German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Counter
Member
Posts: 101
Joined: 01 Mar 2019 16:48
Location: Europe

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 25 Feb 2022 22:06

Peter89 wrote:Are you a Wehrmacht fan or something?
Nope. Only honest and well informed :)

According to you, the germans after conquering France were about surrender...
Peter89 wrote:Luftwaffe was critically weak at the end of 1940
Sure. That´s why they were destroying the british cities and the brits were unable to do the same in Germany (in 1942 they could make it...)
Peter89 wrote: Tactical air superiority was won from time to time, but it had its ebbs and flows.
Obviously, depending on the capacity of the forces sent to the front. In winter 1940/41 Axis could have stablished a total superiority in North Africa if that would have been the strategical priority.
Peter89 wrote:Long story short: no extra 10, 20 or 50 divisions could be sustained in NA, and not extra Luftflotten. It was a combined arms operation theater too.
It is enough to count the forces were kept in NA actually: at the time of the battle of Tunis, nearly 30 divisions... :roll:

I think that is enough, certainly. Be happy, Peter...

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 26 Feb 2022 09:22

Counter wrote:
25 Feb 2022 22:06
Peter89 wrote:Are you a Wehrmacht fan or something?
Nope. Only honest and well informed :)

According to you, the germans after conquering France were about surrender...
Peter89 wrote:Luftwaffe was critically weak at the end of 1940
Sure. That´s why they were destroying the british cities and the brits were unable to do the same in Germany (in 1942 they could make it...)
Peter89 wrote: Tactical air superiority was won from time to time, but it had its ebbs and flows.
Obviously, depending on the capacity of the forces sent to the front. In winter 1940/41 Axis could have stablished a total superiority in North Africa if that would have been the strategical priority.
Peter89 wrote:Long story short: no extra 10, 20 or 50 divisions could be sustained in NA, and not extra Luftflotten. It was a combined arms operation theater too.
It is enough to count the forces were kept in NA actually: at the time of the battle of Tunis, nearly 30 divisions... :roll:

I think that is enough, certainly. Be happy, Peter...
Usually I am, especially when I am spared of a lengthy exercise in futility. Thank you.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5572
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 27 Feb 2022 16:38

Peter89 wrote:
25 Feb 2022 17:41
Are you a Wehrmacht fan or something?
The Luftwaffe was capable - barely - of replacing its frontline strength about two times per year. The 1,700 German aircraft lost in the Battle of Britain represented about 40% of its frontline strength. These numbers suggest that the Battle of Britain in its most intensive phase was beyond the tempo of the Luftwaffe to sustain.
Germany could not divert endless forces to Africa because of the weak logistical system. In fact they operated too much units for most of the time (the quality of the equipment could be improved tho).
Germany could not mass the necessary logistics in the Mediterranean under a Barbarossa strategy. Whether it could have done it without war in the East, this is not so easily determined.
The Luftwaffe never "dominated" North Africa. You don't seem to grasp the essentials of air supremacy. Tactical air superiority was won from time to time, but it had its ebbs and flows.
The Luftwaffe never dominated in Africa, that is true. Then again, the Luftwaffe in Africa was never more than a small fraction of total LW strength, so your argument is hardly convincing. From a question of the logistics balance, one of the problems is that the types of longer ranged bombers of the Luftwaffe were never committed in strength to the war in Africa. It's not clear that if subjected to heavy, sustained, night bombing raids on the three key British logistical nodes - Alexandria, Port Said, Port Suez - would leave the British in position to deliver the level of supply necessary to ward off the Afrika Korps.
Luftwaffe was critically weak at the end of 1940, and only partially recuperated by the time Barbarossa began. The quality of the pilots was already lower than one year before, and operational circumstances in the MTO were to eat their combat readiness alive
.

The idea that the strain on Luftwaffe resources undertaken for Barbarossa were less than what would have been the case for a massive Axis campaign in the Med in 1941 instead is absurd on its face.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 27 Feb 2022 19:59

glenn239 wrote:
27 Feb 2022 16:38
Peter89 wrote:
25 Feb 2022 17:41
Are you a Wehrmacht fan or something?
The Luftwaffe was capable - barely - of replacing its frontline strength about two times per year. The 1,700 German aircraft lost in the Battle of Britain represented about 40% of its frontline strength. These numbers suggest that the Battle of Britain in its most intensive phase was beyond the tempo of the Luftwaffe to sustain.
Even the Westfeldzug and the Weserübung was beyond the replenishment capacity of the Luftwaffe - but we tend to ignore that in face of the convincing results.

What a lot of people do not understand in this forum is that to operate a complex and needy weapon system like an air force, it requires more than joggling with geschwaders and divisions and numbers. You can't redeploy all frontline unit to another theater of operations where the ground echelon and the supply options are weak. Some types were utterly unsuited for certain temperatures, like the Do 217 was famous not being operable in the Arctic. One just have to read the reports (which I do a lot in the past half a year or so) of the ground echelon staff and officiers who faced another climate in a week. It doesn't work like that. Also, if a maintenance unit had knowledge, tools and spare parts for, let's say, He 111, they could not service a Me 109 Gruppe with full proficiency.

Also the Luftwaffe was not able to replace twice its numbers in a year with matching quality in the Mediterranean theater - not even in 1940/1941. The Germans could do that, let's say, in the defense of Germany.
glenn239 wrote:
27 Feb 2022 16:38
Germany could not divert endless forces to Africa because of the weak logistical system. In fact they operated too much units for most of the time (the quality of the equipment could be improved tho).
Germany could not mass the necessary logistics in the Mediterranean under a Barbarossa strategy. Whether it could have done it without war in the East, this is not so easily determined.
Any other strategy than the Barbarossa one would consist of a series of operations that make such predictions dangerously volatile. But in any case, without Gibraltar, there was no chance to unite the Atlantic and the Mediterranean forces, thus: the naval supply to Africa would be by and large the same. Even if the Germans send 30 divisions to Africa, they could not build ports with a snap of a finger, and the air transport there was very minimal. Extra forces in North Africa would starve of supplies, and eventually lose combat readiness.
glenn239 wrote:
27 Feb 2022 16:38
The Luftwaffe never "dominated" North Africa. You don't seem to grasp the essentials of air supremacy. Tactical air superiority was won from time to time, but it had its ebbs and flows.
The Luftwaffe never dominated in Africa, that is true. Then again, the Luftwaffe in Africa was never more than a small fraction of total LW strength, so your argument is hardly convincing. From a question of the logistics balance, one of the problems is that the types of longer ranged bombers of the Luftwaffe were never committed in strength to the war in Africa. It's not clear that if subjected to heavy, sustained, night bombing raids on the three key British logistical nodes - Alexandria, Port Said, Port Suez - would leave the British in position to deliver the level of supply necessary to ward off the Afrika Korps.
There were two possibilities to bomb Alexandria: from the Agean Islands and from Africa itself. The latter option could be ruled out immediately because it would place an extra burden on the already overburdened shipping there. The former was done OTL and it is questionable how much more could be done. Bombing of that nature is overrated, and the defense against it always held the upper hand.

The only possibility, in my mind, is that Germany capitalizes on the situation that was brewing in the Middle East in the spring of 1941; the Suez could be taken by a two pronged attack, if overwhelming forces would be available. Only by opening up another LOC and the use of local resources (including that 4000t of POL and another 100,000t crude with a working refinery), foodstuff, heavy weapons, etc. could do the trick. Nothing less, and even this one is questionable.
glenn239 wrote:
27 Feb 2022 16:38
Luftwaffe was critically weak at the end of 1940, and only partially recuperated by the time Barbarossa began. The quality of the pilots was already lower than one year before, and operational circumstances in the MTO were to eat their combat readiness alive
.

The idea that the strain on Luftwaffe resources undertaken for Barbarossa were less than what would have been the case for a massive Axis campaign in the Med in 1941 instead is absurd on its face.
The thing that is absurd is the idea that all the aircrafts at Barbarossa are 1:1 redeployable to the MTO. They are not, and not simply for maintenance / ground echelon reasons. They could not be supplied, stationed, dispersed, etc. on airfields, besides: a lot of Luftwaffe aircrafts would simply be inoperable, because their range did not allow them to be operated anywhere else than in Africa, meaning, Germany could not redeploy all its Me 109s there.

Of course, only a small part of the forces earmarked for the gargantuan effort of the eastern front could mean a lot in the MTO (mostly in equipment), but to operate those units effectively and to bring their real power to bear would require airfields, bases, supply, etc. so the whole apparatus of warmaking via air.

Again, no such options existed, not even theoretically, anywhere else than in the Vichy Levant/Iraq.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

glenn239
Member
Posts: 5572
Joined: 29 Apr 2005 01:20
Location: Ontario, Canada

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by glenn239 » 27 Feb 2022 22:15

What a lot of people do not understand in this forum is that to operate a complex and needy weapon system like an air force, it requires more than joggling with geschwaders and divisions and numbers. You can't redeploy all frontline unit to another theater of operations where the ground echelon and the supply options are weak.
Rule#1 of internet discussions. If the simple conclusion is not satisfactory, seek complexity.

The general rule of thumb is that the German air force was capable of losing about 9,000 aircraft a year and retain capability. In 1941, the big commitment was Barbarossa which absorbed roughly 3,000 losses by the end of the year. No Barbarossa, there is no reason whatsoever to conclude that a Southern offensive would be beyond German resources.

Also the Luftwaffe was not able to replace twice its numbers in a year with matching quality in the Mediterranean theater - not even in 1940/1941. The Germans could do that, let's say, in the defense of Germany.
They could replace twice a year at acceptable quality.
Any other strategy than the Barbarossa one would consist of a series of operations that make such predictions dangerously volatile. But in any case, without Gibraltar, there was no chance to unite the Atlantic and the Mediterranean forces, thus: the naval supply to Africa would be by and large the same. Even if the Germans send 30 divisions to Africa, they could not build ports with a snap of a finger, and the air transport there was very minimal. Extra forces in North Africa would starve of supplies, and eventually lose combat readiness.
I'm not optimistic of British chances in Egypt if Barbarossa does not occur. Then again, even if Egypt falls Torch should succeed, so how does it matter?


There were two possibilities to bomb Alexandria: from the Agean Islands and from Africa itself. The latter option could be ruled out immediately because it would place an extra burden on the already overburdened shipping there. The former was done OTL and it is questionable how much more could be done. Bombing of that nature is overrated, and the defense against it always held the upper hand.
There is also the question of Cyprus, whose fate is not so clear in a non-Barbarossa scenario. There is no doubt but that a sustained night bombing and mining, (Suez Canal) campaign would be a serious - perhaps fatal- impediment to British logistics, but historically with the war in the East, the forces simply were never available.

In terms of air forces in Africa, the assertion that this was a non-starter due to competing demand for supply is true, but needs to be qualified. The advantage of air power was that it could draw supply not far from the Benghazi, without the need for it to be dragged hundreds of miles to the front.

The only possibility, in my mind, is that Germany capitalizes on the situation that was brewing in the Middle East in the spring of 1941; the Suez could be taken by a two pronged attack, if overwhelming forces would be available. Only by opening up another LOC and the use of local resources (including that 4000t of POL and another 100,000t crude with a working refinery), foodstuff, heavy weapons, etc. could do the trick. Nothing less, and even this one is questionable.
If Raeder had succeeded and the main attack was in the south, I think the smart bet is that Egypt falls. But just because Egypt fell does not mean that anything of significance would have occurred in terms of the overall trajectory of the war. The fact remains that with the US intervention the initiative in Africa passes to the Allies, so even if the 8th Army was thrown out of Egypt, British sea supply would sustain it and American intervention would lead to Egypt being retaken during 1943.
The thing that is absurd is the idea that all the aircrafts at Barbarossa are 1:1 redeployable to the MTO.
Nobody said they were. The question is whether the Luftwaffe in 1941 could sustain the attrition of a NA campaign without Barbarossa. The answer is, obviously, yes.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 27 Feb 2022 23:01

glenn239 wrote:
27 Feb 2022 22:15
What a lot of people do not understand in this forum is that to operate a complex and needy weapon system like an air force, it requires more than joggling with geschwaders and divisions and numbers. You can't redeploy all frontline unit to another theater of operations where the ground echelon and the supply options are weak.
Rule#1 of internet discussions. If the simple conclusion is not satisfactory, seek complexity.

The general rule of thumb is that the German air force was capable of losing about 9,000 aircraft a year and retain capability. In 1941, the big commitment was Barbarossa which absorbed roughly 3,000 losses by the end of the year. No Barbarossa, there is no reason whatsoever to conclude that a Southern offensive would be beyond German resources.

Also the Luftwaffe was not able to replace twice its numbers in a year with matching quality in the Mediterranean theater - not even in 1940/1941. The Germans could do that, let's say, in the defense of Germany.
They could replace twice a year at acceptable quality.
Any other strategy than the Barbarossa one would consist of a series of operations that make such predictions dangerously volatile. But in any case, without Gibraltar, there was no chance to unite the Atlantic and the Mediterranean forces, thus: the naval supply to Africa would be by and large the same. Even if the Germans send 30 divisions to Africa, they could not build ports with a snap of a finger, and the air transport there was very minimal. Extra forces in North Africa would starve of supplies, and eventually lose combat readiness.
I'm not optimistic of British chances in Egypt if Barbarossa does not occur. Then again, even if Egypt falls Torch should succeed, so how does it matter?


There were two possibilities to bomb Alexandria: from the Agean Islands and from Africa itself. The latter option could be ruled out immediately because it would place an extra burden on the already overburdened shipping there. The former was done OTL and it is questionable how much more could be done. Bombing of that nature is overrated, and the defense against it always held the upper hand.
There is also the question of Cyprus, whose fate is not so clear in a non-Barbarossa scenario. There is no doubt but that a sustained night bombing and mining, (Suez Canal) campaign would be a serious - perhaps fatal- impediment to British logistics, but historically with the war in the East, the forces simply were never available.

In terms of air forces in Africa, the assertion that this was a non-starter due to competing demand for supply is true, but needs to be qualified. The advantage of air power was that it could draw supply not far from the Benghazi, without the need for it to be dragged hundreds of miles to the front.

The only possibility, in my mind, is that Germany capitalizes on the situation that was brewing in the Middle East in the spring of 1941; the Suez could be taken by a two pronged attack, if overwhelming forces would be available. Only by opening up another LOC and the use of local resources (including that 4000t of POL and another 100,000t crude with a working refinery), foodstuff, heavy weapons, etc. could do the trick. Nothing less, and even this one is questionable.
If Raeder had succeeded and the main attack was in the south, I think the smart bet is that Egypt falls. But just because Egypt fell does not mean that anything of significance would have occurred in terms of the overall trajectory of the war. The fact remains that with the US intervention the initiative in Africa passes to the Allies, so even if the 8th Army was thrown out of Egypt, British sea supply would sustain it and American intervention would lead to Egypt being retaken during 1943.
The thing that is absurd is the idea that all the aircrafts at Barbarossa are 1:1 redeployable to the MTO.
Nobody said they were. The question is whether the Luftwaffe in 1941 could sustain the attrition of a NA campaign without Barbarossa. The answer is, obviously, yes.
Glenn, just please answer one question.

How does significantly more supplies reach the front in North Africa, if there was no Barbarossa?

Without Gibraltar, there would be no extra ships; there would be no extra ports, there would be no overland railroad, etc.

The things that could improve:
- more air transport (from 25t/d it could rose to 100t/d)
- more trucks
- better supplies.

Not nearly enough to take Suez.

The idea that a bombing campaign could disrupt British efforts in the Suez is... well, like other ideas where bombers were sent on their own without escort for heavily dispersed, well-defended, predictable targets.

I also disagree with your notion that Egypt's fall was kind of irrelevant; on the contrary, actually, it was the lynchpin that held British possessions together. If Egypt falls in 1941, then Sudan would be untenable and the IEA might be relieved. Moreover, the link could be established to Vichy France and Iraq, thus securing oil, refineries, bases, etc.

What you write about the Luftwaffe's replenishment capacity and complexity is also kind of not correct. You can judge me that I dig to deep into complexity, but when ground service had a decisive effect on operational readiness, then what should I do?

The Luftwaffe did not retain its numerical strength and acceptable crew quality in 1941 because it was an inherent nature of their production and training system. The contributing factors were that they captured great stocks of avgas and that their pilot training programs for the pilots coming out in 1941 started over a year earlier. Only when operations were minimal could the Luftwaffe save any avgas and maintain its authorized / actual strength ratio. Also, for example, the ground crew schools trained much more students in 1940 than in 1939, but the result would not be a great improvement in ground echelons, because now they had to cover most of the European continent. To understand this, during the Westfeldzug, the LW needed 80-100 ground personnel to keep one aircraft in operable condition; during the winter of 1941/1942, it was around 250. It is safe to say that it required at least twice as many ground personnel to keep an aircraft airborne in North Africa or in the Russian winter than in Central Europe.

Long story short, it was possible to increase the German air power in the MTO in absence of the Ostfront, but not so easily
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4822
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Feb 2022 23:19

glenn239 wrote:
27 Feb 2022 22:15
Rule#1 of internet discussions. If the simple conclusion is not satisfactory, seek complexity.
Rule #2 of internet discussion. If the complex conclusion is not satisfactory, seek simplicity. Thus, the internet can be all things to all people.
The general rule of thumb is that the German air force was capable of losing about 9,000 aircraft a year and retain capability.
I'm curious, but whose rule of thumb is that? The Germans consistently produced more aircraft than they lost on operations, but they did not retain capability.
In 1941, the big commitment was Barbarossa which absorbed roughly 3,000 losses by the end of the year. No Barbarossa, there is no reason whatsoever to conclude that a Southern offensive would be beyond German resources.
Around 2,521-3,115 depending on sources, but that they are not lost in Barbarossa does not mean they would not be lost.
They could replace twice a year at acceptable quality.
Again, who says?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 4822
Joined: 01 Jan 2016 21:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Richard Anderson » 28 Feb 2022 02:19

Not to put too fine a point on it, but the actual figures are:

1 Sep-31 Dec 1939
Average Operational strength - 3,448 (start 3,699, end 3,237)
Total Losses - 437
Total Production - 5,396 (entire year)

1 Jan-31 Dec 1940
Average Operational Strength - 3,271 (start 3,121, end 2,857)
Total Losses - 4,445
Total Production - 7,571
Producing 1.7 aircraft per loss and a strength decline of c. 9.2%

1 Jan 41-31 Dec 1941
Average Operational Strength - 2,962 (start 2,772, end 2,571)
Total Losses - 5,145
Total Production - 8,565
Producing 1.7 aircraft per loss and a strength decline of c. 7.3%

1 Jan-31 Dec 1942
Average Operational Strength - 3,133 (start 2,301, end 3,054)
Total Losses - 6,989
Total Production - 12,304
Producing 1.8 aircraft per loss and a strength increase c. 25%

1 Jan-31 Dec 1943
Average Operational Strength - 4,082 (start 3,088, end 4,702)
Total Losses - 11,216
Total Production - 21,368
Producing 1.9 aircraft per loss and a strength increase of c. 34.5%
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 28 Feb 2022 09:46

Instead of reaching a dead end with the discussion, here's my two cents on this topic.

I think it was impossible to relocate all Eastern Front aircraft to the MTO. But relocating some units could tip the scale in that theater. Note that the forces sent against Greece - and especially against Crete - lacked their full equipment, most notably their signals equipment, thus their full combat potential. Also the swap 5th GJ - 22nd Air Landing division undermined German potential in operations that were relevant for the MTO. And I could go on and on.

In my opinion, the attack against Suez could not be won from the West alone. It might be won in 1940, were the Italian preparations adequate, but they weren't. After that, every single day favored the British and disfavored the Axis.

The British spent 1941 with the exact operations that eliminated the chance of an Axis victory: IEA, Iraq, Levant, Iran, etc. The only exception was the Greek expedition, which coincided with the Iraqi rebellion and the Paris Protocols, all of which was not dramatic alone, but together they set the British off-balance. Nothing, in my opinion could be as beneficial for the Axis in 1941 as the established infrastructure northeast of the Suez base; it is also worth to note that supplies (both military and basic) and the Levant Army and the Iraqi Army were there, too.

The greatest German mistake in 1941 was not that they didn't launch their "200 divisions" across the sea and across North Africa, but that they did not airlift a few divisions into this zone and they did not relocate a few wings there. Heck, even to allow Darlan to reinforce the Levant in time could do half of the trick. Not to mention that they even ran supply runs on the sea, too.

Mr. Churchill also realized this and that is why he acted decisively and with remarkable speed, overriding his C-in-C, sending a hodgepodge of half-trained and half-equipped units into this region, which became experienced formations by the next year with all Axis hope gone.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Counter
Member
Posts: 101
Joined: 01 Mar 2019 16:48
Location: Europe

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 28 Feb 2022 14:59

All this question about the admiral Raeder´s proposal (Mediterranean plan 1940) would stay incomplete if not adding:
Peter89 wrote:The thing that is absurd is the idea that all the aircrafts at Barbarossa are 1:1 redeployable to the MTO.
As a matter of fact, not only "absurd", but also unnecesary. As it was innecesary to deploy 200 german divisions. But there were resources enough to conquer easily the Mediterranean coastline previous to the 1941 summer only against the forces of the British Empire that at that time was fighting alone. Probability 99%.

The logical date to start would be January 1941, as it was estimated in the "Operation Felix " (seizure of Gibraltar Straits) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Felix

Every pedantry on "air-filters" or "ground echelon" about unsurmountable inconvenients is just ridiculous. These are technical problems that military officers resolve as they are supposed to do, and those problems affected both german and british.
Peter89 wrote:Even if the Germans send 30 divisions to Africa, they could not build ports with a snap of a finger,
Also ridiculous writing about "snap of a finger" (as about landing 200 divisions or as about moving 1:1 the Barbarrosa Luftwaffe forces to the Mediterranean). Germans conquered Benghazi and Tobruk ports, they did their job and the ports got operational at the time it was possible to make it.

It can be debatable whether at any time Luftwaffe reached dominance in NA for some time or not. But they did make it in Crete and the Balcans and in Malta for some time. It was also perfectly possible to make it too if not "Barbarrosa". No doubt.

The same about diplomatic negotiations or Protocols... If the germans (Allies sometimes too, of course) required urgently some strategic position to occupy, that was done as long as that goal was possible to reach. As they did in Tunis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_for_Tunis#Axis

Surprisingly (well, surprisingly for anyone not knowing Peter89 :) ) Peter sees as possible for the Axis to occupy Levant at the time of the Iraqui rebellion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_War . Maybe, but much riskier, as it was the campaing of Norway, due to the Royal Navy supremacy.

Every discussion must start from some realistic historical view...

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 28 Feb 2022 17:09

Counter wrote:
28 Feb 2022 14:59
All this question about the admiral Raeder´s proposal (Mediterranean plan 1940) would stay incomplete if not adding:
Peter89 wrote:The thing that is absurd is the idea that all the aircrafts at Barbarossa are 1:1 redeployable to the MTO.
As a matter of fact, not only "absurd", but also unnecesary. As it was innecesary to deploy 200 german divisions. But there were resources enough to conquer easily the Mediterranean coastline previous to the 1941 summer only against the forces of the British Empire that at that time was fighting alone. Probability 99%.

The logical date to start would be January 1941, as it was estimated in the "Operation Felix " (seizure of Gibraltar Straits) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Felix

Every pedantry on "air-filters" or "ground echelon" about unsurmountable inconvenients is just ridiculous. These are technical problems that military officers resolve as they are supposed to do, and those problems affected both german and british.
Peter89 wrote:Even if the Germans send 30 divisions to Africa, they could not build ports with a snap of a finger,
Also ridiculous writing about "snap of a finger" (as about landing 200 divisions or as about moving 1:1 the Barbarrosa Luftwaffe forces to the Mediterranean). Germans conquered Benghazi and Tobruk ports, they did their job and the ports got operational at the time it was possible to make it.

It can be debatable whether at any time Luftwaffe reached dominance in NA for some time or not. But they did make it in Crete and the Balcans and in Malta for some time. It was also perfectly possible to make it too if not "Barbarrosa". No doubt.

The same about diplomatic negotiations or Protocols... If the germans (Allies sometimes too, of course) required urgently some strategic position to occupy, that was done as long as that goal was possible to reach. As they did in Tunis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Run_for_Tunis#Axis

Surprisingly (well, surprisingly for anyone not knowing Peter89 :) ) Peter sees as possible for the Axis to occupy Levant at the time of the Iraqui rebellion https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Iraqi_War . Maybe, but much riskier, as it was the campaing of Norway, due to the Royal Navy supremacy.

Every discussion must start from some realistic historical view...
You don't seem to have even a basic knowledge of what was going on in NA/ME. The Levant did not need to be captured by the Axis.

Equalling the unopposed landing in Tunis with a journey from Morocco to Suez through a hostile territory is just another sign your deficiencies do not stop at diplomacy.

Just write your alternate history and don't mind the facts.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Counter
Member
Posts: 101
Joined: 01 Mar 2019 16:48
Location: Europe

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 28 Feb 2022 19:03

Just to make it short: what I meant about Tunis was related to "diplomacy". Nazi troops landed in Tunis unopposed 9 november 1942. They did not negotiate anything with Vichy, no pact, no treaty no protocols of any sort. That was AFTER the Rommel´s defeat in El Alamein! Just threat and imposition. The same happenned as germans advanced unopposed into Greece -through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria... the yugoslavian exceptional case can be explained.

The same could happen too on 1940/41 if Hitler wanted to conquer Egypt from Gibraltar (from other places too) and then NA and then surrounding the USSR from the south (maritime flank)

Another useful analogy:

at the time Rommel defeated the british in Gazala and Tobruk (june 1942) the RAF heavily bombed Koln

at the time Hitler could have started the conquest of the whole Mediterranean (January 1941) the germans were heavily bombing Liverpool and London

These are the important facts,

And I agree the british commited very few mistakes instead of the absurd Hitler bet on "Barbarrosa". That´s the point.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 28 Feb 2022 19:06

Counter wrote:
28 Feb 2022 19:03
Just to make it short: what I meant about Tunis was related to "diplomacy". Nazi troops landed in Tunis unopposed 9 november 1942. They did not negotiate anything with Vichy, no pact, no treaty no protocols of any sort. That was AFTER the Rommel´s defeat in El Alamein! Just threat and imposition. The same happenned as germans advanced unopposed into Greece -through Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria... the yugoslavian exceptional case can be explained.
You truly believe that German troops "advanced" in Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria "unopposed"? So you think that they did not have the right and the cooperation to be in those countries?
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Counter
Member
Posts: 101
Joined: 01 Mar 2019 16:48
Location: Europe

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 28 Feb 2022 22:50

What I mean, obviously, is that Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had no choice but allow the germans to pass through their countries in Spring 1941. Poor prime minister Teleki, in Hungary, shot himself.

The same would have happened if Hitler would have intimidated Franco to reach Gibraltar (but Franco would have never shot himself!). And you see what happened with the Vichy french in Tunis... even by the end of 1942.

The yugoslavian exception: neutralist yugoslavian officials did a coup 27 March 1941. They did so because they expected to be protected by the Russians and because British power in the area was apparently increasing (big italian defeat in Africa, british landings in Greece...) So they expected that neutrality was possible.

Nothing of the kind was similar to the situation in the Mediterranean area by January 1941.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 1600
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 28 Feb 2022 22:59

Counter wrote:
28 Feb 2022 22:50
What I mean, obviously, is that Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria had no choice but allow the germans to pass through their countries in Spring 1941. Poor prime minister Teleki, in Hungary, shot himself.

The same would have happened if Hitler would have intimidated Franco to reach Gibraltar (but Franco would have never shot himself!). And you see what happened with the Vichy french in Tunis... even by the end of 1942.

The yugoslavian exception: neutralist yugoslavian officials did a coup 27 March 1941. They did so because they expected to be protected by the Russians and because British power in the area was apparently increasing (big italian defeat in Africa, british landings in Greece...) So they expected that neutrality was possible.

Nothing of the kind was similar to the situation in the Mediterranean area by January 1941.
Do you realize how Germany maneuvered in this area well before it sent any troops?

Do you realize how different that was from the Reich's relation to Spain or to Vichy France?
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”