Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

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BDV
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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by BDV » 11 Oct 2018 18:54

Sid Guttridge wrote: Hi BDV,

I would reply, but I have no idea what you are trying to say. Sorry.

Cheers,

Sid.

Bringing up current political debates/controversies/controversial figures has no place in this thread.

Excellente journée à vous aussi

BDV
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Oct 2018 19:23

Hi BDV,

Fair point, however accurate and to the point such observations may be.

Cheers,

Sid.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Oct 2018 19:48

I'm still trying to figure out what "And junta is nowhere to be found" is supposed to mean?
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 11 Oct 2018 20:09, edited 1 time in total.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 11 Oct 2018 19:52

Cult Icon wrote:
11 Oct 2018 13:02
jesk wrote:
10 Oct 2018 20:06

Hitler preferred mini-battles. He constantly crushed the Wehrmacht into small groups. If there are 78 German divisions in Typhoon, no more than 30 in the battles of 1945. This is surprising, considering the conduct of the war in Germany with its developed network of roads and the ability to quickly deploy troops in battle.
Ardennes 24 divisions. Why not 54?
It had less to do with preferences than logistics, realities, and political goals.
It is not necessary to substitute real reasons for fictional ones. The retention of 45 divisions in Norway and Courland is exclusively Hitler’s initiative. In Norway, there were many separate parts, the total number of group up to 400 thousand. In addition to divisions, the Germans received a large number of replenishment and, for example, the opportunity to form 5-10 new divisions.
In 1941 the german ostheer and their allies were mobilized. In the summer of 1942, only Army Group South was refitted and mobilized due to shortages (read: Enduring the Whirlwind 1941-1943 and Germany in WW2 series, To the Gates of Stalingrad, From Moscow to Stalingrad covers this as well). Axis allied support was gradually withdrawn after the defeat at Stalingrad.
In 1942, the army groups "Center" and "North" confidently repelled all Soviet attacks. In fact, Hitler did not provide any arguments in favor of the inactivity of the two army groups. He just wanted to and his desire took shape in the orders. Comes only army group "South".
In the fall/winter of 1944, the situation in Hungary deteriorated greatly and there were armored battles involving the retention of Budapest and Hungary as an axis allies. However, at the same time the German command needed to make a gamble in the West or they were done- the circumstances were very dire for them.

https://www.amazon.com/Enduring-Whirlwi ... 1910777757
The circumstances were not difficult. The Germans and in 1945 played in the giveaway. Due to the evacuation of troops to Germany, they were able to strike superior forces on the enemy. Even 100 divisions in the Ardennes could advance if all German forces were concentrated in Germany. On December 1, 1944 in Europe, there were 270 Wehrmacht divisions. In the Ardennes, only 24 attacked. Accordingly, only 9% of German power participated in the battle of the Bulge.

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Oct 2018 20:02

Hi Jesk,

As you know, I have pointed out several times that the Germans had problems supplying the 24 divisions you say were actually used in the Ardennes, and asked you repeatedly how you were proposing they should supply twice as many. You did not answer.

Yet now you propose to redouble the divisions used to 100!

I ask again, how are you proposing to supply 100 divisions when 24 already presented a problem?

Surely, given that, according to you, "Any historian understands the history of the Second World War worse than me", you have an answer?

Cheers,

Sid.

Richard Anderson
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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Oct 2018 20:11

Simple, every man carries a loaf of bread and a sausage. Supply "problem" solved.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Sid Guttridge » 11 Oct 2018 20:28

Hi Richard,

Don't be ridiculous. They'd be out of food by the end of the day.

I was thinking more of inflatable, interlocking sections of autobahn that the Luftwaffe could air-drop to the forward troops, who would then blow them up with the bicycle pumps each man would be issued with. This would allow the follow-up, carpet-slipper-shod, troops and supply trucks, who obviously could not use crampons or winter tyres on the aufblasbahn (copyright applied for), to keep pace with the advance.

The element of surprise would ensure that it would take several days for the Allied air forces to accumulate enough tin tacks to pose a threat to the aufblasbahn, by which time the Channel would have been reached and the battle won.

A practical and elegant solution, I think you will agree,

Cheers,

Sid.

jesk
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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 11 Oct 2018 21:22

Sid Guttridge wrote:
11 Oct 2018 20:02

As you know, I have pointed out several times that the Germans had problems supplying the 24 divisions you say were actually used in the Ardennes, and asked you repeatedly how you were proposing they should supply twice as many. You did not answer.

Yet now you propose to redouble the divisions used to 100!

I ask again, how are you proposing to supply 100 divisions when 24 already presented a problem?
Your logic is deadlocked. December 1944 is not only the Ardennes. The fighting was conducted in Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Courland. So why the German divisions who fought in Italy could not do this in the Ardennes?
Surely, given that, according to you, "Any historian understands the history of the Second World War worse than me", you have an answer?
What more should I add. My humble opinion. All my statements strictly correspond to military reality.

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 11 Oct 2018 21:30

Sid Guttridge wrote:
11 Oct 2018 20:28

I was thinking more of inflatable, interlocking sections of autobahn that the Luftwaffe could air-drop to the forward troops, who would then blow them up with the bicycle pumps each man would be issued with. This would allow the follow-up, carpet-slipper-shod, troops and supply trucks, who obviously could not use crampons or winter tyres on the aufblasbahn (copyright applied for), to keep pace with the advance.

The element of surprise would ensure that it would take several days for the Allied air forces to accumulate enough tin tacks to pose a threat to the aufblasbahn, by which time the Channel would have been reached and the battle won.
There is more of a problem with a lack of strength. The way to Antwerp is 200 km. Even if the Germans would have covered this distance, the internal and external front of the arc was 400 km. To cover the flanks would have to allocate up to 20 divisions. The remaining 7-8 try to crush. Allocated forces are obviously not enough for implementation of so ambitious plan.

Image

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 12 Oct 2018 08:29

Hi Jesk, Hi Jesk; Hi Silly Boys :milsmile:

The operational / tactical level is also important. Hitler controlled everything and completely eliminated the probability of a German victory.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/fatalerror/12.html

The commander of the Western Front proposed that the formations, which, according to the "small problem solving" plan, should operate on the right flank of our attacking troops, were transferred here from the Geilenkirchen area to attack in the direction of Maastricht and the area east of this settlement. Hitler rejected this proposal. Moreover, he ordered the transfer of two tank divisions of the 47th Corps from the area of ​​Geilenkirchen to the Ardennes. This order has now been executed. At that moment, when the commander of the 9th Tank Division came to me, his unit, which should have been connected to the 47th Tank Corps, was stretched over a hundred-kilometer stretch of road. The division commander did not know when and where the division would be able to fill the tanks with fuel to complete the march.

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Sid Guttridge » 12 Oct 2018 11:03

Hi Jesk,

To repeat:

As you know, I have pointed out several times that the Germans had problems supplying the 24 divisions you say were actually used in the Ardennes, and asked you repeatedly how you were proposing they should supply twice as many. You did not answer.

Yet now you propose to redouble the divisions used to 100!

I ask again, how are you proposing to supply 100 divisions when 24 already presented a problem?

Cheers,

Sid.

jesk
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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 12 Oct 2018 19:01

Sid Guttridge wrote:
12 Oct 2018 11:03
Hi Jesk,

To repeat:

As you know, I have pointed out several times that the Germans had problems supplying the 24 divisions you say were actually used in the Ardennes, and asked you repeatedly how you were proposing they should supply twice as many. You did not answer.

Yet now you propose to redouble the divisions used to 100!

I ask again, how are you proposing to supply 100 divisions when 24 already presented a problem?

Cheers,

Sid.
German divisions in Italy, Courlnd and Yugoslavia had no problems with "supply". Only 24 divisions assigned to attack in the Ardennes faced such problems.

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by Sid Guttridge » 12 Oct 2018 21:09

Hi Jesk,

So, if, as you say, the 24 divisions in the Ardennes faced supply problems, why do you want to quadruple their number to 100?

A mystified Sid.

jesk
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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 12 Oct 2018 21:17

Sid Guttridge wrote:
12 Oct 2018 21:09
Hi Jesk,

So, if, as you say, the 24 divisions in the Ardennes faced supply problems, why do you want to quadruple their number to 100?

A mystified Sid.
What do you mean about supply problems. In what exactly are they expressed? Maybe the divisions from Italy, if they were involved in the Ardennes, could avoid problems?

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Re: Ersatzheer and German peacemeal strategy

Post by jesk » 12 Oct 2018 22:48

Sid, I will not complicate you with the answer. There is a good Russian-language source about blitzkrieg. In chapter about Ardennes, the author criticizes the Volks-Grenadier divisions. They are weak and have 6 infantry battalions in them, instead of 9 relying infantry divisions across the state. According to the OKW calculations, the scale of the operation required 15 tank and 23 infantry divisions. The Germans gathered 30 divisions, 17 of them Folks-Grenadiers. Few tanks. The main problem, as I have already noted, was Hitler’s refusal to collect troops in Germany, refusing to hold the “Fortress Europe”.

https://www.litmir.me/br/?b=223638&p=71

Summary. The offensive in the Ardennes was the Wehrmacht’s last desperate attempt to defeat the Allies on the Western Front. It was conceived in the style of the classic blitzkrieg - a rapid tank attack with the environment and the destruction of large enemy forces. However, in its course even more clearly than during the operation "Luttih", the inability of the German army to the offensive was manifested. First of all, the Germans failed to gather sufficient forces. For example; The training tank division at the beginning of the offensive had only 57 tanks. The superiority of the Allies in the air forced the Germans to use bad weather, precluding the intervention of aviation, but this decision deprived air support and their own troops, which could lead to fatal consequences, as during the battles for Bastogne. The choice of the offensive area turned out to be erroneous. Yes, the Germans felt the weakness of the front of the Allies, and once again proved that tanks could pass through the Ardennes, even in winter. But “to pass” does not at all mean “to fight successfully”. Even the 2nd Panzer Division, advancing more successfully than all the others, passed no more than 10 kilometers in a day, which is not enough for a Blitzkrieg. In short, the operation “Watch Am Rein” was an attempt with unfit means, and all the successes of the Germans are explained only by the carelessness of the Americans.

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