What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

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What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 11 Oct 2019 21:13

A win condition is a set of objectives that, when achieved, result in a country's victory in a war.

What would have been a "victory" for Germany in WW2? If we go by Hitler's objectives, it was the creation of a German empire that held sole military dominance over Europe and was powerful enough to contend with the United States for global military hegemony and also bring the German standard living equal to or greater than that in the United States.

What objectives would Germany need to achieve in order to bring about this result? We can break it down by 3 basic objectives:

(1) Capitulate France.

(2) Capitulate the Soviet Union.

(3) Capitulate Great Britain.

For these purposes, "capitulate" means to militarily dominate a country to the extent that they agree to a peace treaty on favorable terms that will allow Germany to achieve "victory" as defined above. It doesn't necessarily mean conquer. Capitulation can be brought about through blockade, strategic bombing, and/or attrition, in addition to conquest.

Germany successfully conquered France, but this failed to achieve victory. So the question is which of the other two objectives, or both, were necessary to realize victory?

It is commonly proposed that conquering European Russia would have sufficed to bring about victory. The problem with this analysis is that it leaves Great Britain in the war, which is essentially an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which the United States can launch unending air, sea and land attacks on German held Europe. It also leaves Germany's European empire surrounded by British bases - at Gibraltar, North Africa, Malta, Iraq and Persia. Even if Great Britain and the United States can't conquer German occupied Europe, they are in an excellent position to contain and blockade it. The result is that even though Germany is the sole military power in continental Europe, it cannot challenge the United States for global military hegemony, and its people will not come anywhere close to the standard of living of the United States. The most it can do is hold on to what it already has, and slowly suffer under years and potentially decades of economic strangulation by the United States and Britain, which makes Germany's people poor in the long-term, which is the exact opposite of what Hitler wanted.

Capitulating Great Britain instead of Russia would have left Germany in a better position. It would eliminate a base from which air and land invasions could take place against German occupied Europe. It would weaken the British Empire to such an extent that the capture of Gibraltar, Malta, North Africa and the Middle East would now be feasible. Either Britain would cease to blockade Germany, or else Britain would be unable to hold onto its colonies in Asia, which would then be seized by Japan in the same way that French Indochina was. Japan, Italy and Germany could then link up through the Indian Ocean and create a global economic and military power bloc to counter the United States. And this would leave the Soviet Union isolated between two hostile powers, Germany and Japan, with its only potential ally, the United States, on the other side of the world. Without naval bases in Great Britain, all of Russia's ports could be blockaded by Germany and Japan. Germany wouldn't have to conquer Russia at the cost of millions of German lives in order to exploit that country's resources. Instead, Germany could dictate favorable terms of trade with the Soviet Union to exploit that country's resources without the need for shedding blood.

Hitler seems to have believed that capitulating Great Britain was the necessary win condition for victory, but in 1940-41 he decided that the best way to to this was by capitulating Russia. This is why the planning for Barbarossa required that the Soviet Union be capitulated within a matter of 2-3 months. Germany's long-term economic investments in the period leading up to Barbarossa were in its navy and air force, not the army. Capitulating the Soviet Union was just one step on the way toward capitulating Great Britain.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 12 Oct 2019 06:49

In short, taking into account all factors (ex ante/ex post), they had to push the Allies off the continent (concluded in 1940) and knock the Soviets out of the war before 1943, in order to circumvent the trap of a multi front war that prohibited them to fight the front to a standstill (historically speaking, victory was already beyond their grasp at the time). This could have been achieved by either capturing the capital (historically: failure of Barbarossa), or strangling them into submission (the Soviets would not have survived another year with AGC sitting around Rzhev pointing towards the Volokolamsk-Mozhaisk line, overextension in 1942 that led to encirclement forced them to give up their "siege"), while denying them the populations westwards that were so critical for their push towards Berlin during the last phase of the war. With a victory over the USSR, the Nazis would control the continent and the entire labour force would be at their disposal to be shifted and committed to the defense of the channel, rendering Allied invasion either impossible or simply futile. The inhibition of economic support to the Soviet Union by GB and the US would be another factor to consider, during WWI Britain failed to establish this important line. Knocking out Imperial Russia during WWI and France during WWII was only half of the job. Demography was one of the decisive factors.
also bring the German standard living equal to or greater than that in the United States.
Actually in various parts of Western and Central Europe the living standards already surpassed those of the United States, not much different from today.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Peter89 » 12 Oct 2019 07:45

In 1941 Hitler gave a speech in the Sportpalast.
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/hi ... ry-30-1941

It was about the New Order, the way he saw the world.

Later, they struck a deal about the imaginary spheres of influence with Japan on 18 January 1942. It divided Eurasia at the line of Yenisei river, and British India also would have went to Japan. They loaned the former German colonies in Asia to Japan.

But after all, the Japan dream of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was fundamentally against Nazism especially because it included the rule of Australia and New Zealand: a yellow race ruling over nordic whites.

So there was no end of their war plans. The same goes for every power by the way. The Soviets tried their luck too, but they were defeated by economical and political means. The Japanese tried their luck and got defeated too. The Anglo-Saxon alliance tried their luck too - and they rule the world ever since.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 12 Oct 2019 13:41

Stiltzkin wrote:
12 Oct 2019 06:49

Actually in various parts of Western and Central Europe the living standards already surpassed those of the United States, not much different from today.
In some parts, yes, but as a whole, the standard of living in 1930s Germany was well below that in the United States. In many respects it was still a developing nation. Adam Tooze documents this extensively in The Wages of Destruction. One of the main reasons Hitler wanted to conquer so much territory is that he didn't trust the intentional trade system to allow Germans to compete on fair terms. In the 1930s, Germany's rivals (USA, Britain and France) all had large internal markets for goods and commodities that gave them protection from international competition in trade. The Depression only made it harder for Germany to try to find export markets. Hitler thought that building an empire would give Germany an internal market to rival that of the United States.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 12 Oct 2019 18:34

n many respects it was still a developing nation.
No, it certainly was not. A nation can be in a transition but not be in part a developing nation that reaches similar levels of a fully developed system, or else you could state the same about the United States, Kentucky or Arkansas for instance were hardly as developed as the district of Columbia. The inequality in the US is naturally more pronounced. The disparity between East and West Germany increased further as a consequence of Soviet occupation, post 45.

Even if we rely on something like Maddison's time series for per capita GDP's (PPP, 2011 Int$) that becomes already quite obvious, we have Germany with 91% of the US, 97% of the UK. Fully developed nations had an average per capita GNP of 800$ (1960 values), for 1938 the figure was +326$ higher. The values for the USSR are below 1st world averages.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_r ... per_capita
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index
Of course, one can argue that GDPs aren't everything. In fact, despite of an increase in GDPs, the standards temporarily lowered throughout the developed world after WWI. The impacts of the recession were obviously felt and Hitler's war preparations were rather counterproductive. Germany reinstated its power by absorbing and leeching off new (or lost) territories.
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo_wp800.pdf

WW2 was primarily a conflict between two tyrannical regimes, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, a fully developed, middle sized industrial nation taking over the capital stock of the Western continent and clashing with a system of developing nations in a war of annihilation. Everything else would be a misunderstanding of WW2.
Germany's rivals (USA, Britain and France
Germany's main adversary during WW2 was the USSR, that was economically inferior to Germany and still won.
Hitler thought that building an empire would give Germany an internal market to rival that of the United States.
Indeed and they failed in both world wars. Individually they were already one of the strongest players, their strategic choices were so poor that they ended up fighting the world twice. :D

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 12 Oct 2019 18:51

Have you read Tooze's book? This is what he says:
Both the real-life experience of Europeans since the early 1990s and a generation of technical work by economists and economic historians has shaken, if not demolished, the myth of Germany’s peculiar economic superiority.... Germany from the late nineteenth century onwards was the home for a cluster of world-beating industrial companies. Brand names like Krupp, Siemens and IG Farben gave substance to the myth of German industrial invincibility. Viewed in wider terms, however, the German economy differed little from the European average: its national per capita income in the 1930s was middling; in present-day terms it was comparable to that of Iran or South Africa. The standard of consumption enjoyed by the majority of the German population was modest and lagged behind that of most of its Western European neighbours. Germany under Hitler was still only a partially modernized society, in which upwards of 15 million people depended for their living either on traditional handicrafts or on peasant agriculture.

Hitler understood the overwhelmingattraction already exerted on Europeans by America’s affluent consumer lifestyle, an attraction whose force we can appreciate more vividly, given our sharpened awareness of the more generally transitional status of the European economies in the inter-war period. As in many semi-peripheral economies today, the German population in the 1930s was already thoroughly immersed in the commodity world of Hollywood, but at the same time many millions of people lived three or four to a room, without indoor bathrooms or access to electricity. Motor vehicles, radios and other accoutrements of modern living such as electrical household appliances were the aspiration of the social elite. The originality of National Socialism was that, rather than meekly accepting a place for Germany within a global economic order dominated by the affluent English-speaking countries, Hitler sought to mobilize the pent-up frustrations of his population to mount an epic challenge to this order. Repeating what Europeans had done across the globe over the previous three centuries, Germany would carve out its own imperial hinterland; by one last great land grab in the East it would create the self-sufficient basis both for domestic affluence and the platform necessary to prevail in the coming superpower competition with the United States.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 12 Oct 2019 19:02

Have you read Tooze's book? This is what he says:
Yes and his work suffers heavily from anglo-american supremacism and antifa propaganda. You just have to observe military outlays or CINC values to debunk his claims.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 12 Oct 2019 19:25

Stiltzkin wrote:
12 Oct 2019 19:02
Have you read Tooze's book? This is what he says:
Yes and his work suffers heavily from anglo-american supremacism and antifa propaganda. You just have to observe military outlays or CINC values to debunk his claims.
Can you cite anyone who specifically rebuts his claims regarding Hitler's goal for raising the economic standard of living for his people?

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 12 Oct 2019 20:16

Can you cite anyone who specifically rebuts his claims regarding Hitler's goal for raising the economic standard of living for his people?
There is no one at the moment who would spring into my mind, maybe you could find something in Scherner's or Streb's contributions. A decent evaluation was Emile Despres assessement of the USSBS, written not long after the war.
I do not necessarily reject the assertion that Hitler may have had this goal, albeit trying to achieve this by expansionistic campaigns. You were arguing (and so does Tooze) that Germany was a developing nation, a claim that can be easily refuted. You correctly assessed that Germany tried to challenge the World Order by establishing control over the European continent to increase their influence and power, but I do not understand the transition into the belief that it must have been a developing nation. Germany did not start a war because it was poor, rather it emerged as a new contender (with a limited population). I have stumbled across this misconception on occassion, which should be dismissed as a misinterpretation of the variables and motives. Nazi Germany's main ambition was securing the "Lebensraum" in the East. Barbarossa derailed in 1941, at a time when the economic balance shifted on the continent against Soviet favour, thus it played a subordinated role (contrary to WWI). In 1914 and 1940, Germany was already competing with the US. The United States, though being the economic backbone of the Allies, had no Divisions on European soil before late 1943, it was quite undermilitarized at that time and did not possess the world presence it enjoys today, hence Tooze's stance can be rated as being american-centric. Germany's victory condition for WW2, was to defeat France and the USSR, then consolidate its position in order to challenge Anglo-American dominance over the seas.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by David Thompson » 13 Oct 2019 00:00

Stiltzin -- Let's start seeing some authority for your claims, per our forum rules.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 13 Oct 2019 16:53

Let's start seeing some authority for your claims, per our forum rules.
I did and which by the way, is classified as an argumentum ad verecundiam. This does not substitute individual research, which requires to call upon a vast variety of literature, to combine all fields and not merely falling back on one authority, especially if the work is tainted by supremacism.

I listed HDIs, development levels, GDPs (Maddison, Bairoch et al. ) and referred to CINC levels (Singer), more information can also be found in Ritschl, A. and M. Spoerer., 1997, Das Bruttosozialprodukt in Deutschland nach den amtlichen Volkseinkommens- und Sozialproduktsstatistiken 1901-1995, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2, 27-5 .
The OPs claim that Germany was a developing nation was refuted and can be dismissed as a poor observation from an academic standpoint. Furthermore, the CESIfo paper by Baten, et Wagner (which by the way is one of the most renown institutes in Germany) demonstrates that Hitler was unable to raise the standards in the long run, while also devoting resources to the war effort (here the growth in GDP may distort the view). Additionally, immediate benefits from expansionism may also not occur nor be felt, especially not if institutions remain ineffective. On the other hand, despite the trend in the economic development from 1914, the 20s into the 30s, with the impact of WW1, the treaties and the recession in mind, there is not much that would suggest that Germany deteriorated to such a degree that would support Tooze's thesis. An upswing occured naturally, even before Hitler came to power, while rearmament cut consumption - although the sacrifices the German population had to make were still leaner, as opposed to those of other belligerents, such as the USSR or even Great Britain (Despres).
Hitler financed his campaigns via annexation and confiscation, but in its sphere of power, Germany was already the strongest economy on the continent, with the conclusion of WW1 it was simply culled, but Nazi ambition went beyond mere "restoration" efforts.
The levels in Europe deteriorated from such politics, policies and polities. Conflict and Hitlerism and not the other way around. This was not comparable to an event like the Iraq-Iran war of the 80s.

Taking into account militarization rates and outlays (MilPersonnel to Population and military outlays, Harrison, Economics of WW2) this paints a different picture. During WW1 this was even more pronounced, expressed in %MIL, posted here: viewtopic.php?f=26&t=243841
Western and central European standards also exceeded or matched American living standards in many instances. The most developed parts of the Western Offshoots were the territories around the original anchor points anyway.
The US expeditionary force could not field the necessary contingent in time, it is not like they could deploy 200 Divisions on the continent.

Germany was a fully developed, industrialized nation that turned into a military dictatorship with the desire to impose its will on Europe and parts of Asia. The GDP levels were in the range of fully developed nations, the HDI was higher or similar to the US, while its CINC (material capabilties) rating was the 2nd in the world after the US and that without factoring in all of the assets they gained post 1940 (1937 to 39 values, which can be obtained here http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-set ... ities-v4-0).
In fact, it is probably even safer to say that the United States had to protect both the Entente and European Alliance from Central Power and European Axis economic power throughout both conflicts respectively. The population differences were more pronounced. Note that relying on aggregated data is problematic, simply stacking Axis versus Allied assets gives us only an overview of the macroscopic level, i.e. supplying the BEF and Armée de terre in 1940 with e.g. 10,000,000 additional shells from the US would not have produced a different outcome, they would have fallen into the Wehrmachts hands, likewise the Nazis could not always extract all assets from an occupied territory effectively.

The military apparatus of the Nazis was bloated, expensive and prior to the war, the investment was only matched by the USSR (Samuelson), a system that cherished imperialism and prepared 20 years for expansionistic campaigns (though it was dependent on Commonwealth and US support in order to survive, at least to ward off a possible collapse under the strain of a prolonged war of attrition), unlike Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union was a conglomerate of developing nations. This also serves as an explanation for the discrepancy in casualty infliction.
Germany reoccupied the Rhineland, wrestled down Poland with economic and demographic superiority, absorbed the industrial hubs of Silesia, Czechoslovakia and the adjacent, smaller, highly developed nations and with France also in a recovery phase post WW1, Britain unable or at least unwilling to commit due to their experiences of the First World War, the balance was hardly in Allied favour. Additionally, the US military lagged behind Axis levels and was not immediately available on the continent until 1943. Germany may have been incapable of fielding a substantial navy and a large land force simultanously in its original state (Ferguson), at least not before absorbing the entire capital stock of Western Europe, but those objectives were of secondary nature. Germany was terrorizing the slavic population, despite greater development levels, they failed.
This leaves us with the precondition: Victory over France and subsequent occupation, the isolation of Britain and a successful invasion of the USSR. Historically: Hitler speculated on a long war with France and a short war with the USSR. The inability to knock the USSR out of the conflict, induced the blueprint for defeat and enabled the Allies to unite their effort.

Those are already more than six names, opposed by one.

Also, I do not know where he came up with ->
Can you cite anyone who specifically rebuts his claims regarding Hitler's goal for raising the economic standard of living for his people?
As this has little to do with my demonstration that Germany was not a developing nation. Hitler did rather little to raise the standards, on the contrary he disrupted the order in Europe and incited a costly war, which was on his agenda.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Sheldrake » 13 Oct 2019 17:56

I have a problem with the premise of this thread. WW2 was not a game where victory conditions can be set in advance.

Did Hitler have a single war aim? Sure, by 1944 survival of the regime would have been a win. ;) but what about before then?

Did Hitler deliberately start a A World war or did he think that in 1939 he might only be fighting Poland?

Was the invasion of the Soviet Union a fulfillment of the Lebensraum ideas expressed in Mein Kampf? Or did he embark on this as an attempt to force the British to come to terms?

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 13 Oct 2019 18:45

I have a problem with the premise of this thread. WW2 was not a game where victory conditions can be set in advance.

Did Hitler have a single war aim? Sure, by 1944 survival of the regime would have been a win. ;) but what about before then?

Did Hitler deliberately start a A World war or did he think that in 1939 he might only be fighting Poland?

Was the invasion of the Soviet Union a fulfillment of the Lebensraum ideas expressed in Mein Kampf? Or did he embark on this as an attempt to force the British to come to terms?
Those are all based on mission accomplishment factors.

ad 1) By 1944 survival of the regime was hardly feasible. The prospect of fighting the Allied and Soviet offensives to a standstill was gone, a consequence of the setbacks in the East and the two front war. Here we have to work with chances to observe the statistical determinants for victory and defeat, running attrition models shows us that survival in a one on one scenario was not impossible, but we have to take in mind that the situation of 1944 was a product of the crisis that occured and unfolded since late 1941. Two things matter the most: Manpower and territory. A contraction of territory and a decline of manpower below a certain threshold results in a reduced and insufficient attrition rate on the forces of the assailant and the loss of territory has an impact on output and defensive abilities, which mark inevitable defeat.
ad 2) He either speculated on the passivity of the Allies when fighting Poland or strikes that could have been potentially repelled (with the Western defensive installations in mind).
When we take the wording, we can conclude that his aims were the control over the continent and the Lebensraum in the East all along, of course you could make the point that Germany would have gone to war regardless of the Nazi's rise to power (likely), but would not try to expand post 1939 or 40 levels. He wanted war, maybe not World War, but starting conflicts of these proportions can provoke the emergence of a world war. We know that he was willing to commit to a similar degree as Imperial Germany did during WW1.
Was the invasion of the Soviet Union a fulfillment of the Lebensraum ideas expressed in Mein Kampf? Or did he embark on this as an attempt to force the British to come to terms?
This seems unlikely, considering that we know that their attention already turned eastwards, though various individuals advocated to conclude the conflict first. Perhaps they were aware that Britain was less prepared (with the exception of the RAF), so they prioritized their campaign in the East and hypothesized that they could knock the Soviets out of the war before a combined Anglo-American force could threaten them.
Weisung Nr.21, Fall Barbarossa 1940
Fall_Barbarossa_1.jpg
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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 13 Oct 2019 21:51

Sheldrake wrote:
13 Oct 2019 17:56
I have a problem with the premise of this thread. WW2 was not a game where victory conditions can be set in advance.

Did Hitler have a single war aim? Sure, by 1944 survival of the regime would have been a win. ;) but what about before then?

Did Hitler deliberately start a A World war or did he think that in 1939 he might only be fighting Poland?

Was the invasion of the Soviet Union a fulfillment of the Lebensraum ideas expressed in Mein Kampf? Or did he embark on this as an attempt to force the British to come to terms?
We know from Hitler's speeches and writings what Hitler's goals were prior to the war. He (1) wanted Germany to be the sole military power in Europe, (2) wanted to create an empire large enough to challenge the United States for global hegemony and (3) he wanted to raise the standard of living in Germany to be equal to or greater than that in the United States.

I am arguing that to achieve all three of these goals, Germany needed to capitulate Great Britain. If Germany had merely capitulated France and the Soviet Union, then Germany would have achieved the first goal (continental military supremacy) but would have failed to achieve the second and third. A landlocked Greater German Reich would not have been able to contend with the United States for global hegemony, not when it was surrounded by British and American military bases. And a blockaded Reich, cut off from international trade, would have seen its people's living standards plummet, which is exactly what happened when the continent was blockaded during the war.

Stiltzkin seems to miss this final point. Citing per capita GDP and CINC figures from before the war, while dismissing Tooze simply because Tooze seems to be on the other end the political spectrum (even though Stiltzkin can't cite a single scholar who has rebutted Tooze, whose work has been out for over a decade and is widely cited by other WW2 historians) ... all of that misses the point. A landlocked Reich, blockaded on all sides by the Americans and British, would have seen its living standards plummet, no matter how much Lebensraum it acquired in the East. Whether or not Germany was a "developing" nation before the war, it would have rapidly become an undeveloping nation had it succeeded in merely capitulating France and the Soviet Union while remaining blockaded from the rest of the world.
Last edited by HistoryGeek2019 on 14 Oct 2019 02:38, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: What was Germany's win condition for WW2?

Post by Stiltzkin » 13 Oct 2019 23:04

Stiltzkin seems to miss this final point. Citing per capita GDP and CINC figures from before the war, while dismissing Tooze simply because Tooze seems to be on the other end the political spectrum (even though Stiltzkin can't cite a single scholar who has rebutted Tooze, whose work has been out for over a decade and is widely cited by other WW2 historians) ... all of that misses the point. A landlocked Reich, blockaded on all sides by the Americans and British, would have seen its living standards plummet, no matter how much Lebensraum it acquired in the East. Whether or not Germany was a "developing" nation before the war, it would have rapidly become an undevelopoing nation had it succeeded in merely capitulating France and the Soviet Union while remaining blockaded from the rest of the world.
Indeed, access to the global market was one of the prerequisites for post war recovery, whether it would have plummeted is debatable (ignoring an intracontinental or an Eurasian network for a moment), but I have also pointed out that standards were suffering due to Nazi policies, so again you have either not fully read or simply misunderstood my comment. You implied that Germany was a developing nation and so far the only evidence you have is Tooze's contention (so much for quoting my "GDPs" and CINC levels), so instead of relying on this you are just evading into a "long term prognosis". If this thread is not about the victory conditions of WW2, but actually about Germany's progress into the 90s, then I apologize.
I have yet to see any hard evidence that would support the theory that Germany was a developing nation, that levels would have deteriorated under Nazi control is likely, as the continental structure suffered from their occupation.
On the other hand, coal production rose from the late 30s to the early 40s in continental Europe and the blockade had far greater consequences for the belligerents of WW1, as opposed to the Allied blockades effects on the Axis during the 2nd World War.
Furthermore, this theory has a twist and is somewhat contradictory, since the UK and the US would suffer in like manner, as they would be unable to trade with continental Europe, making up a large share of their ex- and imports.

You miss the following points:
a) the integration of the continental economies. During the 30s and 40s the intracontinental structure was already stronger interconnected than it was the case at the dawn of the 20th century and
b) the territories in question: This is not about Hitler, nor the Nazis, but the nation, the economy under Nazi rule and lastly
c) the nature of the war. WW2, as a reversal of WW1 (which was confined to the most industrialized nations), played out mainly on the Eastern Front, which consumed vast amounts of manpower and had little to do with living standards.
whose work has been out for over a decade and is widely cited by other WW2 historians
Still an argumentum ad verecundiam, but in what sphere? A substantial amount of people still believe that Speer was responsible for the armament miracle and scholars were perpetuating this misconception for quite a while. So how do you explain that an "underdeveloped nation" with highly inferior living standards, was able to impose a greater attrition on the Allies and possessed an overall greater per capita, tentative national force effectiveness? I may have to throw away everything I have ever learned about cliodynamics and military studies. :)
I do not think that developing nations can achieve that. Germany produced 47 nobel laureates up to 1945, the United States 29 (and that figure includes migrants), the USSR 7 (or 4 minus the Polish and Ukrainian individuals).
Another indicator, life expectancy: https://u.demog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/figure2.html
http://www.sozialpolitik-aktuell.de/tl_ ... VIII42.pdf

I think this alone debunks Tooze's developing nation theory.
even though Stiltzkin can't cite a single scholar who has rebutted Tooze
Well, I do not necessarily contest all of his postulations, just that Germany was a developing nation. :?
I would suggest The Review of Economics and Statistics Vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov., 1946), pp. 253-256 , MIT press. A post war review from 1945 when things were still fresh.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1925424?se ... b_contents

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