Yes i agree. 580% change is significant change. Very significant change. But datas images give by themarksplan on self not give any explanation of what is cause of significant change and worstest still what is consequence of change.Max Payload wrote: ↑07 Feb 2020 16:16
If you have a stable population of say 50,000 people over the age of 5 in a particular location and the average further life expectancy of those people is 50 years, then you would expect 1,000 of those people to die every year. If one year 5,800 die, then that is significant. Something has changed to cause a 580% increase in the number of expected deaths and a problem appears to exist. But if during that year 10,000 sick and starving people arrive at that location, that would be a likely explanation for the rise in the percentage data. Alternatively if between 1940 and 1943 an additional 250,000 people have moved to the area (i.e. the population has grown by 500%) that is another less sinister explanation.
Without knowing what contributing factors may be at work in a particular data set, the percentage figures being quoted are only an indication that something has changed. Yet a 580% increase in the death rate is also an indication that something very significant has happened at that location.
How many total peoples dead? How to die? Short time starvation and quick dead or long time starvation? When dead? 1940,1941,1942,1943. Who dead? Factory workers or somebodys else? What war production lost? 1% 99%
In other topic i try to explain to other member that saying action have consequence is not proof that consequence is consequence you claim happen. Datas images from book hunger and war in this topic give very little informations. With explanations from authors of book we have much better understanding of datas. But we never get 100% understanding of 100% issue.
In 2001 Harison give very interested speech and essay about topic. Title of essay The USSR and Total War: Why didn’t the Soviet economy collapse in 1942?
In paragraph before conclusion he was write
He also was writeWe cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it can hardly be doubted that collapse was near.
The outcome of the war was decided by production, and production rested on the mobilisation of overall resources into the war effort. But in 1942 the Soviet war effort itself rested on a knife–edge. The war in that year saw a battle of motivations in which a hundred million people made individual choices based on the information and incentives available. Their preferences were shaped by moral, political, and national feeling. But their context was determined by overall resources. Only where the balance of overall resources was indecisive did moral, political, technical, and organisational factors play a significant role.