Zetterling on II. SS-PzK Totalausfälle during CITADEL

[Westphalia1812]

On page 203 (Kindle) of his book Kursk 1943 - A Statistical Analysis, Zetterling lists the Totalausfälle of HGr. Süd during CITADEL for the duration of 5.07-17.07.43. His Source is RH 10/64, p.74. This document gives 33 Totalausfälle for II.SS-PzK. A later document (28.07.43) written by the corps engineer, however, increases this number to 45 total losses for the timeframe 05.07.-18.07.43. It could be that I missed a note somewhere in his book but it seems that he overlooked the latter account. The higher number given in RS 2-2/25 can, of course, be explained by the arrival of late-reports.

For comparison see both documents below:

RH 10/64: https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio ... 5835a5494/

RS 2-2/25: https://invenio.bundesarchiv.de/invenio ... 403a5db63/

[Art]

As far as I know, first found about 15 years ago by a former forum member:
viewtopic.php?p=2192105#p2192105
See also the summary table from this article here:
https://storage.yandexcloud.net/wr4img/458049_i_054.jpg

The second document includes armor sent for repair to Germany in the number of losses, as I can see.

[Westphalia1812]

As far as I know, first found about 15 years ago by a former forum member:
viewtopic.php?p=2192105#p2192105
See also the summary table from this article here:
https://storage.yandexcloud.net/wr4img/458049_i_054.jpg

Thank you very much for the table. I didn't found the report myself The second doc was given as a reference in an article by Roman Töppel.

[Westphalia1812]

The second document includes armor sent for repair to Germany in the number of losses, as I can see.

Well, that sounds like a total loss for the given unit.

[Michael Kenny]

This document gives 33 Totalausfälle for II.SS-PzK. A later document (28.07.43) written by the corps engineer, however, increases this number to 45 total losses for the timeframe 05.07.-18.07.43. It could be that I missed a note somewhere in his book but it seems that he overlooked the latter account. The higher number given in RS 2-2/25 can, of course, be explained by the arrival of late-reports.

The German habit of keeping heavily damaged tanks 'on the books' and those tanks not getting repaired and being written off/cannibalised at a later date will distort the actual number that were total losses.

[Westphalia1812]

This document gives 33 Totalausfälle for II.SS-PzK. A later document (28.07.43) written by the corps engineer, however, increases this number to 45 total losses for the timeframe 05.07.-18.07.43. It could be that I missed a note somewhere in his book but it seems that he overlooked the latter account. The higher number given in RS 2-2/25 can, of course, be explained by the arrival of late-reports.

The German habit of keeping heavily damaged tanks 'on the books' and those tanks not getting repaired and being written off/cannibalised at a later date will distort the actual number that were total losses.

The 'distortion' could have been prevented, however, if Zetterling would have taken into account the latter report.

[Westphalia1812]

Another report (23.07.43) giving 38 total losses for II.SS-PzK. Looks like we have three different reports with accumulating loss stats. Probably one of the better examples for late reporting of AFV casualties...

Edit: Zetterling actually mentions this report on page 205:

Losses of other equipment
Concerning other kinds of equipment it has only been possible to present scattered information. The II SS-Panzer Corps submitted a report on 23 July with detailed information on equipment losses. This report gave losses (including destroyed but not damaged and repairable equipment) as 5 Panzer III, 23 Panzer IV, 3 Tiger, 5 StuG, 2 15cm heavy infantry guns, 2 10.5cm field howitzers, 16 7.5cm PAK 40 (towed), 2 7.5cm PAK (SP),per cent of all machine-guns, 3.5 per cent of all 5cm AT guns, 3 per cent of all motorcycles, 4 per cent of all cars and trucks, 4 per cent of all towing vehicles, 8 per cent of all armoured personnel carriers (SPW). Even though the precautions discussed in Appendix 14 should be observed when using this report on destroyed equipment, a number of interesting conclusions can be drawn from it. The loss of 36 tanks and assault guns is indicated, a figure far below the common estimates on the losses suffered by II SS-Panzer Corps. But also it is interesting to note that 16 towed AT guns of 7.5cm calibre were destroyed. This is testimony to the German practice of pushing the anti-tank guns as far forward as possible. For all other types of equipment the losses were negligible. This is perhaps typical of offensive operations, since the tanks and the infantry thrust forward, with most other weapons supporting from behind. During defensive operations, the situation

[Sean Oliver]

This document gives 33 Totalausfälle for II.SS-PzK. A later document (28.07.43) written by the corps engineer, however, increases this number to 45 total losses for the timeframe 05.07.-18.07.43. It could be that I missed a note somewhere in his book but it seems that he overlooked the latter account. The higher number given in RS 2-2/25 can, of course, be explained by the arrival of late-reports.

The German habit of keeping heavily damaged tanks 'on the books' and those tanks not getting repaired and being written off/cannibalised at a later date will distort the actual number that were total losses.

On the other hand, I've seen quite a few cases after Zitadelle and into late 1943 (from 4th Panzer Army) of AFVs first identified as Totalausfälle by company commanders yet were then examined by a regimental or other more senior officer and determined to be repairable. Any attempt to obtain precise figures regarding AFV losses is unlikely to succeed, and considering they aren't that important anyway, it's been my policy to be satisfied with approximate numbers

Edit: T-313 roll 390 (? I think) from 4th PzArmy has the some of the most thorough German AFV inventory docs that I've seen, and should help clarify Zitadelle tank losses to a considerable degree. But everybody already knew that, right?

[Michael Kenny]

Any attempt to obtain precise figures regarding AFV losses is unlikely to succeed, and considering they aren't that important anyway, it's been my policy to be satisfied with approximate numbers

Given the amount of time and effort dedicated (in print and online) to the 'only 'X' Tigers were total losses' ' version of Kursk I think this subject is very important to a large number of people. You may not agree with them but they can not be ignored.

[Sean Oliver]

Tank losses shouldn't be ignored, but they should be put into perspective. The notion of Kursk as a 'tank battle' causes historians and researchers to focus almost entirely on tank losses, and base their conclusions on them, which is myopic.
The fighting in the summer of 1943 (and most European land battles after 1942 ) was decided largely by the irreplaceable losses of well-trained German infantry, NCOs and officers in Russia from 41-42, without achieving any strategic success. This attrition was pointlessly exacerbated by the mindless frontal assaults on waiting Red Army defences during Zitadelle.
4th Panzer Army's casualties among the grenadier companies were heavy during Zitadelle and did not decrease in the weeks immediately after. July losses among the companies were approx 50% or more, and Rumyantsev in August reduced them again by about half. These were full-strength 100-150 man companies before Zitadelle, but by Sept 1, companies were down to 20-30 men each, and generally remained under 30-60 men until the end of the war.
Replacements were sporadic, piecemeal, and undertrained.
This infantry attrition made it almost impossible to stop Red Army attacks, especially under Hitler's 'All retreats and maneuver are categorically forbidden until I allow it' command philosophy.
I'll stop now, as this is a huge overlooked topic worthy of continuation elsewhere.