glenn239 wrote: ↑
06 Jan 2020 23:03
I figure about 4 miles effective against DD's, harassment value out to 12 miles, up to about 12 miles effective vs. BB's. If/when 5.9" batteries were landed on the Dover side, 8 miles effective out of 23 against DD's (4 miles on each side).
Really? What do you base that on? The professional's whose business was firing the 155mm GPF at ships judged that against destroyers the probablity to hit from point blank to 5,000 yards decreased from 100 to 35 percent, from 5,000 to 10,000 yards decreased from 35 to 10 percent, from 10,000 to 15,000 yards from 10 to 3 percent. To its maximum effective range of 17,500 yards the chance decreased from 3 to nil percent.
What "5.9" batteries" are you referring to? Where do they come from? How do they get to the "Dover side"? The German 15cm divisional piece is a howitzer and the divisional batteries are neither trained nor equipped to engage ships at sea. The Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie deployed on the French side of the Channel were not part of the SEELÖWE invasion force.
If the mine barrier is in place according to plan then the RN is unable to get at Sealion from the eastern side. If the mine barrier is not in place, then the T and Z boots allocated to it will not be trying to defend a barrier that does not exist.
Except they have neither the ships, nor the mines, nor the time required to put the "mine barrier in place according to plan"...and the RN also had a large and well-trained and equipped mine clearing organization. So are unlikley to be "unable to get at Sealion from the eastern side". The problem is the effort to try to get the barrier in place required the Z- and T-Boot to participate, using their secondary mine laying capability in the usual German manner of robbing Peter to pay Paul.
So you have two end states possible:
1. The Germans keep trying to achieve the planned barrier right up to S-Tag and fail. The Z- and T-Boot are engaged laying mines.
2. The Germans give up on the planned barrier sometime before S-Tag. The Z- and T-Boot are not engaged in laying mines
True, but also not relevant to the fact that RN targeting decisions and fire would be hopelessly confused in a night battle and many shells better thrown at steamers and barges will be aimed at R and M boats instead.
Why would the RN, which had spent much of the last twenty years developing night engagement TTPs become "hopelessly confused"...other than because you want them to be?
So when the 37's and 88's were on the Siebel ferries in transit they were for decorative purposes only?
I see you are back at your usual game of ignoring the actual point. The effective range of the Flak 8.8cm firing from a stable platform at ground targets was 14,860 meters, roughly 9 miles, so call it 18 miles in diameter. They are in four separate groups so have, in theory a maximum range span of 72 miles. The initial frontage the Transportflotte cover is 250 miles. It is only in the final approach to the beaches that the frontage would decrease to something the very theoretical range of the 88s could nearly span...just under 80 miles.
My understanding was that in the final version of the plan the western most German invasion convoy was composed of motor boats with the heavier elements in reserve.
In all of the Transportflotte the assault element were carried in the Schleppverband, while the divisional combat and service support elements were mainly carried in the Geleitzug. E was unique in that rather than relying primarily on powered and unpowered barges they were able to accumulate a large number of small diesel and gasoline powered motorboats and motorsailors along with the barge tows. The problem was they had limited beach landing ability, unlike the barges.
Transportflotte E out of Le Havre consisted of:
Räumbootsflottille 1 (8 R-Boot, R17-R24)
Vorpostenflottille 4 (8 converted trawlers, V401-408)
Vorpostenflottille 13 (13 converted trawlers, V1301-1308)
Vorpostenflottille 20 (8 converted trawlers, V2001-2008)
Schlepper: 25 (each towing two barges)
Geleitzug 4 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 12 (5 converted trawlers, M601-605)
Geleitzug 5 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 14 (8 converted trawlers, M1401-1408)
You're referring to the initial deployments and you seem to be assuming that the minefields the U-boats are scheduled to defend are in place for the purposes of U-boat operations, but not in place for the purposes of the RN counterattack? Which is it? Is the mine barrier in place or not? My comments assume 'not'.
I'm not assuming anything Glenn, I'm stating what was available, what the plan called for, and what the constraints were. The plan called for 21 U-Boot, but only 19 Typ-VII and IX were actually available...and many of those were already on patrol, were returning from patrol, or were preparing to go on patrol, so the only possibility to make up the numbers was to rely on the obsolescent Ducks, the Typ-II, which suffered badly in the Norway campaign. Also, by September, the Germans were coming to realize again that the Channel was a very dangerous place for U-Boot.
Let's say 2 RN light cruisers and 12 destroyers encounter this force in fresh condition. In the course of a 3 hour battle assuming they have fire control radar and the coastal defenses do not interfere and that some of the steamers are able to evade by being warned by coastal radars, then something like 22 German vessels sunk of which about 10 are minesweepers, tugs and motor boats and 12 are steamers or barges.
Glenn, please look at a map. Like the map Knouterer provided. The German "coastal defenses" cannot do a thing. If the RN engages the Schleppverband 3 at the point where the tide turns against them, then they are more than 15 miles from the french coast. Geleitzug 3, which is the "steamers" is coming from Antwerp and is far to the rear of the 15-kilometer long Schleppverband 3 convoy.
So does invading Russia.
Which has exactly what to do with SEELÖWE?
A 3,500 ton steamer is going to bolt for Pas de Calais as the RN approaches. It might have to cut its barges loose....now the KM doesn't have smoke generators?
The steamers are coming from Antwerp and are trailing Schleppverband 3...why are you having so much trouble absorbing this?
The size and composition of the German convoys required good visibility to maintain command and control. The visibility requirements were half moon or better, no fog, no rain...but then you've been told this over and over, so you'll probably just ignore it again.
Check "The Big Book of British Army victories against Germany 1939-1941" and show me where it says the British army will perform so perfectly.
Check what happened to the Germans when they attacked a prepared British defense at Tobruk in April 1941. And that was a combined arms attack from land to land rather than a half-assed amphibious assault.
Level bombers could attack targets at night. Even better if those targets were currently being illuminated with starshells by the coastal artillery you discounted.
No, they could not. The Germans had a single dedicated long-range maritime attack Gruppe, I./KG 40 and it was not part of SEELÖWE planning because of the vulnerability of the FW 200. The only other unit trained for maritime attack were the three medium bomber Gruppen of KG 30. I./KG 40 used low-level bombing, KG 30 used low-level and dive-bombing. Neither would be possible in the dark.
I did not "discount" coastal artillery, I stated its capability. Firing "starshells" or any other type of shell to a range of 24,000 meters was not one of them.
At dawn every ME-110 in the inventory of the German air force will presumably commence low level strafing and bombing attacks on any RN warship in the Channel.
You mean the Bf 110 of ZG 26. and 76? The under 200 of them serviceable? The ones tasked with duties like long-range escort for the bombers and dive bombers tasked to support the assault forces?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018