German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2022 14:56

If Italy remained neutral in the war between Britain and Germany, why would anyone of those attack /defend Greece ? Even if Italy attacked Greece ?
If Italy had invaded Greece in December 1939,while it ( = Italy ) was still neutral,would Britain have helped Greece and or Germany have helped Italy ?
When neutral USSR invaded Finland, both Germany and Britain/France remained neutral .
Why would it be different if neutral Italy invaded Greece ?
I know that Churchill was dreaming about a Balkan Front as in WW 1 ,but his dreams were only illusions and full of self-deceit :the Balkan states were very weak and Britain had not the forces to open a new front in Europe .
Besides, if he intervened to help Greece, the risk was very great that Italy would become a German ally and Greece was not worth this danger .
What was more important to Britain : an independent Greece or a neutral Italy ?

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 22 May 2022 15:50

It is very boring writing about the absurds wrote by Ironmachine. And insults, swear words and rest of his personal particularities that are giving very little historical information in this thread.

But, anyway, some of the ridiculous things he claims should be refuted, not staying this way. The worst is writing things like that Germany could not provide to Spain food not to starve the country, that Hitler should have fulfilled ALL the Franco demands in order to get Spain in the Axis, that Franco never wanted to entry the war...

Is Ironmachine an ignorant? No, he has very good sources,so, the only possibility is that he likes writing stupid things just for fun...
Ironmachine wrote:Nobody has ever proved that Spain (i.e. Franco) really wanted to entry the war
I don´t know what someone with the mind peculiarities of Ironmachine understands as "really", but every HONEST person that likes reading on history about this subject, knows that already in June 1940 (Hitler was in France, not yet in Paris), Franco sent one of his generals offering his help, and soon later (19 June 1940) the german secretary Weizsäcker got a memorandum from spanish ambassador in Berlin, already including the colonial territories Spain wanted from France. No neutral country would have sent such a memorandum if not wanting to join the war and getting some booty (did Portugal, Sweden, Turkey -neutral countries- send that kind of memorandum to Hitler?). Of course, negotiations -very serious from the Spanish part, indeed- continued... up to the moment Franco realized that he was not going to get any guarantee for the territories he asked... and then it came the Franco´s refusal, 7 December 1940.

Ironmachine knows that, but Ironmachine is Ironmachine, a special person, not reliable in a serious place to discuss about history.

Should I call "liar" to Ironmachine? No, simply, he is the way he is. And in a forum for learning history he does not deserve any respect...

And more Ironmachine...
Counter wrote:You already know that Germany was in early 1941 in a foodstuff situation good enough to provide what Spain required not to starve.
Ironmachine wrote:No, I don't know that. It is just a claim you made, without showing any evidence for it.
Should I call Ironmachine "liar" again?

I already posted the data of the rations in Germany: 2445 calories in the period 1940/1941... and only 1928 in the period 1941/1942 (Food crisis from April 1942 on... but the armies and industries of Germany did it anyway well). Every serious study about availability to spare foodstuff during a war should consider first that reality.

For example, as Adam Tooze did in his book "Wages of Destruction"... page 542 In this case, the author is dealing with the question of feeding the foreign workers (slaves). Did they have means to feed them or not?

there was no hope of pushing through any
improvement in the rations for Sauckel's newly arrived Ostarbeiter. It
was true, of course, that the most disadvantaged Ostarbeiter and Soviet
prisoners numbered altogether just over a million in the spring of 1942
and that a substantial improvement in their rations would have required
only a very modest further cut in the food supplied to the German
population.
But given the mood both in the Food Ministry and in the
population at large, any such redistribution was out of the question.
The public demanded that if the German ration was to be reduced,
the foreign workers should fare even worse


Someone serious in understanding historical facts requires to ponder every factor. Yes, it was possible -materially possible- to feed better the poor slaves... but there were other historical factors to consider.

In the spanish case (previous to the Food crisis, of course, as the rations in Germany were around 2400 calories, not just over 1900) the factors could be similar or not, but what is sure is that the document of the "experts" of 12 February 1941 can not contradict the reality.

I found something about it -this is information of some value- in this paper by Donald Detwiler

https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406358?re ... 8bed&seq=8

In page 49 it is commented the previous spanish document that the german experts referred to:

"Early in February, 1941, his [Franco´s] general staff turned over to the German Embassy a thirteen page catalog of what Spain would need to be able to enter the war. Among the staggering requirements were 56,000 tons of automobile gasoline and 8,000 tons of aviation gasoline monthly. Before the opening of hostilities, Spain would require 16,000 railways cars and 13,000 trucks (...) Ribbentrop (...) finally realized that Franco didn´t have the slightest intention of entering the war"

Foodstuff is not mentioned in the mr Detwiler paper, but the spanish demands on food (at least, grain) were already known from the beginning of the negotiations (around 600,000 tons annually). So, the absurd spanish document -actually, a pretext not to entry the war- was -apparently- a consequence of the Hitler´s refusal to give any guarantee to Spain about the territories demanded for a spanish Empire... That is the most reasonable explanation.

I add my personal comment that the paper of mr Detwiler is not reliable in everything. Apparently, it is based partially in spanish testimonies, included spanish minister Serrano. It includes some things I think today are totally discarded: that admiral Canaris wanted Spain not to join the Axis and informed Franco that if he refuse, Germany would not invade Spain, and that the visit of Serrano to Berchstegaden in November was to convince Hitler that Spain was not prepared to go the war... Detwiler doesn´t mention the previous letter from Franco to Hitler (30 October) asking for a guarantee for the desired colonial territories.

But, anyway, it referred to the content of the spanish document at which the german experts reacted in February 1942.

And with this, I hope to have finished with the Ironmachine matter... :roll:

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 22 May 2022 16:05

ljadw wrote:Logistics in the Libyan desert , Italy, the Mediterranean and Turkey are not pedantries but decisive points .
Have you ever thought on how the Germans would cross the Bosporus ?
Crossing the Bosporus by Istanbul was not difficult: tons and tons of goods were doing that everyday, like crossing a river in a big commercial city.

About "pedantries": as Raeder did his proposal (September 1940), he could have thought that the italians were amassing a powerful army to conquer Egypt. Then, Hitler sent general von Thoma to check the situation there. I posted already something about it. He thought it was possible to conquer Egypt from the Libyan desert.

But according to ljadw, that was not possible due to logistics (ports, roads, terrain, lack of airfields and so on...) and general von Thoma was an incompetent. Good, that is possible. Nobody knows. I suspect that the germans could have made it, the feats of Rommel from March 1941 on make me think they could have... but... maybe a military advisor -thinking like Ijadw- cound have convinced Hitler that it was not...

So, Hitler could have then taken advantage of the expedition to Greece (decided in November 1940): after seizing Greece, forcing the pass through neutral Turkey and reaching Syria, Palestine... no more unsurmountable logistics problems like in the desert...

What I mean is that we don´t need a what-if story: if Hitler wanted to implement that strategy he had an overwhelming ground and aerial superiority to make it (UK fighting alone). He could have used an army (List´s) to conquer Greece and then Egypt, another army to conquer Spain (Weichs?, Reichenau?) and even to send Rommel and his Afrika Korps to Libya.

The question is: what then? What about, for example, the soviets, the americans, the japanese... the reaction in the United Kingdom after losing the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and so many good men and machines...?

Counter
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 22 May 2022 16:14

Peter89 wrote:we went extraordinary lengths before about the invasion against Turkey and concluded the debate with a maybe, mostly because the Germans lacked the necessary landing crafts, the Turkish defenses were established and concentrated in the axis of the main attack, and the Soviet response for this move might be extremely hostile.
This is also "what-if" story: Turkey could not have stopped the general von List army if, after conquering Greece and defeating (again) the British, they would have demanded to get through Turkey to reach Syria (Vichy France at that time),then Palestine and finally Egypt. There were railways, roads, airfields, cities... Not harder than to invade Russia, and always with the Luftwaffe to support also supplies arrived by sea.

"Turkish defenses" were unimportant, because, unlike in 1915, now the Luftwaffe and the Panzer divisionen would have eliminated any Turkish resistance... but why to resist? Bulgaria didn´t. Yugoslavia did... and the turks would have learned the horrible lesson... In my view, 100% chance that the turks would have agreed. Nothing to gain if resisting the german army...

The Soviets... that is the real strategic question... What they would have done? In my opinion, nothing either. Attacking Germany? After the experience of the Finnland war?

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 22 May 2022 16:19

glenn 239 wrote:Assuming a Nazi-Soviet partition of Turkey as the political basis for an Axis offensive into Egypt and Syria,
Like in Poland? I don´t think so. After gaining Greece, defeating the Brits (and seizing Gibraltar... with an alliance with Spain or invading Spain) the Germans would have taken the Dardenelles only for themselves...
glenn239 wrote:The key to the Axis ejecting the British from the Middle East was to maintain good relations with the USSR, not to attack it.
Both ways possible: good relations or surrounding the USSR to prepare invading Russia the next year, with the British already defeated and maybe the cooperation of Japan, Persia, Turkey and so on...

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Ironmachine
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Ironmachine » 22 May 2022 19:19

Counter wrote:It is very boring writing about the absurds wrote by Ironmachine.
And still here you are, boring yourself to death... What can be the reason that cause that kind of behaviour?
Counter wrote:And insults, swear words and rest of his personal particularities that are giving very little historical information in this thread.
And still I have provided in this thread far more sourced historical information than you. Please remember, your opinion is not, by any means, historical information.
Counter wrote:But, anyway, some of the ridiculous things he claims should be refuted, not staying this way. The worst is writing things like that Germany could not provide to Spain food not to starve the country, that Hitler should have fulfilled ALL the Franco demands in order to get Spain in the Axis, that Franco never wanted to entry the war...
I will repeat it again, though I have no hope that you can understand the difference. I have not claimed any of those things. What I actually claimed in this thread:
1) Germany could not provide what Spain asked for.
2) There was no reason for Franco to join the Axis if Hitler did not satisfy all his demands.
3) Franco never entered the war, so perhaps he did not really want to in the situation of 1940.
Counter wrote:Is Ironmachine an ignorant?
I know what I know and I know what I don't know. I don't arguee about what I don't know.
Counter wrote:No, he has very good sources,so
Which you constantly ignore or misunderstand.
Counter wrote:, the only possibility is that he likes writing stupid things just for fun...
The only one I have seen in this thread writing stupid things is you, but the worst part is that you don't do it for fun, you actually believe the stupidities you write
Counter wrote:
Ironmachine wrote:Nobody has ever proved that Spain (i.e. Franco) really wanted to entry the war
I don´t know what someone with the mind peculiarities of Ironmachine understands as "really", but every HONEST person that likes reading on history about this subject, knows that already in June 1940 (Hitler was in France, not yet in Paris), Franco sent one of his generals offering his help, and soon later (19 June 1940) the german secretary Weizsäcker got a memorandum from spanish ambassador in Berlin, already including the colonial territories Spain wanted from France. No neutral country would have sent such a memorandum if not wanting to join the war and getting some booty (did Portugal, Sweden, Turkey -neutral countries- send that kind of memorandum to Hitler?). Of course, negotiations -very serious from the Spanish part, indeed- continued... up to the moment Franco realized that he was not going to get any guarantee for the territories he asked... and then it came the Franco´s refusal, 7 December 1940.
And after that long tirade, you are still where I began: nobody has ever proved that Franco really wanted to entry the war, certainly not in the situation present in 1940. Did he negotiate with Hitler? Of course. What would have you done in 1940, with the German Army at the border? Tell Hitler to go fuck himself? Other neutral countries did not send Hitler such a memorandum? Of course, because no other neutral was in the same position as Spain. What other neutral country was being pressured in 1940 by Hitler to join the Axis? And still Sweden, for example, allowed the passage of German forces through her territory, something that Spain did not allow.
The facts are clear. Hitler wanted Spain to join the Axis. Spain sent her demands to Hitler. Those demands were substantial, and Spanish authorities may have been aware, or not, that they could not be satisfied by Hitler. In fact, in the case of the territories demanded, they should have been aware there was no way all of them could be given to Spain before Spain joins the Axis, in fact not until a victoriuos end of the war was achieved, and even those that could have been (remotely) conceivably assigned to Spain before joining the Axis were going to be a difficult demand to satisfy for Germany. So either Franco did want to enter the war and for whatever reason he presented some remarkably difficult conditions for Germany to fullfil before doing what he really wanted to do , or he did not want to enter the war and presented some remarkable difficult conditions for Germany to fullfil in order to have an excuse for not entering the war when Germany fails to satisfy them. Nobody has ever proved which of those two options was in Franco's mind in 1940.
Counter wrote:Ironmachine knows that,
No, Ironmachine does not know all that, because some parts of your text are just your opinion, not fact.
Counter wrote:but Ironmachine is Ironmachine,
:lol: Yes, of course I am myself. Who is Counter, if he is not Counter? :lol:
Counter wrote: a special person,
Well, for those who love me I am indeed a special person. :wink:
Counter wrote:not reliable in a serious place to discuss about history.
Why are you talking about yourself now?
Counter wrote:Should I call "liar" to Ironmachine?
You can do it, if you want. You have no reason for that, as I have not lied in this thread, but whatever...
Counter wrote:No, simply, he is the way he is.
So you are not the way you are? :roll:
Counter wrote:And in a forum for learning history he does not deserve any respect...
Deserving any respect from you is something that doesn't interest me at all.
Counter wrote:And more Ironmachine...
Counter wrote:You already know that Germany was in early 1941 in a foodstuff situation good enough to provide what Spain required not to starve.
Ironmachine wrote:No, I don't know that. It is just a claim you made, without showing any evidence for it.
Should I call Ironmachine "liar" again?
You can call me "liar" as many times as you want, it would change nothing: I have not lied.
Counter wrote:I already posted the data of the rations in Germany: 2445 calories in the period 1940/1941... and only 1928 in the period 1941/1942 (Food crisis from April 1942 on... but the armies and industries of Germany did it anyway well). Every serious study about availability to spare foodstuff during a war should consider first that reality.

For example, as Adam Tooze did in his book "Wages of Destruction"... page 542 In this case, the author is dealing with the question of feeding the foreign workers (slaves). Did they have means to feed them or not?

there was no hope of pushing through any
improvement in the rations for Sauckel's newly arrived Ostarbeiter. It
was true, of course, that the most disadvantaged Ostarbeiter and Soviet
prisoners numbered altogether just over a million in the spring of 1942
and that a substantial improvement in their rations would have required
only a very modest further cut in the food supplied to the German
population. But given the mood both in the Food Ministry and in the
population at large, any such redistribution was out of the question.
The public demanded that if the German ration was to be reduced,
the foreign workers should fare even worse

Someone serious in understanding historical facts requires to ponder every factor. Yes, it was possible -materially possible- to feed better the poor slaves... but there were other historical factors to consider.

In the spanish case (previous to the Food crisis, of course, as the rations in Germany were around 2400 calories, not just over 1900) the factors could be similar or not, but what is sure is that the document of the "experts" of 12 February 1941 can not contradict the reality.
Whether Germany could or could not feed Spain is not the point. The point is whether Germany could satisfy the Spanish demands, which of course were not only food. And the reality is that the German experts in February 1941 believed that Germany could not satisfy Spanish demands including food.
Counter wrote:I found something about it -this is information of some value- in this paper by Donald Detwiler
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1406358?re ... 8bed&seq=8
In page 49 it is commented the previous spanish document that the german experts referred to:
"Early in February, 1941, his [Franco´s] general staff turned over to the German Embassy a thirteen page catalog of what Spain would need to be able to enter the war. Among the staggering requirements were 56,000 tons of automobile gasoline and 8,000 tons of aviation gasoline monthly. Before the opening of hostilities, Spain would require 16,000 railways cars and 13,000 trucks (...) Ribbentrop (...) finally realized that Franco didn´t have the slightest intention of entering the war"
Foodstuff is not mentioned in the mr Detwiler paper, but the spanish demands on food (at least, grain) were already known from the beginning of the negotiations (around 600,000 tons annually). So, the absurd spanish document -actually, a pretext not to entry the war- was -apparently- a consequence of the Hitler´s refusal to give any guarantee to Spain about the territories demanded for a spanish Empire... That is the most reasonable explanation.
No, this is not the most reasonable explanation, it's just the only explanation you are ready to accept because it fits your preconceived idea that Franco did want to join the Axis and only changed his mind when his territorial demands were refused.
But consider that: the quantities of oil are present both in the telegram of the German ambassador in Spain of August 1940 (post 202, page 14 of this thread) and in the February 1941 catalog sent by the Spanish general staff. The telegram mentions a consumption of 600,000 tons of gasoline (reduced to 400,000 due to a increase in price, which should not be considered if Spain was going to war) with strict rationing and a peace economy, while the catalog included a demand for 56,000 tons of automobile gasoline and 8,000 tons of aviation gasoline monthly, that is 768,000 tons anually. Considering that one is the consume in peace and the other the needs for war (which should also include a greater reserve), both quantities are remarkably similar, and unless proven otherwise that the quantities of other goods were not also similar in both documents. Well, if you believe that the quantites demanded in the February 1941 catalog were a pretext not to entry the war, then the similar quantities presented already in August 1940 should have been also a pretext in August 1940, long before Hitler´s refusal to guarantee Spain's territorial demands, and it follows that Franco did not want to enter the war already in Agust 1940.
The alternative would be that those Spanish demands were just real needs of that country, and as the opinion of the German experts was that they could not be satisfied, Franco would have had no reason to join the Axis; at least, peacefully.
Counter wrote:And with this, I hope to have finished with the Ironmachine matter... :roll:
You can end this when you want, but it seems you get some sort of pleasure out of this "Ironmachine matter" :lol:

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2022 19:33

Counter wrote:
22 May 2022 16:05
ljadw wrote:Logistics in the Libyan desert , Italy, the Mediterranean and Turkey are not pedantries but decisive points .
Have you ever thought on how the Germans would cross the Bosporus ?
Crossing the Bosporus by Istanbul was not difficult: tons and tons of goods were doing that everyday, like crossing a river in a big commercial city.

About "pedantries": as Raeder did his proposal (September 1940), he could have thought that the italians were amassing a powerful army to conquer Egypt. Then, Hitler sent general von Thoma to check the situation there. I posted already something about it. He thought it was possible to conquer Egypt from the Libyan desert.

But according to ljadw, that was not possible due to logistics (ports, roads, terrain, lack of airfields and so on...) and general von Thoma was an incompetent. Good, that is possible. Nobody knows. I suspect that the germans could have made it, the feats of Rommel from March 1941 on make me think they could have... but... maybe a military advisor -thinking like Ijadw- cound have convinced Hitler that it was not...

So, Hitler could have then taken advantage of the expedition to Greece (decided in November 1940): after seizing Greece, forcing the pass through neutral Turkey and reaching Syria, Palestine... no more unsurmountable logistics problems like in the desert...

What I mean is that we don´t need a what-if story: if Hitler wanted to implement that strategy he had an overwhelming ground and aerial superiority to make it (UK fighting alone). He could have used an army (List´s) to conquer Greece and then Egypt, another army to conquer Spain (Weichs?, Reichenau?) and even to send Rommel and his Afrika Korps to Libya.

The question is: what then? What about, for example, the soviets, the americans, the japanese... the reaction in the United Kingdom after losing the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and so many good men and machines...?
About the Bosporus : you don't get it : there was NO railway bridge over the Bosporus : trains that arrived from the Balkans had to be unloaded,the goods had to be loaded on small ships,carried to the Asian part of the city ,unloaded and loaded on other trains who had to transport them farther away .
How do you transport tanks of 40 tons over the Bosporus, the supplies for the divisions, the supplies for the LW ?
And all this in the assumption that Turkey would say yes . If it refused ,it was over .How would Hitler force neutral Turkey ?
Do you know how many trains were needed to transport a PzD and how many were needed to supply this division and how many were needed to supply the supply forces ?
About Thoma : he was a fool : he said that the 4 PzD ,whom he claimed did not need any help of the ID (typical tank lobby nonsense ) could operate in Libya on the condition that ALL Italians returned to Libya .Do you think that Mussolini would accept this proposal ?
And if Rommel arrived at the Canal , he could NEVER conquer the Persian Gulf : you probably never heard of the existence of the Sinai Desert ?
Distance Tripoli-Alexandria 2000 km without decent roads and decent ports .
Distance Alexandria-Kuwait City : 2500 km without decent roads and decent ports .
Do you know how many time did last the engines of tanks and trucks in NA and the ME 80 years ago ?
The Axis ( which is Italy as Germany had no fleet in the Mediterranean ) could not dominate the Mediterranean and could also not dominate the Middle East .
Besides : to try to do this was very stupid as there was no need for it .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 22 May 2022 20:36

Counter wrote:
22 May 2022 16:14
Peter89 wrote:we went extraordinary lengths before about the invasion against Turkey and concluded the debate with a maybe, mostly because the Germans lacked the necessary landing crafts, the Turkish defenses were established and concentrated in the axis of the main attack, and the Soviet response for this move might be extremely hostile.
This is also "what-if" story: Turkey could not have stopped the general von List army if, after conquering Greece and defeating (again) the British, they would have demanded to get through Turkey to reach Syria (Vichy France at that time),then Palestine and finally Egypt. There were railways, roads, airfields, cities... Not harder than to invade Russia, and always with the Luftwaffe to support also supplies arrived by sea.

"Turkish defenses" were unimportant, because, unlike in 1915, now the Luftwaffe and the Panzer divisionen would have eliminated any Turkish resistance... but why to resist? Bulgaria didn´t. Yugoslavia did... and the turks would have learned the horrible lesson... In my view, 100% chance that the turks would have agreed. Nothing to gain if resisting the german army...

The Soviets... that is the real strategic question... What they would have done? In my opinion, nothing either. Attacking Germany? After the experience of the Finnland war?
I see : you never heard of partisan war, of destroyed railways, destroyed roads, destroyed bridges .
General von ( SIC ) List had no chance at all to arrive in Syria : distance Istanbul-Damascus 1500 km .
And who would transport supplies by sea ? If these supplies would be miraculously available .

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by pugsville » 22 May 2022 21:06

Counter wrote:
22 May 2022 16:14
Peter89 wrote:we went extraordinary lengths before about the invasion against Turkey and concluded the debate with a maybe, mostly because the Germans lacked the necessary landing crafts, the Turkish defenses were established and concentrated in the axis of the main attack, and the Soviet response for this move might be extremely hostile.
This is also "what-if" story: Turkey could not have stopped the general von List army if, after conquering Greece and defeating (again) the British, they would have demanded to get through Turkey to reach Syria (Vichy France at that time),then Palestine and finally Egypt. There were railways, roads, airfields, cities... Not harder than to invade Russia, and always with the Luftwaffe to support also supplies arrived by sea.

"Turkish defenses" were unimportant, because, unlike in 1915, now the Luftwaffe and the Panzer divisionen would have eliminated any Turkish resistance... but why to resist? Bulgaria didn´t. Yugoslavia did... and the turks would have learned the horrible lesson... In my view, 100% chance that the turks would have agreed. Nothing to gain if resisting the german army...

The Soviets... that is the real strategic question... What they would have done? In my opinion, nothing either. Attacking Germany? After the experience of the Finnland war?
There are no significant railways in the middle east,. Turkish railways were pretty much a joke. It is much the same situation as North Africa, Each kilometer the Germans advance they have to bring everything by truck. Each kilometer the truck consumes more of its' load getting there, The smaller force that can be supported. Once you get past 500 kms it;s very hard work, over 1,000 and your force is struggling to subsist.

Turkey had a much bigger army, much better equipped than Greece or Yugoslavia, , A natural fortress border (the straits) which would require a massive near sea borne invasion, Turkey is also much bigger and much more rugged terrain. Turks were incredibly stubborn. They did not intimidate easily. The lessons the Turks drew from WW1 is that getting involved in other peoples wars was likely to be fatal,

The Turks were likely to resist (IMHO) They could be defeated if the Germans devoted enough resources, but projecting any significant force beyond Turkey is extremely hard, a few divisions,. The British would overrun Syria well before the German got anywhere near it. (remember Vichy Syria rejected Germans offers of assistance when the British invaded) The British plan was to try and stop the Germans at the Tarsus mountains.

All the Soviets have to do is overrun some of the Nearer parts of Romania. Then what do they Germans do for Oil? The Soviets saw Turkey as being int the Soviet sphere of influence, as vital Russian interest, Any invasion or occupation by Germany woudl be viewed as a very hostile act,

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 22 May 2022 21:52

About the Turkish and Middle Eastern railways: the Istanbul-Baghdad line was not a joke, and a railway ferry carried the waggons over the Bosporus. Moreover the military trains between Syria and Iraq were of standard military load, indicating a good railway on that section too. The fundamental problem was the low capacity of the Balkans railway, which was basically one single track, standard gauge railway with 2/3 standard load. Not to mention Turkish ports, which were more or less useless for military purposes.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Counter » 23 May 2022 06:14

I forgot to add some data about the oil production in the Persian Gulf.

Previously it has been written something about the Iraq´s oil production and the pipeline to the Mediterranean. I didn´t see yet the wikipedia article on it (with bibliography...)

two pipelines, each with a throughput capacity of 2,000,000 tons a year. The length of the Northern line would be 532 miles (856 km), that of the Southern line (Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline) 620 miles (1,000 km).[19] In 1934, the pipelines were completed from Kirkuk to Al Hadithah, and from there, to both Tripoli and Haifa; the Kirkuk Field was brought online the same year. Only in 1938, nine years after the discovery, did IPC begin to export oil in significant quantities.[18]

The Kirkuk production averaged 4 million tons per year until World War II, when restricted shipping in the Mediterranean forced down the production sharply.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Petroleum_Company

Already referred previously, the oil in Egypt (around one million tons annually).

And the Persian oil...

By 1939 AIOC oil production had increased to 11,327,000 tons

https://iranicaonline.org/articles/angl ... il-company

I am surprised that you are still discussind how feasible could have been to move the general List army to Middle East: british were moving around that territoty without much problems... doing industrial work, moving soldiers... There were roads, ports and railroads. And airfields for the Luftwaffe, that could protect the maritime transport (italian ships) to ports like Izmir, Beirout, Tripoli, Haifa... And of course, if this decision taken at December 1940 (or even at November), previous to the conquest of Greece (April 1941) the strait of Gibraltar would be closed... either by an alliance with Spain or by invasion of Spain, which would be very detrimental to the Royal Navy.

Another question, if the USA and USSR are not declaring war to the Axis then, how long could a british government resist not asking for an armistice?

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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 23 May 2022 07:11

Counter wrote:
23 May 2022 06:14
I forgot to add some data about the oil production in the Persian Gulf.

Previously it has been written something about the Iraq´s oil production and the pipeline to the Mediterranean. I didn´t see yet the wikipedia article on it (with bibliography...)

two pipelines, each with a throughput capacity of 2,000,000 tons a year. The length of the Northern line would be 532 miles (856 km), that of the Southern line (Mosul-Haifa oil pipeline) 620 miles (1,000 km).[19] In 1934, the pipelines were completed from Kirkuk to Al Hadithah, and from there, to both Tripoli and Haifa; the Kirkuk Field was brought online the same year. Only in 1938, nine years after the discovery, did IPC begin to export oil in significant quantities.[18]

The Kirkuk production averaged 4 million tons per year until World War II, when restricted shipping in the Mediterranean forced down the production sharply.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Petroleum_Company

Already referred previously, the oil in Egypt (around one million tons annually).

And the Persian oil...

By 1939 AIOC oil production had increased to 11,327,000 tons

https://iranicaonline.org/articles/angl ... il-company

I am surprised that you are still discussind how feasible could have been to move the general List army to Middle East: british were moving around that territoty without much problems... doing industrial work, moving soldiers... There were roads, ports and railroads. And airfields for the Luftwaffe, that could protect the maritime transport (italian ships) to ports like Izmir, Beirout, Tripoli, Haifa... And of course, if this decision taken at December 1940 (or even at November), previous to the conquest of Greece (April 1941) the strait of Gibraltar would be closed... either by an alliance with Spain or by invasion of Spain, which would be very detrimental to the Royal Navy.

Another question, if the USA and USSR are not declaring war to the Axis then, how long could a british government resist not asking for an armistice?
I think most of the people here are very well aware of the oil production of the region. What this wiki snap doesn't mention are the infrastructure and the scenario that would happen if Germans tried to take it. Maybe you should re-read what I wrote you about it.

The Balkans campaign can not be used as a real alternative for a German what-if campaign towards the Middle East.

The Germans could also not protect their shipping lanes in the Eastern Mediterraneum: there were Cyprus and the Royal Navy. The few ships that got trough were mostly fast destroyers with a few hundred tons of cargo.

The infrastructure of the Middle East could not be used easily; there were two railway lines and only a few ports. The Turkish ports were in a very sorry state.

The Mediterranean strategy of yours would provide the British mid-Atlantic bases, antagonize the Soviets and put a huge strain on the transport system. Ofc the British would continue to fight on, but Germany had to feed an additional 80-100 million people, with a good quarter of them in an outright famine already. All this for what? Chrome, iron, tungsten were not in critically low supply in Germany, and oil could not be transported back to Germany in quantity.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

ljadw
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Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 07:14

The ME oil production was of no importance for Britain in its war against Germany and for Germany in its war against the USSR and the Wallies .
British oil came from the Americas . The Mediterranean was not used already before the Italian DOW .
Germany could not rebuild the oil fields (Britain would destroy them ) ,could not restart the production (they had no staff ) could not transport the oil to Haifa (Britain would destroy the pipelines ) ,could not use Haifa ( Britain would destroy the port ) ,could not transport the oil to Italy ( The Axis had not the needed tankers ) ,Italy could not unload and stock the oil at the port of Trieste, the oil could not be transported from Trieste to Germany,it is doubtful that Germany had the refine capacity for this oil ,Germany could not transport millions of additional oil to the front .
And :last but not least :Germany did not need in 1941 the oil of the ME .
In 1941 Germany produced ( imports included ) 8,485 million ton of oil,of which the WM consumed 4,567 million .
The oil problems on the Eastern front were not caused by production shortages,but by transport problems and more oil in the depots in Germany would not help the Ostheer ,neither would help more oil at the front .
In 1942 Germany had 8,965 million tons of oil (an increase of 480000 ) and the WM consumed 4,410 million : a decrease of 157000 .
Oil problems did not cause the defeat of Germany .

Peter89
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Location: Spain

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by Peter89 » 23 May 2022 08:37

ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14
The Mediterranean was not used already before the Italian DOW .
It was used, because to transport the oil from the Americas to the Eastern Med and Middle East would make no sense. That was the true strength of the British Empire: a worldwide network of resources, forces and strongpoints, making London capable to project power from Greece to Hong Kong.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

Germany could not rebuild the oil fields (Britain would destroy them ),
Over time they could, and that's where you and Counter are both wrong: the Mediterranean strategy, which was mostly a bunch of incohesive ideas and postwar literal invention, could not aim to pamper Germany with resources, but to establish a perimeter which the Allies could not break easily or at all.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

could not restart the production (they had no staff )
Yes, they could.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

could not transport the oil to Haifa (Britain would destroy the pipelines)
The importance of the pipelines is overrated, the pumpin stations mattered. But yes, the British would destroy those.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

,could not use Haifa ( Britain would destroy the port ),
Not so much the port, but the oil installations.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

could not transport the oil to Italy ( The Axis had not the needed tankers )
No, the correct question is: WHY would the Germans fight for Italian oil supply?
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

Italy could not unload and stock the oil at the port of Trieste,
It was not necessary to do it in one port, besides: it made no sense.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

the oil could not be transported from Trieste to Germany,
How so?
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

it is doubtful that Germany had the refine capacity for this oil,
It's not doubtful, it's clear that they had the capacity, the problem was that the idle refineries were mostly located on the Atlantic coast.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

Germany could not transport millions of additional oil to the front .
Using this scheme, the answer is obvious.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

And :last but not least :Germany did not need in 1941 the oil of the ME.
Yes they did.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

The oil problems on the Eastern front were not caused by production shortages,but by transport problems and more oil in the depots in Germany would not help the Ostheer ,neither would help more oil at the front .
There is no Eastern front in this scenario.
ljadw wrote:
23 May 2022 07:14

In 1942 Germany had 8,965 million tons of oil (an increase of 480000 ) and the WM consumed 4,410 million : a decrease of 157000 .
Oil problems did not cause the defeat of Germany .
Abundant oil supplies didn't help them to win either.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

ljadw
Member
Posts: 13122
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: German strategy regarding the maritime flanks of the USSR

Post by ljadw » 23 May 2022 08:48

British oil imports in 1942
from the US 60 %
from Trinidad,Venezuela and Mexico :40 %
1944:
US 79 %
Caribbean : 21 %
In 1939 Iraq and Iran accounted for 5,4 % of the world petroleum production .
Source : WW 2 Forum : Thread :Yes or no Germans take Gibraltar .

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