Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

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Aida1
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Aida1 » 01 Apr 2021 18:34

ljadw wrote:
31 Mar 2021 19:55
Elimination of the USSR would give Germany not more resources (if it needed them )and would not give Germany the ability to concentrate on fighting the western allies
Your personal opinion without any attempt at giving substance :lol:

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 01 Apr 2021 19:31

ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 17:54
There is no proof that the overwhelming majority of the WIA returned to active service in the East and we are even not talking about the non combat losses .
Notice ljadw's ignorance: a total of 683,887 Heer personnel either died from wounds or were discharged between 1.9.1939 - 31.12.1944, out of a total of 4,032,956 wounded. At least some proportion of those discharges must have been from severe sickness rather than from combat wounds. Thus, ~85% of Heer wounded must have returned to active service.

Notice then how in 1943, 581,000 convalescents were sent as replacements to field forces fighting in the East.

ljadw is self-evidently wrong here.
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 17:54
And, yes, Germany was already exhausted in 1942 :it could ,after Torch, send only a few divisions to Tunisia .It had only a few divisions in Libya .The RM could supply ,with very big difficulties ,the Axis forces in Libya and Tunisia ,but it could not transport and supply the forces needed to expel Britain from the Mediterranean .And a German intervention through Turkey was excluded .
Notice how ljadw shifts the goalposts: he claims the limited German commitment against the Western Allies is proof of German exhaustion, ignoring how ~3 million personnel in the Heer and Waffen-SS were at the time locked in combat in the East.

He conflates "exhaustion" and "overextension".
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 17:54
A successful Barbarossa in 1941 would only increase the problems and a successful Barbarossa in 1943 followed by an intervention in NA/the ME was totally excluded .
Besides : the bigger the army, the weaker the LW :a strong army would deprive the German cities from an adequate protection and a strong LW would make the defense of the European coasts impossible .
Notice how ljadw asserts his views with much hyperbole and little fact. He is all solipsism, all the time. Engaging with him is an exercise in futility.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 01 Apr 2021 21:06

Germany could not have in peacetime (if Britain gave up in 1940 ) an army of 120 divisions . That is a fact .
If the USSR gave up in 1941, Germany would need an army of 170/180 divisions. Impossible . This is a fact .
If the USSR was defeated in 1943 and Germany would intervene in the Mediterranean, this would mean an army of 220 divisions in peacetime . Impossible .
The 3 million men fighting in the East in 1943 were less than the manpower fighting in 1941 in the East .
If Germany defeated the USSR in 1943 ,it could not intervene in the Mediterranean , even not with 300000 men . It had not the force to do this .
And: your figures about returned wounded are meaningless and irrelevant :Germany was forced to use recovered wounded soldiers again, because its manpower was exhausted .An Ostheer with 30 % of its manpower consisting of soldiers who had been wounded,is much weaker than an Ostheer that consisted of fresh troops .The WSS used in 1943 men who had lost an arm .
And, there is no hyperbole and little fact : already before Barbarossa the LW argued that it needed a 400% increase of its manpower to defend the German cities : the only way to make this possible was to demobilize half of the army and to transfer these men to the LW . But with an army of 100 divisions only it was impossible to defend Germany's conquests .
In 1941 Germany could not afford to have and a strong army and a strong LW . And in 1943,even after victory in the East, the situation was worse, much worse .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 01 Apr 2021 21:43

Hiljadw,

You post:

"Germany could not have in peacetime (if Britain gave up in 1940 ) an army of 120 divisions. That is a fact!" Why is that a "fact"? Improbable? Yes. Unsustainable? Yes. Inadvisable? Probably. Unnecessary? Very likely.

"If the USSR gave up in 1941, Germany would need an army of 170/180 divisions. Impossible. This is a fact." Why would this be necessary and why is that a "fact"?

"If the USSR was defeated in 1943 and Germany would intervene in the Mediterranean, this would mean an army of 220 divisions in peacetime. Impossible ." Why would it "mean" this and why is that "impossible"?

Cheers,

Sid.

Counter
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Counter » 02 Apr 2021 05:13

Ijawd wrote:If the USSR was defeated in 1943 and Germany would intervene in the Mediterranean, this would mean an army of 220 divisions in peacetime . Impossible .
??? In 1944, in spite of all german disasters due to a wrong military strategy, germans had more than 200 divisions. And if the USSR is defeated, then the whole Europe would have add another 300 divisions (France, Italy, Turkey, Spain, Romania etc).

In peacetime? They planned to keep 60 divisions guarding off the Eastern frontier. About the Wallies, obviously the peacetime would come after Wallies accepting that the intercontinental war (America vs nazi Europe) would lack sense.
Ijawd wrote: If Germany defeated the USSR in 1943 ,it could not intervene in the Mediterranean , even not with 300000 men . It had not the force to do this .
If the nazis had 140 divisions in the Eastern front, obviously, if the USSR defeated, they could afford 30 or 40 of these to clear out the Mediterranean of Wallies, locking up it then and doing whatever they please in the Eurasian continent. Just a question of letting the european industry to produce weapons, vehicles and other resources.

Not only LW could produce more aircrafts, also french and italian aerial forces too: they would have raw materials, labour force and, something important, a unified command, as nazi Germany would control directly those resources, a little like happened after the USSR conquered Eastern Europe (as a matter of fact, if not the atom bomb, they could have conquered the whole Europe and establishing an European Communist Empire).

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 02 Apr 2021 06:05

ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
The 3 million men fighting in the East in 1943 were less than the manpower fighting in 1941 in the East .
Wrong. German strength in the East peaked for the whole war in July 1943, with 3,138,000 men.
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
And: your figures about returned wounded are meaningless and irrelevant :Germany was forced to use recovered wounded soldiers again, because its manpower was exhausted .An Ostheer with 30 % of its manpower consisting of soldiers who had been wounded,is much weaker than an Ostheer that consisted of fresh troops .
Wtf are you talking about? Every army used recovered wounded.
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
The WSS used in 1943 men who had lost an arm .
Source this. We'll see how anecdotal it is.
ljadw wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:06
And, there is no hyperbole and little fact : already before Barbarossa the LW argued that it needed a 400% increase of its manpower to defend the German cities
Source this.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 02 Apr 2021 06:39

Never heard of the Göring Programm ?

From ''Vabanque " P 44 :
''Am 26.Juni 1941 fand eine Besprechung statt,an der u.a.Generalfeldmarschall Milch und Oberst Hünermann teilnahmen .Davon ausgehend dass der Krieg '' durch den Einsatz der Luftwaffe entschieden werden'' müsse,die durch das Göring -Programm zu vervierfachen sei, .......''
Vervierfachen means to quadruple = 400 % increase .
About the WSS using again soldiers who had been severely wounded : the Wallies were not forced to reuse men who had lost an arm .
Not only the WSS did this, but also the army : Stauffenberg had lost more than an arm .The employment of Stauffenberg indicates that the German man power pool was empty .

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 02 Apr 2021 06:49

ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
Vervierfachen means to quadruple = 400 % increase .
As expected. Nowhere does it mention quadrupling the manpower of the Luftwaffe.
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
About the WSS using again soldiers who had been severely wounded
Still waiting for that source.
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
Not only the WSS did this, but also the army : Stauffenberg had lost more than an arm .The employment of Stauffenberg indicates that the German man power pool was empty .
Ivan Leonov.

Was the Soviet manpower pool "empty"?

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 02 Apr 2021 06:51

Sid Guttridge wrote:
01 Apr 2021 21:43
Hiljadw,

You post:

"Germany could not have in peacetime (if Britain gave up in 1940 ) an army of 120 divisions. That is a fact!" Why is that a "fact"? Improbable? Yes. Unsustainable? Yes. Inadvisable? Probably. Unnecessary? Very likely.

"If the USSR gave up in 1941, Germany would need an army of 170/180 divisions. Impossible. This is a fact." Why would this be necessary and why is that a "fact"?

"If the USSR was defeated in 1943 and Germany would intervene in the Mediterranean, this would mean an army of 220 divisions in peacetime. Impossible ." Why would it "mean" this and why is that "impossible"?

Cheers,

Sid.
A peace army ( in 1940 ) of 120 divisions means a WM of at least 4 million men : army 3 million, LW and KM 1 million = 5 % of the German population ,and this for generations . This was impossible . Imagine the present US with a peace army of 16 million men and this during decades of peace .
A peace army in 1941 (after the fall of the USSR ) would mean 180 divisions : 120 + 60 in Russia = more than 5 million men .
If after the Soviets were defeated in 1943 Germany would intervene in the ME and NA,this would mean an increase of another 50 divisions needed to occupy and protect the African coast from Tanger to Suez and also the ME .That would mean more than 6 million men needed also after the war ,because if after the war Germany withdrew from NA and the ME ,these territories would be hostile again .

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 02 Apr 2021 06:57

KDF33 wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:49
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
Vervierfachen means to quadruple = 400 % increase .
As expected. Nowhere does it mention quadrupling the manpower of the Luftwaffe.
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
About the WSS using again soldiers who had been severely wounded
Still waiting for that source.
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:39
Not only the WSS did this, but also the army : Stauffenberg had lost more than an arm .The employment of Stauffenberg indicates that the German man power pool was empty .
Ivan Leonov.

Was the Soviet manpower pool "empty"?
With the present manpower strength an increase of the number of aircraft by 400 % was impossible .
Thus an increase of the manpower was needed, especially as the Reichsverteidigung was assured mostly by the Flak and less by Luftflotte Mitte and the Flak consumed a lot of manpower .

KDF33
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by KDF33 » 02 Apr 2021 07:13

ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:57
With the present manpower strength an increase of the number of aircraft by 400 % was impossible .
An increase in manpower would have been necessary, but your figure of 400% is pulled out of thin air. The USAAF had a much larger aircraft component than the Luftwaffe, and it peaked at 2,411,294 personnel on 31.3.1944. The Luftwaffe had 1,545,000 personnel at the time of Barbarossa.
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:57
Thus an increase of the manpower was needed, especially as the Reichsverteidigung was assured mostly by the Flak and less by Luftflotte Mitte and the Flak consumed a lot of manpower .
The Göring program was set to expand aircraft strength, not AAA.

I note you have yet to provide sources for the one-armed Waffen-SS or acknowledge Ivan Leonov and what he means wrt the Soviet manpower pool.

Edit: Unnecessary sentence.
Last edited by KDF33 on 02 Apr 2021 08:14, edited 1 time in total.

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by Sid Guttridge » 02 Apr 2021 07:52

Hi ljadw,

You post that mobilising "5 % of the German population ,and this for generations . This was impossible ." Nope. Not impossible. North Korea has done precisely that. You are overstating your case. As I said "Improbable? Yes. Inadvisable? Probably. Unnecessary? Very likely." Impossible? No!

You post, "A peace army in 1941 (after the fall of the USSR ) would mean 180 divisions : 120 + 60 in Russia = more than 5 million men." Why?

You post, "If after the Soviets were defeated in 1943 Germany would intervene in the ME and NA,this would mean an increase of another 50 divisions needed to occupy and protect the African coast from Tanger to Suez and also the ME." Why?

Cheers,

Sid.

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 02 Apr 2021 09:11

Sid Guttridge wrote:
02 Apr 2021 07:52
Hi ljadw,

You post that mobilising "5 % of the German population ,and this for generations . This was impossible ." Nope. Not impossible. North Korea has done precisely that. You are overstating your case. As I said "Improbable? Yes. Inadvisable? Probably. Unnecessary? Very likely." Impossible? No!

You post, "A peace army in 1941 (after the fall of the USSR ) would mean 180 divisions : 120 + 60 in Russia = more than 5 million men." Why?

You post, "If after the Soviets were defeated in 1943 Germany would intervene in the ME and NA,this would mean an increase of another 50 divisions needed to occupy and protect the African coast from Tanger to Suez and also the ME." Why?

Cheers,

Sid.
5 % of the population conscripted and this for years was impossible
for demographic reasons : most men between 18 and 28 would be in the army ,which means that marriages and births would crash
for financial reasons : who would pay for this ?
for economic reasons : the result would be a manpower shortage in the industry and the agriculture sector
for political reasons : people would not accept it .
In June 1940 ,without Barbarossa, Hitler ordered to bring back the army on 120 divisions .Barbarossa resulted in an army of 200 + divisions .After the fall of the USSR the Army would brought back on 180 divisions : the 120 divisions needed without Barbarossa and 60 divisions needed to occupy European Russia .
An intervention after the fall of the USSR in NA and the ME would result in a new increase of the army needed to occupy these territories :without the presence of these 50 divisions, Britain would be back .And 50 divisions to occupy and protect Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, the Levant, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq,,Turkey is not too much,probably more would be needed .
The French had an army of 120000 men in NA , Germany would need more .

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 02 Apr 2021 09:32

KDF33 wrote:
02 Apr 2021 07:13
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:57
With the present manpower strength an increase of the number of aircraft by 400 % was impossible .
An increase in manpower would have been necessary, but your figure of 400% is pulled out of thin air. The USAAF had a much larger aircraft component than the Luftwaffe, and it peaked at 2,411,294 personnel on 31.3.1944. The Luftwaffe had 1,545,000 personnel at the time of Barbarossa.
ljadw wrote:
02 Apr 2021 06:57
Thus an increase of the manpower was needed, especially as the Reichsverteidigung was assured mostly by the Flak and less by Luftflotte Mitte and the Flak consumed a lot of manpower .
The Göring program was set to expand aircraft strength, not AAA.

I note you have yet to provide sources for the one-armed Waffen-SS or acknowledge Ivan Leonov and what he means wrt the Soviet manpower pool.

Edit: Unnecessary sentence.
Manpower strength of the 14 th Flak division in October 1944 : 57000 men and women .
The German fighters could not prevent air attacks on German cities, only the Flak could do this .
Goebbels said : we will Coventrysier the British cities. What the LW did, the BC could and would do .
The aim of the Goering program was to defend the German cities,the industry and the occupied territories . This could not be done by aircraft .
Source for the one -armed WSS is the diaries of Goebbels, which I no longer have .
And, what Leonov meant with the Soviet manpower pool has nothing to do with the fact ( also mentioned in Germany and WW 2) that already in 1941 Germany had big manpower problems .
These problems would not disappear if there was peace but would become bigger .

ljadw
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Re: Vulnerability of Soviet population, agriculture, and industry to German occupation

Post by ljadw » 02 Apr 2021 09:45

Strength of the Flak in Germany, without the occupied countries and without the Flak units used for ground fighting
1942 : 400000
1943 : 600000
1944 : 900000

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