German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

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Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 24 May 2022 21:00

ijadw wrote:In 1939 Japan produced 2,3 million barrels, imported from the US 27,2 million and from the DEI+ Borneo 4,8 million and from other countries 1.5 million barrels .
The DEI produced in 1939 48,4 million barrels .
Thus, if US stopped to sell oil,Japan could easily import oil from the DEI who were much closer than Iran .
on July 26, 1941, Roosevelt “froze Japanese assets in the United States, thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end. One week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan.”[2] The British and the Dutch followed suit, embargoing exports to Japan from their colonies in southeast Asia.
https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=1930

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by pugsville » 24 May 2022 23:06

ljadw wrote:
24 May 2022 11:19
About Japan getting oil from Iran/Iraq (post 265 ) : why did Japan not import such oil before 1939 ? Was it not because of the distances ? ( If my memory still works, Japan had not that many oil tankers .)
In 1939 Japan produced 2,3 million barrels, imported from the US 27,2 million and from the DEI+ Borneo 4,8 million and from other countries 1.5 million barrels .
The DEI produced in 1939 48,4 million barrels .
Thus, if US stopped to sell oil,Japan could easily import oil from the DEI who were much closer than Iran .
(a) the NEI would almost certainly tow the same line as the US. Si no it could just import oil from the NEI.

(b) Imports form the US almost certainly used US tankers. They probably are not available,.

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 25 May 2022 00:00

pugsville wrote:Imports form the US almost certainly used US tankers. They probably are not available,.
Just before their attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had only 49 merchant tankers of about 587,000 tons and the IJN had but nine slow fleet oilers. Despite its prewar stockpiling of two years of petroleum products, Japan had to rely on imports from its conquered South Asia territories for survival.
Like all navies, oil was the lifeblood of the IJN. As a result, the IJN requisitioned 77 merchant ships from their owners for conversion to auxiliary oilers (Yusosen). In late 1942, due to shortage of tankers necessary to meet war time demand for oil and gasoline, some cargo ships and ore carriers were converted to temporary tankers during their construction. Twenty existing passenger-cargo ships were converted to emergency tankers called Ohkyu Yusosen.


http://www.combinedfleet.com/Yusosen.htm

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 06:44

pugsville wrote:
24 May 2022 23:06
ljadw wrote:
24 May 2022 11:19
About Japan getting oil from Iran/Iraq (post 265 ) : why did Japan not import such oil before 1939 ? Was it not because of the distances ? ( If my memory still works, Japan had not that many oil tankers .)
In 1939 Japan produced 2,3 million barrels, imported from the US 27,2 million and from the DEI+ Borneo 4,8 million and from other countries 1.5 million barrels .
The DEI produced in 1939 48,4 million barrels .
Thus, if US stopped to sell oil,Japan could easily import oil from the DEI who were much closer than Iran .
(a) the NEI would almost certainly tow the same line as the US. Si no it could just import oil from the NEI.

(b) Imports form the US almost certainly used US tankers. They probably are not available,.
(b) is questionable as it would mean the bankruptcy of of the companies who owned the tankers and it would also hurt the oil companies .
I would not be that certain about the reaction of the authorities in the DEI. They needed to sell oil and in the HTL they were selling 10 % of their oil production to Japan .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 06:48

Counter wrote:
24 May 2022 21:00
ijadw wrote:In 1939 Japan produced 2,3 million barrels, imported from the US 27,2 million and from the DEI+ Borneo 4,8 million and from other countries 1.5 million barrels .
The DEI produced in 1939 48,4 million barrels .
Thus, if US stopped to sell oil,Japan could easily import oil from the DEI who were much closer than Iran .
on July 26, 1941, Roosevelt “froze Japanese assets in the United States, thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end. One week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan.”[2] The British and the Dutch followed suit, embargoing exports to Japan from their colonies in southeast Asia.
https://www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=1930
''bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end '' : that is a very big exaggeration : trade between US and Japan continued, but to a lesser extent .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 10:58

About the oil of the DEI :in November 1940 a Japanese delegation went to Djakarta and asked for more oil.
The Dutch authorities said that they were willing to sell 14,5 million barrels but the Japanese demanded 22 million.
22 million is an increase of 17,2 million but not sufficient to replace the imports from the US which were in 1939 27,2 million barrels ;
Why did the Dutch refuse to sell 22 million barrels and why did the Japanese not ask for 27 million ?
All this proves also that an increase,before PH, of oil imports from the ME is a non sequitur :
1 There was no way that the Germans could capture the oil wells of Iran before PH and restore their production .
2 It was also impossible that Japan could transport 3,5 million ton of oil back to Japan .Japan did not have the needed tankers and these tankers should be protected by the IJN,which means : NO PH .
Yamamoto could not at the same time and attack PH /Midway and protect the tankers who were sailing to and returning from Iran .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 25 May 2022 11:41

The thread seems to be derailed to a completely offtopic nonsense. If Germany captured oil fields in the Middle East, they would not let Japan to ship away that oil, which was an idiocy anyway, given the Japanese never controlled the Indian Ocean.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 14:12

One of the reasons that was given for the Germans going to Iraq/Iran was that Japan could use this oil to supply itself in a war with the US .It is of course an illusion, but so were the other reasons that were given .
There was nothing in the ME that could benefit Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain could do without this oil :from June 1940 to September 1943 Britain did not import oil from the ME,this oil was used only in NA/the ME because there was a war going on there .
There are a lot of people who lack historical perspective and think that because today the ME is important,it was also so EIGHTY years ago .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 25 May 2022 15:17

ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022 14:12
There was nothing in the ME that could benefit Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain could do without this oil :from June 1940 to September 1943 Britain did not import oil from the ME,this oil was used only in NA/the ME because there was a war going on there .
There are a lot of people who lack historical perspective and think that because today the ME is important,it was also so EIGHTY years ago .
Maybe it is you who lack historical perspective in this case. The ME oil was used by the British and the French, and both Germans and Italians competed for it in the 1930's. The US had shares there as well. The notion that "Britain did not import oil from the ME, it was used there" makes me wonder whether you are trolling or not.

Arguing like "Germany had more oil in 1943 than in 1940, but the military situation was worse in 1943, meaning: Germany didn't need oil" is as much insulting to historical perspective as to common sense.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 25 May 2022 15:49

Peter89 wrote:The thread seems to be derailed to a completely offtopic nonsense. If Germany captured oil fields in the Middle East, they would not let Japan to ship away that oil, which was an idiocy anyway, given the Japanese never controlled the Indian Ocean.
Apparently, the idea was conquering the whole Mediterranean as a way of gaining assets in a long war. Attacking the USSR was risky. Fighting Brittain in the air and in the see was inconclusive, costing much losses. Defeating the Royal Navy was possible if closing the Mediterranean by using the best arm the germans had: the overwhelming superiority of the Wehrmacht.

As the germans invaded Greece they got a new chance to defeat the British. Even risky aerial operations like Norway and Crete were successful. If the Germans invaded Spain, they would have got another chance to defeat the British. If reaching Middle East through Turkey... more British defeats coming.

Instead, the Rommel´s campaign in Libya was risky due to the problem of the supplies across the Mediterranean (Royal Navy and RAF again).

You must fight where you have advantages on your side.

If you are in the Middle East to defeat the British again and to close the Mediterranean, then you have the chance of capturing over 15 millions tons of oil annually which would change totally the economic situation of the Nazi Europe (you get also manpower and some other gains)...

What I added about maybe selling the Persian Gulf oil to Japan is another chance, but in September 1940 it didn´t happen yet the oil embargo -but it was thinkable to happen. Anyway, the Royal Navy would blockade the area.

Anyway, part of the idea was avoiding war against the USSR but coercing the Russians, particularly by controlling Turkey (and also, maybe, threatening the soviet muslim territories of Caucasus and Central Asia).

So, for me the interesting thing is how Stalin would have reacted if the Germans force the turks to let them pour all over the Middle East through Turkey.

-Declaring the war against the Axis?
-Not declaring war against the Axis, but invading Persia and Iraq... avoiding the Germans to seize the oilfields that they need?
-If invading Persia, accepting the chance of a local and limited war against Germany (something like the Mongolian clashes against Japan)?
-Doing nothing and wait...

About the United Kingdom, the problem is that it was a democratic country, with a powerful public opinion, and so many defeats in a row and seeing the idleness of the neutralist -if not isolationist- USA could have finally exhausted the will of keep fighting

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 16:00

Peter89 wrote:
25 May 2022 15:17
ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022 14:12
There was nothing in the ME that could benefit Germany, Italy, Japan and Britain could do without this oil :from June 1940 to September 1943 Britain did not import oil from the ME,this oil was used only in NA/the ME because there was a war going on there .
There are a lot of people who lack historical perspective and think that because today the ME is important,it was also so EIGHTY years ago .
Maybe it is you who lack historical perspective in this case. The ME oil was used by the British and the French, and both Germans and Italians competed for it in the 1930's. The US had shares there as well. The notion that "Britain did not import oil from the ME, it was used there" makes me wonder whether you are trolling or not.

Arguing like "Germany had more oil in 1943 than in 1940, but the military situation was worse in 1943, meaning: Germany didn't need oil" is as much insulting to historical perspective as to common sense.
We are talking about the war, NOT about the pre war period .Between June 1940 and September 1943 Britain did not import oil from the ME, the reason being the Italian DOW .
And I never said that Germany did not need oil, but I said that having more oil did not increase Germany's chances to win the war .
And I say that Germany did not lose the war because it had not enough oil.
And I say that the Allies did not win because they had more oil than Germany .
There is no automatism, no causal relation between oil production/consumption and winning/losing a war .Especially 80 years ago when oil was less important in peace time and in war time .
The USSR conquered Berlin although its oil production during the war was only 60 % of the prewar production .
The Taliban won in Afghanistan,although the US had much, much more oil available than them .
Russia is consuming more oil than Ukraine, but it is not winning .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 16:15

Counter wrote:
25 May 2022 15:49
Peter89 wrote:The thread seems to be derailed to a completely offtopic nonsense. If Germany captured oil fields in the Middle East, they would not let Japan to ship away that oil, which was an idiocy anyway, given the Japanese never controlled the Indian Ocean.
Apparently, the idea was conquering the whole Mediterranean as a way of gaining assets in a long war. Attacking the USSR was risky. Fighting Brittain in the air and in the see was inconclusive, costing much losses. Defeating the Royal Navy was possible if closing the Mediterranean by using the best arm the germans had: the overwhelming superiority of the Wehrmacht.

As the germans invaded Greece they got a new chance to defeat the British. Even risky aerial operations like Norway and Crete were successful. If the Germans invaded Spain, they would have got another chance to defeat the British. If reaching Middle East through Turkey... more British defeats coming.

Instead, the Rommel´s campaign in Libya was risky due to the problem of the supplies across the Mediterranean (Royal Navy and RAF again).

You must fight where you have advantages on your side.

If you are in the Middle East to defeat the British again and to close the Mediterranean, then you have the chance of capturing over 15 millions tons of oil annually which would change totally the economic situation of the Nazi Europe (you get also manpower and some other gains)...

What I added about maybe selling the Persian Gulf oil to Japan is another chance, but in September 1940 it didn´t happen yet the oil embargo -but it was thinkable to happen. Anyway, the Royal Navy would blockade the area.

Anyway, part of the idea was avoiding war against the USSR but coercing the Russians, particularly by controlling Turkey (and also, maybe, threatening the soviet muslim territories of Caucasus and Central Asia).

So, for me the interesting thing is how Stalin would have reacted if the Germans force the turks to let them pour all over the Middle East through Turkey.

-Declaring the war against the Axis?
-Not declaring war against the Axis, but invading Persia and Iraq... avoiding the Germans to seize the oilfields that they need?
-If invading Persia, accepting the chance of a local and limited war against Germany (something like the Mongolian clashes against Japan)?
-Doing nothing and wait...

About the United Kingdom, the problem is that it was a democratic country, with a powerful public opinion, and so many defeats in a row and seeing the idleness of the neutralist -if not isolationist- USA could have finally exhausted the will of keep fighting
1 Germany could not win a long war and it could not afford to win a long war .See WW 1 .
2 Attacking the USSR was risky ,but it was the only possible choice .
3 Germany could not close the Mediterranean,besides the Italians had already closed the Mediterranean, WITHOUT German help .
4 Invading Spain was suicidal ( see Napoleon ) and would also make the invasion of Turkey impossible .
5 The problem of transporting supplies over the Mediterranean is a myth : Italy won the battle of the convoys .
6 The only way to force Britain to give up before the US intervention was a short and fast campaign,which could only happen in Russia .
7 This campaign had only 0,001 % chance of success.
8 Even if it succeeded, Britain would not give up and US would nuke the German cities .
9 Conclusion : when Britain decided at the end of June 1940, Germany had lost the war .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 25 May 2022 17:39

ljadw wrote:
25 May 2022 16:15
Counter wrote:
25 May 2022 15:49
Peter89 wrote:The thread seems to be derailed to a completely offtopic nonsense. If Germany captured oil fields in the Middle East, they would not let Japan to ship away that oil, which was an idiocy anyway, given the Japanese never controlled the Indian Ocean.
Apparently, the idea was conquering the whole Mediterranean as a way of gaining assets in a long war. Attacking the USSR was risky. Fighting Brittain in the air and in the see was inconclusive, costing much losses. Defeating the Royal Navy was possible if closing the Mediterranean by using the best arm the germans had: the overwhelming superiority of the Wehrmacht.

As the germans invaded Greece they got a new chance to defeat the British. Even risky aerial operations like Norway and Crete were successful. If the Germans invaded Spain, they would have got another chance to defeat the British. If reaching Middle East through Turkey... more British defeats coming.

Instead, the Rommel´s campaign in Libya was risky due to the problem of the supplies across the Mediterranean (Royal Navy and RAF again).

You must fight where you have advantages on your side.

If you are in the Middle East to defeat the British again and to close the Mediterranean, then you have the chance of capturing over 15 millions tons of oil annually which would change totally the economic situation of the Nazi Europe (you get also manpower and some other gains)...

What I added about maybe selling the Persian Gulf oil to Japan is another chance, but in September 1940 it didn´t happen yet the oil embargo -but it was thinkable to happen. Anyway, the Royal Navy would blockade the area.

Anyway, part of the idea was avoiding war against the USSR but coercing the Russians, particularly by controlling Turkey (and also, maybe, threatening the soviet muslim territories of Caucasus and Central Asia).

So, for me the interesting thing is how Stalin would have reacted if the Germans force the turks to let them pour all over the Middle East through Turkey.

-Declaring the war against the Axis?
-Not declaring war against the Axis, but invading Persia and Iraq... avoiding the Germans to seize the oilfields that they need?
-If invading Persia, accepting the chance of a local and limited war against Germany (something like the Mongolian clashes against Japan)?
-Doing nothing and wait...

About the United Kingdom, the problem is that it was a democratic country, with a powerful public opinion, and so many defeats in a row and seeing the idleness of the neutralist -if not isolationist- USA could have finally exhausted the will of keep fighting
1 Germany could not win a long war and it could not afford to win a long war .See WW 1 .
2 Attacking the USSR was risky ,but it was the only possible choice .
3 Germany could not close the Mediterranean,besides the Italians had already closed the Mediterranean, WITHOUT German help .
4 Invading Spain was suicidal ( see Napoleon ) and would also make the invasion of Turkey impossible .
5 The problem of transporting supplies over the Mediterranean is a myth : Italy won the battle of the convoys .
6 The only way to force Britain to give up before the US intervention was a short and fast campaign,which could only happen in Russia .
7 This campaign had only 0,001 % chance of success.
8 Even if it succeeded, Britain would not give up and US would nuke the German cities .
9 Conclusion : when Britain decided at the end of June 1940, Germany had lost the war .
The lack of oil - unlike any raw material - seriously limited the operations and training programs of the Axis, and sent a rippling effect across the economy; moreover, it directly influenced diplomacy.

A Germany that was much less depending on Soviet imports and that had a strategic depth of defense might prove the Anglo Saxon powers a very hard nut to crack, especially with Marshall and Harris both pushing for dangerously ineffective and costly alternatives.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 19:42

When there was a shortage of oil,it was mostly caused by transport problems, not by production problems .Besides :production problems could be catched by the use of stocks .
And the influence of Soviet oil deliveries is much exaggerated( by Marxists,the ''von '' lobby and by US ''historians ").
In 1940 Germany produced( imports included ) 6,9 million ton of oil,of which 690000 were imported from Russia .
Round figures
January : not available
February : 43700
March : 27000
April : 24700
May :65000
June : 90000
Imports from February to July : 250000
There is no proof that without these imports,Fall Gelb and Fall Blau would have failed .
Romanian imports for January -July : 300000 tons .
For the whole year of 1940 Germany imported 690000 ton of oil from Russia and 1,040,000 from Romania .
About the influence on the training programs : this was mainly the case for the LW and here also the influence was exaggerated,because the post war German narratives tried to place the responsibility for the defeat of the LW on the oil production and to deny the role of the Allied Air Forces .
About the strategic depth of defense : defense was the worst strategy for Germany: it would lead inevitably to defeat .
Such a strategic depth would not prevent the nuking of the German cities .

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 25 May 2022 20:04

For those who dream of List going from Vienna to Tehran ( 4500 km ) : if Rommel could not go from Tripoli to Alexandria (2000 km ) ,why would List succeed ?

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