Remilitarization of the Rhineland

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tigre
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 08 Mar 2020 12:14

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

The French General Staff had appreciated the strength of German army troops in about 10 Army Corps with 24 infantry divisions, a mountain brigade, 2 cavalry divisions and a cavalry brigade plus 3 armored divisions. The number of units was approximately correct, but the supposed number of 520,000 soldiers owned by the German Army was not reached until the fall of the autumn of that year after the creation of other units.

It can be seen that the assumptions of the effective force are based on purely mechanical calculations, without knowledge of the missing units in the divisions. The estimated number of 1,800 tanks was also not realistic, because the actual stock at January 1, 1936 was only 720 of the Pz Kw I type.

Incomprehensibly, the French General Staff also included 30,000 men from the state police, 40,000 men from the garrisoned SS and 200,000 men from the RAD (Reichsarbeitsdienst), which led they to consider an unreal total force of 790,000 men. This would have made the German army twice as strong as the continental French (European) army.

But the state police in the Reich had already been fully integrated into the German army since the fall of 1935, the garrisoned SS were made up of 6,000 men who did not constitute a noteworthy number and the Reich Labor Service (RAD) was a strength without any military training.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 15 Mar 2020 13:02

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

The Wehrmacht was unsure how the French would react to the reoccupation. One author (Shore) claims that AH had learned through the "intelligence service" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the French General Staff would not commit itself. As evidence, he cites a report from the press office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated January 10, 1936, which was based on information from French politicians, whose quality was not unlike that of many others. Neurath, through his press office, knew more about French operational intentions than the French cabinet itself. There were a lot of opinions, assumptions, and rumors with a wide range.

But there was no secure basis for all of them. Had there been one, discussions about the possibility of going to war from the French high command after the reoccupation would have been impossible to determine. And thus, the German political and military leadership was insecure before and throughout the operation, as shown above by AH asking about the possibility of stopping the units.

The French army, at the time of the Rhineland crisis, had in the country more than 20 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, 2 Senegalese divisions, 2 North African divisions, 1 of the so-called white colonial division, the latter with a number of nominally low staff. In all, Inspector General Gamelin had a nominal force of 425,000 in the country. In the first step of mobilization, the 20 active divisions could be increased with the same number of Type A divisions, so that initially 50 divisions would have been available.

After the occupation the OKH estimated that the forces that could have been used against Germany or were available for use were 10 infantry divisions, 1 light mechanized division, 1 and half cavalry divisions, parts of a North African division, plus troops of fortress and at army level with a total of 200,000 men.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 22 Mar 2020 13:00

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

One author (Shore) claims that France, due to its defense concept, was no longer interested in maintaining the demilitarized zone. This is not sustainable. Because potential (German) attacking units had to traverse an area 150-170 km wide, that area offered significant protection, even with a defensive strategy such as that of the French Army.

It is surprising that this fact has not been included in the calculation of French politicians. French reactions during the occupation of the Rhineland clearly show this. Over and over again, French generals pointed out that they could not become aggressive or, more clearly, did not want to.

This was expressed by Marshal Pétain in 1934, the French army was not an offensive army, despite the fact that it (Petain) was foreseen in the mobilization plans of the 1920s as commander-in-chief of a group of armies that would join to the Republic of Czechoslovakia through southern Germany. But the French generals made use of numerous arguments in 1936 using the meaningless numbers of the German forces that were available, so that they did not have an active mode of action when hostilities broke out, but rather to implement their defensive concept.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 29 Mar 2020 14:02

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

On March 8, 1936, at a meeting of the French General Staff, Gamelin declared that resistance to the reoccupation of the Rhineland meant war and promoted a joint alliance of the signatories of Locarno, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium. But this was far from reality, since Belgium had already declared its neutrality, Great Britain had shown its disinterest since January and as for Italy it was currently engaged in Ethiopia.

After the failed Stresa conference, France must have realized how ineffective such actions would have been. As a first concrete measure of military order, the French GHQ proceeded to reinforce the troops that were deployed on the Maginot Line. Of course this had no effect on the German troops marching in the Rhineland. The question of possible partial mobilization arose at the meeting of the French Council of Ministers after March 7, 1936. The French General Staff was not prepared for this and was therefore unable to make any suggestion to the cabinet.

Although the French ambassador Francois Poincet had accurately informed Paris that the force used by the Germans consisted of 19 infantry battalions and 13 artillery groups, after the reoccupation the French General Staff numbered the German troops, only in Rhineland, of about 295,000 troops, with a total available of 21 or 22 divisions. They counted 30,000 members of the Wehrmacht, 30,000 of the State Police (Landespolizei), 30,000 of the RAD, 150,000 of the SA, 15,000 of the SS and 30,000 of the NSKK.

They thus had a total absurd sum, since neither the RAD nor the party organizations were ready for military intervention due to the lack of training and weapons. Gamelin is supposed to have been informed of this through his Berlin Military Attaché.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 05 Apr 2020 14:26

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

However, Gamelin presented these figures at the meeting of the French Supreme War Council on March 11, 1936 and demanded the mobilization of 1,200,000 men and industrial mobilization, and to be able to act against a power that was really only 36,000 men (together the units of the German army that entered and the state police already deployed in the Rhineland).

Most of these army units had only been organized in 1935, had inadequate training, and therefore had only limited employment. The operational capability of the state police was still below that. It was not as Völker suspected that "despite all the camouflage and deception on the German side, French military intelligence was aware of German military weakness (had to).

Already three weeks before the occupation, the OKH issued new instructions for deployment in case of war from April 1, 1936. As in 1935, this directive continued to show the defensive character of German western planning. As in the previous year, it was planned to deploy three armies (E, C, D) in the west, with the main effort still in the area between the Luxembourg border and the Rhine, because a French offensive was expected there.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Sid Guttridge » 06 Apr 2020 07:30

Hi Tigre,

If Gamelin had had his way, Hitler would quite possibly have been overthrown by his own army as a reckless risk taker (as nearly happened later) and 50 million lives might have been saved!

Cheers,

Sid.

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tigre
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 12 Apr 2020 14:33

Hello to all :D; yes Sid, but at that time the concept of Maginot line was a full. More...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

Again six army commandos (Armeeoberkommando - AOK) would be organized with nine army corps (AK):

Army E (North) with VI. AK and the 3rd Pz Command, plus the 6, 16 and 26 Infantry Divisions.
Army C (Center) with the Sperrverband 2, the 1. Pz, plus the 9, 19 and 34 Infantry Divisions.
Army D (South) with Sperrverband 4, IV. AK with the 13th and 33rd Infantry Divisions; V. AK with the 7th, 15th, and 25th Infantry Divisions; also VII. AK with the 5th Infantry Division and the Mountain Brigade; the 14th Infantry Division as a reserve.

As reserves of the entire western front would be the VI. AK (probably in common IX. AK) with 6? and 17 Infantry Divisions available.

Army G (Southeast) with the 10. Infantry Division and the Border Protection Command (Grenzschutzabschnittskommando) South deployed on the border with Czechoslovakia.

Army B (Northeast) with AK II, III and VIII guarding the border with Poland.

Army F (OKH reserve) with X. AK and 2, 3, 4, 8, 12, 18, 20, 22, 23 and 24 Infantry Divisions and four reserve divisions, which after their training will be available.

The number of units in the 1935 Mobilization Plan that provided for 21 divisions was increased to 29, including those that must be organized after reoccupation, such as the 26, 33 and 34 Infantry Divisions.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

FELICES PASCUAS - HAPPY EASTER - FROHE OSTERN - JOYEUSES PÂQUES - FELIZ PÁSCOA - BUONA PASQUA! :thumbsup:

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