Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

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Aida1
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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 07 Feb 2020 18:28

memorandum continued
" It shows the abundance of the objections which were raised against the measures of the OKW from all possible offices. A query with the UK kdos concerning its opinion whether and to what extent the march battallions which were requested by us could be really made available and in particular
a) when exploiting all forces
b) when considering all objections
is shown by annexe 23

It forces to the realisation that the class of 22 must already be inserted in february. A certain relief of the situation happened here through a new directive by FM Keitel whereby the march battallions planned for february were shifted to april. This directive however changes nothing to the fact that the class of 22 still needs to be called up already before the start of the operations. This measure means a time-related relief but not a fundamental one.
The constraint to the early calling up of the class of 22 entails that besides the already ordered calling up of unskilled UK (indispensable for the economy) men for january and february, also in march a further 100.000 unskilled UK men have to be gained from the economy( instead of skilled men and therefore more bearable) and that the class of 23 has to be conscripted in april as before. It is the class of the 19 year olds that must be considered as our last reserve. The reserve army would therefore on 1.5 dispose of:
- the remainder of the class of 22 78.800 men
(fully trained)
- now UK 189.700
( of which half fully trained
respectively in june and july)

in total therefore only 268.500 men
Only from 1.8 the the class of 23 will be fully trained at the disposal of the army with around 300.000 men
Grand total : 568.500 men
This number can only be considered insufficient from a viewpoint of time and quantity . A certain but not substantial relief can only be brought by the number of men recovered from wounds which will be 25.000 per month from 1.5.
One must therefore say in conclusion to the personnel situation that it can be solved at the moment for the coming months, but however in the long run with big operations must be viewed with the same seriousness as our material situation."

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 07 Feb 2020 19:18

memorandum continued
The insights which were gained here are not of a satisfying nature. One can not avoid the responsability to describe things unvarnished as they come from meticulous calculations. The positive proposals which now follow try still to make the best from things.
They are:
a) fully operational can be made including equipment with vehicles
9 Pz div , 5 inf div mot with a Panzer point, 2 brigades mot, 15 inf div ,3 light div(see annexe 24)
b) ready for use , however without full equipment with vehicles
28 inf div, 3 light div, 2 mountain div which are all with Army group South excluded 2.army(see annexe 25)
c) all other div of the Ostheer are only limited ready for use as they cannot be fully filled up with panzer, weapons and vehicles (see annexe 25)
d) the 3 Panzer div and 6 inf div which have to be transferred to the west can be until may only makeshift , fully equipped only ftom june (annexe 27)

If it will be necessary on account of the current situation, to supply besides personnel also Panzer, weapons and material to support Army group center and north, then the proposals are not achievable.
It can obviously not be judged from here whether these proposals can be attuned with the objectives of the whole eastern front.
Above all it cannot be known whether Army group center and north with the certainly to be expected limited mobility and incomplete equipment with weapons,while taking into acount the large areas, are able to conduct the defense against operational enemy attacks or even beyond this fix enemy forces by attack or when possible participate in a big operation.
The whole question is at the end about the central problem where the focal point of preparatory work has to be put: on the creation of new well equipped and psychologically intact units for new operations or on a personnel and material refitting of the existing units with constant insufficient mobility while renouncing new units and probably also new operations. "

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Yuri » 08 Feb 2020 13:47

I think it would be appropriate to Supplement the above Memorandum with the report of the artillery inspection on a trip (from 26.4.42 to 5.6.42) to inspect artillery weapons in the East.
12480-45 OKH 42-09-25 Report_Inspect.jpg
12480-45 OKH 42-09-25 Report_Inspect3-4.jpg
12480-45 OKH 42-09-25 Art_Insperction5.jpg
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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 08 Feb 2020 16:30

memorandum continued
" When from here a position can be taken on this problem , it is like this :
The creation of new battleworthy big units seems to be the only solution. Whether it will be sufficient, besides the insufficiently equipped Army group center and Army group north, to start an offensive in great style at Army group south and persevere, can not be judged from here.The consideration of the frontline always getting longer later forces a thorough examination. In any case, it seems in all circonstances to be necessary to setup these new units for this reason that the Ostheer must be liberated from the unbearable situation that it stands in a front of many 1000 km without operational reserves and perhaps also in the summer and winter in possibly even longer fronts will stand before a similar situation. The creation of these new units seems also inevitable because the high command needs to contunouously also dispose of units which can be used anytime anywhere. When this opinion would be accepted then it is however inevitable from now on to keep the supply of material to the eastern front within the limits which comply with the program here presented , and beyond this block any supply."

end
Last edited by Aida1 on 08 Feb 2020 19:55, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 08 Feb 2020 19:50

In this context also
"Organisationsabteilung (III)
Nr. 3356/41 geh.Kdos HQ 18.11.1941
Concerns: Consequences of the vehicle situation Presentation memo

I. The vehicle situation
a) The vehicle situation of the Ostheer cannot to be determined in detail because this overview is often already not available with the division staffs. Based on the status reports, other impressions and reports from the front , it can roughly be stated that from the Soll of about 500.000 vehicles ;
20% = 100.000 fail
10% = 50.000 cannot be repaired
40% = 200 .000 need a general overhaul
15% = 75.000 need small or medium repairs
15% = 75.000 are roadworthy
b) the 30% of vehicles that fail =150.000 compare with 60.000 from new production and current repair
Consequently there remain 90.000 vehicles whose loss can only be covered by a reduction in vehicles , therefore through drastic organisational measures .
The second, separate from this to be treated urgent matter is the repair of the total of 55% = 275.000 vehicles which need repair.
c) the above-mentioned numbers prove unequivocally that the preservation of army motorisation is not possible at the former level.
The fact cannot be ignored anymore that the motorisation of the army will for the forseeable future of the war not reach the level of 22.06.1941 anymore. A demotorisation and conversion to horse transport alone is not enough . Substantial disbanding of army units , conversion of the logistical services to greater centralisation and their allocation from case to case to units intended for special missons, is necessary."
to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 08 Feb 2020 20:45

vehicle situation note continued

" On the whole a sufficient mobility of the whole army and a full satisfactorily mobility that can cope with all missions must be guaranteed for the majority of the mobile divisions.

II. Organisational necessities to cover the 90.000 vehicles that failed
a) for the transformation of the army for the spring of 1942, the following planning is the basis:
1) setting up of 3 new Pz div(22.,23.,24.)
2) conversion of 3 inf div(mot) to pz div
3) no new formation of inf div mot
4) disbandment of 15 inf div

From this results a total stock of mobile divisions spring 1942:

27 Panzerdivisions
11 inf div (mot) inclusive 4 SS div
I.R Gr.D
SS AH
Total 38 2/2 units
From a viewpoint of vehicles this results in:
setting up of the 22.,23.,24. Pz div increased demand of 12.000
conversion of 3 inf div (mot) to pz div no difference
transferring army units into the new pz div alltogether
9 Art abt (mot)
3 Pi Batlne(mot)
1 Pz Flamm Abt
3 H.Pzjg Abtlgen
whose vehicles have to be deducted because already included
in the increased demand for the Pz div reduced demand 2.400
disbandment of 15 inf div reduced demand 15.000

From this results an economy of around 5.000 vehicles.

b) The following organisational modifications and disbandments are proposed:
1) with all inf div (except light divisions and mountain div)demotorisation of the 14.(Inf Pz jg)comp of the inf regiments, and its conversion to horse movement except one platoon which remains motorised . Economy: 270 Inf Pz Jg comp = 14.500 vehicles
2) with all inf div(except ligt and mountain div) demotorisation of the supply company. Economy: around 50 supply companies = around 1000 vehicles."

to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 10 Feb 2020 13:44

vehicle note continued

"3) in about 45 inf div, (except light and mountain div)demotorisation of pi kp(mot)of the Pi batln. Saving: around 45 Pi Kp(mot)= about 1.800 vehicles
4) Disbanding of 40% of all the mot supply columns with inf div(except light and mountain div). By this disbanding , the practical existing situation through disablement of vehicles, will be made permanent. These inf div will be reduced to horsedrawn supply columns(Panje vehicles). Carrying of munition with existing loading space.
The remaining truck columns will be taken away from the divisions and grouped together with the supply troops of the O.Qu. Their allocation will be done from to case to those divisions that are used in operations on long distances. Only through this measure is it guaranteed that the existing column volume will be used on the operational important spot. Saving : around 100 truck kololumns which is about 1.000 vehicles.

5) Refitting of part of the army troops , where again the existing situation through disablement the of vehicles will be recognised and the mismatch between movement possibilities and outlay is eleminated .
In detail it is proposed:
aa) disbanding of 1/3 of all Army artillery of all calibers, that is excluding the 9 Abteilungen to be transferred to new pz div, 30 Abteilungen. Saving: around 5000 vehicles. Partial replacement by horsedrawn heavy artillery Abteilungen from to be disbanded inf div is planned.
bb) Disbanding of about 1/3 of all HeeresPionier Batln(mot) that is, outside the 3 to be transferred in new Pz div, a further 4 batln.
Saving: around 800 vehicles. Replacement by horsedrawn Pi Batln from to be disbanded inf div is planned."

to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 10 Feb 2020 16:06

vehicle note continued

" cc) Disbanding or downgrading to equipment unit of 1/3 Army bridge columns B . Saving : 40 Brucko : 1600 vehicles
dd) Disbanding of 1/3 of the bridge building Batlne and roadbuilding Batlne. Saving 10 Bridge building Batlne,10 roadbuilding Batlne= about 1.000 vehicles
ee) Disbanding of 3 MG Batlne(mot) which are with the Ostheer and use them for later new set up of mobile units. Saving: around 800 vehicles.
ff) Disbanding of all Army Pz Jäger Abteilungen, insofar as they are not needed for the new Pz div, because sufficient armament cannot yet be guaranteed. Saving: about 2.200 vehicles

All in all these proposals of b) result in a saving of around 30.000 vehicles

c) already since the beginning of july, under the command of Oberst Balck work has been going on for a general saving of vehicles by changing and unifying the K.St.N of all weapons, at whose end in december , a saving of 70.000 vehicles is expected. In this is included the demotorisation of the supply trains of all inf div (without light and mountain div).

d) Put together, the organistional measures proposed under a) to c) result in a saving of 105.000 vehicles

This number is higher than the toal loss of vehicles with a necessary safety margin. Details and dividing up among vehicle types were not taken into account . Nonwithstanding the final conclusion that needs to be made at the end, the proposed organisational measures are sufficient from a numbers viewpoint but also absolutely necessary to compensate the loss of vehicles."


to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 11 Feb 2020 13:35

vehicle note continued

"III. Repair of the repairable vehicles

a) the repair of the initially mentioned vehicles of the Ostheer in need of repair

15% = 75.000 vehicles with small and medium repairs
40% = 200.000 vehicles which needed a major overhaul

is the further fundamental prerequisite for the motorisation of the army under the organisational conditions of II.
The possibilities for repair depend above all from the availability of the needed spare parts and the necessary workshops and repair services.

b) on the condition of a sufficient accumulation of spare parts, calculations of Ag K have revealed :
1) 15% = 75.000 with small and medium repairs will be overhauled in the workshops of the units of the Ostheer, part by the repair services of the Ag K or also- with the units to be transferred - in workshops in Germany and the west.
2) of the 20% = 200.000 vehicles which need a major overhaul:
about 60.000 will be able to be repaired in the repair services of the Ag K when the following prerequisites are fullfilled for achieving the highest possible performance:
1) best possible accomodation of the J services in workshops or other suitable spaces with heating and if possibility electricity
2) guarding of the grounds by other units
3) J services if possible on railroads or hard roads
4) bringung up of spare parts from the central spare parts depots by special supply columns
5) if possible pooling of mobile and fixed J services , also the repair companies, to use the available personnel and material resources in the fullest way"

to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 11 Feb 2020 19:49

vehicle note continued

" 6) civilian foreign workers (russian/russian prisoners of war)to be employed extensively
7) it is to be strived for to convey units to be refitted to the repair services to prevent a relocation of the repair centers and the resulting loss of efficiency

A further 60.000 vehicles to be shunted to repair centers in Germany for repair. Of these 25.000 can be loaded in up to 400 trains provided for this from january 1942, 5.000 count on the Grosstransportraum that has to be moved back , the rest of 30.000 on the troops which transfer or will be transferring to Germany or the west.

c) Unter the condition of the mentioned highest possible performance in the east (60.000 main overhauls) and the shunting of 60.000 vehicles that need a main overhaul in the Reich and in the west, there remain 80.000 vehicles that need a main overhaul.
Its repair which isonly possible in Germany or the west is linked to
1) enough operational workshops, workers and spare parts are allocated
2) the vehicles are relocated from the east

From the measure of fullfillement of these conditions depends whether and to which extent there will be a shortage of vehicles that are available but cannot be repaired.

IV Conclusions

a) The vehicle situation has become the decisive factor for the refit of the army and requires radical organisational measures to restrict the motorisation of the army where it can happen without major impairement of the overall operational and tactical mobility .
b) The organisational changes and savings proposed under II are enough to compensate the total losses
Any residue because of lacking repair possibiity of the 80.000 last vehicles that need repair will as a shortage, have an effect on the previously proposed army motorisation.
c) the covering of such a shortage is necessary to attain the full operational readiness
In addition to that the building of a vehicle reserve is necessary to be able to excecute the augmentation of the Sturmgeschütz- and Army flakabteilungen and the desirable building of further mobile units which was not taken into account yet."

to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 12 Feb 2020 20:14

Vehicle note continued

" Both are only possible :
1)Through savings of vehicles in the area of the army logistics and administration.
Through sharper grouping of the supply services in the army troops, through substantial reduction of their number and equipment with vehicles and through radical savings in the area of army administration, a considerable saving of vehicles must be achieved. Preparations for this have started . Detailed proposals by OQu.
2) Through further savings of vehicles by reducing the number of high commands with the army and corps troops which belong to it.
3) Through taking full advantage of all possibilities for repair with the aim to repair the remaining 80.000 vehicles that need a major overhaul.
For this the following demands are established:
aa) Transporting away these vehicles if possible in the highest possible number in Germany or the west. This can only be done efficiently by the transferring of whole mobile units with their relatively high number of vehicles.
In the interest of the striking force , mobility and operational ability of the army in the spring of 1942 , the transfer of the highest possible number of mobile units from the east is necessary.
bb) all measures of an organisational and production nature have to be taken, to carry out the repair of all vehicles that can be repaired in Germany or the west. To this belongs in the first place the allocation of the necessary contingents for the production of spare parts."

End

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 27 Feb 2020 18:34

Annexe 9 to the memorandum on the manpower and material armament situation 1942

"Panzer situation

I Basis
1) the Panzer need is as all other already ordered plans, to be deducted from the stocks and what arrives from new production

these are the folowing plans:

22,23, 24 pz div(the latter with 3 Abteilungen)
1 Pz Abteilung each for I.R Grossdeutschland and SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler
1 Pz Abteilung of pz regt 202
1 Pz Abteilung for a SS div (mot)
1 Pz Abt Krim
Assistance Hungary
Panzer reserve Sagan ( 80 pz III 40 38 t 20 pz IV)
Panzer reserve Afrika ( 50 III 6 IV)
2) After deduction of the panzer needed for these plans from the stocks and the new production, there are at the disposal of the field army for the refitting of the pz troops already in operation: pz II 79, Pz III 491 , 38 t 206 - 120 for transforming into sfl=86, Pz IV 140
2) this refitting can be executed

case A :considering all pz troops operating with the field army uniformly
case B : with prioritisation of an operations army"

to be continued
Last edited by Aida1 on 27 Feb 2020 21:28, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 27 Feb 2020 19:37

" II Case A
1) In the field army are operating Soll stock 19 small pz div (2 Abteilungen each with 2 light and 1 medium company East army) : 855 pz II, 923 III,426 38t, 380 IV ; 2 big pz div (2 Abteilungen each with 2 light and 1 medium company Afrika): 74 Pz II, 246 III, 40 IV; pz rgt 203 (army group north) : 45 II, 71 III, 20 IV ; total Soll : 974 II, 1240 III, 426 38 t , 440 IV.

2) Of these were operational based on the communications of stocks on 22.12.1941 : 119 II, 255 III, 52 38 t, 108 Pz Pz IV ; in repair with the troops(because of uncertainty of repair only 50% is counted) : 107 II , 138 III, 68 38 t, 58 IV ; on transport to Afrika from 03.12-31.12(for transport and other losses 25% is deducted): 28 II, 367 III, 52 38 t , 110 IV ; total : 254 II, 367 III , 279 38 t , 276 IV

3) Soll stock 1) minus stock 2) = need: 720 II , 480 III, 147 38 t, 164 IV

4) Stock at disposal according to I 2) : 79 II, 491 III , 86 38 t , 140 IV minus need II 3)= -641 II , + 11 III, - 61 38 t , - 24 IV

Conclusion: On the basis of the stocks communicated by the troops on 22.12.1941 it is only possible with the stocks at disposal and the new production until april , to approximately refit the operating pz div.. The to be expected losses in tanks until april will however still reduce the stock considerably. For emergencies the pz reserves Sagan and AfrIca are still at disposal."

To be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 27 Feb 2020 20:09

" II Case B

1) From the already supplied tanks to Army Group south will be filled up:

16. pz div 100%
13. and 14. Pz div to each 50% (3 Abteilungen)

2) 3 Pz div of Army group north or center will after surrendering their remaining material at Army Group south be refitted 100%(3Abteilungen)

3) to build 3rd Abteilungen at the Pz div of Army group south and to build Panzer vanguards for 5 inf div(mot) have to be set up new : 1 pz abt with Tsjech material and 7 Abt with german material

4) This means that the need is for 13. and 14. pz div(50%) 45 II, 71 III, IV 20 ; 3 pz div of Army group north and center(100%): 135 II, 213 III, 60 IV ; 8 Pz Abt : 160 II, 245 III, 35 38 t, 80 IV ; total : 340 II , 529 III, 35 38 t, 160 IV .

5) Stock at disposal according to I 2) minus need according to III 4)= -261 II, -38 III, + 51 38 t, -20 IV.

6) Therefore there is no stock for the refitting of the pz regt of the other east divisions and the pz regt 203. The refitting of these pz regt must therefore be done exclusively from repair whereby Pz regt 203 has to have priority because its Abteilungen will be used as vanguard for inf div(mot).

7) Soll stock pz regt 203: 45 II, 71 III, 20 IV; Soll stock of the other 10 pz div which remain in the east: 450 II, 568 III, 142 38 t , 200 IV; total : 495 II, 639 III, 142 38 t, 220 IV "

to be continued

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Re: Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

Post by Aida1 » 27 Feb 2020 21:22

" 8). According to the stocks communicated on 22.12.1941 the 16 pz div of army group north and center had operational: 66 II, 180 III, 84 38 t, 75 IV ; in repair with the troops (50% counted because of uncertainty of success with repair): 94 II, 127 III, 101 38 t, 68 IV ; supplied: 138 III, 53 38 t, 48 IV; total stock : 160 II, 445 III, 238 38 t , 191 IV

9) Soll according to III 7) - total stock according to III 8 = shortage 235 II, 194 III, 29 IV; surplus 96 38 t

10) Because according to III 5) there is no surplus ,the shortage of III 9) can only be reduced by repair . However, because of the heavy fighting a further strong wastage has to be taken into account so the shortage will be probably get higher. By the 10 pz div which remain with Army group north and center one can therefore only count with one pz Abt.

Conclusion: With execution of the refitting according to Case B and concentrated keeping together of the available individual Pz Abteilungen and the Pz div 203 with the pz div and inf div(mot), until 30.4 100 % of the material is at the disposal for: 9 pz div with 3 Abteilungen , 1 Abteilung each for IR Grossdeutschland and Leibstandarte AH, 1 Abteilung each als vanguard for 5 inf div(mot). As well ,the refitting of the remaining 10 pz div is possible to 50% of the stock(1 Pz Abteilung).
For urgent emergencies the pz reserve Afrika is still available."

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