German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 09:17

Peter89 wrote:
23 May 2022 08:37
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14
The Mediterranean was not used already before the Italian DOW .
It was used, because to transport the oil from the Americas to the Eastern Med and Middle East would make no sense. That was the true strength of the British Empire: a worldwide network of resources, forces and strongpoints, making London capable to project power from Greece to Hong Kong.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

Germany could not rebuild the oil fields (Britain would destroy them ),
Over time they could, and that's where you and Counter are both wrong: the Mediterranean strategy, which was mostly a bunch of incohesive ideas and postwar literal invention, could not aim to pamper Germany with resources, but to establish a perimeter which the Allies could not break easily or at all.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

could not restart the production (they had no staff )
Yes, they could.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

could not transport the oil to Haifa (Britain would destroy the pipelines)
The importance of the pipelines is overrated, the pumpin stations mattered. But yes, the British would destroy those.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

,could not use Haifa ( Britain would destroy the port ),
Not so much the port, but the oil installations.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

could not transport the oil to Italy ( The Axis had not the needed tankers )
No, the correct question is: WHY would the Germans fight for Italian oil supply?
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

Italy could not unload and stock the oil at the port of Trieste,
It was not necessary to do it in one port, besides: it made no sense.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

the oil could not be transported from Trieste to Germany,
How so?
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

it is doubtful that Germany had the refine capacity for this oil,
It's not doubtful, it's clear that they had the capacity, the problem was that the idle refineries were mostly located on the Atlantic coast.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

Germany could not transport millions of additional oil to the front .
Using this scheme, the answer is obvious.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

And :last but not least :Germany did not need in 1941 the oil of the ME.
Yes they did.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

The oil problems on the Eastern front were not caused by production shortages,but by transport problems and more oil in the depots in Germany would not help the Ostheer ,neither would help more oil at the front .
There is no Eastern front in this scenario.

1 The oil of Iraq and Iran was used locally ,it was not transported to Britain .The reason was the Italian DOW .
2 '' Over time they could '' : Germany had no time .Look at the time Red Adair needed to stop the fires of the oil field of Kuwait .
3 If Germany needed the oil of the ME ,this oil had to be transported over the Mediterranean by tankers ,and there was already a shortage of tankers in the HTL.And if the ME was conqured ,why would Italy need/consume more oil ?
4 Trieste : there was no pipeline from Trieste to Germany, thus trains had to be used ,but there were no sufficient trains and not sufficient railway space : reason : every year 10 million tons of coal had to be transported from Germany to Italy .
5 Refineries on the Atlantic coast in France are not refineries in Germany : when the oil from the ME arrived in Germany, the Reichsbahn had to transport the oil to the French west coast and back to Germany .
6 If there was no war with the USSR in 1941 ,Germany would consume less oil , thus no need for the oil of the ME .Besides : this oil could not arrive in Germany in 1941 : it took Red Adair 8 months to stop the burning of the oil fields of Kuwait , it would take the Germans years to do it .
If there was a war in the east in 1941,Germany would not need this oil ( the Ostheer arrived at the suburbs of Moscow without the ME oil ) AND Germany could not transport hundreds of thousands more oil to the front ( it took them in the HTL already 3 weeks to transport oil to the front ).Barbarossa was conceived as a fast and short operation,and oil had nothing to do with it .
In 1940 ( NO war in the East and no ME oil ) the WM consumed 3 million tons of oil.
If there was no war in the East in 1941,why should the WM consume more oil?

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 23 May 2022 09:56

ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 09:17

1 The oil of Iraq and Iran was used locally ,it was not transported to Britain .The reason was the Italian DOW .
2 '' Over time they could '' : Germany had no time .Look at the time Red Adair needed to stop the fires of the oil field of Kuwait .
3 If Germany needed the oil of the ME ,this oil had to be transported over the Mediterranean by tankers ,and there was already a shortage of tankers in the HTL.And if the ME was conqured ,why would Italy need/consume more oil ?
4 Trieste : there was no pipeline from Trieste to Germany, thus trains had to be used ,but there were no sufficient trains and not sufficient railway space : reason : every year 10 million tons of coal had to be transported from Germany to Italy .
5 Refineries on the Atlantic coast in France are not refineries in Germany : when the oil from the ME arrived in Germany, the Reichsbahn had to transport the oil to the French west coast and back to Germany .
This is irrelevant, because the transport of the oil back and forth over continents made no sense, so no need to keep repeating things I've said myelf before. The only ways to use the ME oil was to use part of it locally and to transport some of it back to Italy via sea (because others had no refineries on the Mediterranean coast).
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 09:17
6 If there was no war with the USSR in 1941 ,Germany would consume less oil , thus no need for the oil of the ME .Besides : this oil could not arrive in Germany in 1941 : it took Red Adair 8 months to stop the burning of the oil fields of Kuwait , it would take the Germans years to do it .
If there was a war in the east in 1941,Germany would not need this oil ( the Ostheer arrived at the suburbs of Moscow without the ME oil ) AND Germany could not transport hundreds of thousands more oil to the front ( it took them in the HTL already 3 weeks to transport oil to the front ).Barbarossa was conceived as a fast and short operation,and oil had nothing to do with it .
In 1940 ( NO war in the East and no ME oil ) the WM consumed 3 million tons of oil.
If there was no war in the East in 1941,why should the WM consume more oil?
The continent was undermotorized and the economy suffered greatly as a result; not to mention Spain's and other nations' claims. The whole area controlled by the Germans would profit from the extra oil. And the Wehrmacht needed oil for its training programs, which expanded in a pace (independently of Barbarossa) that during 1942, the oil shortage would hit them. Not to mention the air and naval war.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 10:58

1 WHAT would do Italy with more oil ?Did Italy need more oil ?
2 WHAT would do the area controlled by Germany with more oil ?The economy of this area was mainly depending on coal and it would last to the sixties to change this .
3 WHY would the WM need more oil for its training programs if there was no war in the East ?
4 The naval war : without the oil of the ME, Dönitz had more operational submarines in 1941 than in 1940 and more in 1942 than in 1941 and more in 1943 than in 1942 .And there is no proof that there was a shortage of oil for the submarines .
More oil does not mean more submarines .And more oil would not give Germany more BB .
5 It is the same for the LW : more oil does not mean more bombers or fighters and more bombers or fighters does not mean more aircrew .And I like to sea proofs that with more bombers Goering could force Britain to give up and that with more fighters he could force Britain to give up its air attacks on Germany .
What Germany needed was more time, but more time was a luxury it could not afford as general time worked for the allies .
The oil from the ME would be useful for the continent dominated after the war after 1960 ,as it was in the HTL. It would be very stupid to adjust your military strategy in 1941 for something that would be useful only in 1961 .There was no use for the ME oil in WW 2 .

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 13:54

An other IF (some people like IFs,it gives them the opportunity to ''prove '' that Germany would have won,if Hitler listened 80 years ago to what they are saying now ) concerning this thread .
Italy remains neutral,but Spain joins Hitler and conquers Gibraltar .
What would be the result ? The result would be that the UK would ( as in the HTL ) cease to import oil from the ME and as there would be no of almost no fighting in the Mediterranean,Britain would not need this oil .
What would do Germany ?
It would not try to invade the ME,as without the Italian merchant fleet,there was no opportunity to transport oil from the ME to Germany . Besides: Germany had no harbor on the coast of the Mediterranean .
If Vichy France joined Hitler, but Mussolini and Franco remained neutral (something totally unlikely as France was still at war with Germany ),what would be the result for Britain/for Germany ?

pugsville
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by pugsville » 23 May 2022 14:01

ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 10:58
1 WHAT would do Italy with more oil ?Did Italy need more oil ?
So they could use their navy.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 10:58
2 WHAT would do the area controlled by Germany with more oil ?The economy of this area was mainly depending on coal and it would last to the sixties to change this .
Not entirely true. The removal of much of the trucks and oil from France lead to collapse of the dairy industry milk production as it relied on Trucks picking up the Milk. While the mass of the economy was not motor and ok dependent some of it very much was. The Germans also took a lot of French rolling stock. It's anotehr reason the occupied French economy tanked heavily,

Peter89
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 23 May 2022 14:33

I find it very funny that in 10 comments we arrive from "Germany could not fulfill Spanish oil demands!" to "What could Germany do with more oil?".
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 23 May 2022 16:29

ljadw wrote:WHAT would do the area controlled by Germany with more oil ?The economy of this area was mainly depending on coal
This is interesting...

I think the "Raeder´s proposal" implied not to do war to the USSR. USSR would stay surrounded by territories controlled by Axis (Turkey, Middle East... Japan). This way, Axis could continue doing war against the British Empire and amassing economic resources (and territories) for the future... The Russians would not dare attacking Germany because, tactically, the Wehrmacht was far superior to the Red Army.

The only way to defeat the UK (and keeping under threat the USA, at least) would be developing an enormous Luftwaffe and Kriesgmarine. Obviously that was also in Raeder´s personal interest: instead of an enormous ground army to invade the USSR, shifting industrial resources for the Navy and Aviation.

So, oil was necessary for aviation, for the Navy... and also to prepare a full motorized army (able to conquest fast Russia, Africa etc...). Conquering the Persian Gulf would have tripled the oil at disposal of the nazis (of course it would have taken some time to repair the oilfields, pipelines, to build tankers and so on...).

But coal was also necessary because the heavy industry of that time was, indeed, depending on coal (coal plus iron meant steel). Germany had enough coal (it was the only raw material they had). But coal production failed... and that´s why the Germans could not produce as many aircrafts (and boats) as the Allies (the british, but supplied by the USA too).

Coal production failed for lack of manpower. German miners went to the Wehrmacht and foreign workers were scarce and not feeded adequately.

Was lack of food the reason why the Germans lost the war?

As a matter of fact, productiviy rose in certain areas, but in general less coal was extracted in other parts of Europe. Increasing coal extraction implied more miners working, but they needed to be fed. Without the Atlantic sea lanes (foodstuff from America) Europe had a shortage of food -grain, in particular.

But that scarcity was in part made up by Soviet supplies. And, besides, the terrible war in Russia affected the whole industry: expending ammunition, wasting specialized workers and other expenses.

So, the Raeder´s proposal could have been economically profitable, meaning an abundance of workforce (spanish, italians, balcanics, arabs, turks... even persians), some supplements in food (from the neutral USSR) and saving other resources (weapon losses, ammo...).

Only one or two motorized german armies (like that of List having conquered the Balkans) could have continued pursuing the british, always supported by the Luftwaffe superiority. Maybe another one hundred divisions would keep Russia under threat... and not excluding recruiting some mercenaries. The rest of the Nazi Europe would keep working to outproduce british and americans in advanced weapons (aircrafts, submarines and so on...). German technology was good enough, I think.

Would the british never surrender? In theory, as long they keep the dominance in the Oceans and would be supported by the wealth of the USA, they could. Defeated in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean, in Egypt, in the Red Sea... they could continue fleeing, escaping and evacuating troops for long time, but...

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 17:43

Germany had not the means in WW 2 to develop an enormous LW and KM : the attempts to do this would last more than a decade and would fail .And the Third Reich would be nuked if it declared war on the US .
The German people would demand demobilization and the return to prosperity and abundance .
''It would have taken some time to repair ... ": NO : it would have taken more than a decade and Germany would be defeated by general time .
The coal industry : it did not fail,there is no proof that coal miners were mobilized and Germany did not need more aircraft and ships, but more aircraft,more crew,technicians, spare parts and all this took time and general time was Germany's biggest enemy .
"Maybe another one hundred divisions would keep Russia under threat ": Germany could not afford to have during a decade against Russia .
What Germany needed very fast was PEACE .Otherwise there would be revolution and the economy would collapse.

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 18:51

About the claim by Counter in post 262 that the German coal production failed,the following figures debunk this claim :
German brown coal production ( without the Protectorate )
1939/1940 : 211 million of tons
1940-1941 :226 million
1941-1942 : 235 million
1942-1943 : 248 million
1943-1944 : 252 million
Source : The Collapse of the German War Economy P 190 by Mierzejewski

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 23 May 2022 21:55

To meet its expansion
targets, the steel industry claimed to need 2.12 million tons of coal per
month. In October 1942 it had received only 1.4 million tons and Pleiger
now proposed to slash this to 925,000 tons. This would imply a 40 per
cent cut in iron production, with disastrous consequences for the entire
armaments programme. Without adequate workers, Pleiger could not
dig coal. Sauckel had not delivered the 120,000 men he had promised.
The pits were short of 107,417 miners. A further 9,000 were needed by
the railway system serving the mines.T


"The Wages of Destruction", page 574

Obviously, the nazi industry did have problems with coal and steel, and lacking "adequate workers". That was at the time of the germans experiencing heavy casualties and heavy expenses in arms and ammo. What I mean is that not only the oil situation would have been improved by the "Raeder´s proposal" (getting much more oil) but also the coal production: counting on more workers (fewer casualties in war, shorter mobilization, possible use of mercenaries), less need of ammo and new weapons and, also, with more fuel... less coal required for the synthetic oil.

About repairing and working again the oilfields that the british could have destroyed as withdrawing...

'
ijadwl wrote:'It would have taken some time to repair ... ": NO : it would have taken more than a decade and Germany would be defeated by general time .
I think not so long time. That is what I found about the german engineers and the soviet oilfield of Maikop, that was exhaustively destroyed
with logistics circumstances much harder than the Persian Gulf:

The TBM estimated that it would not be able to extract
significant quantities of oil until mid-1943 and that Maikop would not be
restored to large-scale production (50,000–70,000 tons per month) until late
1943. In other words, it would require at least 15 months to bring Maikop
back on line
, but the Germans did not have that long

The Caucasus 1942-43: Kleist's Race for Oil
Robert Forczyk, Steve Noon page 91

German engineers were not bad. At the time the Soviets freed the Donbass they were near to get high profits of their work done there too.
ijadwl wrote:general time was Germany's biggest enemy .
Not with this strategy: longer time would mean more oil, more coal, stabilization of the foodstuff problem, better weapons, more vehicles, more morale (more victories and more conquered territories) and a bad situation for the enemy. Only the USA would improve in armament, but the british would be experiencing more and more defeats and the Soviets everyday would be more and more under threat of the enemy. Japan, for example, would have no reason to declare war to the USA, as they could get oil from the Persian Gulf. It would be also everyday harder for FDR to convince the USA Congress to declare war to the Nazi Europe.

Why to risk everything by emulating Napoleon 1812 if invading Russia?

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 24 May 2022 06:57

Four points
1 The claims of the steel industry :it is very possible that these claims are exaggerated.Intentionally .In war time everyone asks for more.
2 Why did they get not less coal,but less than they demanded ? Was it because of production problems or was it because of transport problems ?In other words : was it possible for the Reichsbahn to transport 2,1 million ton every month to the steel plants .
3 Were there disastrous consequences ? Did the armaments production collapse ?
4 If they had these 2.1 million tons of coal every month,would the armaments production increase and how much ?
It is very simplistic to say that everything depended on an amount of coal that was calculated by those who demanded more coal .

pugsville
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by pugsville » 24 May 2022 07:03

ljadw wrote:
24 May 2022 06:57
Four points
1 The claims of the steel industry :it is very possible that these claims are exaggerated.Intentionally .In war time everyone asks for more.
2 Why did they get not less coal,but less than they demanded ? Was it because of production problems or was it because of transport problems ?In other words : was it possible for the Reichsbahn to transport 2,1 million ton every month to the steel plants .
3 Were there disastrous consequences ? Did the armaments production collapse ?
4 If they had these 2.1 million tons of coal every month,would the armaments production increase and how much ?
It is very simplistic to say that everything depended on an amount of coal that was calculated by those who demanded more coal .
The German economy was constrained on multiple fronts, labor, coal, steel, oil, workers, transport in creasing one would just shuffle the hats of which is not critical immediately, but to get significantly more productions all had to be addressed. There was no simple fix.

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 24 May 2022 09:13

I agree.
There is also the fact that the bosses of the steel industry were bitter enemies of Pleiger,who was the Director of the Herman Goering Werke and was now Reichskommissar für Kohle Versorgung .

pugsville
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by pugsville » 24 May 2022 09:30

ljadw wrote:
24 May 2022 09:13
I agree.
There is also the fact that the bosses of the steel industry were bitter enemies of Pleiger,who was the Director of the Herman Goering Werke and was now Reichskommissar für Kohle Versorgung .
The entire Nazi regime was a patchwork of competing personal petty empires. Herman Goering fingers were in way to many pies.

And some people say they were well organized.

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 24 May 2022 11:19

About Japan getting oil from Iran/Iraq (post 265 ) : why did Japan not import such oil before 1939 ? Was it not because of the distances ? ( If my memory still works, Japan had not that many oil tankers .)
In 1939 Japan produced 2,3 million barrels, imported from the US 27,2 million and from the DEI+ Borneo 4,8 million and from other countries 1.5 million barrels .
The DEI produced in 1939 48,4 million barrels .
Thus, if US stopped to sell oil,Japan could easily import oil from the DEI who were much closer than Iran .

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