Aida1 wrote: ↑
13 Apr 2020 09:46
Sid Guttridge wrote: ↑
13 Apr 2020 08:55
Dresden was close enough to the front line for the Soviet Union to ask the Western Allies to bomb it to help their troops nearby, but it was not yet in it.
P.S. Dresden was apparently 68 miles from the front - less than half the distance Rommel advanced in a single day in France in June 1940. (See what I did there?)
The red army offensive only resumed in mid april 1945 so Dresden was certainly not on the verge of being taken red army ground forces .
On February 3, 1945, Red Army troops capture a bridgehead on the West Bank of the Oder.
Stavka is developing a plan of operation to capture Berlin and reach Dresden on February to 13-15. In this regard, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Stalin, on the first day of the Yalta conference, appeals to British Prime Minister Churchill and US President Roosevelt with a request to bomb the railway junction of Dresden, as well as the warehouses of weapons and ammunition near this city. What has been promised.
The threat to the right flank of the 1st Belorussian front (that is, the threat from Pomerania) forced the Stavka to refuse to continue moving in the direction of Berlin-Dresden.
The final decision to abandon the Berlin-Dresden offensive was made after February 18, 1945. At the same time, some of the military leaders of the red Army advocated a non-stop continuation of the offensive on Berlin.
The most active opponent of the stop on the Oder river line was the commander of the 8th Guards Army Marshal of the Soviet Union Chuikov. Disputes about this issue continued both immediately after the end of the war, and many years later, and do not stop even now. You can read about this in the memoirs of Marshal Zhukov.
1. The Stavka appealed to its allies at the beginning of February 1945 to bomb the district of Dresden in connection with the plan to continue the offensive on this city and the capital of the Third Reich. Therefore, this request is caused by military necessity.
2. At the time of the bombing of Dresden on February 13, 1945, the allies did not know that the Stavka would postpone the start of the offensive on the capital of the Third Reich for a very simple reason - on this day, even the Stavka did not yet know what the final decision on this issue would be. Conclusion-the bombing of Dresden on February 13 was carried out due to tactical necessity.
And now the question: was there a tactical need to bomb the city of Kiev on the morning of June 22, 1941, without declaring war?
For reference: the distance from the Western border of the USSR to the city Kiev (the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) is more than 500 kilometers.