Guderian's Corps experience in the Polish Campaign

[Art]

From:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

Headquarters 19 Army Corps
Commanding General
Gallingen. 29.9.1939

To the Army Group North with a request to forward to the Commander in Chief of the Army

Experience report

Subordinated to the 19th Army Corps the 3rd tank division of normal composition, 10th tank division taken from the garrison of Bohemia (only one tank regiment), 2nd and 20th infantry divisions (mot.)

A. Organizational issues.

II. Panzer division
1) Reconnaissance battalion (mot) is sufficient if detachments are avoided. To maintain its reconnaissance and combat capabilities tank and rifle brigades must be equipped with their own reconnaissance vehicles.

2.) Tank brigade. Reconnaissance tanks are required for close and combat reconnaissance (Pz-II with a faster track and commander's cupola or panoramic periscope).
Battalions should consist of 4 companies. Stronger companies and platoons, since natural losses lead to significant weakening!
The main requirement is to accelerate procurement of the Pz-IV and the formation of the medium companies as much as possible. They have a very strong actual moral effect. Troops had a special faith in these tanks. Every tank needs a submachine gun for close combat and self-defense. The repair service, organizationally efficient, was severely weakened by a lack of spare parts.
The supply of spare parts is critical for maintaining combat capability. Towing means for Pz-III and Pz-IV (18 ton tractors with a low trailer) are required.
Replenishment of fuel, food (including special food) and replenishment of ammunition were satisfactory. The medical supply was inadequate as there was no armored ambulance.

3.) Rifle brigade. The rifle regiment should be reinforced to 3 battalions. The motorcycle company in the battalion is indispensable and must be retained or formed anew.
Armored reconnaissance units should be organically included in the headquarters from the battalion and above.
Acceleration of the production of armored personnel carriers is urgently required.

4.) Artillery. Artillery requires an armored observation vehicle, a self-propelled gun carriage, 2 anti-tank guns and 6 light machine guns per battery. Communication platoons of regiments and divisions need carbines, light machine guns and hand grenades.
The division needs an organic heavy artillery battalion.

5.) The anti-tank battalion needs a self-propelled gun carriage for at least some of the companies. Experience with 4 2-cm anti-aircraft guns proved effective.

A larger ammunition load for the machine gun is required (3000 rounds).

6.) Signals battalion. Unarmored radios are useless. An armored vehicle is required for the division commander (same for the corps commander).

30W transmitter is too weak. Better armament with machine guns. Radio otherwise prooved itself.
7.) Pioneer Battalion: Satisfactory. Very hard working and brave.

8.) Supply. Organizationally satisfactory. Armament is not sufficient. It is needed to give one field infirmary to each tank division.

II. Infantry division (mot)
9.) Reconnaissance battalion (mot) is too small. The composition should be the same in the tank division.

10.) Infantry: Too large and lacks mobility off road.

11.) Artillery: good, the same for pioneers, signals and anti-tank battalions.

12.) The division lacks tanks. The reorganization of the infantry division (mot) into the tank division is considered necessary, first of all, in order to have an effective strike force.

III. Headquarters of the tank corps.

13.) Corps headquarters in combat consists of:
A) The commander with an escort officer, an adjutant and a radio officer in two armored command vehicles with motorcycle messengers and a 100 watt transmitter. He is far ahead at the focal point of the battle and communicates with the command echelon by radio. It should not be tied to its location.
B) The command echelon (chief of staff with operations and intelligence officers) is located in a settlement that is easy to find, with a central position, from where radio and wire communication is established with the superior, subordinates and neighbors. It is tied to its location.
C) The Quartermaster's office is located far enough away so as not to impede joint work with the command echelon.

14.) The most important means of communication is the radio. Short partial orders and advance orders, also in matters of supply, are the rule.
General orders are sent later.

15.) Sufficient number of liaison officers for assignments (two per division). Items 13-15 apply equally to a panzer division.

16.) Communication planes: 6.

17.) The command of 19 Army Corps improvised in the matter of one shortcoming, namely mobile units. There were no command vehicles and vehicles for rest, there was no dedicated headquarters guard (armored vehicles, anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft guns), insufficient field gendarmerie.

18.) Communication is required with the chief of supply of the corps and division.

19.) Regarding corps units a signals battalion, a reconnaissance battalion (mot.), a strong reconnaissance air squadron, an anti-aircraft battalion, a heavy artillery battalion, 2 corps pioneer battalions and 2 bridge columns and at least one road construction battalion are also needed.

B. Tactical principles of employment.

20.) Generally proved themselves

In particular:
21.) The commander of the mobile troops must be far ahead at the expected focal point of action, otherwise his decisions and orders pass too late along the long march column of motorized forces. The command apparatus must be adapted to this requirement (see Paragraph 13).

22.) Marches were hampered by numerous impassable or destroyed bridges, bad roads, burning settlements. There were cases when 4 divisions were supplied through one bridge (crossing the Narew near Vizna). To overcome the difficulties that arise, it is necessary to keep the pioneers far ahead and maintain a high marching speed (more than 35 km).
There were absolutely no organs for control of the rear areas (local commandants, guard units, construction unit)s. This made it easier for the enemy to interrupt technical and other communications, damage bridges, and create a danger for the movement of messengers and supplies. As a result, losses occurred. The orderly evacuation of prisoners and trophies was impossible. More than 10,000 prisoners were left behind to the Russians, and thousands remained uncaptured.

23.) In battle, there was a lack of interaction between arms, and most of all within the infantry. Heavy infantry weapons were committed too late or not committed at all, their action, as well as the action of artillery, smoke units and tanks, was not capitalized on. Junior commanders (regiments, battalions) often hesitated when deciding to attack. The leadership in the battle of engagement was insufficient.
Target reconnaissance, target recognition on the ground leave much to be desired; this led to wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The training of small units was lacking.
The command posts of junior and middle commanders were often too far behind, so that decisions were made without their personal presence.
The action of the tanks, as a result of clumsy leadership, was too scattered. They must be committed into battle together and at the same time.
Reconnaissance battalions were often unreasonably given a combat mission, or the task of conducting night reconnaissance on the ground occupied by the enemy. The result was unjustified losses. Otherwise, they performed well and provided good information.
Anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft guns were successfully used together with tanks for firing at embrasures during the battle with pillboxes on the Narew near Vizna and near Brest. Artillery also demonstrated good results when firing with individual guns.
Tanks showed themselves brilliantly. Starting from September 2, the fear of tanks was noticeable among hostile troops. The action of tanks was possible even on difficult terrain. However, they could not overcome the vertical stone walls and water-filled ditches near the citadel of Brest. Heavy field howitzers also proved ineffective against them. Heavier calibers are required. The fortress fell as a result of the decline in the morale of the Poles and the flight of their officers under the threat of blocking from the west.
The interaction with the reconnaissance squadron was quite good, but with the bombers it failed. Numerous attacks on own troops.

24) Troops at rest, due to the absence of air threat, showed neglect of camouflage, questionable in other theaters of war. Also, in conduct of the battle, especially in the actions of artillery, with this enemy one could afford a lot.

B) Equipment.
The equipment met my high expectations. The main danger lies in the supply of spare parts, especially tracks for tanks and rubber pads for tractors for artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. If this danger is not immediately eliminated, then one must reckon with the fact that hostilities will immediately begin. Otherwise, 80% combat capability can be maintained for about 14 days. Currently, mobility is about 50% and its lifespan is declining.
Motorcycles suffered a lot. There are no spare parts for BMW in East Prussia.
Separate units, primarily the reconnaissance battalion (mot) urgently need to be replenished with personnel; the embargo on replenishment established in East Prussia must be lifted.

D. Miscellaneous.
As of 24.9 the field post does not work at all.

E. Summary.
In general, motorized formations performed excellently. The actions of the troops and commanders deserve full recognition. Numerous individual feats show that speed and offensive impetus can achieve results that seem impossible. Marching performance was excellent.
The morale of the troops has been raised by success; faith in weapons, especially tanks, among officers and soldiers is great.
Tanks have shown themselves to be blood-saving weapons of great offensive power. The production of the Panzer IV is especially important.
Corps losses (4 divisions) for 1-22.9 were:
650 killed
1345 wounded
241 missing
2236 men in total, which is 3.39% of the total population. The physical condition is excellent.

Signed: Guderian, General of the Tank Troops.

[Ponury]

I wonder how many war crimes they have already committed?

[Westphalia1812]

I wonder how many war crimes they have already committed?

Go find out. Do the research instead of asking silly rhetorical questions...

[Westphalia1812]

From:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

Headquarters 19 Army Corps
Commanding General
Gallingen. 29.9.1939

To the Army Group North with a request to forward to the Commander in Chief of the Army

Experience report

Subordinated to the 19th Army Corps the 3rd tank division of normal composition, 10th tank division taken from the garrison of Bohemia (only one tank regiment), 2nd and 20th infantry divisions (mot.)

A. Organizational issues.

II. Panzer division
1) Reconnaissance battalion (mot) is sufficient if detachments are avoided. To maintain its reconnaissance and combat capabilities tank and rifle brigades must be equipped with their own reconnaissance vehicles.

2.) Tank brigade. Reconnaissance tanks are required for close and combat reconnaissance (Pz-II with a faster track and commander's cupola or panoramic periscope).
Battalions should consist of 4 companies. Stronger companies and platoons, since natural losses lead to significant weakening!
The main requirement is to accelerate procurement of the Pz-IV and the formation of the medium companies as much as possible. They have a very strong actual moral effect. Troops had a special faith in these tanks. Every tank needs a submachine gun for close combat and self-defense. The repair service, organizationally efficient, was severely weakened by a lack of spare parts.
The supply of spare parts is critical for maintaining combat capability. Towing means for Pz-III and Pz-IV (18 ton tractors with a low trailer) are required.
Replenishment of fuel, food (including special food) and replenishment of ammunition were satisfactory. The medical supply was inadequate as there was no armored ambulance.

3.) Rifle brigade. The rifle regiment should be reinforced to 3 battalions. The motorcycle company in the battalion is indispensable and must be retained or formed anew.
Armored reconnaissance units should be organically included in the headquarters from the battalion and above.
Acceleration of the production of armored personnel carriers is urgently required.

4.) Artillery. Artillery requires an armored observation vehicle, a self-propelled gun carriage, 2 anti-tank guns and 6 light machine guns per battery. Communication platoons of regiments and divisions need carbines, light machine guns and hand grenades.
The division needs an organic heavy artillery battalion.

5.) The anti-tank battalion needs a self-propelled gun carriage for at least some of the companies. Experience with 4 2-cm anti-aircraft guns proved effective.

A larger ammunition load for the machine gun is required (3000 rounds).

6.) Signals battalion. Unarmored radios are useless. An armored vehicle is required for the division commander (same for the corps commander).

30W transmitter is too weak. Better armament with machine guns. Radio otherwise prooved itself.
7.) Pioneer Battalion: Satisfactory. Very hard working and brave.

8.) Supply. Organizationally satisfactory. Armament is not sufficient. It is needed to give one field infirmary to each tank division.

II. Infantry division (mot)
9.) Reconnaissance battalion (mot) is too small. The composition should be the same in the tank division.

10.) Infantry: Too large and lacks mobility off road.

11.) Artillery: good, the same for pioneers, signals and anti-tank battalions.

12.) The division lacks tanks. The reorganization of the infantry division (mot) into the tank division is considered necessary, first of all, in order to have an effective strike force.

III. Headquarters of the tank corps.

13.) Corps headquarters in combat consists of:
A) The commander with an escort officer, an adjutant and a radio officer in two armored command vehicles with motorcycle messengers and a 100 watt transmitter. He is far ahead at the focal point of the battle and communicates with the command echelon by radio. It should not be tied to its location.
B) The command echelon (chief of staff with operations and intelligence officers) is located in a settlement that is easy to find, with a central position, from where radio and wire communication is established with the superior, subordinates and neighbors. It is tied to its location.
C) The Quartermaster's office is located far enough away so as not to impede joint work with the command echelon.

14.) The most important means of communication is the radio. Short partial orders and advance orders, also in matters of supply, are the rule.
General orders are sent later.

15.) Sufficient number of liaison officers for assignments (two per division). Items 13-15 apply equally to a panzer division.

16.) Communication planes: 6.

17.) The command of 19 Army Corps improvised in the matter of one shortcoming, namely mobile units. There were no command vehicles and vehicles for rest, there was no dedicated headquarters guard (armored vehicles, anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft guns), insufficient field gendarmerie.

18.) Communication is required with the chief of supply of the corps and division.

19.) Regarding corps units a signals battalion, a reconnaissance battalion (mot.), a strong reconnaissance air squadron, an anti-aircraft battalion, a heavy artillery battalion, 2 corps pioneer battalions and 2 bridge columns and at least one road construction battalion are also needed.

B. Tactical principles of employment.

20.) Generally proved themselves

In particular:
21.) The commander of the mobile troops must be far ahead at the expected focal point of action, otherwise his decisions and orders pass too late along the long march column of motorized forces. The command apparatus must be adapted to this requirement (see Paragraph 13).

22.) Marches were hampered by numerous impassable or destroyed bridges, bad roads, burning settlements. There were cases when 4 divisions were supplied through one bridge (crossing the Narew near Vizna). To overcome the difficulties that arise, it is necessary to keep the pioneers far ahead and maintain a high marching speed (more than 35 km).
There were absolutely no organs for control of the rear areas (local commandants, guard units, construction unit)s. This made it easier for the enemy to interrupt technical and other communications, damage bridges, and create a danger for the movement of messengers and supplies. As a result, losses occurred. The orderly evacuation of prisoners and trophies was impossible. More than 10,000 prisoners were left behind to the Russians, and thousands remained uncaptured.

23.) In battle, there was a lack of interaction between arms, and most of all within the infantry. Heavy infantry weapons were committed too late or not committed at all, their action, as well as the action of artillery, smoke units and tanks, was not capitalized on. Junior commanders (regiments, battalions) often hesitated when deciding to attack. The leadership in the battle of engagement was insufficient.
Target reconnaissance, target recognition on the ground leave much to be desired; this led to wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The training of small units was lacking.
The command posts of junior and middle commanders were often too far behind, so that decisions were made without their personal presence.
The action of the tanks, as a result of clumsy leadership, was too scattered. They must be committed into battle together and at the same time.
Reconnaissance battalions were often unreasonably given a combat mission, or the task of conducting night reconnaissance on the ground occupied by the enemy. The result was unjustified losses. Otherwise, they performed well and provided good information.
Anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft guns were successfully used together with tanks for firing at embrasures during the battle with pillboxes on the Narew near Vizna and near Brest. Artillery also demonstrated good results when firing with individual guns.
Tanks showed themselves brilliantly. Starting from September 2, the fear of tanks was noticeable among hostile troops. The action of tanks was possible even on difficult terrain. However, they could not overcome the vertical stone walls and water-filled ditches near the citadel of Brest. Heavy field howitzers also proved ineffective against them. Heavier calibers are required. The fortress fell as a result of the decline in the morale of the Poles and the flight of their officers under the threat of blocking from the west.
The interaction with the reconnaissance squadron was quite good, but with the bombers it failed. Numerous attacks on own troops.

24) Troops at rest, due to the absence of air threat, showed neglect of camouflage, questionable in other theaters of war. Also, in conduct of the battle, especially in the actions of artillery, with this enemy one could afford a lot.

B) Equipment.
The equipment met my high expectations. The main danger lies in the supply of spare parts, especially tracks for tanks and rubber pads for tractors for artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. If this danger is not immediately eliminated, then one must reckon with the fact that hostilities will immediately begin. Otherwise, 80% combat capability can be maintained for about 14 days. Currently, mobility is about 50% and its lifespan is declining.
Motorcycles suffered a lot. There are no spare parts for BMW in East Prussia.
Separate units, primarily the reconnaissance battalion (mot) urgently need to be replenished with personnel; the embargo on replenishment established in East Prussia must be lifted.

D. Miscellaneous.
As of 24.9 the field post does not work at all.

E. Summary.
In general, motorized formations performed excellently. The actions of the troops and commanders deserve full recognition. Numerous individual feats show that speed and offensive impetus can achieve results that seem impossible. Marching performance was excellent.
The morale of the troops has been raised by success; faith in weapons, especially tanks, among officers and soldiers is great.
Tanks have shown themselves to be blood-saving weapons of great offensive power. The production of the Panzer IV is especially important.
Corps losses (4 divisions) for 1-22.9 were:
650 killed
1345 wounded
241 missing
2236 men in total, which is 3.39% of the total population. The physical condition is excellent.

Signed: Guderian, General of the Tank Troops.

Very interesting, thank you!

[Carl Schwamberger]

A lot of that looks like the recomendtaons made in previous years for the composition of the German armored forces. Lack of time and funding for every item prevented all the recommendations being included in the 1939 panzer waffe

From:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

Headquarters 19 Army Corps
Commanding General
Gallingen. 29.9.1939

To the Army Group North with a request to forward to the Commander in Chief of the Army

Experience report

...

II. Panzer division
1) Reconnaissance battalion (mot) is sufficient if detachments are avoided. To maintain its reconnaissance and combat capabilities tank and rifle brigades must be equipped with their own reconnaissance vehicles.

2.) Tank brigade. Reconnaissance tanks are required for close and combat reconnaissance (Pz-II with a faster track and commander's cupola or panoramic periscope).

This seems to be a perennial problem in all armies. Recommendation Reports seem to raise the issue often. I do recall the MkI & Mk II tanks were distributed to the companies as command vehicles and scouts.

4.) Artillery. Artillery requires an armored observation vehicle, a self-propelled gun carriage, 2 anti-tank guns and 6 light machine guns per battery. Communication platoons of regiments and divisions need carbines, light machine guns and hand grenades.
The division needs an organic heavy artillery battalion.

The French also saw this need pre 1940 and had some prototype artillery armored command vehicles in various stages of construction. Also some prototype armored artillery vehicles. The French, British, and US resolved the same demand for heavier artillery for the armored division by close support from the corps heavy artillery group.

5.) The anti-tank battalion needs a self-propelled gun carriage for at least some of the companies. Experience with 4 2-cm anti-aircraft guns proved effective.

Again the French had SP AT guns under development. & Again IIRC its a recommendation Guderian had made previously when designing the composition of the armored forces.

12.) The division (infantry) lacks tanks. The reorganization of the infantry division (mot) into the tank division is considered necessary, first of all, in order to have an effective strike force.

The French are French criticized for providing groups of independent tank battalions to the support of Infantry Divisions. here Guderian is recommending small tanks groups for infantry support. In later campaigns the British and US armies were generous in providing independent tanks battalions for supporting infantry corps & divisions.

23.) In battle, there was a lack of interaction between arms, and most of all within the infantry. Heavy infantry weapons were committed too late or not committed at all, their action, as well as the action of artillery, smoke units and tanks, was not capitalized on. Junior commanders (regiments, battalions) often hesitated when deciding to attack. The leadership in the battle of engagement was insufficient.
Target reconnaissance, target recognition on the ground leave much to be desired; this led to wasteful expenditure of ammunition. The training of small units was lacking.

That all sounds so familiar. Some how these things are difficult to grasp in training. In my own experience I saw commanders apply actions that degraded specific combined arms training.

[Art]

This seems to be a perennial problem in all armies. Recommendation Reports seem to raise the issue often. I do recall the MkI & Mk II tanks were distributed to the companies as command vehicles and scouts.

Theoretically at that point there were light tank platoons at the regimental and battalion level as a means of reconnaissance. Probably this part means recce tank at the panzer brigade level.

That all sounds so familiar. Some how these things are difficult to grasp in training. In my own experience I saw commanders apply actions that degraded specific combined arms training.

See accoounts in the Guderian's memoirs written in a similar vein.

The French are French criticized for providing groups of independent tank battalions to the support of Infantry Divisions. here Guderian is recommending small tanks groups for infantry support. In later campaigns the British and US armies were generous in providing independent tanks battalions for supporting infantry corps & divisions.

Guderian advocated converting motorized divisions to standard panzer division with a larger striking power. But that seems to be purely his own opinion. Guderian never supported dissipating tanks to support infantry, that was a salient point of his writings in 30s.

[Art]

Several pages above there is a letter from the OKH sent in response to experience reports on 27.10.39 and signed by Halder. The letter said thet experience reports of the four motorized corps raised mostly similar points. Some measures had been already ordered to meet their wishes:

- increase of infantry strength in panzer divisions (one regiment with 3 battalion and a motorcycle battalion in six divisions, 2 regiments of 2 battalions in four divisions).
- motorized infantry divisions reduced to 2 infantry regiments
- a position of the staff officers for traffic control had been introduced to the army HQ and 10 traffic control battalions were being formed
- 2 securtity regiments and 4 guard battalion were being formed to improve security of supply roads
- towing units for evacuation of vehicles were being formed
- tank crews from armed with machine pistols and trains and supply services in mobile divisions with hand weapons adn hand grenades

Other requests from troops were considered reasonable but could not be met at the moment due to a lack of equipment (tank battalions increased to 4 companies, increased numbers of Pz.IV, armored cars given to brigade and regiment HQ, stronger artillery in panzer divisions).

https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6