Possbilty of Seelöwe and Inertia

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

While a Telephone system in 1940 was a well known and understood technology, it was still
vulnerable to bombing and artillery. A single downed line can cut off a sector, and a hit
on an exchange can leave an entire region out of action. A fellow named Marconi had come
up with a workaround for the use of wires a few years earlier than many armies ended up
exploring to great effect.

As for Pigeons, while it is true that the U.S. Army kept a Signal Pigeon Corps until 1957, that
says a lot more about the U.S. Army than it does about the concept of relying on a BIRD to
carry vital military messages.

Carrier Pigeon.jpg

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Richard Anderson]

Ah, yes, so the trolling continues, now the British military was ignorant of both W/T and R/T. Somehow, I don't think the ignorance was on their part.

[Gooner1]

The Bartholomew Committee Final Report includes this on intercommunication

Wireless

The B.E.F. did not make the best use of wireless. The Germans, on the other hand, appeared to use the wireless to the maximum extent and mostly “in clear”. We had no difficulty in intercepting information but there was so much that it was rarely possible to extract items in time to take action on them. Approval was given in the B.E.F. To break wireless silence on crossing the frontier and our failure to make full use of it was due to:-

(a) lack of training and practice in view of restrictions during the static period;
(b) the ingrained habit of wireless silence during this period;
(c) the fear of D.F.

It is recommended that a greater use of wireless should be made at all times, and that once operations are joined, the maximum use of wireless should be made.
Certain precautions are, however, necessary to counter the enemy's D.F. organization, which is most efficient; these will include the use of remote control, and periodical moves of wireless sets, which should be dug-in, particularly after contact has been made for more than 24 hours and the enemy's
D.F. organization is well established.

I believe much of the restrictions on the use of wireless during the 'Phoney War' came from the French High Command.

Also, In the notes from a D.M.T committee on lessons to be learnt, was this:

General C.C. Malden “The last point is the question of D.F.”
Brigadier Oliver Leese “I would like to say one word about that. It was of enormous value for intercepted German messages; we gained a lot of interesting information which was of great value to us. It was mostly corroborative evidence, but it did give us a great deal of very valuable information.”

[Carl Schwamberger]

I believe much of the restrictions on the use of wireless during the 'Phoney War' came from the French High Command.

Also, In the notes from a D.M.T committee on lessons to be learnt, was this:

General C.C. Malden “The last point is the question of D.F.”
Brigadier Oliver Leese “I would like to say one word about that. It was of enormous value for intercepted German messages; we gained a lot of interesting information which was of great value to us. It was mostly corroborative evidence, but it did give us a great deal of very valuable information.”

The French had a robust signals intel service & seem to have penetrated the low level (Non Enigma) tactical code systems used by the Germans. Plus they were busy building on what the Poles had provided them for penetrating the Enigma system. For those and reasons of boilerplate signals analysis the French made the assumption their radio signals were equally vulnerable and choose to go 'dark' at the strategic and operational level of comm. What the Germans thought of that is not clear to me.

45 years later my own training parallel some of that thinking. Upper levels of operational and strategic comm were tightly restricted and secured. We, used telephone whenever practical for tactical communication & covered the landscape with temporary wire. I don't know what the NKPA other sigintel capability was, but the were very active in infiltrating out radio networks with fake message traffic and other active measures. How much of that was done in WWII I cant say. Tho the anecdotal evidence makes it sound common.

[Richard Anderson]

Ran across this in AIR 20/5202, L.A.A., V.P.'s and Armament. Shows the change from August to October (unstated, but apparently the 1st)

August 1940/October 1940
40mm
Aerodromes
Debden 4/4
Wattisham –/4
Biggin Hill 3/6
Manston 4/4
West Malling 2/4
Croydon –/4
Kenley 4/4
Redhill –/3
Gravesend 4/4
Shorts (Rochester) -/4
Detling -/2
Eastchurch -/2
Hawkinge 4/4
Lympne -/-
North Weald 3/5
Martlesham 4/4
Rochford 2/4
Hornchurch 3/5
Stapleford Abbotts -/2

A.M.E. Staions
Darsham 2/2
Dunkirk 3/3
Rye 3/3
Pevensey 3/3
Bawdsey -/3
Great Bromley -/3
Canewdon 3/3

Industrial and Oil
Crayford -/3
Dartford -/1
Northfleet -/-
Grain 2/2
Chelmsford -/2
Murex -/-
Purfleet -/-
Canvey -/-
Thameshaven -/-
Shellhaven -/-

Naval
Chatham -/-
Chattenden -/-
Sheerness -/4
Landguard -/-
Wrabness -/-
Parkeston Quay -/-
Dover 5/9
Tilbury -/-
Southend Pier -/-

[Richard Anderson]

August 1940/October 1940
AALMG (number of barrels)
Aerodromes
Debden 3/17
Wattisham -/8
Biggin Hill 2/3
Manston 4/4
West Malling 10/10
Croydon 12/8
Kenley 8/10
Redhill -/-
Gravesend 4/-
Shorts (Rochester) -/8
Detling -/12
Eastchurch -/10
Hawkinge 4/4
Lympne -/2
North Weald 12/8
Martlesham 10/11
Rochford 8/12
Hornchurch 7/7
Stapleford Abbotts -/-

A.M.E. Staions
Darsham 7/8
Dunkirk 6/7
Rye 6/11
Pevensey 6/21
Bawdsey -/3
Great Bromley -/11
Canewdon 4/12

Industrial and Oil
Crayford 8/30
Dartford -/20
Northfleet -/16
Grain 4/34
Chelmsford 8/21
Murex 20/20
Purfleet 14/16
Canvey 12/12
Thameshaven 4/-
Shellhaven 8/8

Naval
Chatham -/24
Chattenden -/28
Sheerness -/22
Landguard -/13
Wrabness -/28
Parkeston Quay -/10
Dover 9/16
Tilbury 14/18
Southend Pier -/-

[Richard Anderson]

3" AA

Kenley 2/3
Crayford -/1
Grain -/1
Purfleet 2/2
Canvey -/1
Thameshaven -/3
Shellhaven -/1
Chatham -/3
Landguard -/1

Hispano (20mm)
Shorts -/3
Detling -/2
Crayford -/3
Dartford -/4
Grain -/2
Chatham -/4
Sheerness -/5
Dover -/4

[Richard Anderson]

Southend Pier also had a 2-pdr Pom-Pom and Dover had 4 "AT"?

[EKB]

Hello All ;

While a Telephone system in 1940 was a well known and understood technology, it was still
vulnerable to bombing and artillery. A single downed line can cut off a sector, and a hit
on an exchange can leave an entire region out of action. A fellow named Marconi had come
up with a workaround for the use of wires a few years earlier than many armies ended up
exploring to great effect.

As for Pigeons, while it is true that the U.S. Army kept a Signal Pigeon Corps until 1957, that
says a lot more about the U.S. Army than it does about the concept of relying on a BIRD to
carry vital military messages.

Carrier Pigeon.jpg

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

Considering the amount of ammunition expended to kill each enemy soldier, the success rate of carrier pigeons wasn't too bad. Vacuum tube field radios were not reliable and also suffered from shorter range than a bird.

[Huszar666]

Morning,

Ran across this in AIR 20/5202, L.A.A., V.P.'s and Armament. Shows the change from August to October (unstated, but apparently the 1st)

Thank you, very interesting.
For a few points.
1, Lympe not having any AA save for the the two AA-MGs in October (probably the often mentioned Bofors weren't from the AA-Command)
2, RAF Ramsgate, RAF Swingfield and RAF Friston aren't mentioned at all
3, the RADAR sites at Rye and Pevensey having a nice allocation with 6/6 AA-MG + 3/3 Bofors in August but the stations at Fairlight and Beachy Head aren't mentioned at all.

I assume, the 3" AA are the LAA without predictors.

[Gooner1]

Thank you, very interesting.

3, the RADAR sites at Rye and Pevensey having a nice allocation with 6/6 AA-MG + 3/3 Bofors in August but the stations at Fairlight and Beachy Head aren't mentioned at all.

Yes and climbing to 11 and 21 AALMG at R.D.F. Rye and R.D.F. Pevensey respectively by October.
From 45th Defence Scheme their garrisons would also include (Officers/Other Ranks):
R.D.F. Rye - 2/8 (HD) Bn. Royal Sussex (2/68), 35 Lt. A.A. Bty (-/59)
Pevensey - 2/8 (HD) Bn. R. Sussex (2/71), 136 Bde. A/Tk.Coy. (-/12)
Formidable strongpoints.

In contrast the Chain Home Low stations at Fairlight and Beachy Head were only weakly protected.
C.H.L. Station Fairlight - 2/8 (HD) Bn. R. Sussex (1/50)
C.H.L. Station Beachy Head - 70 (HD) Bn. R Sussex (-/14)