Employment of the armored division.

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tigre
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Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 07 Mar 2011 17:35

Hello to all :D; a little article for those interested................

The German Armored Divisions.

The employment of the armored division, in cooperation with other arms, in an action which contemplates a breakthrough of the hostile defensive position organized on more or less irregular terrain, may be illustrated by briefly outlining the successive phases of the attack. A preliminary phase should first include a thorough reconnaissance by units of the engineer battalion in order to remove road blocks, obstacles and traps.

1. Initiating the attack; the attack is now launched by the leading wave of the first echelon of tanks against the outpost line of resistance and across the mined area in front of the main line of resistance. This phase includes a coordinated attack from the air, in which assault planes attack the main line of resistance with machine guns and bombs while the bombers attack the reserves.

Sources: The German Armored Divisions. Foreign Military Digests. Vol XX. Nº 78. Sept 1940.
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 10 Mar 2011 22:12

Hello to all :D; more follows................

The German Armored Divisions.

2. The tanks of the first echelon attack the antitank units: The infantry advances under cover of the third echelon, whose mission is to destroy machine-gun nests. The artillery opens fire on the hostile observation posts and impedes the bringing up of the enemy’s reserves by firing on the rear areas.

3. Continuing the attack: The tanks continue to move forward, the first echelon fanning out when it begins to reach the high ground on which the hostile main line of resistance is located.

4. Crossing the main line of resistance: The first echelon now crosses the hostile main line of resistance and enters the hostile artillery position. It destroys command posts and makes every effort to prevent the defence from becoming organized. The second echelon attacks the hostile batteries which have become disorganized in rear of the hostile main line of resistance, while the third echelon and the infantry cross the main line of resistance.

Sources: The German Armored Divisions. Foreign Military Digests. Vol XX. Nº 78. Sept 1940.
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 16 Mar 2011 22:18

Hello to all :D; more follows................

The German Armored Divisions.

5. Combat between tanks: By this time the defence will have made some effort to reorganize his forward position in an attempt to block the advance of the first echelon
and to employ his artillery against the forward movement of the various echelons. The infantry, following the attacking tanks, now occupies the hostile main line of resistance.
Meanwhile, the motorized antitank guns have been closely following the first echelon, and it is now their mission to take up positions for supporting their own tanks when combat against the enemy’s armoured vehicles is initiated. During the combat between tanks our own artillery is displaced forward.

The combat between tanks is a decisive phase which determines the ultimate success of the battle. The force of the impact delivered by an armored unit is essentially a function which varies with the degree of resistance which the armored vehicle can offer to the projectiles of the opposing antitank guns. The Germans, in order to attain speed as well as a great radius of action, have necessarily been obliged to sacrifice a certain amount of
protection. In their particular case, therefore, the success of an attack by armored units against positions organized for defense must be based mainly on the element of surprise, strategic as well as tactical.

Sources: The German Armored Divisions. Foreign Military Digests. Vol XX. Nº 78. Sept 1940.
eBay auction. Martes, 30 de Marzo de 2010, 16:27:56.

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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 24 Mar 2011 13:16

Hello to all :D; here goes a little scheme of the first four phases................

Source: Hechos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. tomo 1. Editorial Cardon. Buenos Aires.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 07 Apr 2011 23:13

Hello to all :D; something more about it.......................

Streamlining the Offensive.

Source: Streamlining the Offeneive. The Evolution of the Panzer Division and its Place in Blitzkrieg. By COLONEL FREDERICK M. BARROWS F ield Artillery. G. & G,S.S. Military Review.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 16 Apr 2011 14:38

Hello to all :D; something more about it.......................

Streamlining the Offensive.

Source: Streamlining the Offeneive. The Evolution of the Panzer Division and its Place in Blitzkrieg. By COLONEL FREDERICK M. BARROWS F ield Artillery. G. & G,S.S. Military Review.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 21 Apr 2011 13:07

Hello to all :D; something more about it.......................

Streamlining the Offensive.

Source: Streamlining the Offensive. The Evolution of the Panzer Division and its Place in Blitzkrieg. By COLONEL FREDERICK M. BARROWS F ield Artillery. G. & G,S.S. Military Review.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 30 Apr 2011 00:06

Hello to all :D; the end of it.......................

Streamlining the Offensive.

Source: Streamlining the Offensive. The Evolution of the Panzer Division and its Place in Blitzkrieg. By COLONEL FREDERICK M. BARROWS F ield Artillery. G. & G,S.S. Military Review.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 10 Aug 2020 22:07

Hello to all :D; more.......................

The armored attack is underway.

Source: ILLUSTRIERTER BEOBACHTER 1940 Folge 20 Führerhauptquartier.

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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 29 Nov 2021 19:34

Hello to all :D; more...............

Ernst Volckheim and the early Reichswehr Mobile Force Doctrine.

Little known outside of professional military and historical circles, Volkheim is considered the foremost military academic influence on German tank war proponent, Heinz Guderian, because both Volckheim’s teaching as well as his 1924 professional military articles place him as one of the very earliest theorists of armored warfare and the use of German armored formations including independent tank corps.

The Reichswehr’s infantry training manual of 1921 warned against the infantry laming its offensive spirit by becoming too dependent on armor. These positions were in good part shaped by the tanks’ existing technical limitations. In particular they were considered too slow and too unreliable to play a central role in the fast-paced offensive operations central to Reichswehr tactics. At the same time, German military thinkers and writers, recognized that even with their current shortcomings, tanks had a future. The trailblazer here was Ernst Volckheim. He had been a tank officer during the war, and afterward returned to his parent branch.

In 1923 he was assigned to the Reichswehr’s Inspectorate for Motor Troops. That same year he published an operational history of German tanks, affirming armor’s continuing technological development and its corresponding importance in any future war. “If tanks were not such a promising weapon,” Volckheim dryly asserted, “then certainly the Allies would not have banned them from the Reichswehr!”

Above all, Volckheim argued, tanks were general-service systems, able to engage any objective and move in many different formations. In that way, they resembled the infantry more than any other branch of service. The tanks’ future correspondingly seemed to lie with emphasizing their basic characteristics: speed, reliability, and range. In contrast to a general European predilection for light tanks that focused on improving their mobility, Volckheim saw the future as belonging to a medium-weight vehicle built around its gun rather than its engine. In a future war where both sides had tanks, speed might provide some initial tactical opportunities. The tank with the heaviest gun would nevertheless have the ultimate advantage.

The next year (1924) Volckheim published two more books on tank war. One repeated his insistence that tanks would develop to the point where infantry would be assigned to support them—a hint of the rise of the panzer grenadier that was near-heresy in an army focused on infantry as the dominant combat arm. Volckheim’s second book went even further, projecting the future main battle tank by asserting that technology would eventually produce a family of armored vehicles specially designed for particular purposes. Equipped with radios, exponentially faster, better armed, and with more cross-country ability than anything even on today’s drawing boards, they would in fact be able to operate independently of the traditional arms.

Volckheim was also an officer for the working day. First detached to the Weapons Testing School at Doeberitz, in 1925 he was promoted to First Lieutenant and assigned to teach tank and motorized tactics at the infantry school at Dresden. From 1923 to 1927 he also published two dozen signed articles in the Militär-Wochenblatt, the army’s long-standing semiofficial professional journal. Most of them dealt with tactics of direct infantry support by setting problems and presenting solutions. An interesting subtext of these pieces is the scale of armor Volckheim’s scenarios usually presented: an armor regiment to a division, a battalion supporting a regiment.

Volckheim also addresses the subject of antitank defense—a logical response to the Reichswehr’s force structure—and some of the best were published in pamphlet form. Volckheim recommended camouflage, concealment, and aggressive action on the part of the infantry, combined with the forward positioning of field guns and light mortars to cover the most likely routes of advance. Unusual for the time, Volckheim also recommended keeping tanks in reserve, not merely to spearhead counterattacks but to directly engage enemy armor as a primary mission.

Sources: https://weaponsandwarfare.com/2019/05/0 ... -doctrine/.
https://www.reddit.com/r/Kaiserreich/co ... rs_of_the/
https://www.auctionzip.com/auction-lot/ ... 625422AB73
https://www.warrelics.eu/forum/cloth-he ... 344027-31/

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by tigre » 03 Mar 2022 19:37

Hello to all :D; more.......................

German armored divisions.

At the beginning of the WWII the German armored regiments were mainly equipped with light tanks:

At the beginning of the Polish campaign, the PR 1 consisted of 6 light tank companies with a total of 39 Pz Kw I, 60 Pz Kw II, 20 Pz Kw III, 28 Pz Kw IV and 6 Panzerbefehlswagen.

While PR 2 consisted of two medium and four light companies with a total of 54 Pz Kw I, 62 Pz Kw II, 6 Pz Kw III, 28 Pz Kw IV and 6 Panzerbefehlswagen.

At the beginning of the war, the PR 3 consisted of two detachments with a total of 62 Pz Kw I, 78 Pz Kw II, 3 Pz Kw III, 8 Pz Kw IV and 9 Panzerbefehlswagen.

At the beginning of the Polish campaign the PR 4, consisted of 62 Pz Kw I, 77 Pz Kw II, 3 Pz Kw III, 9 Pz Kw IV and 11 Panzerbefehlswagen.

Source: https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gl ... derung.htm
https://sallyantiques.co.uk/product/exc ... -campaign/

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Employment of the armored division.

Post by Urmel » 27 Jul 2022 09:19

Meanwhile, the motorized antitank guns have been closely following the first echelon, and it is now their mission to take up positions for supporting their own tanks when combat against the enemy’s armoured vehicles is initiated. During the combat between tanks our own artillery is displaced forward.
It's astonishing that stuff like this was written down in Sept. 1940, but still not understood by British commanders in the desert a year later.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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