The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 03 Nov 2018 09:20

Kelvin wrote:
02 Nov 2018 05:17
BDV wrote:
02 Nov 2018 03:56
jesk wrote: Without Hitler, the picture of the story is cut off. Conclusions are often incorrect, based on fragmentary information. For example, sources are hardly mentioned, Hitler’s expectation in April 1945 of the main attack in Czechoslovakia. This mistake facilitated the advance of Soviet troops to Berlin. Without Czechoslovakia and Hitler can not see the real picture.
But Skoda factories are in Prague, not Berlin.
This is moment whether Hitler took right option is does'nt matter. The loss of Ruhr and Silesia industrial zones made German cannot go on any longer. Behind the back of Berlin was Anglo-Amercian Troop and arrvial or reinforcement of Heeresgruppe Mitte from Czechoslovakia was useless. In this period, equipment status of Heeresgruppe Vistula is much better than other HG except Heeresgruppe C in northern Italy.
But he was still wrong. Russian it helped. Halbe is also the work of Hitler. There was an opportunity to keep the 9th army, but she was severely beaten in an attempt to escape from the boiler.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Kelvin » 04 Nov 2018 14:16

jesk wrote:
03 Nov 2018 09:20
Kelvin wrote:
02 Nov 2018 05:17
BDV wrote:
02 Nov 2018 03:56
jesk wrote: Without Hitler, the picture of the story is cut off. Conclusions are often incorrect, based on fragmentary information. For example, sources are hardly mentioned, Hitler’s expectation in April 1945 of the main attack in Czechoslovakia. This mistake facilitated the advance of Soviet troops to Berlin. Without Czechoslovakia and Hitler can not see the real picture.
But Skoda factories are in Prague, not Berlin.
This is moment whether Hitler took right option is does'nt matter. The loss of Ruhr and Silesia industrial zones made German cannot go on any longer. Behind the back of Berlin was Anglo-Amercian Troop and arrvial or reinforcement of Heeresgruppe Mitte from Czechoslovakia was useless. In this period, equipment status of Heeresgruppe Vistula is much better than other HG except Heeresgruppe C in northern Italy.
But he was still wrong. Russian it helped. Halbe is also the work of Hitler. There was an opportunity to keep the 9th army, but she was severely beaten in an attempt to escape from the boiler.

Image

He still believed his German soldiers can meet his expectation just like in 1939-41. He missed his opportunity in 1943-44.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 04 Nov 2018 23:10

He helped them lose. Distributed reserves at the rate of the main blow in Czechoslovakia. And miscalculated. :(

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 04 Nov 2018 23:26

6-7 divisions of the 1st pazer army in October-November 1942 attacked in the direction of Baku. 3-4% of the total number of German divisions on the eastern front. Hitler forced the Germans to play with an incomplete deck. Such a war cannot be considered real. What if 15 divisions? By 1.5 million prisoners in 1942 will add more !?

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Kelvin » 05 Nov 2018 04:51

Hi, Jesk, yes, he really used too little troop for too big target and spent most of troop in Stalingrad. I think he suggested Soviet supply was located in the Volga area and his attack on Stalingrad affected Soviet supply. While in the Caucasus, this is far from Soviet supply base and what available for Soviet army is lease lend material through Iran from US. So Hitler took this risk with little troop for conqest of Caucasus. And this areas is full of Soviet ASSR like Chechen, Ingush, Ossetia, Dagestan, Kalymk, Georgia, and Armenia and perhaps Soviet rule will be collapsed much easier.

But you should know that, Soviet Army had launched many many offensives in other fronts to stop German reinforement or even made them transfer troop from main war zone. Soviet offensive in Central area at least made German transfer 9. and 11. Panzer divisions from the south and also used some refitted Pz divisions to counter Soviet offensive in this area like 2. 4. 5. 20 Panzer divisions , all these divisions might be transfered to reinforce HGS in critical time like Causcasu and Stalingrad.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 05 Nov 2018 05:28

Kelvin wrote:
05 Nov 2018 04:51
But you should know that, Soviet Army had launched many many offensives in other fronts to stop German reinforement or even made them transfer troop from main war zone. Soviet offensive in Central area at least made German transfer 9. and 11. Panzer divisions from the south and also used some refitted Pz divisions to counter Soviet offensive in this area like 2. 4. 5. 20 Panzer divisions , all these divisions might be transfered to reinforce HGS in critical time like Causcasu and Stalingrad.
Hitler was looking for a sabotage. For example, in September 1941, he refused to attack on Leningrad, but situation there was not dangerous. The attack could be carried out simultaneously with the reflection of the Soviet offensive. Leibstandarte relocated to Paris. WWII can be characterized as the Greatest Military Sabotage in History.


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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Kelvin » 05 Nov 2018 10:42

jesk wrote:
05 Nov 2018 05:28
Kelvin wrote:
05 Nov 2018 04:51
But you should know that, Soviet Army had launched many many offensives in other fronts to stop German reinforement or even made them transfer troop from main war zone. Soviet offensive in Central area at least made German transfer 9. and 11. Panzer divisions from the south and also used some refitted Pz divisions to counter Soviet offensive in this area like 2. 4. 5. 20 Panzer divisions , all these divisions might be transfered to reinforce HGS in critical time like Causcasu and Stalingrad.
Hitler was looking for a sabotage. For example, in September 1941, he refused to attack on Leningrad, but situation there was not dangerous. The attack could be carried out simultaneously with the reflection of the Soviet offensive. Leibstandarte relocated to Paris. WWII can be characterized as the Greatest Military Sabotage in History.

Hi, Jesk, in Sept 1941, Hitler needed to finish Soviet 11th and 27th Armies and the remnant of 34th Army which were mauled in Staraya Russia in late August 1941. In fact, Soviet tactic was successful as they attempted to attract German direction from Leningrad with attack at Staraya Russia with three Armies of Northwestern Front with 18 divisions. Given limited manpower of Heeresgruppe Nord, Hitler must do that first to counter Soviet threat.

So not attack on Leningrad was obviously not Hitler fault. And also remember that the defence of Leningrad was bolstered up by arrival of newly created Soviet 52nd Army with 7 divisions, mostly recurited in Central Asia.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 05 Nov 2018 21:50

Kelvin wrote:
05 Nov 2018 10:42
jesk wrote:
05 Nov 2018 05:28
Kelvin wrote:
05 Nov 2018 04:51
But you should know that, Soviet Army had launched many many offensives in other fronts to stop German reinforement or even made them transfer troop from main war zone. Soviet offensive in Central area at least made German transfer 9. and 11. Panzer divisions from the south and also used some refitted Pz divisions to counter Soviet offensive in this area like 2. 4. 5. 20 Panzer divisions , all these divisions might be transfered to reinforce HGS in critical time like Causcasu and Stalingrad.
Hitler was looking for a sabotage. For example, in September 1941, he refused to attack on Leningrad, but situation there was not dangerous. The attack could be carried out simultaneously with the reflection of the Soviet offensive. Leibstandarte relocated to Paris. WWII can be characterized as the Greatest Military Sabotage in History.

Hi, Jesk, in Sept 1941, Hitler needed to finish Soviet 11th and 27th Armies and the remnant of 34th Army which were mauled in Staraya Russia in late August 1941. In fact, Soviet tactic was successful as they attempted to attract German direction from Leningrad with attack at Staraya Russia with three Armies of Northwestern Front with 18 divisions. Given limited manpower of Heeresgruppe Nord, Hitler must do that first to counter Soviet threat.

So not attack on Leningrad was obviously not Hitler fault. And also remember that the defence of Leningrad was bolstered up by arrival of newly created Soviet 52nd Army with 7 divisions, mostly recurited in Central Asia.
In the previous comment I confused, wanted to write the year 1942. The Soviet offensive was not dangerous when Hitler appointed Manstein to "save from a catastrophe." In September 1941, Hitler definitely did not want to take Leningrad. He even invented a distracting operation - a blow to Tikhvin forced the German command to cancel the plan of an offensive across the Neva for a complete blockade of Leningrad.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Stugbit » 15 Nov 2018 00:02

I started this topic here to understand better why the Germans had compromised themselves so much in the Caucasus Mountains and secondary objectives when they simple could reach all of their main objectives from the steppes in the North. And I was wanting to know who was the responsible for those actions also.

At first, you could say that`s because the oilfields actually weren’t cited exactly on the cities, like Maikop, and instead they were located rather on it`s surroundings. But yet, they were still far from the mountains anyway. Not even to talk about Tuapse and such.

So, from the texts Bob have shown me here, I could see that the Germans had some sort of traffic problems with overcrowded roads when they began their advance inside Caucasus (they came along with no updated maps of the region and had no clear idea of how the routes actually worked there). Those traffic jams influenced Wilhelm List to disperse even more his already compromised forces, it seems, and Hitler, at least on the beginning, was ok with his orders.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Cult Icon » 15 Nov 2018 00:13

from reading Glantz/Forcyck, "Caucasus and the Oil" , "Stopped at Stalingrad" and the 3.Pz, 23.Pz history it gave the impression that logistics was a key limiting factor in operations. The german forces had to wait long periods of time (many days to weeks) before they accumulated sufficient resources to advance again. The military performance of both sides wasn't very good.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Stugbit » 15 Nov 2018 16:24

Cult Icon wrote:
15 Nov 2018 00:13
from reading Glantz/Forcyck, "Caucasus and the Oil" , "Stopped at Stalingrad" and the 3.Pz, 23.Pz history it gave the impression that logistics was a key limiting factor in operations. The german forces had to wait long periods of time (many days to weeks) before they accumulated sufficient resources to advance again. The military performance of both sides wasn't very good.
Yes.

Forczyk also criticises Wilhelm List decisions very much. For him, it was a waste of resources when List dispersed the troops on a wide range of worthless objectives. It would be better to have a smaller but full of resources force aimed at the right place instead.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by BDV » 15 Nov 2018 19:48

jesk wrote:In the previous comment I confused, wanted to write the year 1942. The Soviet offensive was not dangerous when Hitler appointed Manstein to "save from a catastrophe." In September 1941, Hitler definitely did not want to take Leningrad. He even invented a distracting operation - a blow to Tikhvin forced the German command to cancel the plan of an offensive across the Neva for a complete blockade of Leningrad.

The Wehrmacht was completely impotent and inept at taking fixed positionen. They failed no only in front of Leningrad, but Oranienburg, Sevastopol 1941, Brest, Mogilev, Polotsk (although Polotsk was taken quicker than the others due to commitment of a large force), Tallinn, and 1942 Novorossiysk, Voronezh, Stalingrad.

Add to that Malta and Tobruk 1941 and, why not, the Groß-Daddy of Wehrmacht failures against fixed positionen, Dunquerque
(with its lesser known and appreciated sisters, Lille and Calais).

second, at the time the Tikhvin was attacked, no Tikhvin, no bauxite for Sovjet airplanes. Plus immediate linking with Finnish forces on the Svir. What is gained by attacking Leningrad? 2 million unnutze esser (as Germans were utterly incapable of using the conquered workforce, see Reichsfuhrer's confession at Posen in 1943)?

Ineptness of Fuhrer's overpromoted field exterminators and their subordinate murderers is glaring. If Panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe got it done, it got done. But German line infantry was only fit for judenfreying duty (killing women and children), and little else, clearly inferior to Romanian and Hungarian infantry.
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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Cult Icon » 15 Nov 2018 20:36

Stugbit wrote:
15 Nov 2018 16:24

Forczyk also criticises Wilhelm List decisions very much. For him, it was a waste of resources when List dispersed the troops on a wide range of worthless objectives. It would be better to have a smaller but full of resources force aimed at the right place instead.
the splitting of AGS to AGA And AGB and repeated switching/dispersion of Luftwaffe support made it so they couldn't achieve either objective in an efficient way.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Stugbit » 15 Nov 2018 23:04

Cult Icon wrote:
15 Nov 2018 20:36
Stugbit wrote:
15 Nov 2018 16:24

Forczyk also criticises Wilhelm List decisions very much. For him, it was a waste of resources when List dispersed the troops on a wide range of worthless objectives. It would be better to have a smaller but full of resources force aimed at the right place instead.
the splitting of AGS to AGA And AGB and repeated switching/dispersion of Luftwaffe support made it so they couldn't achieve either objective in an efficient way.
Yep, I agree with you, Cult Icon.

But AGA also lacked focus and leadership. Even with sharing forces with AGB, I think at least Grozny could have been reached if they have done things correctly.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 16 Nov 2018 21:05

Stugbit wrote:
15 Nov 2018 00:02
I started this topic here to understand better why the Germans had compromised themselves so much in the Caucasus Mountains and secondary objectives when they simple could reach all of their main objectives from the steppes in the North. And I was wanting to know who was the responsible for those actions also.

At first, you could say that`s because the oilfields actually weren’t cited exactly on the cities, like Maikop, and instead they were located rather on it`s surroundings. But yet, they were still far from the mountains anyway. Not even to talk about Tuapse and such.

So, from the texts Bob have shown me here, I could see that the Germans had some sort of traffic problems with overcrowded roads when they began their advance inside Caucasus (they came along with no updated maps of the region and had no clear idea of how the routes actually worked there). Those traffic jams influenced Wilhelm List to disperse even more his already compromised forces, it seems, and Hitler, at least on the beginning, was ok with his orders.
Bad approach to the topic. In the first place a small number of divisions. Then only supply problems. November 15, 1942 6 German divisions in 1 panzer army. There are 11 divisions in the occupation service in Norway. In the Caucasus, an increase in the number of divisions was required.

Order of battle (15 Nov 1942)
At the disposal of the 1. Panzerarmee
- General-Kommando z.b.V.
- Befehls-Stab Steinbauer
- 50. Infanterie-Division (part)
III. Panzerkorps
- Romanian 2nd Mountain Division
- 23. Panzer-Division + SS-Division “Wiking” (part)
- 13. Panzer-Division + verstärktes Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 99
LII. Armeekorps
- SS-Division “Wiking” (most) + 50. Infanterie-Division (part)
- 111. Infanterie-Division
- 370. Infanterie-Division
XXXX. Panzerkorps
- 3. Panzer-Division

Order of battle (22 Dec 1942)
At the disposal of Armee Norwegen
- 25. Panzer-Division
Höheres Kommando z.b.V. LXXI
- 230. Infanterie-Division
- 270. Infanterie-Division
- 199. Infanterie-Division
Höheres Kommando z.b.V. XXXIII
- 196. Infanterie-Division
- 702. Infanterie-Division
- 181. Infanterie-Division
Höheres Kommando z.b.V. LXX
- 269. Infanterie-Division
- 280. Infanterie-Division
- 2/3 214. Infanterie-Division
- 710. Infanterie-Division

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