No, I questioned a statement by yours that you believed the four liners carried 12,000, by answering that we don't know what they carried. And then gave my own estimate, based upon a number of ranges - the high was apprently about 2,500, then 1,900, and then two probably equal or smaller. I hardly think any of the smaller were carry more?Wargames wrote:You answered a question with a question. That's what Bronsky did. Please don't dissappoint me. If you don't know what the capacity of the other liners were, just say so. You won't dissappoint. I don't know it either.
You guessed. Right?
So did I.
So I already answered the question and was simply asking why with a range of 2,500 and 1,900 you had developed an average of 3,000? So please don't "dissappoint" me either - could yyou answer the question? I've now answered your's twice and have yet to see you answer any of mine in return?
I see, so I missread the post the second time,and correctly remembered that you had stated that the liners could have carried "seven times" their peacetime capacity?Contrary to what you and Bronsky want to believe, I don't edit a post in order to make a "correction" disappear. If you can show it, do so. Otherwise, it's the drugs. The "seven times" is still in the original post with no editing.
Form follows function,Most shipbuilders, particularly Japanese, had a tendency to copy British designs. This would also explain "familiar".
Thank you for clarifying that. They actually varied quite a bit, for instance the "High-Speed Convoy" of 13 October was six fast transports, carrying 4,500 men, a battery of 10cm guns, a battery of 15cm howitzers, a tank company, a battalion of light AA, and ammunition and rations. So roughly 850 men each. The problem though wasn't with the vessels, it was that they had to sail for a day exposed to the Canal, and they had no unloading facilities there, so everything had to be beached. In fact it made little differance if they were transports, DDs, ocean liners, or freighters.I never said the Japanese relied upon anything. I said their TR's tended to carry 1,000 troops as per Guadalcanal and I believe that would be my point.
US Government Printing Office, the technical service volumes are all available and in print, as are the camapign volumes, or you can order them as CD-ROM. They and most official histories are not hard to find and most can be gotten through interlibrary loan very easily if yout local library system doesn't have them.I would have guessed it was out of print (I can't find it at Amazon) but it is fascinating to find someone who has found it and read it. Your dedication to your subject material goes incredibly beyond that of "Joe of average interest". I could hit ten libraries and walk away with 5% of what you know. I say this because what you've accumulated goes unnoticed and, in another 50 years, will probably be gone entirely, IMO. Current history doesn't give a rat's ass what was shipped when, or what weights loading decks were designed for. That someone out there has actually dug this up goes way beyond the expected or even hoped for.
That you had missed that he had already given you the answer?Bronsky answered a question with a question. Guess what that tells me?
Yes, frankly I'm very surprised that you continue to argue on what is so evidently very shaky ground. If you don't know the significance of those points then I'm no longer sure that we can have a fruitful conversation until you fill in some background knowledge.You're surprised? What convoys to Greece? What "rebuilding of 10th Panzer"? You take for granted that this is common knowledge. It isn't. What is common knowledge is that Winston Churchill wrote the history of the Mediterranean war. Getting past that isn't easy.
You really need to discard your fixations and broaden your viewpoint. The effort to transport 10. Panzer would have been slightly greater than SONNENBLUME. Slightly more troops, but pretty much the same amount and types of equipment. But they weren't transported to the Alamein Front and weren't in gact even moved to Tunisia until the end of November. Instead, 164. le., Ramcke, and Folgore went to Alamein. Why?es - the required shipping effort of transferring 10th Panzer to North Africa would have been enormous, considering it would have had to be be done in addition to the already required shipping efforts to supply the Axis troops already there,. And you seem to have the required intelligence to recognize that 10th Panzer wasn't going to be transported by Italian DD's or submarines. For me, the required transport just for trucks, let alone tanks and troops, is greater than the other two combined.
Yes, I just gave you some "1942 definitions." Littorio, like much of the other reinforcements that went over January-March 1942, went while Malta was effectively suppressed and when the Panzerarmee was based at El Agheila, 400 miles from Tripoli. Shipping wasn't the problem, it was sustainement.By 1942 definitions, Rommel had reached , or exceeded, the limits of his Italian supply - but not the limits of his demands. I hardly think that the Folgore Division and Ramke Parachute brigades were all that was "available" as evidenced by the transfer of the Littorio division in March and the Centauro in Septemmber. I would say that "shipping" had reached its max and, if Rommel wanted more, that air transport would have to make up the difference. Hence, the already available and easily transported divisions for the canceled invasion of Malta became the logical choice for reinforcing Rommel, even if their desert warfare abilities were completely unrelated to his needs. If they had an Arctic "snowshow battalion" available designed for submarine transport, Rommel would have received it, complete with dogsleds.
I can only say....huh? How do "credentials" equal accuracy of analysis? And it's gotten the required intelligent response here, a while ago.Toppe's arguments were, indeed, simplistic. His failure to write in chronological order indicates to me an editorial versus factual need. Yet the credentials for the piece (nine contributors) were undisputed and, therefore, in requirement of intelligent response.