Remilitarization of the Rhineland

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ljadw
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by ljadw » 17 Apr 2015 22:04

Alixanther wrote:
The decision of French defeatism is not Germany's to make. Maybe we don't express the right question: "why France lacked the will to fight"?
France did not lack the willto fight,it lacked the means to fight .

Besides, there was no need to fight for something unimportant .

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Sid Guttridge » 18 Apr 2015 12:19

Hi Alixanther,

You wrote, "Britain historically always inherited the colonial remnants of fallen European empires."

This isn't true. It either conquered terrain off the indigenous population or off previous colonial masters. There was no inheritance "of the colonial remnants of fallen European empires." The UK was not a scavanger of abandoned carcasses. It took its overseas possessions by main force, often by war. However, it acquired no new territory of its own after WWI or WWII, unlike France, which took territory off Germany after WWI and Italy after WWII.

The League of Nations upheld the interests of its members (of which there were dozens, not just the UK) and their LoN mandated territories. Britain and France did not own their LoN mandates as they did their colonies. They administered them on behalf of the League. These mandated territories were inherited after WWII and the demise of the League of Nations by the United Nations, not by Britain or France.

You write, "Britain only gave up colonies and responsibilites when counterproductive." You are absolutely right. This was the pragmatic thing to do. The British population was only about 10% of that of its empire. London's hold was often tenuous and heavily dependent on local acquiescence. If the French, whose metropolitan population was about the same as that of their combined colonies in 1914, couldn't hang on in Indo-China or Algeria by force, what chance had the British in India, with only 1,000 civil servants and about 50,000 British regular amongst 350 million Indians? Of course they got out when the responsibilities began to outweigh the benefits. The French, retrospectively, probably wish they hasd done the same.

I don't see how the Suez Crisis was likely to have put Britain and France in a war against the USSR. In fact they did the USSR a favour, because their move into Egypt gave Moscow cover for its reoccupation of Hungary. It was the USA that was furious and forced the Anglo-French withdrawal, because it undermined Washington's response to the USSR over Hungary.

Cheers,

Sid.

Alixanther
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Alixanther » 18 Apr 2015 20:58

Sid Guttridge wrote: Hi Alixanther,

You wrote, "Britain historically always inherited the colonial remnants of fallen European empires."

This isn't true. It either conquered terrain off the indigenous population or off previous colonial masters. There was no inheritance "of the colonial remnants of fallen European empires." The UK was not a scavanger of abandoned carcasses. It took its overseas possessions by main force, often by war. However, it acquired no new territory of its own after WWI or WWII, unlike France, which took territory off Germany after WWI and Italy after WWII.
Have you ever heard of the war for Spanish succession? The British Empire was pretty much the scavenger. Of course they went to war and pretty much the history of European wars almost always implied the meddling of Britain in a way or another but they could not - and want not - to ratify treaties by brute force. If you want a "predator", that's the Ottoman Empire, or Imperial Russia. But Britain? No, they were more of a scavenger (gaining trophies at the negotiating table after the war than through war itself). They would not have lost U.S. colonies if they were mainly predatory.
How would you call the "letter of marque" approach on the sea, other than a scavenging tactic?
How about African colonies partition with France and other European powers? Did they take them by force? Or by negotiating?
The fact UK did not want to gobble any more European territories after WW1 did not prove anything. They were loaded with more than they could handle already. You said that yourself.
Sid Guttridge wrote:
I don't see how the Suez Crisis was likely to have put Britain and France in a war against the USSR. In fact they did the USSR a favour, because their move into Egypt gave Moscow cover for its reoccupation of Hungary. It was the USA that was furious and forced the Anglo-French withdrawal, because it undermined Washington's response to the USSR over Hungary.

Cheers,

Sid.
Well, of course they did USSR a favour, because USSR was actively pursuing a policy of escalation of the Cold War. That's exactly why US was furious and forced Eden to back down: any such pretext would have been equally good for the Soviets to justify war against Western Europe. And the United States were the main military spender on this matter - dissuading the Soviets of such an attack.

Alixanther
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Alixanther » 18 Apr 2015 21:12

ljadw wrote:
Alixanther wrote:
The decision of French defeatism is not Germany's to make. Maybe we don't express the right question: "why France lacked the will to fight"?
France did not lack the willto fight,it lacked the means to fight .

Besides, there was no need to fight for something unimportant .
You always make me laugh. France had more than enough means to fight. Same as the Soviet First Echelon which surrendered in droves. However they both gave up fighting, because they LACKED THE WILL TO FIGHT.
I share your opinion that fighting against Germany was something unimportant. The whole war was. Everybody should have fought Stalin instead from day 1. It would have lasted less and be less bloody.

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BDV
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by BDV » 18 Apr 2015 23:33

Same as the Soviet First Echelon which surrendered in droves. However they both gave up fighting, because they LACKED THE WILL TO FIGHT.
That "lack of will" inflicted 500 k casualties on the Germans and an additional ~250k on the auxiliaries (i.e. their trained professionals), in 10 weeks. That's with Axis command of the air and with utter imbecility of the Soviet armor doctrine. Some lack!
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

Sid Guttridge
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Sid Guttridge » 20 Apr 2015 11:29

Hi Alixanther,

I don't really understand much of what you write.

What are you proposing that the British "scavenged" or "inherited" during the War of Spanish Succession? If memory serves, in the whole of the 18th Century the only Spanish colony permanently gained by the British was Trinidad (1797), and this was not during the War of Spanish Succession and was conquered by main force.

In fact, as a general rule, Britain conquered far more colonies during wars with other European powers than it retained at the subsequent peaces. It used the return of some colonies to gain recognition of its retention of others. The main victim was France.

You write, "How about African colonies partition with France and other European powers? Did they take them by force? Or by negotiating?" What colonies are you talking about? Are you referring to the Treaty of Berlin? If so, it was a carve up between colonial powers of African lands not yet in the possession of any of them. Scavenging or inheriting them from other colonial powers does not apply. It was the local African population who lost lands, not other European empires.

"Letters of marque" were not about gaining territory. They were about predating on trade.

Cheers,

Sid.

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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by CNE503 » 21 Jul 2015 18:07

I dig up this thread, and especially the following question: does anyone know the units committed to "Winterübung"? It had been buried under a collateral debate about French potential in 1936...

I read that at least parts of Infanterie Regimenter 17 and 38 (19. Infanterie Division), Infanterie Regiment 75 (5. Infanterie Division) and Artillerie Regiment 6 were involved, under the overall command of Generalleutnant Gunther von Kluge (commander of Wehrkreis VI). But if there were 19 infantry battalions and 13 artillery batteries, we are far of the account...

Cheers,

CNE503
"Sicut Aquila" / "Ils s'instruisent pour vaincre" / "par l'exemple, le coeur et la raison" / "Labor Omnia Vincit"

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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by CNE503 » 21 Aug 2015 01:13

I found that the Bavarian Infanterie Regiment 21 of the 17. Infanterie Division contributed to "Winterübung" (staff, I./Infanterie Regiment 21, 13. and 14./Infanterie Regiment 21 in Speyer, III./Infanterie Regiment 21 in Germersheim).
One battalion of the Infanterie Regiment 39 (16. Infanterie Division) led the way into Köln that it reached around noon (Köln-Kalk, the western part of the city).

CNE503
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Sid Guttridge
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Sid Guttridge » 26 Aug 2015 11:53

Hi CNE503,

You have to differentiate between the the units sent over the Rhine up to the French border, which I think was three infantry battalions, and the bulk of the force which remained in those parts of the Rhineland on the river's east bank.

In addition, there were regiments of Landespolizei already in the Rhineland as part of the civil administration which were quickly transferred to the German Army.

It is not widely known, but Germany had plans to defend the Rhine line if the French reacted. If you read Guderian's memoirs he mentions his division being called out of barracks as part of this.

Cheers,

Sid.

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tigre
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 03 Feb 2020 00:28

Hello to all :D; something more..............

Winterübung - March 1936!

The German army, which was still under construction, had to be deployed for the first time. With the introduction of mandatory military service in 1935, the Wehrmacht also made preparations to register recruits in the demilitarized zone. The military replacement delegations in the area inspected until August 31, 1935, recruits from the years of 1914 and 1915. The weapons, equipment and uniforms that were already there had yet to be kept secret. The then Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant Colonel) Jodl pointed this out to the administrations involved in the mobilization preparations with the necessary precaution due to the political situation and specified that "the cover comes before the effect".

Elements of the Kasernierte Landespolizei (quartered State Police) with three inspections of Landespolizei (divisions) in Pforzheim, Düsseldorf and Frankfurt, groups (regiments), detachments (battalions) and centuries (Hundertschaften - companies) were deployed as paramilitary units in the Demilitarized Zone. After 1933 the 28 detachments were organized in infantry, technicians (sappers), signals and motorcyclists (kradeinheiten). Since the spring of 1935, the barracks, airfields and other buildings were restored or constructed according to the need of the troops to come. The French Consul General in Cologne and the French Consul in Düsseldorf regularly reported these actions to the government in Paris.

There was also other information and data in this regard, for example in October 1935 General Gamelin as Inspector General of the French Armed Forces informed the Minister of Defense that a revocation of the status of the Rhineland by Germany could be counted from the autumn 1936. At the beginning of December 1935 the French Military Attaché in Berlin reported on the progress in the demilitarized zone and the eventual cancellation of the Locarno Pact.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 09 Feb 2020 15:31

Hello to all :D; something more..............

Winterübung - March 1936!

Already in January 1936 the OKH had made proposals for the creation of new army units after reoccupation. They had planned the organization of the Staff of the 26. ID in Cologne, the Staff of the 33. ID in Mannheim and the Staff of the 34. ID in Mainz, as well as the transfer of the Staff of the 25. ID to the territory of the Demilitarized Zone. The State Police Inspections (Landespolizeiinspektionen) West, Southwest and South should, after reoccupation, be integrated under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Army (OKH) and von Blomberg in their directives specified that they should organize three Infantry division commands. The construction of barracks and airfields and these organizational considerations show that a large number of OKH and RLM employees participated in the preparation.

Apparently AH had decided to reoccupy it on February 12, 1936. On March 2, 1936, he declared internally that "the commitments made in the Locarno Treaty, in relation to articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles on the demilitarized zone, had expired". However, on March 5, 1936, AH asked the Reich War Ministry about how long would take to stop military movements. This demonstrates the uncertainty of AH regarding the possible reactions of Western powers.

To support the termination of the Locarno Treaty and for propaganda purposes, he offered several proposals at the parliamentary meeting on March 7, all of which were not realistic. He offered France a non-aggression pact and a demilitarized zone on both sides of the border, which would have knocked out the Maginot line. An Air Pact should limit the air forces of the Locarno Pact countries. In view of the weak German Air Force, only the Allies would have to disarm. And finally he declared his will to join the League of Nations immediately, although he had already entrusted Ambassador von Hassell in January that he had no intention of returning to the League of Nations. This point also shows the political amorality of AH.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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tigre
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 16 Feb 2020 18:12

Hello to all :D; more..............

Winterübung - March 1936!

Following directives of the Oberbefelshabers der Whermacht (Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces) on March 7, 1936, troops of the V., VI. and IX. Armeekorps with 19 infantry battalions and 11 artillery groups totaling 22,000 men marched into the Rhineland. This displacement required the support of 90 trains. In the operation the Infantry Regiments 36, 38, 39, 75 and 87 were engaged, which had been organized in the period 1934/35. Similarly, artillery groups - except Artillery Regiments 5 and 7 - were organized in 1934/35. The discrepancy between the disproportionate forces between the two branchs was due to the state police units (Landespolizei) that already existed in the Rhineland, which would be used to increase the infantry, sapper, communications and anti-tank units. Therefore, only artillery units had to be supplied disproportionately.

The French Military Attaché in Berlin, on the other hand, had informed Paris, due to the report received from the French Consul General in Düsseldorf, that a surprising invasion was taking place in which three armored divisions were taking part. In fact, no armored unit took part in the reoccupation of the Rhineland.

The mass of the units was moved to the prepared places on the left bank of the Rhine. Three battalions moved to the cities of Aachen, Trier and Saarbrücken, near the western border. According to Hossbach, the Reich War Minister von Blomberg had lost his nerve in the critical days after the invasion and repeatedly ordered the withdrawal of those battalions, which was denied by AH. Perhaps this was the reason why the German forces were ordered to withdraw before any countermeasures taken by the French. But the OKH had ordered the three advanced battalions to face the eventual case to "stop the advance of the enemy." The deployment and combat instructions for 1935/36 established a defensive attitude with three armies and 13 divisions for the western border. Three of which had to be organized in Rhineland (Infantry Divisions 25., 33. and 34.) with the units that carried out the reoccupation and elements of the state police (Landespolizei).

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)
https://www.you-books.com/storebooks/G/ ... tte/_9.jpg

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by Sid Guttridge » 17 Feb 2020 13:56

Hi Tigre,

You post, "In fact, no armored unit took part in the reoccupation of the Rhineland."

While true, it does not tell the whole story. In fact not only the armoured divisions, but many infantry divisions began low key deployment to the incomplete defences already partly built to the east of the Rhine.

If you read Guderian's memoirs, he describes the deployment of his division at this time: "In the spring of 1936 we were surprised by Hitler's decision to reoccupy the Rhineland. Since the occupation was intended simply as a military gesture, no tank troops were to be em-ployed. It is true that my division was alerted and transferred to the troop training area at Munsingen, but without its Tank Brigade, which remained behind at its normal station in order to avoid unnecessary increase
of tension. After a few weeks we all returned to our peace-time station."

Cheers,

Sid.

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tigre
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 23 Feb 2020 16:11

Hello to all :D; thanks Sid :wink:. More..............

Winterübung - March 1936!

Following the thread, the deployment and combat instructions for 1935/36 established a defensive attitude with three armies and 13 divisions for the western border. The main effort (Schwerpunkt) was in the south with more than half of the forces engaged in the deployment plan according to the following scheme:

Abschnittskommando Nord (AOK E) with the HQ in Hagen and the 16. ID and 26. ID.

Abschnittskommando Mitte (AOK C) with the HQ in Bad Nauheim with the IX. AK and 9. ID, 19. ID and 34. ID.

Abschnittskommando Süd (AOK D) with the HQ in Winnenden and the IV. AK with 13. ID and 33. ID; V. AK with 7. ID, 15. ID and 25. ID; in addition to VII. AK with 5. ID and 17. ID.

As an army reserve, the 14th ID was kept available.

The Luftwaffe was in 1935 in its first phase of organization and had planned at the beginning of the year 1936 to organize the following forces:

7 Kampfgruppen (bomber groups)
1 Sturzkampfgruppe (dive bomber group)
2 Jagdgruppen (fighter groups)
13 Aufklärungsstaffeln (reconnaissance squadrons)
6 Seestaffeln (seaplane squadrons)

The preference of the bombers as an offensive weapon is clearly observed. However, the first-line aircraft of that branch did not comply at all with the requirements of modern air warfare. In a report of the German air conduction it was established that "German air armament, as assumed in the game after 1.4.36, is completely inappropriate."

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/proxy ... 6VyfnKEW-1

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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tigre
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Re: Remilitarization of the Rhineland

Post by tigre » 01 Mar 2020 15:08

Hello to all :D; more...............................

Winterübung - March 1936!

In these unfavorable circumstances the role that the Luftwaffe could play during the reoccupation of the Rhineland were purely symbolic. Following the directives of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht (OKW) two Fighter wings (Jagdgeschwader) were to go to Cologne and Mannheim. Thus aircraft of the Jagdgruppe III./ 134 landed in Cologne and Düsseldorf and machines of the Stuka-gruppe I. / 165 in Frankfurt and Mannheim.

In the month of March 1936 there were only three Fighter groups (Jagdgruppen) in the Luftwaffe and all three had recently been created for that purpose. Therefore it was due to the lack of an additional hunting group, that a Stuka group was moved to Rhineland. These air groups (Fliegergruppen) were "newly organized, not fully trained, insufficiently armed and equipped." The units were equipped with biplanes of type He-50 and He-51.

The troops of both air groups, as well as those of the two anti-aircraft groups and the ground support technical personnel, did not have a significant impact on the total number of troops engaged. According to the data of the Ministry of the Air obtained on March 11, 1936, the airplanes involved were 27 aircrafts in each air group and without having reserve ones. The personnel numbers amounted to 420 men. The two anti-aircraft groups had a total of 24 AA guns with 800 men.

Sources: DER FALL „GRÜN“: 1938 - Krieg gegen die Tschechoslowakei Kindle Ausgabe von Klaus Michaelis (Autor), Rolf Michaelis (Herausgeber)
http://aviarmor.net/aww2/aircraft/germany/he50.htm

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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