German planning concerning the armored counteroffensive in Normandy

[Westphalia1812]

18.06.44

To the Chief of the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief West:

The following are two map studies by the Oberbefehlshaber on the possible conduct of the attack.

The study is sought if present frontal course in Calvados remains generally stable.

As the 1st phase the breakthrough of the XXXXVII Pz.Korps and II. SS. Pz.Korps is planned via Caen-Balleroy road while holding down the enemy north of Caen.

2nd phase: deployment of all Pz Div. with emphasis on Bayeux to divide Army Group Montgomery at the border of 2nd English/1st American Army. Army, then swinging in with mass to the west, with 1st SS. Pz.Korps to the east.

Study II takes into account a possible enemy thrust toward Falaise-Paris. The difficulties of later regrouping (in green) must be accepted here.

Speidel

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

[Mori]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

And that's the whole thing.

Germans could never put up any counterattack because Allied strategy was all about never letting them the opportunity to do so. It wasn't luck by method.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

[Westphalia1812]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

The question remains how they could have done that. Rundstedt, Rommel and even Hausser desperately begged Hitler and the OKW for allowing a flexible defense (more like in Italy or UdSSR) and for evacuating the Caen bridgehead.

[Aida1]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

And that's the whole thing.

Germans could never put up any counterattack because Allied strategy was all about never letting them the opportunity to do so. It wasn't luck by method.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

You really must be kidding. German lines of communication being seriously interdicted by allied air attacks seems to have escaped you. Supplying Normandy was very difficult.
Also clearly not realising that germany lacked enough quality infantry divisions to free the mobile one for operations. There were no miracles for the german army in Normandy. Once the allies got a strong foothold , throwing them back in the sea was impossible.

[Aida1]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

The question remains how they could have done that. Rundstedt, Rommel and even Hausser desperately begged Hitler and the OKW for allowing a flexiible defense (more like in Italy or UdSSR) and for evacuating the Caen bridgehead.

Exactly because one certainly needed to be outside the range of naval guns.

[Michael Kenny]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

Monty was forewarned by ULTRA and he pulled back from Hill 112 to be better prepared for the attack. I remember reading that even when the Germans had called off the attack Monty still expected the main blow. He did not realize he had won. For far too long it was claimed that EPSOM was a 'Monty defeat' and until recent years no one knew how much a disaster it was for the Germans. Still today we have people who refuse to accept the magnitude of the German defeat and how it ended all hope of ejecting the Allies from France.

[Westphalia1812]

It is interesting to note how Kluge, an experienced 'Eastern-front commander', took over OB. West with the arrogant sentiment that the German troops in the West are just morally weak and don't know how to fight but quickly realized that fighting against the Allies means something entirely different than fighting the Soviets...

[Michael Kenny]

Exactly because one certainly needed to be outside the range of naval guns.

Another handy excuse for German failure. For example it is very unlikely Fritz Witt was killed by naval shelling on June 14.

[Mori]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

The question remains how they could have done that. Rundstedt, Rommel and even Hausser desperately begged Hitler and the OKW for allowing a flexiible defense (more like in Italy or UdSSR) and for evacuating the Caen bridgehead.

This is going to a counterfactual, we will be shaky.

Truth may be that there wasn't any way but to hope for an Allied mistake (think of Market-Garden).

How much German general really protested triggers two questions:
1) Couldn't the field generals do anything on their own? Were they just useless pawns?
That's what Rundstedt claimed after the war. But, seriously?

2) How much did they really protest to Hitler?
For example, there is meeting with AH just after the fall of Cherbourg. AH comes to shout on his generals for losing the port. Was that the relevant time to put up requests? Some post-year testimonies say they did, but this is doubtful.
(Same goes with a guy like Model: contrary to his reputation, he never argues against AH).

[Aida1]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

Monty was forewarned by ULTRA and he pulled back from Hill 112 to be better prepared for the attack. I remember reading that even when the Germans had called off the attack Monty still expected the main blow. He did not realize he had won. For far too long it was claimed that EPSOM was a 'Monty defeat' and until recent years no one knew how much a disaster it was for the Germans. Still today we have people who refuse to accept the magnitude of the German defeat and how it ended all hope of ejecting the Allies from France.

Your bias as always. There was never a hoping of ejecting the allies just making them pay a heavy price . No walkover in Normandy for the allies.

[Aida1]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

The question remains how they could have done that. Rundstedt, Rommel and even Hausser desperately begged Hitler and the OKW for allowing a flexiible defense (more like in Italy or UdSSR) and for evacuating the Caen bridgehead.

This is going to a counterfactual, we will be shaky.

Truth may be that there wasn't any way but to hope for an Allied mistake (think of Market-Garden).

How much German general really protested triggers two questions:
1) Couldn't the field generals do anything on their own? Were they just useless pawns?
That's what Rundstedt claimed after the war. But, seriously?

2) How much did they really protest to Hitler?
For example, there is meeting with AH just after the fall of Cherbourg. AH comes to shout on his generals for losing the port. Was that the relevant time to put up requests? Some post-year testimonies say they did, but this is doubtful.
(Same goes with a guy like Model: contrary to his reputation, he never argues against AH).

You must be kidding. Primary sources will tell you otherwise. All quoted in Ose's book which was mentioned before. Rundstedt and Rommels proposals are a matter of record. Not based on testimonies but on contemporary written records.
Model never arguing with Hitler is a good joke too. He was one of the few who could argue with hitler without getting the sack.

[Westphalia1812]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

The question remains how they could have done that. Rundstedt, Rommel and even Hausser desperately begged Hitler and the OKW for allowing a flexiible defense (more like in Italy or UdSSR) and for evacuating the Caen bridgehead.

This is going to a counterfactual, we will be shaky.

Truth may be that there wasn't any way but to hope for an Allied mistake (think of Market-Garden).

How much German general really protested triggers two questions:
1) Couldn't the field generals do anything on their own? Were they just useless pawns?
That's what Rundstedt claimed after the war. But, seriously?

2) How much did they really protest to Hitler?
For example, there is meeting with AH just after the fall of Cherbourg. AH comes to shout on his generals for losing the port. Was that the relevant time to put up requests? Some post-year testimonies say they did, but this is doubtful.
(Same goes with a guy like Model: contrary to his reputation, he never argues against AH).

I am currently on holidays and don't have the source (Entscheidung im Westen 1944) with me . I think the 'protests' we're not really of offensive nature but more like very pessimistic situation assessments.

[Mori]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

And that's the whole thing.

Germans could never put up any counterattack because Allied strategy was all about never letting them the opportunity to do so. It wasn't luck by method.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

You really must be kidding. German lines of communication being seriously interdicted by allied air attacks seems to have escaped you. Supplying Normandy was very difficult.

I am not kidding. I invite you to point how much reinforcements and supplies were delayed because of the interdiction effort. You know, counting hours and days. Allied bombing had an impact but it''s too short an explanation.

However, all German testimomnies readily blamed Allied superiority for their shortcomings. It you are into unit histories and combat reports, you will find that all other the place. But it was also a very convenient way for land forces to blame their defeat on the Luftwaffe. It should therefore be challenged.

[Aida1]

The offensive (or rather the attempt by II.SS.Pz.Kps to reach the baseline for the attack by clearing the British penetration) was defeated by EPSOM in late June.

I am not certain German ever realized this was the way the Allied forced played. What is certain, though, is they never adapted their tactics and operations to unbalance the Allies at any poing during the battle, in spite of much easier lines of communication than cross-channel logistics.

The question remains how they could have done that. Rundstedt, Rommel and even Hausser desperately begged Hitler and the OKW for allowing a flexiible defense (more like in Italy or UdSSR) and for evacuating the Caen bridgehead.

This is going to a counterfactual, we will be shaky.

Truth may be that there wasn't any way but to hope for an Allied mistake (think of Market-Garden).

How much German general really protested triggers two questions:
1) Couldn't the field generals do anything on their own? Were they just useless pawns?
That's what Rundstedt claimed after the war. But, seriously?

2) How much did they really protest to Hitler?
For example, there is meeting with AH just after the fall of Cherbourg. AH comes to shout on his generals for losing the port. Was that the relevant time to put up requests? Some post-year testimonies say they did, but this is doubtful.
(Same goes with a guy like Model: contrary to his reputation, he never argues against AH).

I am currently on holidays and don't have the source(Entscheidung im Westen 1944) with me . I think the 'protests' we're not really of offensive nature more like very pessimistic situation assessments.

True. Very pessimistic indeed.

[Mori]

Model never arguing with Hitler is a good joke too. He was one of the few who could argue with hitler without getting the sack.

You took the bait, thanks.

Good luck finding a single example of Model arguing against Hitler in 1943-45.

And no, I am not "kidding".