Operation Sealion

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 07 Jan 2020 17:01

histan wrote:
07 Jan 2020 00:43
I am afraid your knowledge of the capabilities of a 1940s vintage medium bomber bombing from medium altitude using free fall bombs is not very good.
The degrading effect of level bombing on RN formations attempting to engage in surface battle is not the hit percentage against destroyer or cruiser sized targets, and nothing in the discussion could possibly have led you to the conclusion that it was.
A long thin target, like a bridge or a runway is almost impossible to hit. The Germans tried to drop the bridges in Warsaw during the Polish campaign and failed to hit a single one. Given that the location of a bridge is known and that it doesn't move, imagine how much more difficult it is to hit a fast moving ship.
Here,

https://keisan.casio.com/exec/system/1231475371

Is a free fall time calculator. A 250kg bomb dropped from 5,000 feet will take 22 seconds to reach the sea. A Tribal Class destroyer is 377' long and 36.5' wide. In 22 seconds it can move about 2.5 times the length of the ship, or about 1,000 feet. The total volume of area that it could be in when the bomb arrives is pie x r^2 divided by about 2. The area of the destroyer is about 1,500 square feet, making the odds of a hit by level bombing from 5000 feet about 1 in 115.

The issue for Sealion is not the 1 in 115 hit rate. The issue is that the destroyer has to fire masses of AA ammunition any time a level bomber starts its run, careen all over the sea any time a bomber actually drops a bomb. For, if the bomber drops from 2000 feet the fall time is 12 seconds and the odds of a hit go up to 1 in 41. What causes the bomber to attack from a higher altitude? The volume of defending AA fire. But, to achieve that volume, the warships have to fire large amounts of ammunition of which the warships do not have an endless supply. The destroyer formation is wasting ammunition and time, and is battling disorganisation. If the attacks are constant, these frictions, difficulties, are constant. The effect of the level bombing attacks on the naval battle are the degradation of the RN performance against KM shipping. It has almost nothing to do with the actual hit rate achieved by the level bombers.
I think your Stuka sortie rates are also a bit high...

Indeed, Weal also writes [1 June 1940 Dunkirk operation] - "In a series of raids lasting all day (some crews flying as many as three or four sorties)..."
https://books.google.ca/books?id=2PWLDA ... 22&f=false


Shows an average of 4-6 fighter and Stuka sorties per day during the Battle of France. But, we're not talking average sortie rates. We're talking absolute maximum possible rates. Sortie rate relies on good weather, good serviceability, robust basing, distance to target, and rate of attrition. The Dunkirk air operations were conducted by the Luftwaffe (and RAF) further away and more poorly prepared than what would be the case in a Channel battle. In the Channel, pretty close to the base network in Pas de Calais.
As I understand what you are saying VIII Fliegerkorps will abandon its planned mission in support of AOK16 and timed to coincide with the landing of the troops (the same concept and timing used by the RAF Typhoon force on D-day), to sit on the ground until it is given the actual locations of RN ships to attack. Or that it will undertake some type of "naval" push CAS or armed recce - just flying aircraft into the channel looking for something to attack - where they will clash with all the other Luftwaffe aircraft that are also flying some kind of armed recce sortie in the same area. A real airspace management issue.
The RN is attacking Sealion shipping in the Channel in daylight off the coast of Dover and Pas de Calais. The KM is screaming for air support by 12am the previous night and unless the KM is completely incompetent, they know where their own ships are being attacked, correct?
Still maybe the RAF fighters will sort that out - as we used to say "who says air defence isn't air space management"
A poster quoted the statistics of 1,300 anti-shipping strikes in 1940. From your comment, are you suggesting the RAF was on vacation during these attacks?

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Peter89 » 08 Jan 2020 10:51

glenn239 wrote:
07 Jan 2020 17:01
histan wrote:
07 Jan 2020 00:43
I am afraid your knowledge of the capabilities of a 1940s vintage medium bomber bombing from medium altitude using free fall bombs is not very good.
The degrading effect of level bombing on RN formations attempting to engage in surface battle is not the hit percentage against destroyer or cruiser sized targets, and nothing in the discussion could possibly have led you to the conclusion that it was.
A long thin target, like a bridge or a runway is almost impossible to hit. The Germans tried to drop the bridges in Warsaw during the Polish campaign and failed to hit a single one. Given that the location of a bridge is known and that it doesn't move, imagine how much more difficult it is to hit a fast moving ship.
Here,

https://keisan.casio.com/exec/system/1231475371

Is a free fall time calculator. A 250kg bomb dropped from 5,000 feet will take 22 seconds to reach the sea. A Tribal Class destroyer is 377' long and 36.5' wide. In 22 seconds it can move about 2.5 times the length of the ship, or about 1,000 feet. The total volume of area that it could be in when the bomb arrives is pie x r^2 divided by about 2. The area of the destroyer is about 1,500 square feet, making the odds of a hit by level bombing from 5000 feet about 1 in 115.

The issue for Sealion is not the 1 in 115 hit rate. The issue is that the destroyer has to fire masses of AA ammunition any time a level bomber starts its run, careen all over the sea any time a bomber actually drops a bomb. For, if the bomber drops from 2000 feet the fall time is 12 seconds and the odds of a hit go up to 1 in 41. What causes the bomber to attack from a higher altitude? The volume of defending AA fire. But, to achieve that volume, the warships have to fire large amounts of ammunition of which the warships do not have an endless supply. The destroyer formation is wasting ammunition and time, and is battling disorganisation. If the attacks are constant, these frictions, difficulties, are constant. The effect of the level bombing attacks on the naval battle are the degradation of the RN performance against KM shipping. It has almost nothing to do with the actual hit rate achieved by the level bombers.
I think your Stuka sortie rates are also a bit high...

Indeed, Weal also writes [1 June 1940 Dunkirk operation] - "In a series of raids lasting all day (some crews flying as many as three or four sorties)..."
https://books.google.ca/books?id=2PWLDA ... 22&f=false


Shows an average of 4-6 fighter and Stuka sorties per day during the Battle of France. But, we're not talking average sortie rates. We're talking absolute maximum possible rates. Sortie rate relies on good weather, good serviceability, robust basing, distance to target, and rate of attrition. The Dunkirk air operations were conducted by the Luftwaffe (and RAF) further away and more poorly prepared than what would be the case in a Channel battle. In the Channel, pretty close to the base network in Pas de Calais.
As I understand what you are saying VIII Fliegerkorps will abandon its planned mission in support of AOK16 and timed to coincide with the landing of the troops (the same concept and timing used by the RAF Typhoon force on D-day), to sit on the ground until it is given the actual locations of RN ships to attack. Or that it will undertake some type of "naval" push CAS or armed recce - just flying aircraft into the channel looking for something to attack - where they will clash with all the other Luftwaffe aircraft that are also flying some kind of armed recce sortie in the same area. A real airspace management issue.
The RN is attacking Sealion shipping in the Channel in daylight off the coast of Dover and Pas de Calais. The KM is screaming for air support by 12am the previous night and unless the KM is completely incompetent, they know where their own ships are being attacked, correct?
Still maybe the RAF fighters will sort that out - as we used to say "who says air defence isn't air space management"
A poster quoted the statistics of 1,300 anti-shipping strikes in 1940. From your comment, are you suggesting the RAF was on vacation during these attacks?

Don't count too much on the KM & LW coordination, search for Operation Wikinger.

They had absolutely zero experience in landing operations. Little to zero experience in nighttime fighting or cooperation.

Zero experience on Channel waters.

Risking the U-Boats is also very problematic, because they could only stay underwater for a short time / distance.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Jan 2020 16:09

I see a bunch of posts were lost in the migration. Oh well, I don't think I'll try to recreate them. Sufficient to say Glenn's "source" for such an extraordinary sortie rate are rubbish and in any case he does not provide any evidence for his claim for the even more extraordinary rates.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

histan
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by histan » 08 Jan 2020 17:02

Hi Richard

I noticed the missing posts as well, particularly since one of them was mine trying to establish the time line that Glenn was using. I might try to recreate it.

However, I had ignored the "bombing accuracy" calculation which is too simplistic even for a novice analyst. I wasn't really expecting a response but if there was one I would have expected it to refer to factors such as along track errors (metrics such as Range Error Probable), across track errors (and measures such as Deflection Error Probable), and Circular Error Probable and show some understanding of the factors the determined bomb ballistics.

I might have expected a response that referenced "The System of Target Selection Applied by the German Air Force in World War II" by General der Flieger Paul Deichmann. Perhaps this "Owing to the speed plus their strong defences and their high manoeverability, the smaller types of naval craft such as destroyers or E-boats, proved very difficult to hit, so that attacks against such targets required large expenditures of ammunition. It was found frequently that, for these reasons, action against such targets was only practicable when such craft through their very existence constituted a direct threat to friendly military forces or installations.
The Second Air Fleet, therefore, as a rule desisted from attacking smaller types of naval units returning to Malta from a convoy mission although E-boats did represent fairly good targets for attack with aircraft carried cannon."

I posted a reference that quoted specific dates for the sortie rate figures. I would like to see a specific date on which a sortie rate of 9 per day was achieved. A have had a cursory look through my Ju-87 books have not yet found it. These are generally written by enthusiasts for their subject and present them in the best light - so I am reasonably confident that if such a day existed they would have found it and presented it. Still always happy to be proved wrong.

Regards

John

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Jan 2020 17:09

Yeah, I remarked on the inability of the Stukagruppen to maintain more than a fractional average daily sortie rate at Dunkirk somewhere between 0.15 and 1.0 per aircraft per day. The silliness of using a mathematical formula for objects falling for calculating the dynamics of bombing by moving objects against moving targets didn't really deserve a reply.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 08 Jan 2020 22:55

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Jan 2020 01:40
Actually, they spent the summer operating the Stuka and Jagdgruppen out of unimproved grass fields, with improvised facilities, then spent the fall and winter doing improvements on some, before abandoning many of them as they moved East into more unimproved fields. Didn't you ever wonder why the operational rate of the Luftwaffe was so poor?
AFAIK, Stukas basically fought the entire war from grass strips. That's why I got a laugh out of paved runways.

In terms of sortie rate its about manpower and battle damage, and very importantly - the range to the target. If the target is only 30 miles away, (ie, Sealion), then the planes can move to and from at a high rate of power. They don't have to search around for targets. Get 150 miles away and max sortie rate is more like 2 per day. Get 300 miles away and it's 1 per day.
Nope. Cold, rain and mud were issues on all fronts, but the issue in France in the summer of 1940 was alternating dust and rain. The same problem was encountered by the Germans in Greece in the spring of 1941 and ever summer in the East, as well as the Allies in Normandy in the summer of 1944...and they were flying off PSP fields. Dust affected visibility in take off and landing, affected engine performance, affected wear on other components, while rain could swiftly flood poorly drained fields, also severely affecting take off and landing.
Dustier than North Africa? Interesting info. Do you have any citations for this significantly interfering with German air operations during the BoB? (Day or night).
Doubtful. The same units usually managed fractional sorties per aircraft per day during the Battle of Britain, why should it change for the Battle of SEELÖWE?
Because air attacks during the Battle of Britain were carefully planned and staged daily events, conducted at a reasonable tempo according to some worked out air operations plan. Air attacks during a Sealion air-sea battle would be an all-out maximum desperation effort. Not at all carefully planned and staged. Frantic. More like Henderson Field cranking out sorties at maximum rate during the hectic fighting during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Or, like the Luftwaffe attacks on the RN off Crete cranking out s

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by histan » 09 Jan 2020 00:51

What Sea lion air-sea battle are you talking about?

Can we get a time-line established please?

As I understand it, the Royal Navy cruiser and destroyer force has been attacking the Sea lion convoys since dusk on S-1. These attacks continue throughout the night of S-1/S day.

At what point in this full on night action do the RN ships become short of ammunition and have to return to port to re-arm?

According to previous posts, by midnight the RN had sufficiently disrupted the invasion forces that the Kriegsmarine is "screaming for air cover."

Since, again according to previous posts "no troops have landed so there is no need to provide air support for them"then the invasion has been effectively defeated by dawn on S-day.

So at some time overnight, the Kriegsmarine tells OKW, OKH and OKL that the invasion has failed and it needs air support to cover the invasion fleet as it tries to return home. There is a lot of discussion about what to do next, presumably.

The British also know that the invasion has been defeated by dawn on S day. Early morning recce shows no troops landed and the invasion fleet in disarray, regrouping to return home. RN ships, if they are not already back in port rearming, knowing that they are potentially vulnerable in daylight head back to port.

Bomber command throughout August and September have held those aircraft no committed to operations at high readiness, fully armed. Note Bomber Command released them from readiness every morning (usually between 7 and 9 am) when it was clear that there would be no invasion that day. For example this extract from 3 Group ORB "16/9/40 All aircraft not detailed for operations today stood by at Alert No.1. 50% at Standby 3 hours and 50% Standby 5 hours (76 aircraft in all). This was augmented by a further 40 aircraft when operations were cancelled at 16.:40 hours."
So once it is light, the RAF is set to launch attacks on the invasion fleet. Which it does. The RN tells the RAF that any ship out there is German so it can attack anything it sees.

The RN remains in port, ready to set out again at dusk to attack any of the invasion force that has not made it back home when it gets dark on the S day evening.

German early morning recce shows that there are no RN ships in the vicinity of the invasion fleet.

Corrections to this please - more to follow on Luftwaffe response.

Regards

John

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 09 Jan 2020 02:16

glenn239 wrote:
08 Jan 2020 22:55
AFAIK, Stukas basically fought the entire war from grass strips. That's why I got a laugh out of paved runways.
Which is part of the reason their operational rates were so shitty. It's why I get a laugh out of people that think improved fields are unimportant.
In terms of sortie rate its about manpower and battle damage, and very importantly - the range to the target. If the target is only 30 miles away, (ie, Sealion), then the planes can move to and from at a high rate of power. They don't have to search around for targets. Get 150 miles away and max sortie rate is more like 2 per day. Get 300 miles away and it's 1 per day.
No, in terms of sortie rate its about crew and operational readiness. A crew or aircraft that is not operational cannot sortie, so how near or far it is from the target is irrelevant. Nor is the target "only 30 miles away" in SEELÖWE. I posted some of the SEELÖWE Stuka bases last night. Those for Fliegerkorps VIII are roughly 75 miles away or further, those attached to Fligerkorps I are about 150 miles away or further...the same as in operations against Dunkirk when the sortie rate was somewhere between 0.15-1.0. Unless it is really far away, an aircraft cruising at 130 MPH or so will cover take an hour to cruise 130 miles, but could take another hour taking off and forming as a unit, especially if its is a multi-Gruppen mission, then before takeoff the Schwarze Manner prepare the aircraft, doing maintenance checks, fueling and arming them, warming engines, and the like, while the crews are briefed on the mission. After arriving at target they exit, return, and the process starts all over again. Unless it is truly far away, as in a deep penetration mission, the flight too and from target is usually the shortest part of the mission.

In any case, turn the Kanalkampf, with the Stukas operating from the same fields, flying the same distance, and while executing maximum effort, none that I am aware of achieved a sortie rate of more than one a day.

The loss of effectiveness in the Stukagruppen during the Kanalkampf also has to be worked into the equation.
Dustier than North Africa? Interesting info. Do you have any citations for this significantly interfering with German air operations during the BoB? (Day or night).
Why would it have an effect on the Kampfgruppen in the BoB? They were flying from improved airfields with paved runways. The crap readiness rates of the StG and JG are a good indicator, as is the experience of the Allies operating in similar conditions, in similar terrain, in Normandy in 1944, where priority was given to improving fields with PSP. The crap readiness rates in Africa, despite having the Tropisch modified aircraft is also a good indicator of just how damaging dusty environments and unimproved airfields were.

Meanwhile Glenn, it would be nice if you stopped resorting to strawmen and inserting your amendments into what other people actually say. Nowhere did I ever say the conditions were "dustier than North Africa". If you wish to continue such methods feel free, I can as easily use the ignore button on you as I have for the rest of the gallery.
Because air attacks during the Battle of Britain were carefully planned and staged daily events, conducted at a reasonable tempo according to some worked out air operations plan. Air attacks during a Sealion air-sea battle would be an all-out maximum desperation effort. Not at all carefully planned and staged. Frantic. More like Henderson Field cranking out sorties at maximum rate during the hectic fighting during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Or, like the Luftwaffe attacks on the RN off Crete cranking out s
So the air attacks during SEELÖWE would NOT BE carefully planned? So all the Luftwaffe planning assigning Luftflotte, Fliegerkorps, Fligerdivisionen, Geschwadern, and Gruppen to various support missions during the invasion was just window dressing and they were really just going to wing it? The Luftwaffe just kept sortieing from Greek airfields in the assumption they'd find a British ship and bomb it? Interesting.

So your claim is it would be the same crap planning that went into the scheme for amphibious assault on Britain? And the evidence for this is...?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by histan » 09 Jan 2020 16:51

Looked back at this post.
“Further, given the Crete numbers of 297 killed on 10 transports sunk as a guide, then 175 barges sunk would translate into 5,250 KIA in the Channel by the RN in this hypothetical engagement.”

So I looked at the invasion of Crete.
In the Crete battle to which the quote refers, consider this from “Air War for Yugoslavia and Crete” by Christopher Shores and Brian Cull with Nicola Malizia.
“It was estimated by the jubilant Admiral Glennie and his staff that some 4000 troops must have perished, but in fact losses were a little over 300. A further 1650 had been rescued from the sea by the damaged Lupo, by a second Italian destroyer (Lire), which came out to help, and by German and Italian air-sea rescue aircraft”

So 300 killed and 1650 rescued from the sea would, according to the ratio above, translate into 5,250 killed and 28875 needing to be rescued from the sea.
Maybe 30000 incapacitated soldiers over night on S-1 / S day would be enough to stop Sea Lion.

Regards
John

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Nickdfresh » 09 Jan 2020 19:20

William_2018 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 13:37
Would the invasion only have to be partially enabled before it became successful? i.e. Would a full scale invasion even be necessary to achieve the same result with Britain capitulating early? e.g. France surrendered when only a fraction of the country had been invaded....
France sued for peace not because a "fraction" of territory was taken-as fractions of territory were controlled by Germans during WWI. France 'surrendered' because she had been split in half and due to a massive strategic blunder that let her best forces that should have comprised a mobile, strategic reserve be marooned in Belgium . There was no real prospect of preventing France from being occupied at that point. Conversely, Britain may have looked on a situation of beached, isolate Germans under siege as a galvanizing event, as was played out in war games using the actual commanders from both sides at Sandhurst in the early 1970's...

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 09 Jan 2020 22:31

histan wrote:
08 Jan 2020 17:02
However, I had ignored the "bombing accuracy" calculation which is too simplistic even for a novice analyst. I wasn't really expecting a response but if there was one I would have expected it to refer to factors such as along track errors (metrics such as Range Error Probable), across track errors (and measures such as Deflection Error Probable), and Circular Error Probable and show some understanding of the factors the determined bomb ballistics.
The purpose of that exercise was not to calculate the actual hit percentage against a destroyer with a level bomber. The purpose was to get an idea of how much the hit probably increases as the altitude decreases relative to some base line estimate. The answer is, the PK increases significantly at lower altitudes, meaning the use of AA ammunition to prevent low level bomb release.
Perhaps this "Owing to the speed plus their strong defences and their high manoeverability, the smaller types of naval craft such as destroyers or E-boats, proved very difficult to hit, so that attacks against such targets required large expenditures of ammunition.
Right, but what part of a 1 in 115 back-of-the-envelope calculation struck you as being that they were easy to hit?
It was found frequently that, for these reasons, action against such targets was only practicable when such craft through their very existence constituted a direct threat to friendly military forces or installations.
The idea being 75 RN warships attacking thousands of Sealion vessels in the Channel during one of the decisive moments of WW2 might qualifty as "a direct threat to friendly military forces" that motivates level bombers to attack warships.
I posted a reference that quoted specific dates for the sortie rate figures. I would like to see a specific date on which a sortie rate of 9 per day was achieved. A have had a cursory look through my Ju-87 books have not yet found it. These are generally written by enthusiasts for their subject and present them in the best light - so I am reasonably confident that if such a day existed they would have found it and presented it. Still always happy to be proved wrong.
Sortie rates are an archaic topic. The source of the 9 per day was a link that I've already posted. If you want my guess on an actual sortie rate after dawn, I think it would be significantly lower than this because the scale of air attacks would be so severe that the RN would likely move out of the Channel long before dusk arrived.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by glenn239 » 09 Jan 2020 22:55

histan wrote:
09 Jan 2020 00:51
What Sea lion air-sea battle are you talking about?

Can we get a time-line established please?
Something about this is what I think might happen -

10pm-dawn - Royal Navy in combat in Channel with Sealion forces. Heavy German losses reported, situation is confused and unclear. RN forces reporting massive invasion force. Luftwaffe night capable units thrown into battle.

Around 2am - KM screaming for air support at dawn. LW revises air support plan for dawn and instead commits the bulk of forces to ship attack.

Around dawn- Landings in England. Disorganised. Repulsed in places but in others, the Germans have got ashore.
- Royal Navy still in combat in Channel between Pas de Calais and Dover.
- Practically the entire strength of the Luftwaffe is committed to the Channel battle.

After dawn - Issue in doubt at some landing sights. RN and RAF decide to accept all-out air/sea day battle in Channel.
As I understand it, the Royal Navy cruiser and destroyer force has been attacking the Sea lion convoys since dusk on S-1. These attacks continue throughout the night of S-1/S day.
Yes.
At what point in this full on night action do the RN ships become short of ammunition and have to return to port to re-arm?
Tough to say. Some units might fire wildly and be low on ammunition by 2am. Others might be still engaged at dawn.
According to previous posts, by midnight the RN had sufficiently disrupted the invasion forces that the Kriegsmarine is "screaming for air cover."
I think the KM would be requesting massive air support towards dawn, whether the invasion groups were or were not disrupted.
Since, again according to previous posts "no troops have landed so there is no need to provide air support for them"then the invasion has been effectively defeated by dawn on S-day.
My guess is different. The RN doesn't have JSTARS. The situation will be very confused. Some invasion units will be thrown into disarray. Otherswill not be molested, and will occur. What the RN has done is disrupted the planned landings.
The British also know that the invasion has been defeated by dawn on S day. Early morning recce shows no troops landed and the invasion fleet in disarray, regrouping to return home. RN ships, if they are not already back in port rearming, knowing that they are potentially vulnerable in daylight head back to port.
The British know nothing of the sort. Air and sea landings are being reported. The RN is reporting heavy German losses in the Channel, but reports are coming back that the waters off Dover to Calais filled with thousands of German vessels in various stages of confusion. The picture appears to be that the German invasion units in the Channel are not yet defeated.
Bomber command throughout August and September have held those aircraft no committed to operations at high readiness, fully armed. Note Bomber Command released them from readiness every morning (usually between 7 and 9 am) when it was clear that there would be no invasion that day. For example this extract from 3 Group ORB "16/9/40 All aircraft not detailed for operations today stood by at Alert No.1. 50% at Standby 3 hours and 50% Standby 5 hours (76 aircraft in all). This was augmented by a further 40 aircraft when operations were cancelled at 16.:40 hours."
So once it is light, the RAF is set to launch attacks on the invasion fleet. Which it does. The RN tells the RAF that any ship out there is German so it can attack anything it sees.
Bomber Command and RAF Fighter command are committed all out. So is the Luftwaffe.
The RN remains in port, ready to set out again at dusk to attack any of the invasion force that has not made it back home when it gets dark on the S day evening.
The British army wants the RN in the Channel now, because if it waits until dusk the British might have lost the war.
German early morning recce shows that there are no RN ships in the vicinity of the invasion fleet.
If there are no RN ships in the vicinity of the invasion fleet, then there is nothing to stop the invasion from reorganising and landing at points of success during the day. Bomber Command will be ineffective.
Corrections to this please - more to follow on Luftwaffe response.
Understood - sketch and counter sketch, work in progress.

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by histan » 10 Jan 2020 00:22

Hi glenn239

The quote from Deichmann was what I expected you to quote back to me! :)

I expected you to make just that point - that if the RN were engaging the Sea Lion convoys in daylight the the Luftwaffe would indeed respond, if they had the forces available.

Bomb ballistics is only one part of the problem. Timing of bomb release is important - this is a major contribution to along track error (release too soon and the stick of bombs fall short - too late and they overshoot). Navigation accuracy on the approach is the major contribution to across track error - the actual approach track being to one side of the ideal approach track. I can talk you through this in another forum, with photos :) - if you are really interested.

With regard to sortie generation, I think you mean arcane rather than archaic. In the 1990s I was being paid to produce reports on sortie generation for NATO and to explain the relationship between sortie generation and the ATO in the 2000s.

With regard to your last post:

If as you say, there is some confusion but the landings have not been cancelled then the air support missions planned to coincide with the landing will all go ahead. Nothing will change until recce has sorted out the surface picture once there is daylight.

The problem for the German recce is that if RN ships are still present then they are intermingled with the invasion fleet.

If landings have taken place then much of the invasion fleet is off the south coast - much closer to the RAF fighter bases than the German fighter bases. All German attack missions, particularly those carried out by the Ju-87 force will require fighter escort. After 18.08.1940 the Ju-87s were no longer tasked with missions over the UK because their vulnerability had resulted in heavy losses and they had contributed nothing to the OCA campaign (Not entirely their fault - German intelligence was, as often the case, shockingly bad.)

Regards

John

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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Jan 2020 02:04

glenn239 wrote:
09 Jan 2020 22:31
Sortie rates are an archaic topic. The source of the 9 per day was a link that I've already posted. If you want my guess on an actual sortie rate after dawn, I think it would be significantly lower than this because the scale of air attacks would be so severe that the RN would likely move out of the Channel long before dusk arrived.
Perhaps you've been confused by the migration? The "source" you posted mentioned 4 to 6 sorties per day. It did not mention 9 per day. It did not confirm anything like your claimthat the "German army doctrine for breakthrough operations in France had been that air support flies the maximum sortie rate possible. For Stukas, for example, you will find references to as many as 9 or 10 sorties per day.?

I've asked a couple of times, but the migration ate a few, so you get the benefit of the doubt. However, I'm asking again now, what is the source for "9 or 10 sorties per day"?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

Post by Richard Anderson » 10 Jan 2020 03:01

glenn239 wrote:
09 Jan 2020 22:55
10pm-dawn - Royal Navy in combat in Channel with Sealion forces. Heavy German losses reported, situation is confused and unclear. RN forces reporting massive invasion force. Luftwaffe night capable units thrown into battle.
Which "Luftwaffe night capable units" are those? What are they capable of?
Around 2am - KM screaming for air support at dawn. LW revises air support plan for dawn and instead commits the bulk of forces to ship attack.
So the Schwarze Manner get to pull all the ground attack ordnance and substitute SAP and AP bombs for the HE? Cool. How long does that take? What are the remnants of the infantry landing parties supposed to do for support in the morning? Rely on the Seibelfähre and Artillerieträger?
Around dawn- Landings in England. Disorganised. Repulsed in places but in others, the Germans have got ashore.
Without any air support they are going to have a hard time getting ashore anywhere. Then there is the problem that the Vorausabteilungen and Brandenburgers are supposed to deploy from the R-Boot and VP-Boot to initiate the assault...if the R-Boot and VP-Boot attempt to engage the RN, how do they lead the assault too?
- Royal Navy still in combat in Channel between Pas de Calais and Dover.
Why? The British destroyers have about 25 minutes of ammunition at a rapid rate of fire, which is what you would expect in such a target rich environment. It's about 49 minutes for the 5.25", the 6" about 33 minutes.
- Practically the entire strength of the Luftwaffe is committed to the Channel battle.
So no interdiction of RAF bases, approaches to the battle area, escort for 7. Fligerdivision, and etc? Cool.
After dawn - Issue in doubt at some landing sights. RN and RAF decide to accept all-out air/sea day battle in Channel.
How? Why?
Yes.
Indeed.
Tough to say. Some units might fire wildly and be low on ammunition by 2am. Others might be still engaged at dawn.
Why would they "fire wildly"? They have been practicing for night actions against a possibly numerically superior foe for 22 years. Unless they are being very conservative with ammunition expenditure they are likely to be re-ammunitioning at dawn.
I think the KM would be requesting massive air support towards dawn, whether the invasion groups were or were not disrupted.
So basically letting the invasion force hang.
My guess is different. The RN doesn't have JSTARS. The situation will be very confused. Some invasion units will be thrown into disarray. Otherswill not be molested, and will occur. What the RN has done is disrupted the planned landings.
It is unlikely that any of the Schleppverband will not be engaged, they're leading after all. It is also unlikely the picket lines will be anything more than a speed-bump. The least likely to be "molested" are the Geleitzugen, which have minimal capability of executing an assault landing.

The German's don't have a contingency plan in place for such disruption, so the only option is withdrawal.
The British know nothing of the sort. Air and sea landings are being reported. The RN is reporting heavy German losses in the Channel, but reports are coming back that the waters off Dover to Calais filled with thousands of German vessels in various stages of confusion. The picture appears to be that the German invasion units in the Channel are not yet defeated.
Air landings? I thought all the Luftwaffe goes after the RN? Who escorts the Tante Ju's? Sea landings? Maybe...I suspect the report from Dover will be that the twin-sixes annihilated an unknown force trying to get into the harbor.
Bomber Command and RAF Fighter command are committed all out. So is the Luftwaffe.
ell, the RAF is probably shooting down un-escorted Ju 52 it sounds like...and swarming the confused and un-escorted remnants of the Schleppverband, bombing the few Germans on the beaches, and probably picking off the now thoroughly confused Luftwaffe units trying to figure out which plan they are supposed to follow.
The British army wants the RN in the Channel now, because if it waits until dusk the British might have lost the war.
The problem is the British army doesn't get to decide that. The CIGS does.
If there are no RN ships in the vicinity of the invasion fleet, then there is nothing to stop the invasion from reorganising and landing at points of success during the day. Bomber Command will be ineffective.
What "points of success"? Yet again, disruption of the Schleppverband and the R- and VP-Boot trying to take on the RN virtually guarantees the absence of "points of success". Nor is it likely that "reorganization" could occur with such slow vessels now fighting the Channel tides...remember, the whole approach was designed around the tides...reorganization means a return to port.
Understood - sketch and counter sketch, work in progress.
Yep, and while you're at it how about a source for the claim of "9 to 10 sorties per day" from the Luftwaffe?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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