little sick of all this nonsense started by Peter89 in order not to discuss "Germany strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR" (this is a sub-forum for Strategy, not for "What-if" stories) and I know that I will never convince this amazing trio (Peter89, Ironmachine and Richard). But anyway, now I have time and I can amuse myself

Poor little you.

This forum should be a place for a serious exchange of information concerning historical items and I wanted to learn something about why Hitler dismissed the Mediterranean strategy proposed by Raeder in september 1940.

Really? Your initial post was "That was the right strategy they missed (fortunately):

An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as Turkey is necessary. If we reach that point, Turkey will be in our power. The Russian problem will then appear in a different light ... It is doubtful whether an advance against Russia from the north will be necessary"

That is not an attempt to learn something.

Instead, I found a desperate attempt to build up a fantastic scenario of a historical period -the time of the Blitz, january-may 1941- in which Nazi Germany had a total military superiority in all western and Mediterranean area in Europe- According to Ian Kershaw, for example, the best Hitler could have done at that time -for his own sinister interest- was simply "not doing anything": USA was in the isolationist period, the alliance with the USSR was solid and to the british, fighting alone, only rested the colonial army.

No, instead you found some rather reasonable attempts to start a "serious exchange of information concerning historical items" with you that would teach you about "why Hitler dismissed the Mediterranean strategy proposed by Raeder in september 1940". However, it evidently doesn't sit well with you so now you are whining about how you were treated.

No, Nazi Germany did not have "a total military superiority in all western and Mediterranean area in Europe" and a peekaboo citation of Ian Kershaw doesn't make it so. Total military superiority is quite different to what pertained then. The Germans had total military superiority on the ground in western Europe, but were unable to ever generate even a ground parity in the southern Mediterranean littoral. The Germans did not have a naval superiority or even parity anywhere. The Germans had effective air parity over England, but had to sacrifice that to establish air superiority over the Balkans and then periodically over parts of the Mediterranean. They only were able to effectively contest air superiority into c. May 1942 in western Europe and the Mediterranean.

I did my proposal of debate in page 2 of this thread (post 18)

That was not a "proposal". It was an expression of your unsupported opinion. You have yet to provide any serious support to that opinion or to the objections that have been raised to it.

I answered logically, that numerical superiority of the nazi forces at that time (UK fighting alone) was undisputed (particularly the aerial and terrestrial superiority)...

Um, the German numerical superiority was only on the ground and in selected areas in the air for transient periods.

So, the explanation was the "air filters"... and so on

Yes, and also the crippling effects of the battles in Norway, Denmark, France, and Britain from April-September 194o, which you just ignored again.

Oh, and yes, BTW, "air filters" in the tropics were a real thing and a real problem, both for German aircraft and ground vehicles of all types.

The three final posts of the individuals involved are very easy to refute (as "arguments"), as usual, but it is important to show first how what can have been a good discussion about geopolitical strategy can be ruined only by some inappropiate personal traits.

Then by all means refute them and stop whining. Refutations are interesting, whining is not and is a truly inappropriate personal trait.

Today I have time. Just coming next

I will insure my breath is properly bated in anticipation.

[Ironmachine]

I was a little sick of all this nonsense started by Peter89 in order not to discuss "Germany strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR" (this is a sub-forum for Strategy, not for "What-if" stories) and I know that I will never convince this amazing trio (Peter89, Ironmachine and Richard). But anyway, now I have time and I can amuse myself

Lots of free time, lack of knowledge and a too high opinion of himself (remember the "That was the right strategy they missed" statement?), a sure recipe for disaster!

Or Ironmachine writing that Germany could not assist Spain economically to win the war because the germans did not give to Spaniards what they asked

Well, Germay could not even win the war by itself, that's a fact. It is highly questionable that adding another weak link is going to make the chain stronger, isn't it?

Then, Ironmachine and Richard, apparently came to help their supposed friend. They added the Francoist legend -that Franco never wanted to join Axis

Another day, another lie. I have never said that Franco never wanted to join the Axis. I have no problem in saying that he would have loved to joing the Axis if, and that's is a very great if, the Axis was clearly going to win the war. And that's the problem. That end of the war, an Axis victory, was far from evident in 1940.

and a lot of pedantry about stupendous or not so stupendous airfields and other kind of little irrelevant details. A kind of slippery slope...

Irrelevant for you they may be. Irrelevant in the real world, certainly not.

Ironmachine is even dramatic...
Where is the argument about German impossibility to supply the material resources that Spain asked for ?
I presume that Ironmachine is referring to the texts he inserted in page 6, post 82, in this thread. This is from a very well known book -Germany and the Second World War- why should I not know it?- In any part of those pages it is written that there was an impossibility of providing Spain the economic assistance that Spain needed.

Well, if you don't know how to read or if you can't understand what is said in some plain English sentences, then there is nothing I can do about that.

Ironmachine has the extravagant idea that if Spain is joining the Axis would have been the only Hitler´s ally not getting the required assistance to turn Spain a serviceable factor in the war.

No, I don't have that idea and I have never stated such thing. Putting words in my mouth which I did not say only means that you have no serios arguments to defend your ideas.
However, you should take a look at how much serviceable factors in the war were other Hitler's allies with the assistance provided by Germay. You could be surprised!

What you find in that text -and in every text about that historical question- is the complain of Hitler about Spain asking too much and offering little to Germany. Never that Spain could not get the grain or the fuel required.

What you can find in those texts (I quoted from different sources) is the plain statement, acknowledged by German authorities, that they could not supply what Spain asked for. And that was my point.
Now, you can certainly argue that what Spain asked for was far more than the absolute minimum that Spain required. Then, you could jump to the conclusion that Spain could get the grain or the fuel "required" if the Spanish requirements were those that Germany considered to be appropriate, so that Germany's supply capacity should be enough. But that's playing with marked cards! And what's more, that was not the issue in discussion.
On the other hand, unless the Germans present a military ultimatum, something like an invasion threat if Spain does not join the Axis immediately, Franco has no need to reduce his demands. He has nothing to lose and lots to gain.

Ironmachine added a text with date February 12 1941 stating that Germany could not provide Spain with "rubber, cotton and jute" but about the rest obviously that can be negotiated depending on the "Top-level decision"

You fail to note (on purpose?) that a footnote states:

[…] the OKW replied on Apr. 28 […] that the Army as well as the Luftwaffe was unable to provided any material whatsoever[…]

so that rubber, cotton and jute were not the only supplies (yes, military equipment is also supplies, and Spain also asked for it) that could not be supplied.
As for the rest that "obviously could be negotiated depending on the top-level decision", let's see the actual quote:

Moreover, fertilizers, mineral oil, grain, trucks, and railroad cars cannot be delivered without setting aside important German interests. If by top-level decisión Germany’s own requirements for the last-named goods could be deferred to some extent, certain deliveries might be conceivable, but on a scale which would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests and which, because of the transportation difficulties, could furthermore not be brought to Spain in the time requested in the memorándum.

So the top-level decision should defer Germany's own requirements and still the deliveries that could be provided "would not by a long way approach the Spanish requests" and "could furthermore not be brought to Spain in the time requested". So again, what is being said is plain and simply that Germany could not provide what Spain asked for. Your selective "understanding" of the sources provided is not going to change that fact.

Anyway, that was two months after Franco decided not to join Axis due to the lack of interest of Hitler (no offer of a considerable colonial booty for Spain... and not a proportionate threat against the Franco´s government either).

As a matter of fact, the text is from 12 February, that IIRC was the month when Hitler cancelled Operation Felix. However, unless you imply that two months before that date (or for that matter, six months before) Germany's supply capacity would have been radically different and better, that changes nothing. And two or six months before 12 February, Germany's circumstances were not significantly different.

[Counter]

They added the Francoist legend -that Franco never wanted to join Axis

Another day, another lie. I have never said that Franco never wanted to join the Axis.

It is not correct to accuse me of lying. Fortunately, i don´t take you seriously...

Ironmachine wrote this in post 85, page 6 of this thread.

Spain was apparently not really interested in joining the war, at least in the situation that existed in 1940-1941

"Apparently" according to what? Not according to the historical record, when Franco so many times insisted in getting from Hitler a guarantee for a colonial booty in exchange for joining the Axis. Only Francoist historians deny that.

Ironmachine has the extravagant idea that if Spain is joining the Axis would have been the only Hitler´s ally not getting the required assistance to turn Spain a serviceable factor in the war.

No, I don't have that idea and I have never stated such thing. Putting words in my mouth which I did not say only means that you have no serios arguments to defend your ideas.

Post 85 again..

The Spanish authorities were not stupid, and even they could see that there was no point of obtaining some territories in Africa while your population is dying in droves because you can't replace the supplies that are not coming from the Allies because you have joined the Axis

Dying in droves in spite of having joined the Axis? Did Hitler want an starving ally? What would be the use of that ally, then? Extravagant idea of Ironmachine. Your words, Ironmachine...

You fail to note (on purpose?) that a footnote states:
[…] the OKW replied on Apr. 28 […] that the Army as well as the Luftwaffe was unable to provided any material whatsoever[…]

It is not much relevant because in april 1941 the german Army was preparing "Barbarosa" and obviously they had nothing to spare.

About the relevance of the negotiations about the exact amount of the supplies required for Spain, what is clear is that Spain and Germany, at the time being, did not agree. That´s not surprising. Anyway, there was no previous political agreement, if the political agreement would have come, then negotiations about exact figures would have advanced indeed. As a matter of fact, no one knew how long would have lasted the war once the "Raeder strategy" started. Italians also planned that their joining the Axis (june 1940) would be brief. Then, situation got complicated and Germany had to assist Italy.

[Counter]

So, the explanation was the "air filters"... and so on

Were your manners a little bit more smooth, I wouldn't mind to look up for you some quotes about the effect of sand on mechanized forces. For example, it cut the motor engine life by half.

My manners are correct regarding to you, Peter. And if you want to debate about aircraft technology in the second world war there are other places in this very forum, much better than in a forum about Strategy...

I want to show you, how would be your fantasy world in terms of strategy...

September 1940, Admiral Raeder presents his proposal to Hitler. Hitler then summons his military counsellors to debate the issue:

Then, it speaks Oberst Von Peter:

-Mein Führer, once arrived to the Lybian desert, german aircrafts -unlike italian and british aircrafts that are now operating there- would be disabled due to the lack of air-filters. This Strategy is idiotic!

This is you, Peter...

[Counter]

I answered logically, that numerical superiority of the nazi forces at that time (UK fighting alone) was undisputed (particularly the aerial and terrestrial superiority)...

Um, the German numerical superiority was only on the ground and in selected areas in the air for transient periods.

In the period Admiral Raeder presented his Strategy German numerical superiority against the British was not only on the ground but also in the air (and after the Axis closing the Gibraltar straits, the Royal Navy would have had very little to say in the Mediterranean). Balcans campaign showed it all. No further debate about it for HONEST and well-informed people. You choose your style of life, Richard...

Yes, and also the crippling effects of the battles in Norway, Denmark, France, and Britain from April-September 194o, which you just ignored again.

Oh, and yes, BTW, "air filters" in the tropics were a real thing and a real problem, both for German aircraft and ground vehicles of all types.

Just ridiculous. Luftwaffe had not many problems to be effective in North Africa in spite of coming hastily to save the italians (not to conquer Suez, indeed). Technical problems were minor problems and you know perfectly that they were solved. At the most, that could have delayed the outcome some weeks. Not a serious objection. Nothing to do with a debate on strategy. Norway, France? They confronted powerful enemies then. But at the time of Raeder proposal, the only force the british had was, practically, a colonial army. Efficient against the italians, or the Iraqui or Vichy France... but nothing to do against the german mobile forces at that time. As you know well. As happened in the Balcans. As it would have happened in Egypt... if Rommel would have got the resources for that (but at that time the Eastern Front was the priority...). No further discussion required...

Refutations are interesting

Interesting for you? I don´t think so. Now you have it... It was very easy... But... you knew all this before, didn´t you?

This forum should be a place for a serious exchange of information concerning historical items and I wanted to learn something about why Hitler dismissed the Mediterranean strategy proposed by Raeder in september 1940.

Really? Your initial post was "That was the right strategy they missed (fortunately):

An advance from Suez through Palestine and Syria as far as Turkey is necessary. If we reach that point, Turkey will be in our power. The Russian problem will then appear in a different light ... It is doubtful whether an advance against Russia from the north will be necessary"

That is not an attempt to learn something.

That was the right strategy because, in hindsight, we know today that it was workable -you know it too, Richard- and the british could not have prevented it. But that was not so clear at that time. That strategy was dismissed in favor of "Barbarrosa" (and in favor of the "Blitz" over England, earlier). Why? That is what I wanted to learn...

The same way, we know today that, for the japanese, the right strategy was landing in Ceylon and Madagascar in April 1942... but the japanese did´t know what was expecting them in Midway two monts later... Obviously, Hitler didn´t care much at the end of 1940 -as "Barbarrosa" was decided- about what happened to Napoleon in Russia in 1812. More... I don´t know.

Simply, you, Richard, are not interested in discussing strategy. So, what are you doing in this sub-forum on Strategy? Just for fun? Good, let´s have fun...

[David Thompson]

Everyone -- Please try to keep your posts civil, per forum rules.