Operation Sealion

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
pugsville
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by pugsville » 10 Jan 2020 03:50

The Riyal Navy had a large number of smaller ships.

For example 750 armed trawlers in service in jan 1940 (typically 4 inch deck gun, couple lewis guns but armament varied widely) about half purpose built admiralty trawlers that were intended to be auxiliary warships. With the shortage of escorts some were used as escorts particularity coastal convoys, mine sweeping roles, and anti invasion patrols at night in the channel.

A lager scale effort of the Royal Navy is what say 6 cruisers, 50 destroyers, 50 smaller minesweeper/sloops, 500 armed trawlers, 30 submarines, 50 motor torpedo/gun boats.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Jan 2020 05:29

pugsville wrote:
10 Jan 2020 03:50
For example 750 armed trawlers in service in jan 1940 (typically 4 inch deck gun, couple lewis guns but armament varied widely) about half purpose built admiralty trawlers that were intended to be auxiliary warships. With the shortage of escorts some were used as escorts particularity coastal convoys, mine sweeping roles, and anti invasion patrols at night in the channel.
Indeed, they were essentially exactly the same as the German Vorpostenboot...of which there were 67 tasked with escorting the convoys, transporting the Vorausabteilungen and Brandenburgers, fending off the RN and RAF, all at the same time. Oh, and the 66 similar vessels tasked as auxiliary minesweepers. Do you notice the problem? :lol:
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Gooner1 » 10 Jan 2020 13:17

glenn239 wrote:
09 Jan 2020 22:55
The British army wants the RN in the Channel now, because if it waits until dusk the British might have lost the war.
I think you know a lot less about the British Army's invasion preparations than the Germans did.

More likely the army would want the RN in the channel because the massacre of the invaders on the beaches would start to appal.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by histan » 10 Jan 2020 17:15

In order to understand the British Army's response to the invasion, one needs to understand the background and attitudes of the senior officers involved.

All but one of the senior commanders had experience of how the RN had supported the army and the risks that they took.
Montgomery (V Corps), Thorne (XII Corps), and Brooke (Home Forces) had all been at Dunkirk and Auchinleck (Southern Command) had commanded in Norway. Dill (CIGS) had been in post for Dunkirk and the other evacuations from France that followed. All of these would assume that the RN would make the correct operational and tactical decisions on the day. There would be no pressure from the Army on the RN to do anything.

The senior commanders were not overly concerned about an initial landing of infantry. They might differ about whether the emphasis should be on actual coastal defences (Auchinleck) or on concentration for counter attack (Montgomery) but no one believed that the war would be over if the first wave of German infantry had landed. For example:
[Auchinleck wrote to the VCIGS], summarized by Philip Warner in "Auchinleck - The Lonely Soldier":
"He went on with the more optimistic view that the enemy might be stopped without too much difficulty on the coast. He was less sanguine about Britain's chances if the German's were ever allowed to get their 'heavy stuff' (tanks, guns, transport, bridging equipment) ashore"

So Auchinleck would support the RN withdrawing at dawn on S day to be ready to engage the German second echelon, due to transit overnight S/S+1

Montgomery had a different tactical approach:
"The accepted doctrine was that every inch of the coastline must be defended strongly, the defence being based on concrete pill-boxes and entrenchments on a linear basis all along the coastline.
My approach was different. I pulled the troops back from the beaches and held them ready in compact bodies in the rear, poised for counter-attack and for offensive action against the invaders. After a sea crossing troops would not feel too well and would be suffering from reaction; that is the time to attack and throw the invader back.
On the beaches themselves all I would allow was a screen of lightly equipped troops, with good communications and sufficient firepower to upset any landing an cause it to pause."

As can be seen, the Army was not particularly concerned by an initial landing of German infantry.

It is possible to disagree with their tactics and their assessment but it is clear that there would be no pressure from the Army for the RN destroyer force to remain in action during daylight on S day.

Regards

John

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T. A. Gardner
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by T. A. Gardner » 11 Jan 2020 06:04

This gives you a pretty good idea of what the crossing for a motorized barge would have been like say, from Ostend to the beachhead.



While that's a modern crossing (2010) the barge really is little different from the ones the Germans were going to use in Seelöwe. As you can see, whatever improvised defenses and weapons they mounted were going to be nearly worthless in a naval action. The barges are simply not stable enough. As the crossing takes sufficient time that the barge will be in daylight for part of the trip, air attack is possible. At night the RN could show up and create havoc.

Then there's the unpowered barges being towed. If your barge slips or breaks the tow-- a very real possibility-- you are utterly screwed. I doubt the tug is coming back for you to reestablish it. Now you're floating adrift among a bunch of other shipping and little more than a hazard to navigation. A collision is a real possibility particularly at night. Just one or two such collisions would create chaos in a convoy.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Jan 2020 15:52

T. A. Gardner wrote:
11 Jan 2020 06:04
This gives you a pretty good idea of what the crossing for a motorized barge would have been like say, from Ostend to the beachhead.
To be fair, that crossing is in October. The latest the Germans contemplated making an attempt was September.
While that's a modern crossing (2010) the barge really is little different from the ones the Germans were going to use in Seelöwe. As you can see, whatever improvised defenses and weapons they mounted were going to be nearly worthless in a naval action. The barges are simply not stable enough. As the crossing takes sufficient time that the barge will be in daylight for part of the trip, air attack is possible. At night the RN could show up and create havoc.
Yes, it is essentially exactly the same, except with a covered well deck and modern diesel engine, rather than a hodge-podge of probably new to nearly forty years-old gasoline and diesel engines of various stages of reliability.

However, no, as the trip was planned it would end at dawn off the British coast, so air attack is unlikely.
Then there's the unpowered barges being towed. If your barge slips or breaks the tow-- a very real possibility-- you are utterly screwed. I doubt the tug is coming back for you to reestablish it. Now you're floating adrift among a bunch of other shipping and little more than a hazard to navigation. A collision is a real possibility particularly at night. Just one or two such collisions would create chaos in a convoy.
Yep. the Schlepp complicates the tow enormously. Any barge that breaks tow would have to be at least temporarily abandoned until a shepherding tug or R- or VP=Boot could come to the rescue. The problem was, the Schleppverband had to stay on schedule to take advantage of the tides, otherwise the entire landing risked being compromised, so the loss of individual barges in route had to be accepted.
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by histan » 11 Jan 2020 20:02

Hi Richard

I seem to have got sucked into this thread but looking at some of the secondary sources there seems to be a lack of understanding of the response that the RAF planned to make and the difficulties that the Luftwaffe would face.

Looking at fighter cover for the landing force during daytime - do you happen to know the length of the Normandy landing front compared to the Sea Lion landing front. I know the air plan for defending the Normandy landing force and am trying to envisage a similar plan for Sea Lion - I don't think one exists.

The Luftwaffe fighter force would have a lot to do supporting the invasion. Unlike the RAF Typhoons the Stuka force would require fighter escort as would the bomber force that was allocated to slowing down the rate at which British forces arrived into the battle.

The Luftwaffe were a bunch of pros and the concept they had was quite similar to that of the allies in Normandy, albeit that they had no idea of the time and resources needed to make the concept work. The first phase was the achievement of air superiority but the OCA campaign in August 1940 suffered from either poor intelligence or poor execution or maybe both, which contributed to the failure to even attempt an invasion.

Two "Decisive Conditions" (relatively modern British jargon!) have to be achieved before an invasion can even be attempted. Sea Control and at least local Air Superiority. Sea Control could never be achieved given the size of the RN forces and those of the KM and the fact that Air Superiority could not up for the disparity in naval forces. The KM knew this, which is why they were quite happy when the Luftwaffe failed to achieve Air Superiority, as they had some one to get them out of the invasion shambles.

Regards

John

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Jan 2020 04:29

histan wrote:
11 Jan 2020 20:02
I seem to have got sucked into this thread but looking at some of the secondary sources there seems to be a lack of understanding of the response that the RAF planned to make and the difficulties that the Luftwaffe would face.
Hi John, getting sucked in seems necessary when the bullshit starts getting deeper and deeper. :D
Looking at fighter cover for the landing force during daytime - do you happen to know the length of the Normandy landing front compared to the Sea Lion landing front. I know the air plan for defending the Normandy landing force and am trying to envisage a similar plan for Sea Lion - I don't think one exists.
Well, it all depends on definitions. The ground interdiction plan for NEPTUNE essentially ran along the Seine-Loire line, but marshaling yards outside that zone got hit as well. The air interdiction plan deployed two lines of fighter squadrons, running from roughly Dover-Dunkirk-Arras-Amiens-Paris-Le Mans-Saint Malo-Plymouth. So a "ring" of roughly 600 miles in extent.
The Luftwaffe fighter force would have a lot to do supporting the invasion. Unlike the RAF Typhoons the Stuka force would require fighter escort as would the bomber force that was allocated to slowing down the rate at which British forces arrived into the battle.

The Luftwaffe were a bunch of pros and the concept they had was quite similar to that of the allies in Normandy, albeit that they had no idea of the time and resources needed to make the concept work. The first phase was the achievement of air superiority but the OCA campaign in August 1940 suffered from either poor intelligence or poor execution or maybe both, which contributed to the failure to even attempt an invasion.
Yes, the problem is they had multiple requirements - airfield suppression, land interdiction, direct support of ground forces, and naval strike and interdiction - with insufficient forces to do any of them and even fewer forces to escort them.
Two "Decisive Conditions" (relatively modern British jargon!) have to be achieved before an invasion can even be attempted. Sea Control and at least local Air Superiority. Sea Control could never be achieved given the size of the RN forces and those of the KM and the fact that Air Superiority could not up for the disparity in naval forces. The KM knew this, which is why they were quite happy when the Luftwaffe failed to achieve Air Superiority, as they had some one to get them out of the invasion shambles.
Yep.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by T. A. Gardner » 12 Jan 2020 19:09

histan wrote:
11 Jan 2020 20:02
Two "Decisive Conditions" (relatively modern British jargon!) have to be achieved before an invasion can even be attempted. Sea Control and at least local Air Superiority. Sea Control could never be achieved given the size of the RN forces and those of the KM and the fact that Air Superiority could not up for the disparity in naval forces. The KM knew this, which is why they were quite happy when the Luftwaffe failed to achieve Air Superiority, as they had some one to get them out of the invasion shambles.

Regards

John
Sea control, yes. All you really need is air parity to conduct an invasion as both Salerno and Anzio proved. While losses among ships is somewhat higher, if you can afford those losses, you can stay on the beaches and the invasion usually succeeds in that.

The real problems for the Germans in a Seelöwe are:

1. They don't have sea control. That's an immutable fact you can't get around.
2. They have no real plan for a second wave or follow-on to the initial invasion. Big problem. Really BIG problem.

Sure, they could almost certainly get at least air parity over the invasion beaches, but what does that buy them? Without being able to continually and timely inject more forces and supplies onto those beaches they're doomed to eventual failure. Without sea control, they can never do any of that without the very likely intervention of RN forces and a fairly substantial loss rate to shipping.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Jan 2020 19:35

A bit more than "parity" at Salerno and Anzio, but it was local superiority that made the difference, plus the ability to maintain operations through a much more robust ground support infrastructure.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Knouterer » 13 Jan 2020 21:59

One problem facing the Luftwaffe fighter units in the context of Seelöwe was that not only did they have to defeat Fighter Command; they also had to conserve sufficient strength to provide permanent fighter cover over the invasion zones during daylight. Whatever the Luftwaffe did, the British bomber forces would still be largely intact on S-Tag, given that bases of Bomber Command were well to the north of London and out of range of the Bf 109, and unescorted bombers attacking them were bound to suffer heavy losses, if they got through at all.

Oberst (later Generalmajor) Theo Osterkamp, who at the end of July had been promoted from commander of JG51 to Jagdfliegerführer 1, calculated that in order to provide adequate fighter cover over the landing beaches at any given moment two Geschwader, or about 150 fighters, would be needed (one each for the 9th and the 16th army zones). On the basis of three sorties per day, that would mean that in total twelve Geschwader, or about 900 aircraft, would have to be available. That was a bit more than the Luftwaffe actually had before serious fighting had even started. Other sources mention one Gruppe per beachhead, or four in total. At the beginning of July Osterkamp told the pilots of JG 51 that in order to achieve the required air superiority they would have to shoot down five enemy fighters for every one they lost (Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy, p. 126).

That looks like a pretty good estimate, IMHO.

The Bf 110 Zerstörer had longer range and endurance and could have spent more time over the beaches but there were only a hundred or so left on the Channel front at the end of September.
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 14 Jan 2020 21:55

histan wrote:
10 Jan 2020 00:22
I expected you to make just that point - that if the RN were engaging the Sea Lion convoys in daylight the the Luftwaffe would indeed respond, if they had the forces available.
That would be my assumption. Specifically, that the LW planning for the invasion was predicated on the assumption that the KM protection scheme would succeed in screening the invasion forces, while this discussion assumes some degree of collapse to that scheme, ranging from moderate to severe.
Bomb ballistics is only one part of the problem. Timing of bomb release is important - this is a major contribution to along track error (release too soon and the stick of bombs fall short - too late and they overshoot). Navigation accuracy on the approach is the major contribution to across track error - the actual approach track being to one side of the ideal approach track. I can talk you through this in another forum, with photos :) - if you are really interested.
To be specific with level bombing, the interest is not in the direct results of the bombing, but rather, the indirect effect. Level bombing against fast warships was going to be, generally speaking, ineffective. But, even if ineffective, each attack would absorb time and ammunition and cause some disruption in the ship formations.
With regard to sortie generation, I think you mean arcane rather than archaic. In the 1990s I was being paid to produce reports on sortie generation for NATO and to explain the relationship between sortie generation and the ATO in the 2000s.
You might be right on that archaic thing. What's your take on sortie generation? 1st day only.

My draft sketch is roughly, and not including losses or battle damage but including RAF disruption and interference otherwise -

Twin engine bomber - 2 sorties.
Twin engine fighter - 3 sorties
Single engine fighter - 4 sorties
Single engine dive bomber - 3 sorties (land attack), 6 sorties (sea attack not far from Pas de Calais).

To achieve higher than this, the LW would have to have air superiority, which cannot be the case. These rates could not be sustained for long. (ie, the second day would be a noticeable drop off).
If as you say, there is some confusion but the landings have not been cancelled then the air support missions planned to coincide with the landing will all go ahead. Nothing will change until recce has sorted out the surface picture once there is daylight.
The naval units themselves would presumably be reporting during the night. And, the greater the collapse of the KM protection scheme, the more that this reporting will be for immediate support. Any LW sorties flown during the night, if any, would be of the harassment (low quality) variety.

Certainly a major naval engagement and landing operations simultaneously would be taxing, as per the situation at Crete.
The problem for the German recce is that if RN ships are still present then they are intermingled with the invasion fleet.
I would suspect that more of a problem for the invasion fleet than for the LW.
If landings have taken place then much of the invasion fleet is off the south coast - much closer to the RAF fighter bases than the German fighter bases. All German attack missions, particularly those carried out by the Ju-87 force will require fighter escort. After 18.08.1940 the Ju-87s were no longer tasked with missions over the UK because their vulnerability had resulted in heavy losses and they had contributed nothing to the OCA campaign (Not entirely their fault - German intelligence was, as often the case, shockingly bad.)
Understood that the fighting is closer to RAF bases, but it's still in the Channel and shores, so closer to German bases than the fighting over Southern England. The RAF's radar network might be disrupted, as any captured radar stations are off the network. In terms of the Stukas, fighter escort would be required, or without it losses could be heavy if caught by RAF patrols. They were withdrawn from the BoB in preparation for the invasion, (losses would have been too heavy to sustain otherwise, and the force would have been blown by the time of Sealion). After Sealion was postponed, the Stukas were thrown back into the Channel for a brief period against shipping in October until heavy losses in one mission caused the end of that.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 14 Jan 2020 22:32

histan wrote:
10 Jan 2020 17:15

[Auchinleck wrote to the VCIGS], summarized by Philip Warner in "Auchinleck - The Lonely Soldier":
"He went on with the more optimistic view that the enemy might be stopped without too much difficulty on the coast. He was less sanguine about Britain's chances if the German's were ever allowed to get their 'heavy stuff' (tanks, guns, transport, bridging equipment) ashore"

So Auchinleck would support the RN withdrawing at dawn on S day to be ready to engage the German second echelon, due to transit overnight S/S+1

Montgomery had a different tactical approach:
"The accepted doctrine was that every inch of the coastline must be defended strongly, the defence being based on concrete pill-boxes and entrenchments on a linear basis all along the coastline.
My approach was different. I pulled the troops back from the beaches and held them ready in compact bodies in the rear, poised for counter-attack and for offensive action against the invaders. After a sea crossing troops would not feel too well and would be suffering from reaction; that is the time to attack and throw the invader back.
On the beaches themselves all I would allow was a screen of lightly equipped troops, with good communications and sufficient firepower to upset any landing an cause it to pause."

As can be seen, the Army was not particularly concerned by an initial landing of German infantry.



Regards

John
Sealion would have been a mess at the operational level. But it was better than Barbarossa and strategically it fit with the need to prevent either the USSR or USA coming to the assistance of Great Britain. In terms of casualties, I see according to Wiki about 220,000 dead or missing and 650,000 wounded between June 22nd and December 5th, for the entire German army. Most of these will have been Barbarossa, or about 5,000 casualties per day. That is to say, the capture or loss of the entire first wave of Sealion in failure wouldn't cover much beyond 1 month's fighting in the East.

Anyways, IMO, Auchinleck's approach was a formula for trouble while Montgomery's was the correct method in the case of amphibious warfare defense where the invading forces did not have adequate support fire from warships, (and the KM would not have been able to provide adequate fire support). The specific problem with Auchinleck's assumptions were that Britain was engaged in a war for its empire in which it did not have the resources for a bridgehead battle, while the Germans - assuming they would not invade Russia - had ample forces for such a contest. That is to say, the Axis had sufficient land power to engage in a Sealion bridgehead campaign, the conquest of Gibraltar and Malta, the invasion of Egypt, all of these simultaneously. Therefore, Montgomery was correct - even assuming that a landing was contained, the British were (IMO) best off if the invaders were thrown into the sea altogether in order that forces could be sent elsewhere in defense of the Empire.

The fact that there were two doctrines in disagreement with one another was not good.
It is possible to disagree with their tactics and their assessment but it is clear that there would be no pressure from the Army for the RN destroyer force to remain in action during daylight on S day.
If the RN destroyers and cruisers withdraw at first light, and leave the Channel to the KM, then the Germans would have 12 hours or more uninterrupted except by RAF attacks or RN lighter warships such as sloops. KM forces would presumably be in disarray, but still in the Channel and capable of moving towards the beaches, with most of the LW providing air support for the landings. If the RN fights, then the disarray of the KM continues after dawn and much of the LW preoccupied with naval attacks and in no position to assist landings.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Jan 2020 00:18

glenn239 wrote:
14 Jan 2020 21:55
You might be right on that archaic thing. What's your take on sortie generation? 1st day only.

My draft sketch is roughly, and not including losses or battle damage but including RAF disruption and interference otherwise -

Twin engine bomber - 2 sorties.
Twin engine fighter - 3 sorties
Single engine fighter - 4 sorties
Single engine dive bomber - 3 sorties (land attack), 6 sorties (sea attack not far from Pas de Calais).
Well, if it was 10 May 1940, the first day of GELB, after months of practice and preparation, then the 316 serviceable in the nine Stuka Gruppen would manage nearly 1,500 sorties, c. 4.75 sorties-per-aircraft per day, which is likely the source of Higham's secondhand "4 to 6". However, on day two and three (11 and 12 May) the total fell below 1,000, although losses had been light (only a dozen for sure lost), so about 3.33 sorties-per-aircraft per day. After that the sortie-rate continued to drop as fatigue, losses, and lack of maintenance mounted. For example, the support of Guderian and Reinhardt's crossing of the Meuse on 13 May involved 270 Stuka, with the loss of three, from four Gruppen...so c. 2.0 sorties-per-aircraft per day. More significant though was the drop-off in capability evinced by the operations against Dunkirk, where although most of the Stukagruppen were involved, sortie rates dropped significantly...an estimated 275 aircraft only managed 805 sorties in five days of operations, i.e., c. 0.6 sorties-per-aircraft per day.

The key point was that at the end of September, the Stukagruppen were still recovering from the maximum effort of the Kanalkampf and the battle of the bases. As mentioned before, many of the Stukagruppen were non-operational, training new crews and taking on replacement equipment and the four operational units only had 133 serviceable aircraft. You might assume they could do as well as the first day of GELB, so perhaps 632 sorties.

BTW, the other units are similar, the Kampfgruppen managed about 1,500 sorties on 10 May from 1,093 serviceable aircraft, but fell off steeply afterwards, to 1,000 per day on the 11th and 12th, and then fewer. The Jagd and Z-Gruppen managed 2,000 sorties on 10 May and an average of 1,500 per day through 15 May...from 1,116 serviceable aircraft...so less than 2.0 sorties-per-aircraft per day, albeit some units managed more, such as the nine assorted Staffeln under Stab JG 27 on 12 May, which flew 350 sorties with perhaps 80 to 90 aircraft serviceable, so as many as 4 sorties-per-aircraft.

Oh, the other key point; maximum effort is one thing. Yes, some units flew a lot of sorties in a day. II./Schl)/LG 2 in its Hs 123A managed an average of eight per aircraft on 10 May, so likely 304 sorties from it alone. Yes, "some" Stuka Gruppen in Fliegerkorps VIII reportedly flew six sorties on 10 May. However, exceptions do not make the rule and basing planning on such exceptions is a path to disaster.
To achieve higher than this, the LW would have to have air superiority, which cannot be the case. These rates could not be sustained for long. (ie, the second day would be a noticeable drop off).
Actually, they would require more crews, which was the Achilles Heel of the Luftwaffe. One of the reasons why aircraft serviceability was so low was because aircrew serviceability was so low.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jan 2020 21:38

Well, I finally decided to wade back into Schenk, rather than continue to trust my hazy memory, in order to see what the Luftwaffe support plan was for SEELÖWE. As I remembered it was pretty much the German standard for wishful thinking combined with robbing Peter to pay Paul. :lol:

Of course, much of the Luftwaffe records were destroyed, but enough survived, especially for VIII Fliegerkorps to get the gist of it. As of 11 September, they planned to allocate two Stukageschwader to attack Dover and Folkstone, while a third would hit Dungeness and the assumed (none had actually been located) coastal batteries there. One and two-thirds Gruppen would support VII Armeekorps Hastings-Rye, and one Gruppe would be held in reserve for maritime targets of opportunity.

Does anyone notice a problem with that? :lol: :lol: :lol: The planning was based upon four Stukageschwadern, i.e., twelve Gruppen, when as mentioned before, only four Gruppen were operational. Worse, at its best at the beginning of the French Campaign the Luftwaffe only had ten Gruppen operational, including one in Norway. How does one account for the Luftwaffe planning for operations to be executed by a force three times stronger than what they actually fielded? Magical thinking?

The reality seems to be that the Luftwaffe Stuka support would have been roughly 30 aircraft each for the landings at Dover, Folkestone, and Dungeness, about 20 for Hastings-Rye, and a dozen or so for targets of opportunity.

Similarly, Fliegerkorps IV and V actually had multiple, diametrically opposed tasks. They were assigned battlefield air interdiction of the movement of British reserves west of London, on S-Tag and S-1 would also strike British Army camps at Aldershot, Newbury, Salisbury, Portsmouth, and Worthing, and would also strike 17 raail junctions west of London in the areas of Watford, Reading, and Aldershot, and on S-Tag and after would engage maritime target of opportunity in the Channel. All with 15 Kampfgruppen, all more or less run down by the ongoing losses of the BoB and none of them with specialized anti-shipping training or capability.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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