Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 203
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 04 Feb 2020 18:30

Can anyone help to me to understand what was German estimation of Soviet mobilization timeframe. I did not find anywhere what this is and it seems to me it is most critical to the plan.

From Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band IV, Klink wrote
Für das Kriegsheer standen rechnerisch 11 bis 12 Millionen Mann (als Mobilisirungsgrundlage) zur Verfügung, es wurde jedoch bezweifelt, ob diese Zahl wegen des dadurch entstehenden Arbeitermangels und des Fehlens von Führern und Material erreicht werden könne.

Die Gesamtstärke der Roten Armee wurde angenommen mit (Januar 1941):
20 Armeen (mindestens)
20 Schützen korps
150 Schützendivisionen
9 Kavalleriekorps
32/36 Kavalleriedivisionen
6 mechanisierte Korps und mindestens
36 motorisiert-mechanisierte Brigaden.

Die Stärke der in Europa stehenden Schützendivisionen wurde mit mindestens 121 bei Jahresende 1940 angenommen. Über die stationierung dieser Kräfte allerdings bestand keine sichere Klarheit. Insgesamt rechnete die Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost für den Mobilmachungsfall mit:
107 Schützendivisionen 1. Welle
77 Schützendivisionen 2. Welle
25 Schützendivisionen 3. Welle, insgesamt also 209 Schützendivisionen.

Mit einer Vermehrung der ca. 32 Kavalleriedivisionen und der vielleicht im Kriegsfall auf Divisionsstärke gebrachten beiden selbständigen Brigaden wurde nicht gerechnet.
Estimation is for up to 11-12 millions mens in war times Red Army in 359 rifle divisions, 32-36 kavalry divisions and 36 mechanized brigades. But no information on how long for this total mobilization.


From Barbarossa Derailed, Book 1, Glantz wrote
To achieve this victory, the German military planners sought to annihilate the bulk of the peacetime Red Army in the forward area, that is, the Soviet Union’s western military districts, before Stalin’s state could mobilize its large pool of strategic reserves.
...
The plan for Operation Barbarossa sought to exploit the Soviet Union’s lack of adequate communications route, that is, roads and railroads extending laterally across the front as well as into the depths, by employing panzer forces, rapidly advancing cross country, to encircle and destroy Red Army forces in the forward area before they could regroup from one sector to another or withdraw eastward to escape encirclement and destruction. In this fashion, planners believed the three German army groups could destroy most of the peacetime Red Army’s force in their forward defensive positions before mobilized reinforcements could reach the forward area. However, this belief proved to be incorrect because German intelligence overestimated the number of Red Army divisions concentrated in the forward area and was totally ignorant of Soviet mobilization capabilities, specifically, the quantity of reserve armies the Soviet Union could raise and deploy forward into new defensive positions east of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers.
Glantz says plan is to destroy peacetime army near frontier. Mark wrote in this forum German estimate for peace times army is 2 millions mens. What was plan to destroy rest of war times Red Army after mobilization of reserve?


From Operation Barbarossa, Fugate wrote
Later, at the end of November and early December, the OKH conducted a series of war games under Paulus's direction in which several general staff officers took part. During this time also the staff chiefs of the future army groups conducted games and undertook independent studies of their own. It was Paulus's conclusion, confirmed by the other studies as well, that in case of war with the Soviet Union, provision should first be made for reaching the general line Dnepr-Smolensk-Leningrad. Operations could then be conducted beyond this point only if the supply situation developed favorably. Paulus's appreciation of the supply difficulties was in accord with a study undertaken in November 1940 by the new general quartermaster of the army (this post was functionally different from the one held by Paulus, who was attached to the general staff). Major General Wagner. Wagner believed transportation problems would force a temporary halt in the operations after a line due east of Minsk was reached. The consensus in the Quartermaster's Branch seemed to be that the Red Army would have to be brought to battle and defeated west of the Dnepr line or else the German forces, spreading out in a fan shape into the interior of the Soviet Union, would lack the density to defeat the Russians.

In any case, Paulus warned against allowing the Red Army to retreat intact into the depths of Russia. The great expanse of the country and the broad fronts meant that opportunities would exist for executing breakthrough maneuvers to prevent this withdrawal. On the other hand, Russia had few natural barriers, such as mountain ranges or large bodies of water, that could be utilized in pinning the enemy down after the breakthroughs had been effected. As a result, Paulus envisioned the possibility of further campaigns that would lead to a final battle to be fought on the basis of a "strategy of annihilation." His plan provided for the military occupation of the important parts of the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic states for use as staging areas and as bargaining chips in future peace negotiations.

Although Paulus's studies were not yet complete (with other war games to be analyzed in mid-December) and although the staffs of the various army groups had not yet made their full reports, the stage was now set for Halder to present the general staff proposal to Hitler. This presentation was made at a conference held on December 5, 1940. Before a detailed discussion of the Halder plan, it would be well to examine briefly the theoretical foundations on which the plan rested.
Fugate says Paulus's plan (= OKH plan) is many campaigns after stage 1 before final battle.

It seems to me that Paulus understood Germans must defeat all of Soviet war times Red Army in many campaigns. Stage 1 to destroy peace times Red Army, stage 2,3,4...to destroy Soviet war times Red Army. But it is confusing text because it also says too difficult to defeat war times Red Army after Dnepr line. It seems to me time for mobilization of war times Red Army is critical to plan.

Does anybody know what German estimation is for time to mobilize total war times Red Army of 11-12 millions mens and about 400 divisions?

Thank you.

Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 203
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 11 Feb 2020 13:54

It seems to me nobody on forum can to help.

In other topic for logistics Barbarossa peoples are fight about must to win in stage 1, must to destroy Red Army in stage 1, must to win in 4 months because of weather.

But how to win in stage 1 when fight only against peace times army with 2 millions mens or 4 millions mens? How to win against war times army of 11-12 millions mens?

Was German Army to think that Soviet Union not bother to mobilize war times army?

To me it seems that very strange decision.

User avatar
Yuri
Member
Posts: 1326
Joined: 01 Jun 2006 11:24
Location: Russia

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Yuri » 11 Feb 2020 17:52

Here is a little more detail.
41-01-15 OKH-RKKA.jpg
41-01-15 OKH-RKKA3-4.jpg
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

User avatar
Yuri
Member
Posts: 1326
Joined: 01 Jun 2006 11:24
Location: Russia

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Yuri » 11 Feb 2020 17:55

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
04 Feb 2020 18:30
Can anyone help to me to understand what was German estimation of Soviet mobilization timeframe. I did not find anywhere what this is and it seems to me it is most critical to the plan.

From Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band IV, Klink wrote
Für das Kriegsheer standen rechnerisch 11 bis 12 Millionen Mann (als Mobilisirungsgrundlage) zur Verfügung, es wurde jedoch bezweifelt, ob diese Zahl wegen des dadurch entstehenden Arbeitermangels und des Fehlens von Führern und Material erreicht werden könne.
....
....

Estimation is for up to 11-12 millions mens in war times Red Army in 359 rifle divisions, 32-36 kavalry divisions and 36 mechanized brigades. But no information on how long for this total mobilization.

Fugate says Paulus's plan (= OKH plan) is many campaigns after stage 1 before final battle.

It seems to me that Paulus understood Germans must defeat all of Soviet war times Red Army in many campaigns. Stage 1 to destroy peace times Red Army, stage 2,3,4...to destroy Soviet war times Red Army. But it is confusing text because it also says too difficult to defeat war times Red Army after Dnepr line. It seems to me time for mobilization of war times Red Army is critical to plan.

Does anybody know what German estimation is for time to mobilize total war times Red Army of 11-12 millions mens and about 400 divisions?

Thank you.
The authors of "Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg" try to present the German planners of Barbarossa in a more favorable light than they actually were. In fact, the German planners of Barbarossa fully accepted the concept of Nazism - the territory East of the German borders is inhabited by Untermensch. Therefore, they (the OKH, OKL and OKM Generals) were absolutely sure that after the first strikes, not only the army of the Untermensch, but also all the structures of the Untermensch state (management, factories, Railways, planes, steamships, etc.) would not be able to realize more than 25% of their potential.

Peter89
Member
Posts: 429
Joined: 28 Aug 2018 05:52
Location: Hungary

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Peter89 » 12 Feb 2020 10:26

Yuri wrote:
11 Feb 2020 17:55
In fact, the German planners of Barbarossa fully accepted the concept of Nazism - the territory East of the German borders is inhabited by Untermensch. Therefore, they (the OKH, OKL and OKM Generals) were absolutely sure that after the first strikes, not only the army of the Untermensch, but also all the structures of the Untermensch state (management, factories, Railways, planes, steamships, etc.) would not be able to realize more than 25% of their potential.
I would rephrase this notion, because it wasn't exactly the Nazism what they internalized. Everything came into a different light after WW2 and the end of the colonial empires, but it was different back in 1940. Every single military leadership in 1940 was ready to commit large scale crimes against humanity in our contemporary sense, and every single military leadership used excessively racist and cultural distinctions between the people on Earth.

The British were ready to set up concentration camps in South Africa, the US deprived the black people of their basic human rights, Japan committed insane crimes in Korea and China, the Soviets massacred the Polish officier corps at Katyn. I believe the "untermensch" ideology could have been found in each and every statecraft in 1940. The Nazism was different in the sense that it institutionalized and highly organized mass murder. I believe that was not the style for most of the senior officiers in the Wehrmacht, but they regarded it as a matter of statecraft, not of military. The crimes against humanity they carried out, and the racial ideology they internalized were far less bestial than the Nazism. Nevertheless, they were all aware of the nature of the system, I am just pointing out a difference between imperial racism and totalitarian mass murder.

What the German high command were wrong about was the nature of the totalitarian state. They thought that the bolshevik state's grasp on the society was weak and ready to crumble under a serious blow. The arbitrary draw of the A-A line during the Barbarossa planning never made any sense. In little over 3 years, the German high command could realize how far a totalitarian state can go. So their most decisive ideologically motivated debacle was the assumption that the Soviet state would stop fighting at any line, any city, any river.

They also underscored the modernization capability of the SU. Despite the serious warnings received by Friedrich-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, Gustav Hilger and the negative assessments by Georg Thomas, they decided to ignore it, and treated the Soviet state something like a badly-ran imperial state.

From a military viewpoint, this underscoring is even more apparent. The Soviet-Russian military record was terrible up to 1941, the only border battle they won against Japan was insignificant in scope. The lost Polish war, the hardly won war against Finland, etc. all pictured a weak military. Also, in 1941 there was no experience with communist states, so the Germans didn't know that the worst option to defeat a communist state is to attack it.
In the six months of 1941, the SU suffered more casualties and lost more territory than during the whole WW1, which resulted in the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

Also, an attack on the SU was not favored by a great number of senior German generals, including Erich Reader, Georg Thomas, etc.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 520
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Max Payload » 12 Feb 2020 13:04

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:54
It seems to me nobody on forum can to help.
It may simply be that there was no German estimation of the Soviet mobilisation timeframe as it related to a Soviet strategic reserve.

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:54
In other topic for logistics Barbarossa peoples are fight about must to win in stage 1, must to destroy Red Army in stage 1, must to win in 4 months because of weather.

But how to win in stage 1 when fight only against peace times army with 2 millions mens or 4 millions mens? How to win against war times army of 11-12 millions mens?

Was German Army to think that Soviet Union not bother to mobilize war times army?

To me it seems that very strange decision.
There were a number of factors that led to the decision to invade the SU but those factors did not include any detailed assessment of the Soviet Union’s military/industrial capacity in a prolonged war or the rate at which the Red Army’s strategic reserve could be activated. Indeed there seems to be little to suggest that in July 1940, when Hitler took the decision to invade, he had more than the vaguest notion of the scale and disposition of the Soviet peacetime army. What he did ‘know’ was that the Red Army was an inefficient, poorly equipped force of unenthusiastic Untermenschen from which the best officers had been purged. If the French Army could be beaten in a matter of weeks, why would the Red Army perform any better, particularly if, as might reasonably be expected, its priority would be to defend the newly acquired territory in Romania, Poland and along the Baltic coast? The subsequent German military planning did little to undermine those preconceptions.
What did it matter how many divisions the Red Army had if those divisions were largely combat ineffective? Why would the scale of the SU’s manpower reserve matter if the war was likely to be over before that reserve could brought to bear? Why would the Soviet Union’s military/industrial capacity be of concern if much of it was likely to be overrun in the first weeks?
What mattered most in the Barbarossa planning was that the key battles be fought near the frontier and that the Soviet frontier armies be prevented from escaping to the east. If that could be accomplished the war, it was believed, should be effectively over, with mechanised forces pursuing remnant Red Army units into the interior.
It was not expected that Stalin’s regime would survive such a catastrophe, or if it did, it was assumed it would be intent on seeking a peace deal.
It seems that little thought was given to the consequences of significant elements of the frontier armies escaping to the east, or of the presence of significant operational reserves east of the Dnepr, or of the Soviets being able to mobilise large-scale strategic reserve formations quickly. The operation had to be undertaken and it had to succeed, hence the Red Army and Stalin had to follow the script.

Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 203
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 12 Feb 2020 16:30

Max Payload wrote:
12 Feb 2020 13:04
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:54
It seems to me nobody on forum can to help.
It may simply be that there was no German estimation of the Soviet mobilisation timeframe as it related to a Soviet strategic reserve.
It seems to me this is answer. How mad is that?

About strategic reserve? What is it?

Soviet Union have peace times Red army and detail plans for war times Red army. Peace times and war times Red army not strategic reserve.

It seems to me strategic reserves is peoples after war times army finished. But do you mean peoples already train for Red army or peoples not train?
Max Payload wrote:
12 Feb 2020 13:04
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
11 Feb 2020 13:54
In other topic for logistics Barbarossa peoples are fight about must to win in stage 1, must to destroy Red Army in stage 1, must to win in 4 months because of weather.

But how to win in stage 1 when fight only against peace times army with 2 millions mens or 4 millions mens? How to win against war times army of 11-12 millions mens?

Was German Army to think that Soviet Union not bother to mobilize war times army?

To me it seems that very strange decision.
There were a number of factors that led to the decision to invade the SU but those factors did not include any detailed assessment of the Soviet Union’s military/industrial capacity in a prolonged war or the rate at which the Red Army’s strategic reserve could be activated. Indeed there seems to be little to suggest that in July 1940, when Hitler took the decision to invade, he had more than the vaguest notion of the scale and disposition of the Soviet peacetime army. What he did ‘know’ was that the Red Army was an inefficient, poorly equipped force of unenthusiastic Untermenschen from which the best officers had been purged. If the French Army could be beaten in a matter of weeks, why would the Red Army perform any better, particularly if, as might reasonably be expected, its priority would be to defend the newly acquired territory in Romania, Poland and along the Baltic coast? The subsequent German military planning did little to undermine those preconceptions.
What did it matter how many divisions the Red Army had if those divisions were largely combat ineffective? Why would the scale of the SU’s manpower reserve matter if the war was likely to be over before that reserve could brought to bear? Why would the Soviet Union’s military/industrial capacity be of concern if much of it was likely to be overrun in the first weeks?
Yuri write about Germany think only about untermensen.

Germany army intelligence say Red army up to 11-12 millions mens and 400 divisions.

Did Germany army think they can to destroy everything of that but it only seem like 3 millions mens and 100 divisions?

Hitler was mad person. Nobody argue to that. It seems to me Germany army high command also make mad decisions to.

Max Payload wrote:
12 Feb 2020 13:04

What mattered most in the Barbarossa planning was that the key battles be fought near the frontier and that the Soviet frontier armies be prevented from escaping to the east. If that could be accomplished the war, it was believed, should be effectively over, with mechanised forces pursuing remnant Red Army units into the interior.
It was not expected that Stalin’s regime would survive such a catastrophe, or if it did, it was assumed it would be intent on seeking a peace deal.
It seems that little thought was given to the consequences of significant elements of the frontier armies escaping to the east, or of the presence of significant operational reserves east of the Dnepr, or of the Soviets being able to mobilise large-scale strategic reserve formations quickly. The operation had to be undertaken and it had to succeed, hence the Red Army and Stalin had to follow the script.
Many Germany commanders was write books after war. Nobody was write about Red army mobilization. Nobody was write they complain to army high command and Hitler about how to win against war times Red army.

When plan is for to only mechanized forces to invade after stage 1 then only small forces to fight most biggest part of war times Red army. Mad situation. Why not commanders of mechanized forces complain?

Yuri evidence show under 100 divisions in peace times Red army at frontier. When destroyed in stage 1 mechanized forces must to destroy war times Red army of 300 divisions. Why not Kleist, Guderin, Hoth, Hopner to say mad plan?

It seems to me that everybody in Germany army think Soviet Union not think to mobilize and just stays at home.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 520
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Max Payload » 12 Feb 2020 22:01

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
12 Feb 2020 16:30
About strategic reserve? What is it?
It’s the manpower pool that was not serving in the Red Army on 22 June 1941 but which was available to serve in the 46 new armies that the Soviet Union created in the second half of 1941.

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
12 Feb 2020 16:30
It seems to me that everybody in Germany army think Soviet Union not think to mobilize and just stays at home.
It was a question of timescale. If the Red Army of 22 June could be comprehensive beaten quickly, the war would be over before any significant new formations could be mobilised and deployed.

Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 203
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 13 Feb 2020 01:11

Max Payload wrote:
12 Feb 2020 22:01
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
12 Feb 2020 16:30
About strategic reserve? What is it?
It’s the manpower pool that was not serving in the Red Army on 22 June 1941 but which was available to serve in the 46 new armies that the Soviet Union created in the second half of 1941.
Not in Red army on 22 june was many millions mens of normal war times reserve.

Max Payload wrote:
12 Feb 2020 22:01
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
12 Feb 2020 16:30
It seems to me that everybody in Germany army think Soviet Union not think to mobilize and just stays at home.
It was a question of timescale. If the Red Army of 22 June could be comprehensive beaten quickly, the war would be over before any significant new formations could be mobilised and deployed.
Germany army intelligence was write in 1941 about 300 war times divisions not in borders areas. Not new divisions but estimate old divisions.

I not understand plan to win war before Red army war times mobilization. To think to be possible to win before mean Germany army must to have estimate of how long to Red army mobilize. But nobody know it.

Also Germany army in 1906 was estimate 30 days for to mobilize Russian army. Not all in border but ready to fighting. Most peoples say Russians get quicker and quicker after 1906.

Fugate was write about Paulus war games and was write war games say 20 days to finish stage 1 and then 3 weeks pause for to logistics build up before stage 2.

How to think Red army sit at home and do nothing for 20+21 days?

Mad plan from Germany generals.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 520
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Max Payload » 21 Feb 2020 15:13

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
13 Feb 2020 01:11
Germany army intelligence was write in 1941 about 300 war times divisions not in borders areas. Not new divisions but estimate old divisions.
The pre-Barbarossa estimate was around 200 divisions in 'European Russia'. I have never seen an FHO estimate of 400+ divisions for the SU as a whole.
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
13 Feb 2020 01:11
I not understand plan to win war before Red army war times mobilization. To think to be possible to win before mean Germany army must to have estimate of how long to Red army mobilize. But nobody know it.
The only figures I have seen were apparently quoted by Paulus in 1946 where he claimed that in his pre-invasion study and war games he made allowance for around 30 new Soviet divisions to be raised within the first three months of conflict, rising to some 140 divisions within six months of the commencement of operations. (I don't have a source for that.)

Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 203
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 22 Feb 2020 00:47

Max Payload wrote:
21 Feb 2020 15:13
The pre-Barbarossa estimate was around 200 divisions in 'European Russia'. I have never seen an FHO estimate of 400+ divisions for the SU as a whole.
I was give quote in first message. Germany army intelligence report of january 1941. Datas in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band IV, Klink.

I write here because topic mobilization.

Max Payload wrote:
21 Feb 2020 14:53
Art wrote:
21 Feb 2020 11:42
Max Payload wrote:
20 Feb 2020 17:38

Near the end of the chapter - Советское военное планирование в 1940-1941 гг.
Metlyukhov’s writes the following -
По пункту 1. Еще 8 марта 1941 г. было утверждено постановление СНК СССР, согласно которому предусматривалось произвести скрытое отмобилизование 903,8 тыс. военнообязанных запаса под видом "больших учебных сборов".
The problem is that neither the text of this decree linked above nor the directives issued following the decree ever used the words "большие учебные сборы" or "hidden mobilization" or any synonyms. Which makes this description a little dubious.
I also find his argument that Stalin approved the 15 May War Plan 'a little dubious'.

Art wrote:
21 Feb 2020 11:42
Presumably the 99 divisions he is referring to are the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100”
No that was a incidental coincidence. In general 4/120 divisions received 5000-6000 reservists, 4/100 - 2000. Which brought their strength to 11-12 000 (either 6 000 + 6 000 or 10 000 + 2000).
It is surprising that Meltyukhov’s “99 infantry divisions in mainly western border districts” that the 8 March resolution “made it possible to strengthen”, are not the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100 (mostly border districts)” to which you referred last year. Nonetheless Meltyukhov seems clear that only 99 of the 177 divisions were “strengthened” by the reservists and seems content to include those reservists in his calculation of divisional personnel strength figures.
You can to find easy on internet list all 99 rifles division to receive mobilized peoples. Datas was changing many times so datas is different if you look different source and date. But changes is not so big. About 1/3 of mobilized peoples was in 4 border districts.

Books
1941 год. Сборник документов. Книга 1
1941 год. Сборник документов. Книга 2
Захаров М. В. Генеральный штаб в предвоенные годы
have many interesting datas.

From Захаров 41 rifles division on 4 border districts was to get mobilized peoples. 58 rifles divisions was not on 4 border districts. Also mobilized peoples was go other forces as well as rifles divisions.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 520
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Max Payload » 22 Feb 2020 09:25

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
22 Feb 2020 00:47
Max Payload wrote:
21 Feb 2020 15:13
The pre-Barbarossa estimate was around 200 divisions in 'European Russia'. I have never seen an FHO estimate of 400+ divisions for the SU as a whole.
I was give quote in first message. Germany army intelligence report of january 1941. Datas in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band IV, Klink.

I write here because topic mobilization.
I find the gothic script of the January assessment heavy going, but I don’t see a timescale attached to the operational deployment of the 209 mobilised divisions, and FHO seems to have doubted that the third wave could even be equipped. In the earlier Marcks report it was assumed that the only additional divisions that would be available to face an invasion within the timeframe of the operation would have to come from existing divisions deployed further east.



Ружичасти Слон wrote:
22 Feb 2020 00:47
You can to find easy on internet list all 99 rifles division to receive mobilized peoples. Datas was changing many times so datas is different if you look different source and date. But changes is not so big. About 1/3 of mobilized peoples was in 4 border districts.

Books
1941 год. Сборник документов. Книга 1
1941 год. Сборник документов. Книга 2
Захаров М. В. Генеральный штаб в предвоенные годы
have many interesting datas.

From Захаров 41 rifles division on 4 border districts was to get mobilized peoples. 58 rifles divisions was not on 4 border districts. Also mobilized peoples was go other forces as well as rifles divisions.
Thanks for the references. Meltyukhov on the other hand states that most of the ‘strengthened’ 99 rifle divisions were in the border districts.

Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 203
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 23 Feb 2020 20:51

Max Payload wrote:
22 Feb 2020 09:25

I find the gothic script of the January assessment heavy going, but I don’t see a timescale attached to the operational deployment of the 209 mobilised divisions, and FHO seems to have doubted that the third wave could even be equipped.
Yes. No datas on timescale. Reason for me ask about timescale. But nobodys know anything for it.
Max Payload wrote:
22 Feb 2020 09:25
In the earlier Marcks report it was assumed that the only additional divisions that would be available to face an invasion within the timeframe of the operation would have to come from existing divisions deployed further east.
Was big mistake.
Max Payload wrote:
22 Feb 2020 09:25
Thanks for the references. Meltyukhov on the other hand states that most of the ‘strengthened’ 99 rifle divisions were in the border districts.
Meltyukov words not correct and make undetstand not easy.

Example from datas.
Western Special Military District. 4 rifles division plan for to receive each 6.000 peoples. (64. 108. 143. 161.sd) Total 24.000. (Datas from № Моб/4/548345сс Записка врид. начальника Мобуправления Генштаба Красной Армии начальнику Оперативного управления Генштаба Красной Армии)
Total peoples mobilized for Western Special Military District 71.715. (Datas from БОЕВОЙ И ЧИСЛЕННЫЙ СОСТАВ ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ СССР В ПЕРИОД ВЕЛИКОЙ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ ВОЙНЫ (1941-1945 гг.) Статистический сборник № 1 (22 июня 1941 г.)

Datas not compatible but is possible to see ideas that for to Western Special Military District most mobilized peoples were not for rifles division. About 47.000 for to other forces.

From БОЕВОЙ И ЧИСЛЕННЫЙ СОСТАВ ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ СССР В ПЕРИОД ВЕЛИКОЙ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ ВОЙНЫ (1941-1945 гг.) Статистический сборник № 1 (22 июня 1941 г.)
Total mobilized people
БУС. 805.264
to СЗФ 44.143
to ЗапФ 71.715
to ЮЗФ 142.105
to 9А 3.050
to ОдВО 51.094

You can to calculate about 40% total mobilized peoples is to 4 border districts.

User avatar
AbollonPolweder
Member
Posts: 239
Joined: 09 Jan 2017 20:54
Location: Russia

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by AbollonPolweder » 27 Feb 2020 16:10

Peter89 wrote:
12 Feb 2020 10:26
Yuri wrote:
11 Feb 2020 17:55
In fact, the German planners of Barbarossa fully accepted the concept of Nazism - the territory East of the German borders is inhabited by Untermensch. Therefore, they (the OKH, OKL and OKM Generals) were absolutely sure that after the first strikes, not only the army of the Untermensch, but also all the structures of the Untermensch state (management, factories, Railways, planes, steamships, etc.) would not be able to realize more than 25% of their potential.
...
What the German high command were wrong about was the nature of the totalitarian state. They thought that the bolshevik state's grasp on the society was weak and ready to crumble under a serious blow. The arbitrary draw of the A-A line during the Barbarossa planning never made any sense. In little over 3 years, the German high command could realize how far a totalitarian state can go. So their most decisive ideologically motivated debacle was the assumption that the Soviet state would stop fighting at any line, any city, any river.
...
Yes, sir! It is very correctly written. Thanks!
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

User avatar
AbollonPolweder
Member
Posts: 239
Joined: 09 Jan 2017 20:54
Location: Russia

Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by AbollonPolweder » 27 Feb 2020 17:34

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
04 Feb 2020 18:30
Can anyone help to me to understand what was German estimation of Soviet mobilization timeframe. I did not find anywhere what this is and it seems to me it is most critical to the plan.
...
Does anybody know what German estimation is for time to mobilize total war times Red Army of 11-12 millions mens and about 400 divisions?

Thank you.
1. Hitler and his generals were convinced that the USSR was weaker than France. And why should they have thought differently?
General Marcks believed that Barbarossa would take from 9 to 17 weeks. During this time, the USSR would have lost most of its territory and population. And this means that any mobilization would be already ineffective.
Read this source about the mobilization process in Leningrad in 1939.
http://eprints.tversu.ru/7159/1/%D0%92% ... 23-135.pdf
I give a few quotes:
Many military enlistment offices simply reigned in chaos.Railways were also unprepared for mobilization. The mobilization of vehicles and horses was unsatisfactory.
“The work of the couriers was hampered by the absence of sufficient street lighting. ” It was about the outskirts of the city - Forest, Specific, Ozerki, Shuvalovo. Therefore, according to the source, one hundred couriers did not find the necessary streets and houses and "a huge amount of summons was brought ... back ".
The mobilization mechanism kept failing. It turned out that among those registered in the military commissariats there are many "dead souls". For example, in the Soletsky village council of the Soletsky district such were 67 people out of 269 registered. In the Slutsk region, according to the report of the head of the military department of the regional committee D.N. Sobolev, 924 summons out of 3,223 were returned. … In the Kingisepp District out of 400 summons 180 were returned back - that is, almost half. “Numerous cases of disorder and confusion in registering the military-obligated population,” Sobolev reported, “were also found in other areas of the region”
In some military enlistment offices and at individual assembly points, simply chaos reigned. The Kingisepp District was particularly distinguished. There, according to Sobolev, "the work of the assembly point could not begin due to the lack of ink, pens and preprinted forms of documents ...".
1939! No war in the USSR! No fac..ng Barbarossa! And the "colossus" already has a huge number of dead souls and the absence of pens and ink. And this is in the "capital" city Leningrad. But what about ink and pens in a small town? That's what Adolf had in mind when he mentioned some colossus.
2. One division of the Red Army in 1941 totaled approximately 15,000 soldiers. Let's divide 12 million by 15,000. 12,000,000: 15,000 = 800 divisions. Or am I wrong? How did you calculate?
https://sites.google.com/site/krieg1941undnarod/
Better to lose with a clever than with a fool to find

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”