The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

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jesk
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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 24 Oct 2018 21:49

13 and 23 divisions rushed to Georgia. There probably would have more mountain rifle divisions. For example, Italian.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpini

The divisions saw combat in France, Africa, Italy, Albania, The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Greece. One Alpini battalion was employed in East Africa. In 1942, Tridentina, Julia and Cuneense division were sent to fight in the Soviet Union. In Russia, instead of being deployed in the Caucasus mountains as expected, the Alpini were tasked with holding a front on the plains of the Don River. As a result of this disastrous strategic decision, troops armed, trained, and equipped for mountain warfare were pitted in the plains against tanks and mechanized infantry, to counter which they were neither equipped nor trained. Despite this, the Alpini held the front until January 1943, when, due to the collapse of the Axis front, they were encircled by the advancing Soviet Army. The Alpini were able to break the encirclement in Battle of Nikolayevka and fight their way towards the new line of the front established after the Axis retreat. Only about one third of the Tridentina division (4250 survivors of 15,000 troops deployed) and one tenth of the Julia (1,200/15,000) were able to survive this odyssey. The Cuneense division was annihilated.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 24 Oct 2018 22:01

The transfer of the Italian mountain corps to the steppe in purest form is sabotage and nothing else. No arguments can justify this decision. The reinforcement by this corps of a group in the Caucasus guaranteed collapsed the Soviet defense. This is not a mistake, this is sabotage.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 25 Oct 2018 07:30

Yesterday in Tuapse 162 mm of precipitation per day! 133% of the norm of October. The war in the fall there is always a big question.


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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 25 Oct 2018 08:07

Boby wrote:
05 Aug 2018 17:06
Hi

List was fired (Hitler exploded over the committment of XXXXIX. Geb.Korps) because there was no progress in the Caucasus by early September. Here is a nice map of the actual positions on 9 September
http://www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/maps/L ... t42_lg.jpg

Why would the germans fail only because they made mistakes? It was because the RKKA prevented it. So why 17. Armee never captured Tuapse? Because of mistakes by List and Ruoff or because there was an opponent defending it?
In fact, this falls under the purview of military planning. How many forces need to perform a combat mission. Your objections of plan, the Germans had one division and could not complete the task. Why one division is not enough, 10 can be enough? In the Ardennes, the Germans engaged 24 divisions. According to estimates of American intelligence, published on December 28, 1944, the Germans lacked 15 divisions. Why are 24 divisions small, 39 enough? Obviously, many forum participants do not have enough knowledge for this kind of analysis.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by dgfred » 25 Oct 2018 16:03

Boby wrote:
05 Aug 2018 17:06
Hi

List was fired (Hitler exploded over the committment of XXXXIX. Geb.Korps) because there was no progress in the Caucasus by early September. Here is a nice map of the actual positions on 9 September
http://www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/maps/L ... t42_lg.jpg

Why would the germans fail only because they made mistakes? It was because the RKKA prevented it. So why 17. Armee never captured Tuapse? Because of mistakes by List and Ruoff or because there was an opponent defending it?
Great map, thanks.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 25 Oct 2018 21:42

Boby wrote:
05 Aug 2018 17:06
Hi

List was fired (Hitler exploded over the committment of XXXXIX. Geb.Korps) because there was no progress in the Caucasus by early September.
Stugbit wrote:
06 Aug 2018 13:51
Boby, do you have more information about Wilhelm List dismissal? You said Hitler exploded with him, but do you have some more details to give?

Best regards.
Boby wrote:
06 Aug 2018 15:03
Yes, that was a well known episode at FHQ. You can read some details in Ziemke, Moscow to Stalingrad, here:
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... on-18.html (pp. 375 f.)

Irving, Hitler's War, here:
http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Hitler/1977/ ... er/24.html

and Wegner, "The War against the Soviet Union 1942-1943", Chapter V/3 "September at Vinnitsa", here:
https://books.google.es/books?id=e9znk7 ... onepage&q=

Hope it helps
Boby,
The correct answer is as follows.

Hitler took the 4th panzer army. Hitler took 11 army. Hitler took the Italian mountain-rifle corps with three divisions. And after slowing down the pace of the attack, he refused to strengthen Army Group A. The solution is elementary: blame the commander for defeat and continue further. Other options for Hitler was not.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Kelvin » 26 Oct 2018 07:39

jesk wrote:
25 Oct 2018 08:07
Boby wrote:
05 Aug 2018 17:06
Hi

List was fired (Hitler exploded over the committment of XXXXIX. Geb.Korps) because there was no progress in the Caucasus by early September. Here is a nice map of the actual positions on 9 September
http://www.gutenberg-e.org/esk01/maps/L ... t42_lg.jpg

Why would the germans fail only because they made mistakes? It was because the RKKA prevented it. So why 17. Armee never captured Tuapse? Because of mistakes by List and Ruoff or because there was an opponent defending it?
In fact, this falls under the purview of military planning. How many forces need to perform a combat mission. Your objections of plan, the Germans had one division and could not complete the task. Why one division is not enough, 10 can be enough? In the Ardennes, the Germans engaged 24 divisions. According to estimates of American intelligence, published on December 28, 1944, the Germans lacked 15 divisions. Why are 24 divisions small, 39 enough? Obviously, many forum participants do not have enough knowledge for this kind of analysis.
In Ardennes offensive, 24 divisions were really small in comparsion with Hitler 's successful campaign in 1940. Just one blow in 1940, French 1st Army group and Belgian armed force collapsed and BEF was driven out of Europe. He had 136 divisions on hand. He had 80 divisions, including 7 Pz and 3 Mot.inf divisions as armored barrier to block the LOC of allied force, he also 30 divisions in north as front attacking force. and another 17 divisions to divert allied direction in the south.

In 1944, in the west, he only had 70 divisions and mostly understrengthed and authorized manpower level was also smaller than 1940 level ( 12700 against 17700 men). He attempted to use 25 divisions as armoured barriers to block LOC of British 2nd Army and Canadian 1st Army and 15th Army and 1st Fallschirm Armee about 15-20 division to attack from the north to exploit the breakthrough. And Heeresgruppe G were used as diversion force to attract the allies in the south. The ingredient for successful campaign is lacking. It is why Rundstadt opposed to plan and Model even said, if they succeeded, it would be miracle.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 26 Oct 2018 16:36

Do not forget, the enemy was the American soldiers. The English in Africa sometimes called them "our Italians." With a really serious pressure, the American army could crumble. In Korea, Vietnam, Americans proved to be a nation with very weak infantry.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by Kelvin » 27 Oct 2018 07:07

US soldiers not that bad. And in modern warfare, infantry was much more dependent upon their weapon and artillery pieces and firepower. hand to hand fighting is at least avoidable. Soviet small rifle divisions had abundant of automatic weapon and mortar.German infanterie divisions were reduced much more in later period of war. Only six small size infantry battalions and mostly were understrength. But now they had more heavy firepower to overcome enemy instead of hand to hand fighting, they had a large number of MP, automatic weapon. They had 120 mm mortar, Panzerfaust, Panzerschreck and 75mm antitank gun. And even infantry division each had 10- 14 tank destroyers or StuG III/IV. In Ardennes, each VolksGrenadier Division had 10-14 Hetzer or StuG in offensive and they had more MP-44 assault rifles.
Soviet infanty, ableit with large manpower resouces, also more dependent on firepower and their people were bled white already. Many many mortar 50mm, 82mm and 120mm, and large quantity of PPsH SMG. When the war end, Soviet began to introduce 6 x SU-76 to each Rifle division in 1946. The same concept as German did in 1943.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 27 Oct 2018 10:43

Stalin in August 1952 was surprised that the United States could not defeat small Korea. The main reason for this was considered the weakness of the infantry. Some American commentators, too were not satisfied with the outcome of the war; in the plan the United States turned into a "paper tiger."

http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2008-07-18/10_stalin.html

However, the Generalissimo did not give "good" to end the conflict. He still needed the war, and therefore at a meeting with Zhou Enlai and other members of the Chinese delegation who visited him in the Kremlin on August 20, 1952, Stalin was categorically outraged: “This war spoils the blood of the Americans. The North Koreans did not lose anything except the casualties they suffered in this war. The Americans understand that this war is unprofitable for them, and they will have to end it, especially after it turns out that our troops remain in Korea. Need endurance, patience, Of course, we must understand the Koreans - they have many victims. But they need to clarify that this is a big deal. You need to have patience, you need a lot of restraint. The war in Korea showed the weakness of the Americans ... Koreans need to help and support them ... Americans are not able to wage a big war at all, especially after the Korean War ... America cannot defeat small Korea ... What kind of power is this? ... No, the Americans do not know how to fight. Especially after the Korean War, they lost the ability to wage a big war. They hope for an atomic bomb, air raids. But this does not win the war. Infantry is needed, but their infantry is small and weak. With small Korea they are fighting, and in the USA they are already crying. What will happen if they start a big war? Then, perhaps, everyone will cry. "

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by AdolfDettmer » 28 Oct 2018 04:26

jesk wrote:
27 Oct 2018 10:43
Stalin in August 1952 was surprised that the United States could not defeat small Korea. The main reason for this was considered the weakness of the infantry. Some American commentators, too were not satisfied with the outcome of the war; in the plan the United States turned into a "paper tiger."

http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2008-07-18/10_stalin.html

However, the Generalissimo did not give "good" to end the conflict. He still needed the war, and therefore at a meeting with Zhou Enlai and other members of the Chinese delegation who visited him in the Kremlin on August 20, 1952, Stalin was categorically outraged: “This war spoils the blood of the Americans. The North Koreans did not lose anything except the casualties they suffered in this war. The Americans understand that this war is unprofitable for them, and they will have to end it, especially after it turns out that our troops remain in Korea. Need endurance, patience, Of course, we must understand the Koreans - they have many victims. But they need to clarify that this is a big deal. You need to have patience, you need a lot of restraint. The war in Korea showed the weakness of the Americans ... Koreans need to help and support them ... Americans are not able to wage a big war at all, especially after the Korean War ... America cannot defeat small Korea ... What kind of power is this? ... No, the Americans do not know how to fight. Especially after the Korean War, they lost the ability to wage a big war. They hope for an atomic bomb, air raids. But this does not win the war. Infantry is needed, but their infantry is small and weak. With small Korea they are fighting, and in the USA they are already crying. What will happen if they start a big war? Then, perhaps, everyone will cry. "
I would think the roughly 1.5 million Chinese ground troops compared to about 350,000 american troops might have been a factor.

And if you think the reason the United States “lost” in Vietnam owed to the quality of their infantry, you clearly have no clue about both the Korean War and Vietnam War.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 28 Oct 2018 21:10

How the Americans fought and how Chechens. 50-100 militants broke through to a height 776 and shot Russian soldiers from under-barrel granite launchers. The presence of body armor did not help. The American infantry could not show such a class.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_for_Height_776

At dawn of 29 February, in dense fog, the Russians were surprised by a large-scale Chechen breakthrough and were attacked from their rear by a reconnaissance group of about 20 rebel fighters, soon joined by many more who then had them surrounded. After suffering heavy losses (including the death of Major Molodov) from the initial ambush, the rest of the Russians retreated to a hilltop designated Height 776, where they hastily dug defensive positions. They received fire support, including from the regimental artillery battalion's 2S9 Nona self-propelled 120 mm mortars; however, a pair ofMil Mi-24 attack helicopters reportedly turned back after being shot at en route.[8] The only Russian reinforcement that made it to Height 776 were 14 men of the 4th Company's third platoon, personally led by the battalion's deputy commander, Major Alexander Dostavalov. Attempts by the 1st and 3rd Companies, as well as the rest of the 4th Company, to rescue their surrounded comrades or to stop the breakthrough were largely unsuccessful. Eventually, badly wounded Captain Romanov allegedly called for fire support on his own position before being overrun in the final Chechen attack.According to the Russians, 84 of their soldiers were killed in combat at Height 776, including all of the officers. Only seven rank-and-file soldiers survived the battle, four of them injured[1] (some Russian sources acknowledge only six survivors, not counting the seventh who had answered a call for surrender and was then beaten, stripped out of his uniform and abandoned by the rebels[9]).

Image

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Bloody_Ridge

The 36th ROK Regiment made the initial attack. It succeeded in capturing most, but not all, of the ridge after a week of fierce fighting that at times was hand to hand. It was a short-lived triumph, for the following day the North Koreans recaptured the mountain in a fierce counterattack.

The next UN assault was made by the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. The battle raged for ten days, as the North Koreans repulsed one assault after another by the increasingly exhausted and depleted U.S. forces. After repeatedly being driven back, the 9th succeeded in capturing one of the hill objectives after two days of heavy fighting. The weather then turned to almost constant rain, greatly slowing the attacks and making operations almost impossible because of the difficulty in bringing supplies through "rivers of mud" and up steep, slippery slopes.

Fighting continued, however, and casualties mounted. The 2nd Division's 23rd Infantry Regiment joined the attack on the main ridge while the division's other infantry regiment, the 38th Infantry Regiment, occupied positions immediately behind the main ridge which threatened to cut off any North Korean retreat. The combination of frontal attacks, flanking movements and incessant bombardment by artillery, tanks and airstrikes ultimately decided the battle. Over 14,000 artillery rounds were fired in a 24-hour period. Finally, on September 5, the North Koreans abandoned the ridge after UN forces succeeded in outflanking it.

After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge, the North Koreans set up new positions just 1,500 yards (1,400 m) away on a seven-mile (11 km) long (11 km) hill mass that was soon to earn the name Heartbreak Ridge.

The American soldiers called the piece of terrain they had taken "Bloody Ridge", which indeed it was: 2,700 UN and perhaps as many as 15,000 NK and PRC military members were casualties, almost all of them killed or wounded with few prisoners being taken by either side.The much higher NK and PRC casualties were probably caused by

1.Discipline in the KPA was poor, and constraining orders so strict to the point where subordinate leaders were often not allowed to withdraw under any conditions, in which case the entire unit would be blooded.Even when permission was granted for a withdrawal, it often came only after the large majority of troops in the unit had been killed.

2.In most battles, UN forces had an overwhelming advantage in artillery and air support; indeed, the North Korean and Chinese forces had no air support.An enormously destructive "rain of fire" could be brought by UN units against North Korean and Chinese forces which they could not answer in kind.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 28 Oct 2018 21:22

Russian paratroopers killed at a height taken by Chechens in 1 hour. 84 killed, 6 escaped.

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by AdolfDettmer » 28 Oct 2018 22:07

I fail to see how comparing Russian soldiers fighting a poorly armed irregular force is at all compared to US Infantry fighting against the Chinese conventional or North Vietnamese conventional militaries.

More importantly, for this forum, I fail to see how your random poorly explained musings on the so-called ineptitude of the US serviceman has anything to do with Fall Blau

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Re: The Heeresgruppe A military planning in Fall Blau.

Post by jesk » 29 Oct 2018 05:37

During the discussion, Blau mentioned the theme of the American infantry. You know, military themes are often interrelated. With regard to poorly armed soldiers, they fought with the Russian army and often won the battles. The American infantry would have stormed the height 776 for a long time, constantly causing artillery and aviation fire. This opinion is also of Stalin, he wondered why the American army could not defeat the Chinese army in Korea ?! For the Wehrmacht it would be quite simple.

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