The degrading effect of level bombing on RN formations attempting to engage in surface battle is not the hit percentage against destroyer or cruiser sized targets, and nothing in the discussion could possibly have led you to the conclusion that it was.
Here,A long thin target, like a bridge or a runway is almost impossible to hit. The Germans tried to drop the bridges in Warsaw during the Polish campaign and failed to hit a single one. Given that the location of a bridge is known and that it doesn't move, imagine how much more difficult it is to hit a fast moving ship.
Is a free fall time calculator. A 250kg bomb dropped from 5,000 feet will take 22 seconds to reach the sea. A Tribal Class destroyer is 377' long and 36.5' wide. In 22 seconds it can move about 2.5 times the length of the ship, or about 1,000 feet. The total volume of area that it could be in when the bomb arrives is pie x r^2 divided by about 2. The area of the destroyer is about 1,500 square feet, making the odds of a hit by level bombing from 5000 feet about 1 in 115.
The issue for Sealion is not the 1 in 115 hit rate. The issue is that the destroyer has to fire masses of AA ammunition any time a level bomber starts its run, careen all over the sea any time a bomber actually drops a bomb. For, if the bomber drops from 2000 feet the fall time is 12 seconds and the odds of a hit go up to 1 in 41. What causes the bomber to attack from a higher altitude? The volume of defending AA fire. But, to achieve that volume, the warships have to fire large amounts of ammunition of which the warships do not have an endless supply. The destroyer formation is wasting ammunition and time, and is battling disorganisation. If the attacks are constant, these frictions, difficulties, are constant. The effect of the level bombing attacks on the naval battle are the degradation of the RN performance against KM shipping. It has almost nothing to do with the actual hit rate achieved by the level bombers.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=2PWLDA ... 22&f=falseI think your Stuka sortie rates are also a bit high...
Indeed, Weal also writes [1 June 1940 Dunkirk operation] - "In a series of raids lasting all day (some crews flying as many as three or four sorties)..."
Shows an average of 4-6 fighter and Stuka sorties per day during the Battle of France. But, we're not talking average sortie rates. We're talking absolute maximum possible rates. Sortie rate relies on good weather, good serviceability, robust basing, distance to target, and rate of attrition. The Dunkirk air operations were conducted by the Luftwaffe (and RAF) further away and more poorly prepared than what would be the case in a Channel battle. In the Channel, pretty close to the base network in Pas de Calais.
The RN is attacking Sealion shipping in the Channel in daylight off the coast of Dover and Pas de Calais. The KM is screaming for air support by 12am the previous night and unless the KM is completely incompetent, they know where their own ships are being attacked, correct?As I understand what you are saying VIII Fliegerkorps will abandon its planned mission in support of AOK16 and timed to coincide with the landing of the troops (the same concept and timing used by the RAF Typhoon force on D-day), to sit on the ground until it is given the actual locations of RN ships to attack. Or that it will undertake some type of "naval" push CAS or armed recce - just flying aircraft into the channel looking for something to attack - where they will clash with all the other Luftwaffe aircraft that are also flying some kind of armed recce sortie in the same area. A real airspace management issue.
A poster quoted the statistics of 1,300 anti-shipping strikes in 1940. From your comment, are you suggesting the RAF was on vacation during these attacks?Still maybe the RAF fighters will sort that out - as we used to say "who says air defence isn't air space management"