Duncan_M wrote: ↑
26 May 2021 14:52
US Army defines doctrine as the "fundamental principles, with supporting tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and. symbols, used for the conduct of operations and as a guide for actions of operating forces, and elements." If in 1943, AFHQ wrote a memo detailing exactly how to execute amphibious operations, that seems to be doctrine.
A "planning appreciation" is not doctrine, since, by definition it is specific to a particular operation, rather than a declaration of fundamental operating principles. The doctrine in question was War Department Basic Field Manual [FM 31-5] Landing Operations On Hostile Shores
, 2 June 1941 and United States Navy Office of Naval Operations, Division of Fleet Training Landing Operations Doctrine
, 1938. In the later, Paragraph 501 states, "Naval gunfire mission.--In amphibious operations, it is the mission of certain naval task groups to replace the landing force artillery in supporting the assaulting troops by fire on shore targets. That is, by delivering fire on enemy personnel, weapons, and other defensive installations, and on critical terrain features which may conceal undiscovered enemy positions, ship batteries enable the landing force first to land, then to advance, hold, or withdraw, with fewer casualties than would otherwise be possible. In some cases, effective naval gunfire may be the critical factor which determines success or failure." Problematically, the Army doctrine, which otherwise closely mirrored the Navy doctrine, does not include such a statement. However, such a statement, emphatically headed as "Necessity for Naval Gunfire Support" does appear in the revised November 1944 edition of FM 31-5, stating "a. In a landing attack, ground must be gained before field artillery can be emplaced to support the assaulting infantry. Two principal means of fire support are air operations and naval gunfire. Aviation will not be sufficient in quantity to meet all support requirements. Naval gunfire, including that from special support craft, is the major source of effective fire support. Need for naval gunfire does not cease when the light artillery is firing, as medium artillery usually is not available until later. b. Naval gunfire may be employed to augment normal artillery support during continued operations ashore if hydrographic conditions, terrain, and enemy sea and air actions permit."
And were Clark and Dawley involved in the planning for the amphibious landing of Husky? They wrote that memo? I'm trying to find out who exactly, immediately after Husky, Hewitt was complaining about. Who was he referring to when describing "the Army"?
HUSKY? Sorry, I thought we were talking AVALANCHE? Anyway, yes, they were in the case of AVALANCHE. It is inconceivable that the army and corps commander involved would be excluded from planning an operation involving the landing of their army and corps. They are specifically named by the Navy in the AVALANCHE Action Report. I haven't looked, but I suspect the same was the case with Patton and Bradley in HUSKY.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018